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Abstract 
 
SAVING MORAL REALISM:  AGAINST BLACKBURN’S PROJECTIVISM 
 
by 
 
Paul J. Cummins 
 
Adviser:  Professor Steven M. Cahn 
In the argumentative dialectic between moral realists and non-cognitivist moral antirealists each 
side in the debate is typically thought to enjoy a different prima facie advantage over its rival. 
Moral realism gains plausibility from its truth-conditional semantics because it can explain the 
meaning of moral judgments on the same basis as ordinary propositions. However, many moral 
philosophers doubt moral realism because the theory is committed to the existence of moral 
properties, which are, in J. L. Mackie’s term, “queer.” Moral antirealism denies that these moral 
properties exist, and this is a principal reason why many moral philosophers endorse the theory. 
However, if moral terms like “good”, “immoral”, or “right” do not refer to anything, then the 
meanings of the moral judgments in which they appear cannot be explained with truth-
conditional semantics; moral antirealists who wish to preserve moral practice need to develop a 
semantics that can accommodate it. The general perception of the dialectic is that moral realists 
have the upper hand in semantics, but a disadvantage in metaphysics, and vice versa for moral 
antirealists. This essay challenges this assumption. 
 Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism is one of the principal examples of non-cognitivism, a 
form of moral antirealism that tries to develop an alternative account of moral semantics in 
	   	   	  v	  
which the function of a moral proposition is not to express belief but attitude. Quasi-realism is 
Blackburn’s research program of developing a semantics for moral discourse that is consistent 
with projectivism, the metaphysics of his metaethical theory. After situating Blackburn’s project 
within the history of twentieth century metaethics, this essay reviews Blackburn’s quasi-realist 
semantics and criticizes it. This essay then aims to extend the metaethical dialectic by developing 
and critiquing an account of Blackburn’s projectivism. 
This essay interprets projectivism as an explanation of moral awareness that aims to 
explain the realist phenomenology of that experience when realist explanations of it fail. After 
developing an account of the mechanism of projectivism, this essay argues that a metaethical 
theory feature projectivism as its metaphysical element contrasts negatively with moral realism 
in several ways:  e.g., if it postulates new mental states and more events to account for moral 
awareness, then its ontological economy is less certain; it does not solve a metaphysical problem, 
supervenience, that moral realism cannot; it is incompatible with desirable features of moral 
practice; it undermines Blackburn’s rejection of error theory. This essay then concludes that 
when assessing the dialectic between moral realism and non-cognitivist moral antirealism, it is 
inappropriate to presume a metaphysical advantage for the latter on the basis of the mere denial 
of the existence of moral properties. This suggests that non-cognitivist moral antirealists need to 
supplement their theories with more robust metaphysical research programs. 
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Introduction 
 
I recently ran into a neighbor and his young daughter who were out for a walk. I asked them how 
they were doing, and the little girl, excited, replied that she was very happy because she had 
found twenty dollars on the street. When I asked what she would do with the money, she said she 
would buy candy for her and her sisters. I said to her, “Giving some of your candy to your sisters 
is kind.” 
 This is just one example of making a moral judgment. Some other examples include the 
following. When I read in newspapers about Jerry Sandusky, the former assistant football coach 
at Pennsylvania State University, using his charity to groom children to molest, I thought to 
myself that what he did was bad. I think Victoria Soto, the teacher who threw herself into the line 
of fire trying to save the lives of her students at Sand Hook Elementary School, was a hero. And, 
moreover, the tragedy that occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School is an example of evil in 
the world.1 These are just some examples of moral judgments I have made, and other people 
make their own moral judgments. 
 These examples of moral judgment – that giving to others is kind, that sexual contact 
between children and adults is wrong, that sacrificing one’s life for others is heroic, and that the 
killing of multiple innocent people is evil – are part of a practice, morality. This practice consists 
of moral codes that regulate interaction among the members of social and/or cultural groups by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some readers may be uncomfortable with my use of the word “evil” to describe this tragedy, or 
any person, thing, or event in the world, but I want to make use of it in the examples I discuss in 
this essay. One reason for this is that I think metaethical theories should be able to make sense of 
the argument from evil for the non-existence of God, and I do not think that the metaethical view 
I critique in this work can do this. A second reason for this is that “evil” is a word that seems to 
have a strictly moral use (“sin” might be another example); I find this interesting when 
compared, for example, with “good”, “bad”, “right”, or “wrong” which have moral and non-
moral uses.  
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prescribing or forbidding certain conduct. So, a moral code might require its adherents to care for 
the elderly and it might forbid its adherents to take what belongs to others. It also includes 
ranking the values that are part of the moral code, for example honesty is more important than 
loyalty. Morality also involves deliberation about whether an action is right or wrong; for 
example, some wonder whether it is wrong to intentionally conceive biological-related children 
when there are children without parents who would benefit significantly from being adopted. 
Morality also involves the inculcation of a code and its values among group members, and so it 
will involve praising and censuring group members depending on whether they adhere to the 
moral code. Another part of morality is comparing actions; for example, a subscriber to a moral 
code may compare killing one’s brother to gain his share of an inheritance unfavorably to letting 
him die, when one can prevent it, to gain his share of an inheritance. Similarly, a moral code may 
compare people; so a subscriber to a moral code may favorably compare Mother Theresa to Bill 
Gates, saying, “Mother Theresa is more generous than Bill Gates.” And, of course, morality will 
include assessing actions as morally good or morally bad:  giving to others is kind; sexual 
contact between children and adults is bad.2 Simon Blackburn uses the term “moralize” to refer 
to engaging in the activities that constitute the practice of morality, and I will adopt this term 
(Blackburn-1984, 184).3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In this essay, I will simply use evaluative predicates like “good” or “bad” without appending 
“morally” to the front of them. I assume it will be clear to the reader when I use “good” in a 
moral sense as opposed to in a non-moral sense, e.g., a good argument. 
3 The term “moralize” marks the introduction of the first piece of jargon in this work. Jargon has 
its advantages – as the argot of a specific activity, it allows its practitioners to discuss precise or 
complicated ideas succinctly; however, the use of jargon has the tendency to obfuscate, too. In 
this dissertation I will include definitions with the introduction of jargon, and all appearances of 
jargon terms will appear in bold face type to indicate to the reader that the term is a jargon term 
whose definition can be found in the glossary at the end of this essay. 	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 Moral philosophy is the branch of philosophy that examines the practice of morality, and 
it is subdivided into three traditional areas:  metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. 
Normative ethics is the area of moral philosophy that devises and examines standards for 
distinguishing good actions from bad ones, and applied ethics is the area that examines the 
practical implications these standards have for human conduct. These activities don’t have to be 
mysterious to non-philosophers; non-philosophers engage in arguments about the morality of 
abortion, for example, and they offer reasons for their opinions, and the more thoughtful 
arguments will involve discussions of what makes those reasons valid. Metaethics is the area of 
moral philosophy that analyzes this practice and explains what humans are up to when they 
engage in it; it tries to explain what it is for something to be good, what is the meaning of “bad,” 
or how knowledge of morality is possible. In comparison to normative and applied ethics, 
metaethics is unfamiliar to non-philosophers. 
 It is oversimplifying matters to state it this way, but metaethicists trying to make sense of 
moral practice have traditionally proposed three analyses:  realism, constructivism, and 
antirealism. The moral realism analysis of moral practice claims that the practice is about 
properties that are out in the world, and moral language either accurately or inaccurately 
describes them; the moral antirealism analysis claims that there are no moral properties that are 
out in the world, and moral language does not attempt to describe them; the moral 
constructivism analysis claims that the practice is about a system of rules that all rational 
humans consent to, and moral language either conforms to those rules or it does not. Even 
though metaethics is unfamiliar to non-philosophers, metaethical considerations form the 
backdrop of a common belief, relativism, the view that the sentences of a domain express the 
same propositions in different contexts, but their truth values can legitimately vary across 
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contexts, and within moral practice moral relativism is the view that moral judgments’ truth 
values must not be identical in all contexts. Many non-philosophers claim that the moral code of 
one group is as valid as that of another since there are no moral properties. 
 I do not think this is true; I am a moral realist, and I think whether a moral code is valid 
or not depends on how accurately it reflects the moral properties in the world. One reason that I 
am a moral realist is the Euthyphro problem; I think that it is because giving to others is kind 
that we call it kind, not that giving to others is kind because we call it kind. Some people are 
tempted to a realist or antirealist position about morality because of the practical consequences 
at stake in the debate. For example, Joshua Greene thinks embracing antirealism about morality 
would help people with different values to get along; he suggests that a person who does not 
believe there is a single objective, correct answer to a moral question is more likely to 
compromise on it (Greene, 4-5).  
If it is the case that a moral question does not have a single, objective correct answer, 
several possibilities might still be the case:  there are several correct answers to it, and several 
incorrect answers; all the answers to the question are incorrect; all the answers to the question are 
correct. In the latter two cases, I suspect a person who believes her answer to the moral question 
is as good as any other, will not see any reason why her answer should not win out; in the first 
case, the same situation is probable among the people whose answers are among the correct 
ones. So, while I doubt that embracing moral antirealism will lead to cooperation on thorny 
ethical problems, I agree that something significant is at stake in the realism-antirealism debate 
over morality; but, I suspect that embracing moral realism, appreciating the importance of 
answering moral questions, and humility is more likely to lead to resolution of thorny ethical 
problems. Still, I am not very sure of this; a philosophical consensus on moral realism is not 
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likely to make much impression on non-philosophers, and there is no consensus on thorny ethical 
problems among the partisans of the realist and antirealist camps, respectively. Still, whether 
moral realism or moral antirealism is correct does not depend on the practical benefits of 
embracing either.  
Many moral philosophers criticize moral realism because they are suspicious of its 
metaphysical claim that moral properties are out there in the world; such claims seem 
ontologically extravagant, and, worse, it seems difficult to make the nature of the properties 
understandable.  As J.L. Mackie would put it, moral realism – the view that there are people, 
acts, circumstances that are good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc., and which would be so if 
human beings did not think them so, and moral judgments, thus, may be true or false whether or 
not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances – is metaphysically queer 
(Mackie-1977, 38-42). Moral antirealism – the view that human beings’ experience of people, 
acts, circumstances as good, immoral kind, deceitful, evil, etc. are not the product of features of 
the world that are themselves good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc. independent of human 
beings thinking them so – is attractive to many moral philosophers because they think it is on 
firmer metaphysical footing than moral realism since it denies the existence of these queer 
moral properties. Ordinarily the meaning of a word is explained in terms of the object in the 
world that it refers to, but because moral antirealists deny that there are moral properties in the 
world, they must develop a special explanation of the meanings of the words that feature in 
moral language. Success here has proven to be elusive, but Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism is 
considered a promising version of moral antirealism that meets this challenge.4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Despite my earlier promise to define jargon terms as they arise, I will defer defining quasi-
realism until I begin to discuss Blackburn’s view at length. Impatient readers may refer to the 
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Optimism for the prospects of quasi-realism providing an explanation of the meaning of 
moral language may be warranted or unwarranted. However, I think it is a mistake to emphasize 
the solution to this problem when assessing the merits of moral antirealism. In other realism 
debates about the existence of ordinary physical objects, antirealists have to explain why it 
seems like there are black cats even though there is no such thing.  Once antirealists do this, the 
conflict in those debates strikes me as a common sense account of the world versus a mad 
account of it. I often think the best case for realism is its theoretical alternatives, sort of like the 
best case for not being the Nathan’s Hot Dog Eating Champion is seeing what it involves. For 
example, Berkeley’s subjective idealist solution to the problem of skepticism strikes me as 
absurd.5 Skepticism is the view that there is not sufficient evidence to support a claim of 
knowledge in some domain of inquiry. This characterization, which limits the claims to a 
particular domain, is local skepticism; some skeptics argue that this is the case for all domains 
enquiry – they advocate global skepticism. Yes, skepticism undermines realism about the 
world; I might be under the delusion that there is a computer on the desk before me, and it is not 
too difficult to motivate this worry. However, if I contemplate the antirealist solutions to this 
skeptical worry, they seem worse than the problems that beset realism. I would rather live with 
the problems of realism. And, when it comes to morality, the main antirealist rivals, quasi-
realism included, to moral realism, beggar my belief. Blackburn has touted the metaphysics of 
quasi-realism as one of the theory’s virtues, and I want to subject it to scrutiny in this essay. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
glossary for a definition. In addition, quasi-realism served as an inspiration of other attempts to 
meet this challenge: see Gibbard, and Horgan and Timmons-2006. 
5 Subjective idealism is the view that the only things that exist are minds, and objective reality is 
dependent on the existence of these minds to perceive it to exist; Berkeley’s term for his view 
was immaterialism. 
	   7	  
The form that this scrutiny will take is as follows. In chapter 1 I will briefly outline how 
metaethical inquiry arises; then, I will discuss the realist response to this inquiry and G.E. 
Moore’s argument against a particular version of moral realism. In chapter 2 I will canvass the 
historical antirealist responses to metaethical inquiry in light of Moore’s argument, and then 
discuss some challenges moral antirealism. The aim of the first two chapters is to provide a 
context for Blackburn’s quasi-realism, to provide a comparison and contrast for assessing how 
his theory addresses the questions that motivate metaethics. In chapter 3 I will present and 
critique how Blackburn explains the meanings of the words that feature in moral language in a 
way meant to preserve the features of moralizing, what is commonly thought to be the principle 
problem for moral antirealism, the view that human beings’ experience of people, acts, 
circumstances as good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc. are not the product of features of the 
world that are themselves good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc. independent of human beings 
thinking them so. The main aim there is to show that because quasi-realism does not 
satisfactorily meet this challenge, whatever advantage it has over its realist rivals must rest on its 
metaphysics. Chapter 4 will constitute an original attempt to describe the metaphysics of quasi-
realism, projectivism.6 In chapter 5 I will argue that this metaphysics is not better than moral 
realism at explaining the feature of moral practice in which moral properties supervene on 
natural ones. Finally, in chapter 6 I will argue that this projectivism is not developed on 
respectable naturalistic grounds, which undermines it; and, I will also argue that the 
projectivism and quasi-realism combination does not have the resources to preserve features of 
moralizing, which Blackburn wishes to retain in his metaethics. In my conclusion, I will then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Projectivism is the view that the putative features of a domain do not exist independently of 
human beings experiencing those features, and that instead they are the products of internal 
mental processes that produce an experience that the features exist independently of human 
beings. 
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point out that if projectivism is the metaphysics of Blackburn’s moralizing, Blackburn faces the 
challenge explaining why a projectivist should not be an error theorist, and I will argue that he 
cannot do so without undermining his claim that projectivism is the metaphysics of moralizing.
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Part I Metaethics, History, and Blackburn’s Semantics 
 
Chapter 1 
Metaethics, and Moral Realism 
 
1.1 Making Sense of Morality:  Metaethics 
Suppose that a person is interested in understanding the phenomenon of morality. Mark 
Schroeder proposes that any philosophical inquiry into a phenomenon will be characterized by 
asking “domain-neutral” “core questions” in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, 
and philosophy of mind – these are the questions that a person can ask about all phenomena 
(Schroeder, 4, 9). Since assessing actions as morally good or bad is the basic example of 
moralizing, let’s imagine this person begins by considering moral judgments of the kind 
discussed earlier. The core questions would be as follows: 
Metaphysics:  what are moral judgments about?  
Epistemology:  how do we know about morality? 
Philosophy of Mind:  how do we manage to think about morality? 
Philosophy of Language:  how do we manage to talk about morality (Schroeder-
2012, 4-8)?1 
 
A person investigating morality may notice that the practices of morality and description are on 
their face similar in the way they are expressed; moral judgments, like, “Sandusky’s actions are 
bad,” seem quite like ordinary propositions, e.g., “The cat is black.” If so, this person is likely to 
suppose that since ordinary propositions are about reality, moral judgments are about reality, too. 
I share the intuition that moral judgments are about reality; this makes me a moral 
realist. I offer the following as a preliminary definition of moral realism:  the view that there is 
a moral reality (Shafer-Landau-2003, 13). Despite the prima facie plausibility of moral realism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These questions are not exhaustive of the domain-neutral, core questions, but what further, say 
metaphysical questions should be asked will turn on the answer to what moral judgments are 
about. 
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Schroeder suggest that its difficulty in answering the core questions should undermine the 
confidence people have in it (Schroeder, 6). There may be something to this; in “Aberrations of 
the Realism Debate,” Michael Devitt claims that one of the occupational hazards of philosophy 
is being an antirealist about the world.2 Consider the ordinary proposition “The cat is black.” An 
antirealist about the world denies that there is anything that is a cat to be black (if black itself is 
anything at all).3 I suspect that this view tempts many philosophers because it is difficult to 
answer the core questions. And the antirealist hazard is more extensive than just antirealism 
about the world; philosophers can be, and have been, antirealists about theism (the view, 
roughly, that at least one divine being exists), science, numbers, and, of course, morality, this 
essay’s subject (antirealism about morality is, probably, the second most common antirealism 
philosophers believe).4  I take the unifying element among these various antirealisms to be that 
they all deny that an inventory of the world must include the elements of the domain under 
consideration to be accurate. 
Schroeder argues that several variations on a particular form of moral antirealism are 
attractive because they can dodge the core questions by denying that moral judgments are about 
anything, and thus denying there are any questions about how we find out, think, or talk about 
them. Instead these theories can focus on explaining why it is that a person who makes a sincere 
moral judgment is inclined to act on that judgment. I don’t believe this is correct. For one, these 
theories also need to explain why it seems to us that there is the phenomenon of morality that 
initiated this investigation. Moral antirealists will probably have to address some of the core 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I offer the following as a preliminary definition of antirealism:  the view that putative elements 
of a purported domain do not exist. 
3 It certainly seems that to me when I look at the cat that it is black, so an important part of 
antirealism will be explaining why it seems that way to me, even thought it is not that way.	  
4 Anecdotal evidence suggests that antirealism about theism is the most common antirealism 
among philosophers. 
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questions to explain why sincerely holding a moral judgment inclines people to act on that 
judgment. And, if moral judgments are about nothing, then isn’t the appropriate response to 
abandon moralizing, or at least radically revise the practice? If not, then moral antirealists will 
have to address, at least, how we manage to think about and talk about morality, a sophisticated 
practice in which people are remarkably competent. 
Asking the core questions about morality, examining the apparent connection between 
holding a moral judgment and being inclined to act on it, and explaining why there is the 
phenomenon of morality constitute the branch of moral philosophy called metaethics. The major 
debate within metaethics is the one between moral realists and antirealists. 
In order to provide context for Blackburn’s theory, I will do the following in the rest of 
this chapter:  outline two distinct, traditional formulations of moral realism; describe the 
advantages and disadvantages of each; explain G.E. Moore’s argument against moral realism; 
describe Moore’s metaethical theory. Then in the next chapter, I discuss the antirealist response 
to Moore before examining challenges to moral antirealism. What I have proposed to do in the 
next two chapters is, essentially, to review a century’s worth of work in metaethics. The 
constraints of this project preclude a precise analysis of the various positions, so sketches of the 
views will have to suffice to give a sense of the metaethical landscape out of which Blackburn 
develops his quasi-realism. 
1.2 Moral Realism, and its Advantages and Disadvantages 
To begin understand the phenomenon of morality I am beginning with the metaphysical 
question:  What are moral judgments about?5 Earlier I said that a person investigating morality 
might notice that ordinary propositions and moral judgments seem quite alike. With ordinary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This prioritization of the metaphysical question is inspired by Michael Devitt’s approach to 
realism-antirealism debates in Realism and Truth and Putting Metaphysics First. 
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propositions people aim for the proposition to accurately describe the world, i.e., they want to 
state the facts of how things are – they want to get things right. People who moralize also aim to 
get things right, and they engage in arguments to prove their moral judgments are right. If this 
comparison is appropriate, then it seems moral judgments are about moral reality.6 
1.2.1 Characterizing Moral Realism 
Approaching metaethics by focusing on the fact that people aim to get their moral judgments 
right reflects that moral realism is a view committed to there being a moral reality. The realist 
answer to the core metaphysical question, what are moral judgments about, is that they are about 
moral reality, but this does not exhaust the metaphysical questions about morality. Other 
metaphysical questions are:  What constitutes moral reality? What is the nature of moral reality’s 
constituents? The divisions in moral realism arise from how moral realists answer these 
questions.7 
The phenomenon that people are concerned with getting their moral judgments right is 
likely to guide metaethicists in determining what constitutes moral reality. Since it is typically 
facts of the matter that people are concerned to get right with ordinary propositions, then it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In The Moral Problem Michael Smith argues that the central problem for metaethics is 
addressing the tension between two common features of morality and common view about 
human motivation:  1. the objectivity of moral judgments; 2. the practicality of moral judgments; 
3. the Humean theory of motivation which claims that beliefs and desire are distinct 
psychological states, and actions are explainable only through these two states – desires reflect 
how a person wants the world to be, and beliefs tell us how to change the world to make it so 
(Smith-1994). The objectivity of morality reflects our concern to get things right when it comes 
to morality, suggesting that moral judgments express beliefs. The practicality of moral judgment 
reflects that people who have sincere moral judgments are inclined to act on them; this suggests 
that moral judgments express psychological states that are desires or quite like desires. The 
Humean theory says that the psychological state expressed by a moral judgment cannot be both a 
belief and desire. Metaethicists who face the challenge of addressing this tension have to pick 
one of these views as a way into the problem, and none seem to have a priority; I make my way 
into the problem through the apparent objectivity of morality. 
7 Any list of the possible positions is likely to exclude some of the more subtle versions 
because moral philosophers have proposed many different versions of moral realism. 
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probable that it is the moral facts of the matter that people are concerned to get right with moral 
judgments. If this is so, then moral realists will believe that moral reality is constituted by moral 
facts.8 
So far, the commitment to the existence of moral facts or moral properties distinguishes 
moral realism, but the distinctions between different versions of moral realism lie in the nature 
of these facts or properties. Some moral philosophers appear to be moral realists because they 
agree that there is a moral reality constituted by moral facts, but they explain that these facts are 
constructed from an idealized standpoint. These theories are not examples of moral realism 
because in the absence of the idealized standpoint there would be no moral facts to constitute 
moral reality. So far, moral realism is a strictly ontological thesis characterized by endorsement 
of two claims:  (1) the existence of moral facts or properties; (2) their existence is independent of 
humans thinking about them.9 Moral realism is committed to the mind-independent existence of 
moral facts or properties.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In an article defending the prospects of one version of moral realism Michael Devitt suggests 
that explaining moral realism in terms of objective moral facts may be a mistake since such an 
explanation would presumably exclude from the ranks of moral realism those people who have 
qualms about the “ontological status of facts.” Devitt proposes that it would be better to explain 
moral realism in terms of there being objectively good/bad persons or actions (Devitt-2010, 
185). I think there is something to Devitt’s suggestion, but because so much of the discussion is 
couched in terms of facts or properties, I will use these terms, too. 
9 Early on in Ethics:  Inventing Right and Wrong, J.L. Mackie contrasts moral skepticism, what 
Mackie characterizes as the denial of objective values, with moral subjectivism, “the doctrine 
that moral judgments are equivalent to reports of the speaker’s own feelings or attitudes” 
(Mackie, 18). For Mackie, moral skepticism is the rejection of moral realism as outlined 
above. And in characterizing it as the denial of objective values, Mackie indicates that the view 
holds that no mind independent moral fact or property exists. He makes this clear when he says 
that moral skepticism is distinguished by the fact that it is a negative doctrine – the objective 
values people believe exist do not – and an ontological thesis – it is not a thesis about the 
meaning of moral words (Mackie, 17-18). In Moral Realism:  A Defence, Russ Shafer-Landau 
includes subjectivism among the moral theories he labels constructivist – theories that 
acknowledge moral reality, but claim it is the output from some constructive mental activity; see 
for instance Firth, Rawls, Korsgaard, Scanlon (Shafer-Landau, 14). I don’t think Mackie would 
	   14	  
It may be unclear what it is for something to exist mind-independently. Some examples 
of things that exist mind-independently are trees, rocks, or cats. (Of course, some philosophers 
have denied this, some claiming that these things are constructed out of sense data.11) In addition, 
the nature of mind-independent existence is complicated by the existence of things like tools and 
cars; these objects would not exist except for human imagination, ingenuity, and invention – all 
examples of intellectual activity. And, for some normative moral theories like hedonistic 
utilitarianism (the theory that an action is good if and only if it will produce as much net 
happiness as any alternative action), it does seem that the moral facts will depend on human 
intellectual activity, in this case on human happiness. David Brink characterizes mind-
independence as the claim that “there are facts of a certain kind that are metaphysically or 
conceptually independent of the beliefs or propositions which are our evidence that those facts 
obtain” (Brink-1989, 15). To claim that something exists mind-independently, then, is to claim 
that its existence is not dependent on whether there is evidence that it exists – its existence is or 
is not the case. There is little evidence that the Loch Ness Monster exists, but the lack of 
evidence for its existence is not the cause of its nonexistence; that the Loch Ness Monster does 
not exist either is the case or it is not the case. The mind-independent existence of an object 
should be understood to mean that if that object was not the object of thought, or whatever 
intellectual activity, the object would continue to be part of the inventory of the world. So, a tree 
has a mind-independent existence because if there were no being observing or thinking about the 
tree, it would continue to exist. And, a moral fact, that an instance of sexual contact between an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
have any difficulty assimilating this characterization of subjectivism into his view since without 
those feelings moral words would have no meaning. 
10 This characterization of moral realism being committed to the existence of moral facts and to 
their mind-independence reflects Devitt’s claim that realism is characterized by these two 
commitments (Devitt-2010, 182).	  
11 See, e.g., Russell-1914, “On Our Knowledge of the External World.” 
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adult and a child is evil, would exist even if the act were not the object of any intellectual 
activity. 
If the claim that mind-independent moral facts or properties exist reflects the core of 
moral realism, then another metaphysical question about morality is, what is the nature of a 
moral fact or property? In Principia Ethica, G.E. Moore distinguishes two theories of ethics, 
naturalistic and metaphysical, which he criticizes; these two theories approximate the traditional 
versions of moral realism (Moore-1903, 91). So far, I have presented moral realism as a 
monolithic theory, but now I will distinguish different versions of the theory by how each 
explains the nature of a moral fact or property. 
1.2.1.1 Naturalistic Moral Realism 
One form of moral realism, naturalistic moral realism is committed to the mind-independent 
existence of moral facts or properties, which are identical to or reducible to natural facts or 
properties. Moore claimed, “‘[N]ature’… is the subject of the natural sciences and psychology,” 
suggesting that natural facts or properties are those studied or established by the natural sciences 
and psychology (Moore-1903, 92).12 In distinguishing the natural from the metaphysical, Moore 
marks the distinction by the former being the object of perception, and the latter not (Moore-
1903, 163). One of Moore’s commentators suggests that a natural property is better understood 
as a causal property (Baldwin, xxii).13 Naturalistic moral realism is best understood as the view 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Brink identifies natural facts or properties as the subjects of the social sciences, too, greatly 
expanding the disciplines we must consult to get a handle on the possible natural facts or 
properties to which the moral ones may be reduced or identified (Brink-1989, 22). 
13 Shafer-Landau questions relying on being causal to distinguish the natural properties from 
those properties that are not because there are putatively natural properties that are not causal; 
the property of being self-identical is an example of a natural property that is not causal (Shafer-
Landau, 58-59). Devitt attempts to capture the connection between natural and causal when he 
claims that moral facts and properties must be able to play a role in causal explanations (Devitt, 
187). 
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that there are mind-independent moral facts or properties that can be identified with or reduced 
to facts or properties that are the studied by or identified via the senses, natural sciences, and 
psychology, and they can play a role in causal explanations. Some historical examples of 
naturalistic moral realism include Aristotle’s virtue ethics and Mill’s hedonistic utilitarianism. 
According to virtue ethics, roughly, an action is good if it springs from a virtue within a person, 
and the virtue is explained as what contributes to human flourishing. According to hedonistic 
utilitarianism, an action is good if and only if it will produce as much net happiness as any 
alternative action. 
1.2.1.2 Metaphysical Moral Realism 
Metaphysical moral realism is harder to define since it is difficult to cache out what makes a 
fact or property metaphysical. The difficulty in defining metaphysical moral realism is 
compounded by Moore’s proposed version of moral realism, which holds that moral properties 
are non-natural sui generis properties and is meant to be an alternative to both versions discussed 
here. Moore characterizes a metaphysical object as one that is not the object of experience and 
exists “in a supersensible real world” (Moore-1903, 90). Later, Moore claims that metaphysical 
objects are investigated by religion, thus contrasting it with natural objects, which are explored 
by the natural sciences (Moore-1903, 163). This suggests that metaphysical moral realism is 
best understood as the view that there are mind-independent moral facts or properties, 
undiscoverable by the senses, that can be identified with or reduced to facts or properties that are 
studied by or identified by religion. This definition does not accurately reflect metaphysical 
moral realism since it is possible to accept the view without holding religious beliefs. A better 
definition is probably the following:  the view that there are mind-independent moral facts or 
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properties, undiscoverable by the senses, that can be identified with or reduced to facts or 
properties that are studied by or identified via non-empirical methods.  
Still, the elusiveness of defining metaphysical moral realism suggests that it is probably 
best understood by considering examples of the theory. Sometimes the metaphysical is thought 
to be the supernatural, so, for example, divine command theory – the view that moral facts or 
properties are identified with or reducible to a divine being’s will – is an example of a 
metaphysical moral theory (Brink-1989, 22).14 The Platonic theory in which the Good is an 
eternal, universal Form, and so the moral facts or properties are identified in terms of 
resemblance to this Form is another example of a metaphysical moral realism. Moore cites 
Spinoza’s moral philosophy as an example of metaphysical ethics; Spinoza thought, roughly, that 
the good consists in a person’s appreciation of how she is a mode of God. Mary Warnock 
suggests that an important result of Moore’s work was its refutation of the metaphysical ethics of 
idealists like F.H. Bradley (M. Warnock, 10). She characterizes Bradley’s view as one that holds 
that the good is best understood as the realization of the self as a will which is above itself (M. 
Warnock, 7).15 
Earlier I suggested that when metaethical investigation begins with the core metaphysical 
question, “What are moral judgments about,” moral realism is an intuitive account of morality. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Some may challenge the inclusion of divine command theory among the examples of 
metaphysical moral realism since it seems quite similar to subjectivism, except that it replaces 
human approval with divine approval, or constructivism, except that morality is constructed out 
of a divine being’s mental activity. If moral realism in general reflects a commitment to the 
existence of moral facts or properties which exist even when they are the object of no intellectual 
activity, then divine command theory may not be realist since if there were no divine being, 
there would be no moral facts or properties. On the other hand, it may be appropriate to include 
divine command theory among the examples of metaphysical moral realism since it is 
connected to a metaphysical system with a divine being at its center, the theory is only plausible 
on the prior acceptance that a supernatural divine being exists. 
15 I will not discuss what a will which is above itself is, but the metaphysical character of it 
comes through enough to serve as an example. 
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Naturalistic moral realism and metaphysical moral realism then are attempts to explain the 
nature of the moral facts or properties that moral judgments are about. Now, I want to consider 
the advantages and disadvantages of both of these versions of moral realism. 
1.2.2 Moral Realism:  the Advantages 
Our attempt to get things right when it comes to morality is a reason to believe that morality is 
about something that is part of the inventory of the world. That moral realism is very easy to 
motivate is a significant advantage for it over other accounts of morality, and it seems to be a 
part of the ordinary package of beliefs about the world. However, moral realism’s answers two 
other core questions – how do we manage to think about morality, and how do we manage to talk 
about morality – are its other advantages. 
1.2.2.1 Moral Realism’s Advantage in Explaining How We Think About Morality 
As I understand it, the question, how do we manage to think about morality, is a question about 
what kind of mental or psychological state a person having a moral thought is in. The similarity 
between our ordinary practice of talking about the world and morality – the effort at getting 
things right – suggests that the mental states in both practices are alike, and because it is 
generally agreed that the kind of mental state a person is in when she is thinking about the cat on 
the mat is a belief, moral realists claim that a moral mental state is a belief.16 In metaethics, the 
view that a moral mental state is a belief is called cognitivism.17 Not all cognitivists are moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 I do not think that moral realists must be committed to the claim that all moral mental states 
are beliefs. It seems plausible that there can be moral mental states that are not beliefs; e.g., a 
wish that wealthy people would do more to relieve poverty may be a moral mental state, even if 
it is not a belief. One marker, then, of moral realism is a commitment that at least some, and 
probably most, moral mental states are beliefs. 
17 I have introduced cognitivism strictly as a thesis about the nature of moral mental states; many 
moral philosophers would take issue with this characterization. As they see it, cognitivists are 
committed to two claims:  (1) the view I have outlined, in which moral mental states are beliefs 
states; (2) moral judgments express propositions which are truth apt, i.e., suitable for being 
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realists. For example, error theorists, like Mackie, agree that moral mental states are beliefs 
about the world, but they claim that these beliefs fail to accurately reflect the world since there 
are no moral facts or properties. Another example of an antirealist theory that is cognitivist is 
moral relativism, the view that the moral status of a person or action is determined by a culture 
or society’s attitude toward it; on this theory moral mental states would be beliefs about what a 
culture or society’s attitudes are, with there being no moral facts or properties independent of 
humans thinking there are. A similar claim can be made about constructivism:  the 
constructivist thinks there are true moral judgments, but their truth is established by facts that 
are dependent on at least one agent’s reflection.18 The persistence of our efforts to get things 
right in morality suggests that moral mental states are beliefs since in ordinary thought it is 
beliefs that people try to get right; that moral realism has a plausible story about how we think 
about morality that comports with the commitment to getting it right is a significant advantage of 
the theory.19  
Particular characteristics of morality support that moral mental states are beliefs. The 
manner in which people express most of their moral mental states is, at least on surface grammar, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
assessed for truth or falsity. See, for example, Van Roojen. I reject this characterization for 
several reasons. First, I think it confuses the core question from philosophy of mind – how do we 
think about morality – with the one from philosophy of language:  how do we talk about 
morality? Second, it seems that it might be possible to develop a view in which moral mental 
states are beliefs about how the world is, but moral judgments are not meant to describe how the 
world is; see, for example, Horgan and Timmons-2006.	  
18 Some philosophers might include subjectivism among the example of cognitivist but 
antirealist theories about morality. They would claim that moral judgments report the speaker’s 
belief about his attitudes. I am doubtful that it should be included for the reasons discussed in the 
previous footnote.	  	  
19 This advantage might weigh even more heavily in favor of moral realism if being a 
cognitivist was a necessary condition for being a moral realist, but a position that (i) endorses 
the existence of mind-independent moral facts and properties, (ii) denies that we have cognitive 
access to them, and (iii) claims that moral mental states are not belief seems possible, if 
implausible.  
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the same as how they express mental states that are indisputably beliefs. For example, the belief 
that Antigone killed her children is expressed with the sentence, “Antigone killed her children,” 
and, a moral mental state that sexually touching children is immoral would be expressed with the 
sentence, “Sexual contact between an adult and child is bad.” People can disagree in ordinary 
practice – one person may believe that O.J. Simpson killed his wife, and another person may 
believe that he did not – and, their having incompatible beliefs is what explains the 
disagreement. People also disagree about morality – one person thinks elective abortion is 
immoral, and another thinks it is moral; a very natural way to explain this is that their conflicting 
moral mental states are beliefs. People that disagree about Simpson’s culpability in his wife’s 
murder often debate each other and they offer evidence in support of their beliefs; people that 
debate the morality of abortion do the same thing, and this suggests that the moral mental states 
are beliefs. Ordinary thought and morality are also alike because it is possible to be uncertain 
whether to accept a belief in each case, and, in turn, withhold acceptance of it. Just as a physicist 
may be unsure whether she ought to believe loop quantum gravity or string theory and can 
remain agnostic about each theory, a person may be unsure whether to believe abortion is moral 
or immoral and sincerely say he is unsure what to believe. Finally, the possibility of doubting 
belief is connected to this; a physicist may come to doubt her belief in loop quantum gravity, 
while a person may come to doubt his belief that abortion is immoral. 
That moral realism is able to account for these features of morality by endorsing a 
cognitivist account of moral mental states is important advantage for it because theories that 
reject cognitivism struggle to account for the same features. Moral theories that reject 
cognitivism, called non-cognitivist, must explain the nature of moral mental states, which they 
typically do by comparing them to mental states that are desires. Non-cognitivists are not 
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committed to moral mental states being desires, but they do believe that whatever they are, they 
are more like desires than beliefs. This contrast is often explained by the notion of direction of 
fit; beliefs are meant to fit to the world, while the world is meant to fit to desires. This way of 
drawing the contrast acknowledges that there is an external world, and humans attempt to get 
their beliefs to match how that world is, while humans have desires and they try to change the 
world to satisfy them. For example, I like to drink a beer when I get home from work in the 
evening, so to get the world to match this desire I buy a six-pack of beer when I do my grocery 
shopping on Sunday mornings. When I am on the subway home from work and I look forward to 
drinking the beer, I may wonder if there is still beer in my refrigerator – did my father and I 
drink the last beers watching the football game? Here I want to make sure my belief – there is 
still a beer in the refrigerator – is accurate, so I ask myself, did I see a beer in the refrigerator 
when I got cream for my coffee that morning? If I think my belief matches up with the world, 
then I do not stop at the market to buy beer on the way home from work. 
Non-cognitivists claim that a moral mental state is supposed to reflect how its subject 
means for the world to be. For now, I will use desires as a model for moral mental states. Say a 
person has the moral mental state reflected by the judgment, “Lying is wrong.” Non-cognitivists 
believe that this reflects that the person has the desire that nobody lie. But, it is difficult to 
explain how another person with the contradictory moral mental state of desiring that people lie 
disagrees with first person. And this desire-like account of moral mental states also has trouble 
explaining how a person can be unsure which moral mental state to accept or can doubt his moral 
mental state; desires are just the sort of things I have, and the idea of doubting that I have a 
desire is strange. 
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1.2.2.2 Moral Realism’s Advantage in Explaining How We Talk About Morality 
Another advantage of moral realism is that it has a fairly uncomplicated answer for the core 
question, how do we manage to talk about morality? Moral realists claim that we manage to talk 
about morality the same way we manage to talk about anything else in ordinary thought because, 
prima facie, language about the world and moral language are the same. Language about the 
world is typically called descriptive language. People can talk of cats because the word, “cat,” 
refers to a cat; and I can tell another person that my cat is black by saying, “My cat is black.” 
The meanings of the words in this sentence are established by being about things in the world. 
This view that the meaning of a sentence is explained in terms of what they are about is called 
descriptivism (Schroeder-2010, 226). Moral realists make the same claim about the meaning of 
the words in my moral judgment, “Giving candy to your sisters is kind;” they are established by 
being about things – in this case an action and a moral property – in the world. 
There are other prima facie similarities between descriptive language and moral 
language. The surface grammar, or syntax, of ordinary sentences and most moral judgments are 
similar:  they both refer to something in the world and predicate a property of that thing. In 
addition, for both descriptive language and moral language, it is possible to compose an 
indefinite number of complex sentences. For example, “My cat is black, and, “My cat is fuzzy,” 
can be conjoined to create the sentence, “My cat is black and fuzzy.” Similarly, my judgment, 
“Giving candy to your sisters is kind,” can be combined with “Giving candy to your sisters 
makes your sisters happy,” to make “Giving candy to your sisters is kind and makes your sisters 
happy.” Schroeder points out that this phenomenon is composition, and any theory of meaning 
must be able to account for it (Schroeder-201, 27). Another similarity between descriptive 
language and moral language is that they both apparently share the same rules of logic:  “If 
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giving candy to your sisters is kind, and giving some of your chocolate to another person is 
giving candy, then giving some of your chocolate to another person is kind,” is as instinctive an 
inference as, “If my cat is black, and my car is the same color as my cat, then my car is black.” 
And, just as a descriptive sentence about a cat is true or false depending on whether it accurately 
describes the world, a moral judgment is likewise true or false. In ordinary descriptive language 
the accepted theory of meaning is truth-conditional semantics – the theory that the meaning of 
a sentence is established on the conditions under which it would be true – and moral realism is 
an attractive theory because it can apparently adopt the same theory to explain how we manage 
to talk about morality (Schroeder-2010, 230). 
The advantages of moral realism are the following:  (1) its commitment to the existence 
of moral facts or properties is consonant with our moral practice of trying to get matters right; (2) 
its cognitivism is consistent with the fact that moral practice has the same features as our 
practice about beliefs – it is usually beliefs that people try to get right, the manner in which 
people express moral mental states is the same as for beliefs, and they can doubt them and 
remain agnostic about them; (3) its descriptivism permits the adoption of a fairly well-
understood theory of meaning, truth-conditional semantics. Despite these features, moral 
realism does face some problems. 
1.2.3 Moral Realism:  the Disadvantages 
Despite the advantages described above which make moral realism a compelling and plausible 
account of morality, the theory does face drawbacks. One pressing difficulty for moral realism 
is answering the epistemological core question about morality, how do we know about morality? 
Most people know that sexual contact between an adult and a child is bad, but it is difficult to 
explain how they know it beyond the explanation that other people told them; the question is 
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really about how human beings come by moral knowledge at all. In addition, there is the 
question of what accounts for our confidence that sexual contact between an adult and a child is 
bad; how can we justify this belief? Metaphysical moral realism and naturalistic moral 
realism will answer these questions in different ways; let’s consider the answers of 
metaphysical moral realism first. 
1.2.3.1 Moral Realism’s Epistemological Disadvantages 
The different versions of metaphysical moral realism may equate moral facts or properties to a 
divine will, resemblance to a universal form, being a mode of a God, or an idealized self. If 
morality is ultimately understood in terms of one these ideas, then the question of how can we 
know about morality is a question about how we can have cognitive access to these kinds of 
things. When knowledge of morality is identical or reducible to knowledge of a divine will is 
probably the easiest of these explanations to account for:  the traditional account is revelation – 
God reveals His will to certain people who disseminate it. While this is a relatively 
straightforward account of how we know about morality, it does raise other epistemological 
issues; e.g., how can a person distinguish genuine revelation from hallucination, or how can she 
determine which prophets are genuine and which are false? The other versions of metaphysical 
moral realism offer accounts of how we know about morality that raise their own problems. On 
the Platonic theory of forms, knowing that an action is moral is recognizing its resemblance to 
the Form of Good, but this is predicated on a prior knowledge of the Form that is innate; 
explaining how people came to possess this innate knowledge is tricky. Moore’s and Warnock’s 
characterizations of Spinoza’s and Bradley’s theories indicate that knowledge of the good is an 
understanding of the true nature of reality that is arrived at through reason. The moral knowledge 
of the latter three theories would be a priori knowledge, but it is matter of significant 
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controversy whether a priori knowledge is possible. However, a significant issue for 
metaphysical moral realism is that these accounts of how we manage to know about morality 
are quite different than the account of how we know about ordinary things. A person knows that 
baseballs are white and red because of her experiences of seeing baseballs. Most ordinary 
knowledge is empirical, but in metaphysical moral realism moral knowledge is not empirical; 
the analogy between ordinary practice and moral practice is supposed to count in favor of moral 
realism, but it breaks down here, which is a disadvantage for metaphysical moral realism. 
 Since naturalistic moral realism claims that moral facts or properties are identical to or 
reducible to natural facts or properties, it seems to have the advantage of claiming that people 
have cognitive access to them through the scientific-empirical way of knowing; but this may 
actually be disadvantageous for naturalistic moral realism because Hume famously objected to 
naturalistic moral realism on the grounds that a person could not detect the viciousness in a 
willful murder just through observation (T 3.1.1.26; SBN 468-469). Naturalistic moral realism 
has not yet met the significant challenge of explaining how people empirically detect these moral 
properties. Whatever the prospects of meeting this challenge, an old criticism of naturalistic 
moral realism is that it may not be able to give an account of how moral judgments are justified. 
Again, it is Hume who raised this problem; he pointed out that it is typical for people to justify 
moral judgments by pointing to natural facts or properties – e.g., giving to others is kind because 
it makes people happy, kicking a dog is wrong because it causes pain; people offer a train of “is” 
statements, and then suddenly introduce an “ought” statement (T 3.1.1.27; SBN 469). Hume’s 
point is that people, like naturalistic moral realists, who make inferences from natural facts or 
properties to moral judgments, must show how the latter follows from the former. If they cannot, 
then naturalistic moral realism lacks an account of how moral judgments can be justified. 
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J. L. Mackie raised an epistemological challenge for these versions of moral realism as 
part of the argument from queerness. Mackie assumed that moral facts or properties, 
metaphysical or natural, are strange kinds of facts or properties because they have a “to-be-
pursuedness” inherent in them, and detections of such strange facts or properties would require 
an unknown epistemic faculty (Mackie, 38, 40).20 
1.2.3.2 Moral Realism’s Metaphysical Disadvantages 
So far, I have made it seem that moral realism’s disadvantages only lie with epistemological 
challenges, but it also faces a metaphysical challenge and a non-core challenge. Naturalistic 
moral realism faces a metaphysical challenge to specify just which natural fact or property is 
the one to which moral properties are identical or reduce; there is no consensus among 
naturalistic moral realists, so it remains an unmet challenge.21 In addition, naturalistic moral 
realism faces another variation on Mackie’s argument from queerness; the “to-be-pursuedness” 
of moral properties makes it unlikely that they are natural properties since none of the natural 
properties discovered, so far, have this quality. Moral realism also faces a problem in explaining 
how our moral judgments track changes in the natural facts or properties; a difference in moral 
judgments about two sets of circumstances is attributed to differences in the natural facts of those 
circumstances. This connection is so deep that within moral practice people think something has 
gone terribly askew when someone judges two situations to be identical in their natural facts or 
properties, but different with respect to their moral properties. Metaphysical moral realism’s 
prospect for explaining this seems to rest on some sort of epiphenomenal connection between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The obvious way for moral realists to avoid this challenge is to deny that moral facts or 
properties have this magnetic quality. However, doing so would come with costs since in moral 
practice, we expect that people who admit, say, that lying is bad, will avoid lying. 
21 The use of the singular of natural fact or property is not intended to claim that only one natural 
fact property could be the reduction base for moral properties; it is possible that moral properties 
reduce to multiple natural facts or properties. I am not offering a position on this issue. 
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moral and natural facts. Naturalistic moral realism seems to require the positing of a necessary 
connection between the natural facts or properties and the moral facts or properties to explain 
this; this relationship is poorly understood. These metaphysical challenges are typically taken to 
be significant disadvantages for moral realism. 
1.2.3.3 Moral Realism’s Non-Core Disadvantage 
One non-core challenge for moral realism is connected to the Humean theory of motivation; this 
theory holds that understanding an action can only be accomplished by identifying a desire that 
motivates the action and a belief about the best means of satisfying the desire. The main issue 
here for moral realists is that on the Humean picture only a desire can serve as the motive for 
action, but it seems that a person who makes the moral judgment, “Giving to others is kind,” is 
motivated to give to others. This suggests that a moral mental state is not a belief, but a desire, or 
something like a desire. If this is right, then moral judgments are not about anything because they 
do not reflect beliefs. So, a final disadvantage of moral realism is that it is at odds with the 
Humean account of motivation, which the majority of philosophers with an opinion on it support 
(Bourget and Chalmers). 
 A comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of moral realism does not decisively 
tip the scale for or against it, but many philosophers have thought that G. E. Moore’s open 
question argument does count decisively against naturalistic and metaphysical moral realism. 
1.3 G.E. Moore’s Open Question Argument 
Moore’s open question argument in Principia Ethica is the epicenter of twentieth century 
attempts to refute moral realism. In the first chapter of the Principia Moore claims that the aim 
of ethical inquiry is to answer the question, “What is good” (Moore-1903, 54)? And, a successful 
answer to this question will specify the property that “good” denotes and which is common to all 
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things called “good” (Moore-1903, 54). Moore contends that the basic question of ethics is what 
is the definition of “good” (Moore-1903, 57)? Moore points out that moral philosophers may 
have identified the properties that belong to all the things that are good, but he argues that it is a 
mistake to think that doing so has defined “good.” Moore argues that ethicists may discover, for 
example, that all actions that are good are also pleasant, but ethicists would make a mistake if 
they thought that from this discovery they could either give a definition of “good” as “pleasant” 
or identify the property of goodness with the property of pleasantness; Moore calls this mistake 
the naturalistic fallacy (Moore-1903, 62). To demonstrate that doing this would involve a fallacy 
Moore sets forth the open question argument.  
 The basic outline of the argument is that “good” either denotes a simple property or a 
complex property or nothing at all, and if it denotes a complex property, then it is possible to 
define it via an analytic proposition that breaks down the complex property into its constituent 
properties; but “good” cannot be defined in this manner because for whatever definition one 
gives of “good” it is always an open question whether this definition denotes the same property 
“good” denotes; and, further because this question is open, “good” must denote something.22 The 
ultimate point is that attempting to give a definition of “good” that reduces it to natural terms 
commits the naturalistic fallacy.23 Because Moore also thinks that attempts to define “good” in 
metaphysical terms will make the same mistake, he ultimately concludes that “good” denotes a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 If a person attempts to define “good” as “Good is what maximizes happiness,” it is possible to 
show this attempt is unsuccessful because it is still possible for a person who has understood the 
meaning of all the words in the definition to ask, “Is what maximizes happiness good?” 
23 The “naturalistic fallacy” actually appears to be a misnomer since it really seems to be a 
specific example of a more general kind of fallacy. Moore claims that ethical theories that 
attempt to define “good” in metaphysical terms, e.g., “approved by God,” or identify good with a 
metaphysical property, e.g., God-approved, are guilty of the same naturalistic fallacy (Moore-
1903, 91).	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simple sui generis non-natural property, and any proposition in which the word “good” features 
is a synthetic proposition.24 
Subsequent commentators have interpreted Moore’s argument as decisively refuting 
naturalistic moral realism; to illustrate this putative effect of the argument, I find it helpful to 
interpret Moore’s open question argument as an experiment which falsifies naturalistic moral 
realism:  if naturalistic moral realism is true, it would be possible to give a definitive 
explanation of moral properties in naturalistic terms, but it is not, so naturalistic moral realism 
must not be true. Recall my friend’s daughter’s act of giving candy to her sisters; it has certain 
natural properties, including among them, increasing the happiness among the sisters, and, at 
least in my opinion, it also has the property being good. Some naturalistic moral realists 
propose that the act’s increasing happiness and its being good are one and the same property, but 
Moore believes this is mistaken — they are distinct properties.25 According to Moore, it is not 
possible to give an explanation of its being good in these naturalistic terms because for any 
explanation of the moral property as some natural property, N, it remains an open question 
whether the moral property is N. The argument proceeds as follows.26 
The argument assumes, for the purpose of reductio, that good and happiness maximizing 
are one and the same property of giving to others. If this is so, Moore argues that “good” and 
“happiness maximizing” are analytically, or a priori, equivalent. However, Moore claims that we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 My presentation of Moore’s open question argument is deeply informed by Stefan Baumrin’s 
analysis, which I discuss in depth in § 2.3.1.2 (Baumrin-1968). And, in comments on this draft 
Baumrin has brought to my attention that an important element in Moore’s analysis of “good” is 
his attempt to prove that synthetic a priori propositions are possible. 
25 This identification of goodness with increasing happiness is offered merely as an example. 
26 The explication of the argument here follows the outlines of Michael Smith’s account of the 
open question argument in his “Moral Realism” as reprinted in Ethics and the A Priori. Moore’s 
argument is typically explained as a rebuttal of definitional naturalistic moral realism (see Miller, 
12), but I think that Smith’s presentation of the argument makes it clear that the open question 
argument can also target attempts to equate moral properties with natural properties.  
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know “good” and “happiness maximizing” are not analytically equivalent since it is an open 
question to ask a competent English speaker, “Giving to others maximizes happiness, but is it 
good?” Asking a competent English speaker, “Giving to others maximizes happiness, but is it 
happiness maximizing,” or “Giving to others is good, but is it good,” can only yield one answer:  
“Yes.” Anyone who answered, “No,” would reveal himself to be an incompetent English speaker 
— these are closed questions. And, it is the fact that these questions are closed that confirms that 
the properties are analytically equivalent.27 However, “Giving to others maximizes happiness, 
but is it good,” is not a closed question; it is an open question since the person who answers, 
“No,” does not reveal himself to be an incompetent English speaker. These considerations 
purport to show that “good” and “happiness maximizing” are not analytically equivalent, and 
they do not identify the same property in the act of giving to others. 
The open question argument appears to make a devastating case against naturalistic 
moral realism.28 Naturalistic moral realists cannot respond to any specific iteration of it by 
claiming that the wrong natural property was identified with good because the open question 
argument can be applied to the identification of any natural property of giving to others with 
being good. Whatever natural property a person may try to identify with good will always be 
subject the open question test; it will always be an open question whether a person or an act with 
that property is also good. Naturalistic moral realism must be false since being good cannot be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Closed questions are questions whose answers are immediately obvious to anyone who 
understands the meaning of the words in the questions. Consider the following examples of 
closed questions:  Jane is vegetarian, but does she eat meat; Sam is a bachelor, but is he an 
unmarried male? Anyone who was unsure of the answer to these would not be a competent 
speaker of English; we know “vegetarian” and “non-meat eater” and “bachelor” and “unmarried 
male” are analytically equivalent because all competent English speakers know the answer to 
these questions right away.	  
28 If the open question argument is a devastating argument against naturalistic moral realism, 
then it also refutes metaphysical moral realism since it will be an open question whether an act 
that has a metaphysical property is also good:  Giving to others is God’s will, but is it good? 
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identical to any natural property, and so there cannot be an explanation of good in naturalistic 
terms. The open question argument as falsifying experiment effectively demonstrates that a 
crucial element of naturalistic moral realism, its prediction that a person or action being good 
can be explained in natural terms, is false.29 
1.4 Moore’s Non-naturalistic Moral Realism 
The twin considerations that “good” cannot be defined in natural terms (or good cannot be 
identified with natural properties) and that “good” cannot be defined in metaphysical terms (or 
good cannot be identified with metaphysical properties) should be evidence that moral realism 
cannot be the correct theory of morality. However, it seems that Moore assumed that moral 
realism must be the correct theory of morality, and he reacted to his open question argument by 
developing a different version of moral realism. Moore claimed that since “good” cannot be 
defined or identified with another property, it must be a sui generis non-natural property, which 
is detected by a special moral intuition. 
 Moore’s non-naturalistic moral realism – the view that the goodness, immorality, 
kindness, deceitfulness, evilness, etc. of people, acts, circumstances cannot be explained in any 
non-moral terms even though such people, acts, circumstances do have sui generis moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 There are multiple responses to Moore’s open question argument, the most promising being 
the Kripke-Putnam line of attack. Moore’s argument turns on the assumption that if two 
properties were identical, then the terms used for them, “good” and “happiness maximizing,” are 
analytically or a priori equivalent. However, the Kripke-Putnam line on natural kind terms posits 
that there may be different terms that refer to the same thing even though this is unknown to the 
users of those terms; the terms refer to something that is necessarily identical to itself, but the 
equivalency will turn out be a synthetic, or a posteriori, discovery. The Kripke-Putnam line on 
natural kind terms makes it possible that a person who knows how to use the term “good” and 
other naturalistic terms might not be aware that they refer to the same property (or properties), 
only discovering this later through empirical investigation. Whether or not the essence of the 
open question argument is sound remains a hotly debated matter in metaethics, but the argument 
does appear to have set the tone for the rest of twentieth century metaethics by putting 
naturalistic and metaphysical moral realism on the back foot. 
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properties independent of human beings thinking they do, and moral judgments, thus, may be 
true or false whether or not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances – 
possesses many of the same advantages and disadvantages as the other moral realisms. 
However, for philosophers who doubt the mind-independent existence of moral facts or 
properties, it is a convenient target; if Moore’s open-question argument is sound, then 
antirealism about morality can be established by refuting non-naturalistic moral realism. 
1.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented moral realism as a prima facie plausible response to 
metaethical inquiry, and then presented Moore’s open-question argument as a significant 
challenge to it. However, Moore’s own theorizing about morality reflects the pull of moral 
realism – it is hard to shake the feeling that there is something about morality that makes it 
independent of human beings. So, while Moore’s open-question argument suggests that 
naturalistic or metaphysical moral realism are not viable moral theories, his own theory raises 
metaphysical worries. In the next chapter, I will explain how moral antirealists argue against 
non-naturalistic moral realism, and then describe some representative antirealist accounts of 
morality. After that, I will present several lines of argument that challenge the prospects of these 
antirealist theories and revive the plausibility of moral realism.
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Chapter 2:  From Moral Realism to Moral Antirealism and Back Again 
 
2.1 Denying Non-naturalistic Moral Realism 
The open question argument’s effect on metaethical debate was profound. It practically ruled out 
naturalistic and metaphysical moral realism as viable metaethical theories for a generation of 
moral philosophers; moral philosophers trying to develop a theory of morality faced the choice 
of pursuing non-naturalistic moral realism – the view that the goodness, immorality, kindness, 
deceitfulness, evilness, etc. of people, acts, circumstances cannot be explained in non-moral 
terms even though such people, acts, circumstances do have sui generis moral properties 
independent of human beings thinks they do, and moral judgments, may be true or false whether 
or not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances – or if they wished to 
maintain their naturalistic bona fides, pursuing an antirealist account of morality. Because many 
moral philosophers did wish to preserve their naturalistic bona fides antirealist theories of 
morality became quite common, if not the norm.1 
 In the rest of section 2.1 I will present A.J. Ayer’s positivist argument against non-
naturalistic moral realism, which putative success motivated antirealist theories of morality. 
After that I will review different early versions of expressivism, which attempt to provide a 
naturalistically respectable antirealist theory of morality. These two tasks occupy the first half 
of this chapter, sections 2.1 and 2.2; in the second half of this chapter, beginning with section 
2.3, I will examine arguments that challenge early versions of expressivism and restore moral 
realism as a viable theory of morality. This chapter essentially reviews a half century of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In “What do philosophers believe?” David Bourget and David Chalmers produce a meta-
analysis of the frequency of positions philosophers hold; according to their study, about 56% of 
philosophers are moral realists, while 28% are antirealists and 16% endorse some other 
position. The results surprised me since, on a personal level, I feel myself to be in the minority in 
defending moral realism. 
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metaethics; that subject could easily comprise its own project, so this chapter cannot capture all 
the nuances of the theories or cover every figure in it, but I discuss it to provide context for 
understanding the philosophical climate in which Blackburn develops his metaethical theory, 
which I explore in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.1.1 Ayer’s Argument against Non-naturalistic Moral Realism  
A.J. Ayer was one of the earliest philosophers following Moore to propose an account of 
morality that rejected the options of naturalistic and non-naturalistic moral realism. Ayer 
probably best exemplifies Russ Shafer-Landau’s claim that the core approach to metaethics in 
the twentieth century models Moore’s argument in which moral philosophy proceeds via 
argument from elimination:  three rival accounts of morality are posited, and two are rejected 
(56). In Language, Truth and Logic Ayer offers arguments against utilitarianism (which stands in 
for any attempt to identify morality with natural properties) and intuitionism – the non-
naturalistic theory, which Moore endorsed, that claims “good” cannot be defined or identified 
with another property, so it must be a sui generis non-natural property, which is detected by a 
special moral intuition. Ayer must have accepted that Moore’s open question argument 
eliminated naturalistic moral realism as an option because the argument Ayer presses against 
utilitarianism is just an application of Moore’s:  “[S]ince it is not self-contradictory to say that 
some pleasant things are not good, or that some bad things are desired, it cannot be the case that 
the sentence ‘x is good’ is equivalent to ‘x is pleasant,’ or to ‘x is desired’” (Ayer, 105).2 Ayer 
relies on Moore’s argument to eliminate naturalistic moral realism – the view that the 
goodness, immorality, kindness, deceitfulness, evilness, etc. of people, act, circumstances can be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Ayer’s reliance on the open question argument is representative of the antirealist camp’s 
attitude towards moral realism – they believe the argument effectively rules out naturalistic 
moral realism. 
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explained in terms of natural properties, identified by the natural sciences or psychology, which 
are causal or detectable by the senses, and moral judgments, thus, may be true or false whether or 
not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances – from consideration, and then 
he relies on assumptions from logical positivism to argue against non-naturalistic moral 
realism. 
 The logical positivists had a criterion for meaningfulness that claimed that a statement 
could be cognitively meaningful only if it was either analytic (true in virtue of the meaning of the 
words contained within it) or empirically verifiable (confirmed by experience or science). And 
Ayer uses this criterion to refute Moore’s intuitionism. 
According to Ayer, the meaning of moral terms is either analytic or empirical. One 
implication of the open question argument is that it is always an open question whether a 
definition of a moral term given in natural terms is accurate, and I already pointed out that Moore 
also admits that attempts to define moral terms in metaphysical terms will also commit the 
naturalistic fallacy. Moore claimed moral property terms are sui generis and cannot be analyzed, 
and Ayer leans on this to establish that the meaning of moral terms cannot be analytic. If moral 
terms are meaningful, as Moore apparently assumes they are, but their meaning is not analytic, 
then their meaning must empirically verifiable. However, Ayer argues that this cannot be 
possible since on Moore’s theory any knowledge of the meaning of moral terms must come via 
intuition. Ayer argues that intuitions cannot be verified since there is no basis for discriminating 
among intuitions that conflict:  “[U]nless it is possible to provide some criterion by which one 
may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a 
proposition’s validity. But in cases of moral judgment, no such criterion can be given” (Ayer, 
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106).3 Ayer uses the open question argument’s refutation of naturalistic moral realism and the 
application of the principles of logical positivism to show that non-naturalistic moral realism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In Foundations of Ethics W.D. Ross refuted Ayer’s claim that moral judgments are 
meaningless. Ross points out, as have I, that Ayer’s argument that moral judgments are 
meaningless turns on the assumption that a judgment is either analytic or empirically verifiable, 
but not synthetic and a priori (Ross-1939, 35). Ross objects that Ayer and his supporters do not 
offer any proof for this claim, but he will press the case against this view anyway. First, Ross 
points out that Ayer claims that the putative synthetic a priori judgment, “A material thing 
cannot be in two places at once,” is not a statement about the nature of things, but one about the 
nature of language; it is a necessary claim only because of how we use the words in the 
statement, but there is no necessary link between words and their meanings – a word could have 
come to have some other meaning. Ross admits this, but says that once people accept what a 
word means there is still the question of whether the things picked out by the words have the 
connections people claim they do (Ross-1939, 35). So, once people settle what they mean by “A 
material thing cannot be in two places at once,” there are still questions if the claim is true, 
necessary, and synthetic (Ross-1939, 36)? 
Second, Ross raises the problem of a statement about an historical event for Ayer’s view 
that if a statement is not analytic then it is an empirical hypothesis about what may be expected 
in the future, about what evidence will verify the statement. To account for the meaning of 
statement about a past event Ayer must hold that they are actually rules for predicting the 
historical experiences that will verify them (Ross-1939, 36). For example, “The New York Mets 
won the World Series in 1986,” is a prediction that anyone who investigates the matter will have 
experiences that will satisfy him that the Mets won in 1986. Ross is incredulous that a statement 
about the past is revised to be a statement about the future, but he considers Ayer’s claim that the 
revision is supposed to avoid the commitment that there is an objective past to which the 
statement corresponds (Ross-1939, 36). Ross points out that if the existence of a past to which a 
statement corresponds is problematic, it must be equally problematic that the meaning of such a 
statement is assumed to correspond to an objective future (Ross-1939, 36). 
Ross’ diagnosis of Ayer and the logical positivists’ mistake is that they identify what a 
statement asserts with what evidence would be grounds for believing the statement is true (Ross-
1939, 36-37). The logical positivists deny that moral judgments can have meaning because it is a 
fact that moral judgments cannot be verified by sensible experience and their commitment that 
the only synthetic judgments that have meaning are those which can be verified, sometimes even 
equating the meaning of a synthetic judgment with its verification (Ross-1939, 37). Ross points 
out that if a statement, “All As are B,” is verified by producing via the senses multiple instances 
of As that are B, then the facts which verify the statement are the ones summed up by the 
statement, which leads to a loose identification of the meaning of the statement with the facts 
verifying it. But Ross points out there still must be some difference between that which is being 
verified, the statement, “All As are B,” and that by which it is verified (Ross-1939, 37). Ross 
points out that sometimes the statement, “All As are B,” is verified by the intermediate 
recognition that As are C which implies B; in a case like this it is clear that the meaning of the 
statement cannot be identical to the way it is verified (Ross-1939, 37). Finally, Ross 
acknowledges that logical positivists do not have to make this mistake, instead they can claim 
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also fails to make sense of moral terms; with all forms of moral realism – and their claims about 
the meaning of moral terms – eliminated, the only position about morality that appears viable is 
some species of antirealism, that view that the putative elements of the domain do not exist, 
which claims moral terms are cognitively meaningless because they do not refer to a property in 
the world.4 
2.2 Early Expressivism:  Emotivism5 
Nearly all philosophers, including Ayer, have since rejected logical positivism, so the argument 
presented here against non-naturalistic moral realism does not hold up. There are other, better 
considerations against non-naturalistic moral realism – its inability to explain the mechanism 
of intuition by which we have knowledge of non-natural moral properties, its inability to account 
for the supervenience of the moral on the natural (Smith-2000a, 193-194) – but Ayer’s 
argument and his subsequent formulation of a non-cognitivist account of morality was 
incredibly influential in establishing a research paradigm for antirealists about value:  provide 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that no statement can have a meaning unless it is analytic or verifiable. The claim, “All 
meaningful statements are either analytic or empirically verifiable,” is obviously not analytic, 
and Ross points out that we can never know by sense experience that a statement has no meaning 
that we cannot verify by sense experience. So, if the theory is true, then the statement of the 
theory cannot be verified, so the statement and the theory are meaningless (Ross-1939, 38). 
4 Shafer-Landau characterizes the procession of Moore’s argument as first postulating three 
possibilities — moral terms have naturalistic meanings, moral terms have sui generis moral 
meanings, or moral terms have no meaning — and, then, dismissing the last without argument, 
using the open question argument to refute the first (56). Ayer believed he established that moral 
terms are meaningless, so he would challenge Moore’s flat dismissal of the possibility that they 
are so. 
5 In an interview Blackburn expresses sympathy for emotivism (Dall´Agnol, 102). Initially, I did 
not put much emphasis at all on this sympathy, but Mark Schroeder’s analysis of the emotivists’ 
common focus on the function of language made me reassess their importance in situating 
Blackburn’s view. Schroeder’s chapter “The Noncognitivist Turn” in Noncogntitivism in Ethics 
influences the discussion of their views in this section. 
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an account of moral practice that is consistent with non-cognitivism, the view that the mental 
states expressed by moral judgments are not beliefs.6 
Ayer points out that rebutting non-naturalistic, intuitionist theories of morality, like 
Moore’s, was an important part of shoring up the logical positivists’ project (Ayer, 106). But he 
then admits that logical positivists are in a difficult position since they have also rejected the 
naturalistic alternative to intuitionism; logical positivists need to give an account of morality 
that is compatible with “radical empiricism” (Ayer, 107).7 Ayer’s view, and others that share its 
central features have come to be called emotivist theories. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Supervenience is the relation by which one level of properties is connected to another level of 
properties in which the second level of properties determines the first level, but the first level is 
not reduced to the second level of properties; the rough idea is that if one level of properties A, 
supervene on another level of properties B, then for any two things that are identical at the level 
of B properties, they are also identical at the level of A properties. In moral philosophy, Hare is 
credited with introducing the term to characterize the relation between moral properties and 
psychological and/or natural properties. However, as early as 1922, Moore had introduced the 
notion of supervenience, but not the term, “supervenience,” to moral philosophy in “The 
Conception of Intrinsic Value”: 
 
[I]f a given thing possess any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not 
only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, 
but also anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, must possess it in 
exactly the same degree. Or to put it in the corresponding negative form:  It is 
impossible that of two exactly similar things one should possess it and the other 
not, or that one should possess it in one degree, and the other in a different one” 
(Moore-1922, 261). 
7 I do not think this is a real difficulty for Ayer and the logical positivists; they could extricate 
themselves from this problem by being eliminativists about morality. This is a point that I will 
return to later in the essay, but I think the real difficulty for Ayer, and Blackburn and other non-
cognitivists, is explaining why if moral properties do not exist as either natural or non-natural 
ones, they still find it necessary to provide an account of moral practice, rather than calling for us 
to abandon it. I grant that it is a matter of intellectual interest to determine what kind of meaning 
moral language can have if it is cognitively meaningless, but it is strange that the interpretations 
that non-cognitivists propose leave moral language as meaningful. 
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2.2.1 Ayer 
According to Ayer, ethical terms are cognitively meaningless because they are “pseudo-
concepts” that do not add any “factual content” to the statements in which they appear (Ayer, 
107). On this view, a moral judgment like, “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” does not 
include any description of the situation over and above the simpler statement, “You stole that 
money” (Ayer, 107). Ayer’s view has been called emotivism, the view that a moral judgment 
expresses a mental state identified as a feeling or emotion rather than a proposition.8 A person 
who utters the moral judgment rather than the simpler statement is not adding a further fact to the 
description of the scenario that the simpler statement offers. Instead, all the moral judgment does 
is express the attitude toward stealing of the person who utters it:  “It is as if I had said ‘You 
stole that money,’ in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special 
exclamation marks” (Ayer, 107). Mark Schroeder explains this idea by contrasting the effect of 
adding “quickly” or “wrongly” to the simple statement, “You stole that money.” To say, “You 
acted quickly in stealing that money,” does add more to the simple statement, it does add a 
further fact to the description of the scenario by describing how the act of stealing was 
accomplished; in contrast, the addition of “wrongly” does not describe how the act of stealing 
was accomplished (Schroeder, 21-22). On Ayer’s view, the addition of “wrongly” to the simple 
statement serves to express the attitude of the utterer to stealing. Schroeder suggests an apt 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In subsection 2.2.4.2 I note that Schroeder points out that it is their emphasis on the function of 
moral language that distinguishes Ayer, Stevenson, Edwards, and Hare’s theories of morality, 
and the various versions of moral antirealism that argue that an essential element in the 
meaning of moral language is its function apart from any descriptive content that is part of its 
meaning are known collectively as expressivism (Schroeder, 34). To use the term “emotivism” 
to refer to the views of Ayer, Stevenson, Edwards, and Hare is something of a misnomer since it 
suggests that their views simply claim that to understand the meaning of moral language all one 
needs to attend to is emotion. I will refer to them and their views as early expressivists and early 
expressivism, and I will only use the terms “emotivist” or “emotivism” when quoting other 
works. 
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comparison is to the function interjections like “heck” (or more profane ones) play in adding 
“meaning” to questions (Schroeder, 22); e.g., in “What the heck do you mean,” the addition of 
“the heck” adds something new to the question, “What do you mean?” It does not add any 
content to the question, but it can convey that the person asking the question is confused, 
annoyed, etc. 
 Blackburn has noted, “Emotivism is sometimes called the ‘boo-hooray’ theory of ethics” 
(Blackburn-1984, 167). He once took advantage of this characterization to use boo (B!) and 
hooray (H!) operators to develop a moral semantics compatible with projectivism, the view that 
the putative features of a domain do not exist independently of human beings experiencing those 
features, and that instead they are the products of internal mental processes that produce an 
experience that the features exist independently of human beings.9 This notion of boo and hooray 
operators can help to further elucidate Ayer’s claim that moral terms do not add any factual 
content to a statement. Here are a couple of simple statements and two statements corresponding 
to moral judgments: 
S1:  Megan gives to her sisters. 
S2:  James takes from his brothers. 
 
 M1:  Megan rightly gives to her sisters. 
 M2:  James wrongly takes from his brother. 
 
On the boo-hooray characterization of Ayer’s expressivism, M1 and M2 obscure the real 
grammar of the propositions they are meant to express by making it appear that some factual 
content has been added to S1 and S2. The boo-hooray version of Ayer’s expressivism claims 
that we would not make the same mistake if we appreciated that M1 and M2 are better 
understood as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See for example Blackburn-1984 and Blackburn-1988b. 
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AE1:  H! |Megan giving to her sisters| 
 AE2:  B! |James taking from his brother|. 
 
Ayer points out that individual moral judgments can be generalized, and this is another way that 
the grammar of moral judgment makes it seem like moral terms add something cognitively 
significant. The generalized versions of M1 and M2 make it appear like a genuine property is 
being predicated of giving and taking: 
M3:  Giving is good. 
M4:  Taking is bad. 
 
However, the boo-hooray version of Ayer’s expressivism claims that there should not be this 
confusion, if M3 and M4 are interpreted as follows: 
AE3:  H! |Giving| 
AE4:  B! |Taking|. 
 
The key insight for an expressivist, someone who thinks that the meaning of moral judgments 
cannot be explained without reference to their function apart from any descriptive content that is 
part of their meaning, like Ayer is that within moral practice the function of moral judgments – 
despite their appearance of representing the world – is to express attitudes toward acts or person; 
as such moral judgments are not descriptions of the way the world is, and so they are not truth 
evaluable.10 
2.2.2 Stevenson 
Ayer’s contemporary Charles Stevenson also advanced an early expressivist account of moral 
language. Ayer makes clear that his theory is not a version of subjectivism because in 
subjectivism moral language describes the attitude of the utterer, while on expressivism moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ayer was careful to distinguish his version of expressivism from subjectivism, the view that 
moral judgments describe their utterers’ attitudes; a significant difference between the two 
theories is that in subjectivism moral judgments can be true or false since they either accurately 
or inaccurately describe the utterers’ attitudes. 
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language does not describe anything, it is a cognitively meaningless expression of attitude. 
Stevenson develops a less extreme position. He claims that subjectivism is mistaken to propose 
that moral language is exhausted by the description of its utterers’ interests (his word for 
attitudes); instead the main purpose of moral language is to influence other people. Moral 
language does not merely describe people’s attitudes to actions, it also intensifies those attitudes 
and recommends that other adopt the same attitudes (Stevenson-1937, 18-19).  
In Ethics and Language Stevenson proposes two patterns of analysis for roughly 
capturing the meaning of moral language. On his first pattern of analysis, a statement like M3 
should be interpreted as follows: 
SE3.1:  I approve of giving, do so as well. 
Stevenson is willing to grant that a moral judgment like M3 is descriptive of the attitude of the 
utterer and also about the action of giving of which the utterer approves (Stevenson-1937, 18). 
However, M3 also has another, more important function; it is meant to influence those who hear 
it to adopt the same attitude of approval to giving. The second pattern of analysis interprets M3 
as follows: 
SE3.2:  Giving has the quality of increasing the happiness of many people. 
(Accompanied by a laudatory emotion.) 
 
Stevenson writes, “‘This is good’ has the meaning of ‘This has qualities or relations X, Y, Z…,’ 
except that good has as well a laudatory emotive meaning that permits it to express the speaker’s 
approval, and tends to evoke the approval of the hearer” (Stevenson-1944, 207). On this second 
pattern of analysis “good” is like a persuasive definition which evokes the association of giving 
to others with increasing happiness, or kindness or whatever else might stand in for the variables 
X, Y, Z. The idea here is that this usage of “good” associates the act of giving to others with 
some description of it, which the utterer approves, and the hearers are supposed to come to 
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approve of giving to others because it has those praiseworthy characteristics.11 Stevenson’s 
version of expressivism augments subjectivism while Ayer’s rejects it. 
2.2.3 Edwards 
In The Logic of Moral Discourse, published in 1955, Paul Edwards independently proposed an 
early version of expressivism, the view that the meaning of moral judgments cannot be 
explained without reference to their function apart from any descriptive content that is part of 
their meaning, which is quite similar to Stevenson’s version. Three questions motivate Edwards’ 
investigation of moral discourse: 
(1) What is the meaning, more broadly, what is the function of moral judgments? 
(2) What kind of disagreement is moral disagreement? 
(3) Are moral arguments whose premises do not include any moral judgments 
ever valid (Edwards, 20-21)? 
Edwards’ intention, similar to Ayer and Stevenson’s, to include the function of predicates or 
statements in their meaning is immediately apparent, and he distinguishes three senses of 
meaning for a statement, s:  (i) the facts whose existence one asserts in uttering s; (ii) what one 
intends to achieve in uttering s; (iii) anything that can be inferred about a person, given general 
knowledge about human psychology, from his utterance of s (Edwards, 21). 
 Edwards’ explanation of moral discourse turns on a comparison to meaning in taste 
discourse. He famously proposes to analyze the meaning of “The steak at Barney’s is rather 
nice” (Edwards, 105). Edwards claims that when a person calls a steak “nice” she is referring to 
the steak’s features – whatever they may be, since some people prefer different features of a 
steak, e.g., rare or well-done – which evoke in her an appreciation for the steak (Edwards, 110). 
So, while it is the person’s taste that fixes the features that “nice” refers to, “The steak at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The evocative element in the meaning of moral language is especially important in 
Stevenson’s theory of moral language because he thinks that for many moral disagreements 
resolution cannot be achieved through reason, but only through persuasion (see Stevenson-1948). 
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Barney’s is rather nice,” is an objective claim because it refers to features that are present in the 
steak (Edwards, 110). So far, this analysis of the statement’s meaning corresponds to the sense of 
meaning (i) in the previous paragraph. Edwards points out that if someone asked this steak-lover 
why she thinks it is nice, she would answer by referring to the features which evoke appreciation, 
e.g., it is rare, well marbled, tender, etc., but he also cautions that this should not lead people 
astray into believing that the steak’s niceness is over and above this.12 People should not make 
this mistake because they should also notice that “The steak at Barney’s is rather nice” also 
expresses the person’s gustatory appreciation of the steak and there can be reasons for an attitude 
like appreciation, which corresponds to sense of meaning (iii) in the previous paragraph 
(Edwards, 111). 
 Edwards claims that for any taste evaluation, “X is nice,” where “X” is replaced with the 
name of a food, the statement’s meaning involves both the reference to some feature(s) of the 
food and the appreciation the feature(s) evoke in the person who makes the statement (Edwards, 
118). Edwards also points out that because different features of different foods evoke 
appreciation towards them in people, the meaning of “nice” in “X is nice” will change with 
variation in “X”; in fact, the features that “nice” refers to in the same food may vary from person 
to person because people have different tastes (Edwards, 118). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Edwards returns to this distinction later, when he insists, on the following about the steak 
being nice: 
 
(i) the niceness belongs to, is “located” in the steak, not in me or my feelings; 
(ii) the niceness of the steak is not identical with any one or any one set of nice-
making characteristics; 
(iii) although niceness is objective there is no feature or set of features to which 
one can point and say, ‘This is niceness’; 
(iv) nevertheless niceness is not something distinct from or over and above these 
features – it disjunctively refers to an indefinite set of terms (Edwards, 120). 
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 When Edwards shifts his attention to moral discourse he proposes to expressly compare 
the function of terms like "good" that apply to actions or characters to "nice" as it applies to food. 
Edwards claims that "good" and "nice" are alike in being objective because they both refer to 
characteristics of the thing being judged, and they are polyguous – different cultures, and 
different people within a culture, refer to different characteristics when they call something good 
or nice (Edwards, 141–142).13 Edwards presses the comparison when he reemphasizes his point 
that while his taste determines the features in a steak that "nice" refers to, when he says, "The 
steak at Barney's is rather nice," the statement refers to the steak and not his taste (Edwards, 
147). Edward says that when he judges, "X.Y. is a good person,” it is similar to the case of taste; 
X.Y.’s gentleness, truthfulness, freedom from envy evoke a appreciation for X.Y. in Edwards, 
but in the statement he refers to those features and not his approval (Edwards, 147). Edwards 
insists that “the referent of the moral judgment is determined by the speaker’s attitude, but it is 
not the attitude” (Edwards, 148).  
Edwards’ analysis is similar to Stevenson’s second pattern of analysis discussed in 
subsection 2.2.2, but Edwards draws a distinction between their views. Edwards points out that 
the kind of analysis that Stevenson puts forward only permits resolution of a moral disagreement, 
which Edwards analyzes as disagreement in attitude, via the parties’ convergence on one attitude 
(Edwards, 27-28, 180). This is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, any reason that would move 
one of the parties to align his attitude with the other party’s attitude would be a valid one in a 
moral argument (Edwards, 180). Second, it overlooks another possibility for resolving this 
disagreement:  the properties that evoke the differences in attitudes, and to which the terms 
“good” and “bad” refer in the statements expressing these attitudes, either are or are not present. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Earlier in The Logic of Moral Discourse Edwards defines a “polyguous expression” as “any 
term which has a large number of referents” (Edwards, 74). 
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So, the disagreement can be resolved by noting that the features one party claims are present in a 
person or action, actually are not (Edwards, 181-182). Edwards believes his account of morality 
is superior to Stevenson’s because it includes this method for resolving moral disagreement. 
However, Edwards also includes room within his theory for fundamental moral judgments that 
people cannot support by pointing to features of a person or action that evoke the attitude, but he 
insists that these kinds of moral judgments only have emotive meaning and are very rare 
(Edwards, 189-190).  
2.2.4 Hare 
R. M. Hare developed a version of moral antirealism that, like Ayer, Stevenson, and Edwards’, 
puts the focus on the function of moral language; and although he is explicitly sympathetic to 
Ayer and Stevenson’s projects, Hare does criticize their proposals. Hare thinks that the best way 
to know a person’s moral commitments is to observe her actions, what she does when she knows 
the facts of a situation and has to choose among alternative actions; her actions answer the moral 
question, “What shall I do” (Hare-1952, 1)? Observing a person’s actions is the best way to 
determine her moral commitments because the function of moral judgments is to guide conduct, 
or to tell people what to do. According to Hare, moral language is a subspecies of prescriptive 
language, and it is comparable, though not reducible, to imperative language, which is also a 
species of prescriptive language (Hare-1952, 2). 
2.2.4.1 Hare’s Criticism of Ayer and Stevenson 
Hare thinks that Ayer makes a mistake in explaining moral language’s meaning by linking it to 
the function of “evincing” our feelings (Hare-1952, 10; Ayer, 107). This characterization 
suggests that moral judgments are made when an emotion wells up inside a person, and no 
longer able to suppress it, the emotion erupts from us in the form of an imperative. Hare 
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dismisses this possibility because it would not be able to account for the meaning of the 
imperatives that compose a list of instructions for building a bookshelf, for example. In addition, 
Hare doubts Stevenson’s analysis that part of the meaning of a moral judgment is a description of 
the attitude of the utterer because it is difficult to characterize the attitude; to say somebody has 
an attitude of “moral approval” is to say that she thinks something is right, but Hare complains 
that this does not explain what she thinks when she thinks something is right (Hare-1952, 11). 
And, if we don’t know what a person thinks when she thinks something is right, then we can 
only understand her moral judgment, if we already know what the judgment means.  
Hare thinks the most significant problem in Ayer’s and Stevenson’s theories is their 
emphasis that the function of moral language is to influence people. Hare agrees that when we 
make moral judgments we want the person who hears them to act accordingly, but Ayer’s and 
Stevenson’s views suggest that the moral judgments are meant to causally affect hearers, so that 
moral judgments get hearers to do something (Hare-1952, 13). Hare distinguishes between 
telling someone to do something and getting someone to do something (Hare-1952, 13). If a 
person wants to get someone to act, then he can use rhetoric, propaganda, threats, etc. to get her 
to do so; moral judgments offer people guidance, they tell someone what to do – once a person 
has been told what to do, she can act on it or not, but she has not been influenced to act or not to 
act (Hare-1952, 14-15).14 Hare points out that the implication that moral language should be 
causally effective was the source of a major objection to Ayer and Stevenson’s theories – they 
make moral discourse irrational since any method that succeeds in getting people to conform to 
moral judgments will be a legitimate one.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hare underlines the difference between indicative (descriptive) language and imperative 
language earlier in The Language of Morals:  “An indicative sentence is used for telling someone 
that something is the case; an imperative is not – it is used for telling someone to make 
something the case” (Hare-1952, 5) 
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2.2.4.2 Hare’s Account of Morality 
As noted in subsection 2.2.4, Hare thinks a moral judgment is a form of imperative, or command, 
and he points out that statements and commands are actually more alike than usually supposed; 
they both tell somebody something in answer to a rational question, and both can be governed by 
logical rules (Hare-1952, 15-16). Statements and commands are similar because they contain a 
“phrastic” element – what the sentence is about; the sentences 
H1:  You are going to shut the door, 
and 
H2:  Shut the door, 
are both about the same thing: 
HP:  Your shutting the door in the immediate future (Hare-1952, 17). 
HP represents the phrastic element that is common to H1 and H2, but H1 and H2 also each 
contain a “neustic” element – the mode of assent to the phrastic element – that is different for 
each sentence. To represent the neustic element of H1 in HP, add “yes” to the end: 
HPS:  Your shutting the door in the immediate future, yes. 
And, to represent the neustic element of H2 in HP, add “please” to the end: 
HPC:  Your shutting the door in the immediate future, please. 
HPS and HPC reflect a full representation of the phrastic and neustic elements in H1 and H2, 
respectively, with the phrastic element demonstrating how they are similar, and the neustic 
element demonstrating how they are different:  assent to H1 is a matter of believing HP, and 
assent to H2 is a matter if doing HP (Hare-1952, 18-20). 
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 Hare draws on the common phrastic element between statements and commands to try to 
demonstrate the rules of logic apply to both. He claims the negation of H1, “You are not going to 
shut the door,” should be represented as  
HPSN:  Your not shutting the door in the immediate future, yes. 
The negation, the logical connective, is part of the phrastic element, so the negation of H2 
should be represented as 
HPCN:  Your not shutting the door in the immediate future, please (Hare-1952, 
20). 
 
Hare contends that the other logical connectives – if, and, or – are also parts of the phrastic 
elements of a sentence (Hare-1952, 21). So, Hare’s proposal is that since the logical connections 
between sentences lie in their phrastic elements, if sentences contain phrastic elements, they can 
be logically connected or not, and commands do have phrastic elements, so commands can be 
logical. If moral judgments are or entail imperatives, commands, then they can be logical, too. 
 Hare goes on to argue that a moral judgment is a special kind of imperative, which 
involves a descriptive content and a prescriptive content. The prescriptive content is the 
imperative, which has the function of guiding or telling a person what to do and can feature in 
logical connection. The descriptive content describes the facts of the situation, which, due to a 
feature Hare calls supervenience, universalizes the prescription to all situations with the same 
facts.15 Hare shares Stevenson and Edwards’ insight that to understand the meaning of moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 As noted in footnote 6, supervenience is the relation by which one level of properties is 
connected to another level of properties in which the second level of properties determines the 
first level, but the first level is not reduced to the second level of properties; the rough idea is that 
if one level of properties A, supervene on another level of properties B, then for any two things 
that are identical at the level of B properties, they are also identical at the level of A properties. 
Hare introduced the term “supervenient” to call attention to the peculiar feature of evaluative 
terms like “good” that they cannot be applied only to one of two objects that are alike in all 
characteristics (Hare-1952, 80). 
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judgments, antirealist moral philosophers must focus on more than the descriptive content of 
those judgments, they must also focus on their function. Hare though identifies an imperative 
function in moral judgments, which he uses to establish a rational basis for moral discourse by 
comparing imperative sentences to indicative ones and claiming that they both have a phrastic 
element, which is the locus of logical connections. Hare draws on the descriptive content to 
explain how moral judgments are universal prescriptions; they prescribe the same action when 
the facts of a situation are the same. 
Ultimately, it is the emphasis on the function of moral language that distinguishes Ayer, 
Stevenson, Edwards, and Hare’s theories of morality:  “What the theories in this family have in 
common is the idea that to understand the meaning of moral words like ‘wrong’ and ‘good’ we 
need to understand that they have an importantly different kind of meaning from ordinary non-
moral words” (Schroeder 34, italics original). The various versions of moral antirealism – the 
view that human beings’ experience of people, acts, circumstances as good, immoral kind, 
deceitful, evil, etc. are not the product of features of the world that are themselves good, 
immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc. independent of human beings thinking them so – that argue 
that an essential element in the meaning of moral language is its function apart from any 
descriptive content that is part of its meaning are known collectively as expressivism. Whether 
expressivism is conceived as Ayer, Stevenson, Edwards, or Hare does, the element common to 
all is that the meaning of moral language cannot be explained as description alone; on every 
characterization, to understand the meaning of moral language we must pay attention to its 
function. 
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2.3 Cognitivism Revitalized 
Schroeder suggests that when Hare was writing The Language of Morals he took it for granted 
that a non-cognitivist theory of morality must be correct, the challenge for moral philosophers 
being determining which one (Schroeder, 31). The ascendance of non-cognitivism – the view 
that the mental states expressed by moral judgments are not beliefs – through the nineteen-fifties 
should be attributed to the presumption of naturalism against non-naturalistic moral realism 
and to the assumption that Moore’s open question argument had cleared naturalistic moral 
realism – the view that the goodness, immorality, kindness, deceitfulness, evilness, etc. of 
people, act, circumstances can be explained in terms of natural properties, identified by the 
natural sciences or psychology, which are causal or detectable by the senses, and moral 
judgments, thus, may be true or false whether or not they accurately describe such people, acts, 
or circumstances – from the field of possible accounts of morality. William Frankena’s argument 
that that the open question argument begs the question in rejecting naturalistic moral realism 
was one of the first challenges to the assumption that Moore’s open question argument was 
sound. Other challenges to the open question argument would soon follow. These challenges 
denied that the field of metaethical theories was cleared save non-cognitivism, but the Frege-
Geach problem was a direct challenge to the plausibility of developing a complete non-
cognitivist account of morality. Despite these challenges I would argue that most moral 
philosophers still think non-cognitivism holds a dialectical advantage against moral realism, 
the view that there are people, acts, circumstances that are good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, 
etc., and they would be so if human beings did not think them so, and moral judgments, thus, 
may be true or false whether or not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances. 
In section 2.3 I will present considerations meant to undermine confidence in non-cognitivism. 
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2.3.1 Arguing Against the Open Question Argument 
Moore thinks that anyone who attempts to define a moral term in natural terms is guilty of the 
naturalistic fallacy. At the heart of Moore’s argument for this is the premise that for any natural 
property (really any property since Moore’ argument applies against metaphysical theories of 
ethics, too) it is always an open question whether something that has that property is good. 
William Frankena criticized this premise as begging the question against naturalistic moral 
realism:  “the fallaciousness of the naturalistic fallacy is just what is at issue” between Moore 
and naturalistic moral realists (Frankena, 465). Stefan Baumrin challenges the open question 
argument for not establishing what it aims to:  that “good” is simple and denotes something 
(Baumrin-1968). 
2.3.1.1 Frankena 
Frankena begins his criticism by noting that the naturalistic fallacy is associated with the 
“bifurcation between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’, between value and fact, between the normative and 
descriptive” (Frankena, 466). Frankena proposes that Moore understands the bifurcation to mean 
(1) Ethical propositions are not deducible from non-ethical ones. 
Moore is correct to object when moral philosopher violate (1), and if this was all that Moore took 
the naturalistic fallacy to be, then his criticism of a philosopher making this move would be 
valid, but Frankena claims that Moore is also committed to understanding the bifurcation to 
mean 
(2) Ethical characteristics are not definable in term of non-ethical ones,  
 
and 
 
(3) Ethical characteristics are different in kind from non-ethical ones (Frankena, 
467). 
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Frankena points out that since (2) entails (1) and (3) entails (2), (3) is the core of Moore’s 
position. 
 Frankena notes out that the violations of (1) cannot be what Moore has in mind for the 
naturalistic fallacy since to infer (c) from (a) - 
(a) Pleasure is sought by all men 
(c) Therefore, pleasure is good - 
is fallacious, and not because an ethical term occurs in (c), but not (a). This is a garden-variety 
invalid inference of the form, “A is B, therefore A is C” (Frankena, 468-469.) Most arguments 
like this are not truly invalid; they are enthymemes with a suppressed premise. Frankena notes 
that the suppressed premise can be an “induction, an intuition, a deduction from a ‘pure ethical 
argument,’ a definition, or a proposition which is true by definition, and if it is one of the first 
three, the argument will not violate (1) because one of the premises will be ethical (Frankena, 
468). However, since Moore has judged some valid arguments to be instances of the naturalistic 
fallacy, Frankena examines arguments where the suppressed premise is a definition or a 
proposition that is true by definition. He supplements the argument above with premise (b): 
(a) Pleasure is sought by all men. 
(b) What is sought by all men is good (by definition). 
(c) Therefore, pleasure is good. 
 
If committing the naturalistic fallacy violates (1), does this argument violate it? The answer to 
this question turns on whether (b) and (c) are ethical propositions (Frankena, 469). 
 In order to violate (1), (b) must be a non-ethical proposition, and (c) must be an ethical 
proposition. To suppose though that (b), which is a definition, is non-ethical is to assume that 
ethical terms cannot be defined, which is what Moore is trying to establish. Without a reason to 
think (b) and (c) can be different kinds of propositions, non-ethical and ethical, respectively, they 
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must both be the same kind of proposition in the argument, and the argument does not violate (1) 
(Frankena, 469). However, since Moore thinks an argument like (abc) does commit the 
naturalistic fallacy, the naturalistic fallacy is not simply the violation of (1). Frankena claims that 
for Moore it is the presence of (b) in the argument that involves the naturalistic fallacy; what “(b) 
involves [is] the identification of goodness with ‘being sought by all men’, and to make this 
identification or any other such identification is to commit the naturalistic fallacy” (Frankena, 
469). The naturalistic fallacy is defining natural characteristics as goodness or substituting some 
other characteristics for goodness (Frankena, 470). 
 Frankena then cites some passages from Moore in which Moore explains that the so-
called naturalistic fallacy applies to other terms, too; e.g., defining pleasure as the sensation of 
red commits the same fallacy (Frankena, 470; Moore-1903, 65). Frankena concludes that the 
putative mistake in the naturalistic fallacy is not the mistaken identification of good with a 
natural property, but the general mistake of confusing or identifying two distinct properties, or 
defining one property by a second distinct property, or substituting one different property for 
another (Frankena, 471). The mistake is treating two properties as one, and Frankena calls this 
the definist fallacy. 
 Frankena accepts that it is a mistake to confuse two distinct properties for one property, 
but he notes that naturalistic moral realists will deny they are doing this – instead they will 
claim “that two words or sets of words stand for or mean one and the same property” (Frankena, 
472). Frankena claims that naturalistic moral realists will agree that “[g]oodness is not 
identifiable with any ‘other’ characteristic[,]” i.e., they will concede that people who think some 
characteristic that is not goodness is actually goodness have gone wrong (Frankena, 472). But, 
what the naturalistic moral realists want to know is what are the characteristics in the world 
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that are not goodness and what are the names that stand for them. (Once all the characteristics 
that are not goodness have been listed and labeled, the characteristic left over will be goodness, 
and then the naturalistic moral realists will note that there are multiple words besides 
“goodness” that mean that characteristic.) To claim that a definition of “goodness” like 
“goodness is pleasure” is mistaken because it identifies goodness with some characteristic other 
than goodness begs the question (Frankena, 472).16 
 In subsection 2.3.1 I pointed out that at the heart of Moore’s argument that defining a 
moral term in natural terms is a mistake is the claim that for any natural property it is always an 
open question whether something that has that property is good. Frankena’s point is that to claim 
that it will always be an open question is to assume that a natural, or otherwise, property is not 
the same property as good just known under a different term, which is just what is at issue. 
Moore’s argument does not establish that naturalistic moral realism is obviously wrong. 
2.3.1.2 Baumrin 
Stefan Baumrin offered a more withering assessment of Moore’s argument than Frankena 
did. Baumrin outlines Moore’s argument, and then analyzes it: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Frankena makes the further point that if the definist fallacy rules out any definition of “good” 
because it defines it with words that stand for the same property as “good” stands for, then it 
makes any definition a fallacy, and ultimately amounts to the claim, “Every term means what it 
means, and not what is meant by any other term” (Frankena, 472-473).  
	   56	  
Premise (A) “Good” denotes either: 
 (1) a simple (part or property) 
 (2) a complex 
 (3) nothing at all 
Premise (B) “Good” is definable or indefinable. 
Premise (C) If “good” is definable it must denote a complex, for only complexes 
are definable. 
Premise (D) If “good” is indefinable it must denote: 
 (1) simple 
 (2) nothing at all 
Premise (E1) (¬ C) It does not denote a complex (open question argument 1). 
Conclusion (E2)  ∴ (D) It is indefinable (B & ¬ C). 
Premise (F1) (¬ D2) It does denote something (open question argument 2). 
Conclusion (F2) ∴ (D1) It does denote a simple. 
 
Assumption I:  “Good” denotes a simple notion. 
Assumption II:  “Good” denotes a simple notion and is therefore indefinable 
(Baumrin-1968, 79). 
 
Baumrin says that if Moore assumed Assumption I, then we need to only decide whether it is 
warranted and (D) is true to assess Moore’s argument. If Assumption I is warranted and (D) is 
true, then there is a naturalistic fallacy. If Moore assumed Assumption II, then the argument is 
pointless since if Assumption II is true, Moore has all he needs to establish that a person who 
tries to define the indefinable is making a mistake. If Moore assumed either Assumption I or 
Assumption II, it is possible to assess his argument by deciding independently whether 
Assumption I is warranted. And, if Moore did not assume either I or II, then Baumrin charges 
that (A) is incomplete, (C) is false, (D) is suspect, and open question arguments 1 and 2 are not 
adequate to establish E1 or F1 (Baumrin-1968, 79). 
First Baumrin takes aim at (C) and (D). To begin, he points out that Moore’s claim that 
“good” is indefinable depends on demonstrating that “good” is not complex, because Moore is 
under the mistaken belief that something can only be definable if it is complex (Baumrin-1968, 
80). Baumrin attributes this to Moore confusing part-whole analysis and substance-property 
analysis. Baumrin quotes Moore:  “Definitions of the kind I was asking for, definitions which 
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describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, and which do not merely tell 
us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when the object or notion in question is 
something complex” (Baumrin-1968, 80; Moore-1903, 59). On the traditional theory of 
definition a thing can be defined in terms of its essential properties; it requires that a thing must 
be definable in terms of simpler properties, and complex properties must be treated like things to 
be defined in terms of simpler properties. But, the traditional theory does not require that a thing 
be complex in order to be definable, which Moore somehow has managed to assume (Baumrin-
1968, 80).  
Baumrin also quotes Moore claiming that a definition of horse is possible “because a 
horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate” and once 
“you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you 
can no longer define those terms” (Baumrin-1968, 80; Moore-1903, 59). The first quotation 
highlights Moore’s confusion about definition:  to define a horse on the traditional theory of 
definition does not involve enumerating its properties, it involves identifying the minimal set of 
properties that distinguishes a horse from any other thing; to define a horse with part-whole 
analysis involves enumerating a horse’s parts and the specific arrangement of the parts. 
Regarding the second quotation, Baumrin points out that Moore is mistaken to think just because 
a term features in a definition it is simple full-stop; the term may be simple in its domain, but 
then definable with respect to other domains (Baumrin-1968, 81). Baumrin also makes the point 
that even if we grant that to define something is to reduce a complex thing to its simplest parts, it 
does not follow that “good” which may be one of the simplest parts of a definition is not 
complex or that “good” is a part of anything (Baumrin-1968, 82). These considerations indicate 
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that Moore is confused about the nature of definition, and there is little in Moore to support 
claims (C) and (D). 
 The claims that (a) if something is definable it must be complex and (b) if it is 
indefinable, it must denote something simple or nothing at all, are strange and dubious, but they 
are not the lynchpin of Moore’s argument because even if they are granted, Moore still must 
show that “good” is not complex and that “good” denotes something, that good exists and it is 
simple (Baumrin-1968, 85). Baumrin considers two versions of the open question argument 
meant to demonstrate this.17 Baumrin outlines Moore’s open question argument as follows: 
(1) Of every definiens in every definition it can be significantly asked whether 
what it refers to is or is not the thing, or has the property that we think is referred 
to by the definiendum. 
(2) If we doubt that it is or does then the definiens does not render (for us) what 
the definiendum does (render to us). 
(3) This is true of “desire to desire” as a potential definiens [of good]. 
(4) Inspection will show that it is true of every other candidate [definiens of 
good]. 
(5) Therefore, good is not a complex renderable by a definition (Baumrin-1968, 
86). 
 
Baumrin focuses on premise (2), which claims that if we doubt that the definiens refers to, or has 
the property, that we think the definiendum refers to, then the definiens does not mean what we 
mean by the definiendum. Baumrin points out that no one person’s doubt could make a definition 
faulty, and to suppose it does would mean that the definitions of mathematics, science, and other 
esoteric fields are faulty since ordinary people doubt them. Moreover, Baumrin points out that 
even if premise (2) isn’t false, it may be trivial and irrelevant. If (2) is true, the more reasonable 
conclusion to draw is that the person is confused even though he is “staring at the correct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Baumrin notes that part of what motivates the interest in this question is the fact that there is 
no universally agreed upon definition for “good.” He suggests that the two best explanations for 
this are that no one has yet discovered the right definition or there is nothing “good” names, but 
Moore has rejected these in favor of the view that “good” cannot be defined (Baumrin-1968, 85). 
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definition of good” (Baumrin-1968, 87)! Moore’s open question argument is too strong since it 
seems possible for a person to doubt whether any definiens refers to, or has the property, that he 
thinks the definiendum refers to. So much for Moore’s argument that “good” is not complex. 
 Finally, Baumrin considers Moore’s argument that “good” does have a meaning, and so 
denotes something, and outlines it similarly to above: 
(I) Of every definiens in every definition it can be significantly asked whether 
what it refers to is or is not the thing, or has the property that we think is referred 
by to the definiendum. 
(II) If we doubt that it is or does then the definiens does not render (for us) what 
the definiendum does (render to us). 
(III) This is true of “pleasure,” “the desired,” and the “approved.” 
(IV) Inspection will show that it true of every other candidate [definiens of good]. 
(V) Therefore, “good” does name a unique object distinct from every other object 
(Baumrin-1968, 87). 
 
Clearly, the objections Baumrin raised against premise (2) will apply to premise (II), but 
Baumrin points out that to plausibly infer (V) from the argument Moore needs to insert another 
premise, (X):  “Whenever he [anyone] thinks of ‘intrinsic value,’ or ‘intrinsic worth,’ or says that 
a thing ‘ought to exist,’ he has before his mind the unique object – the unique property of things 
– which I mean by ‘good’” (Baumrin-1968, 88). Baumrin objects that Moore has made no 
argument for this premise, and worse, he has offered definitions for the indefinable (Baumrin-
1968, 88). Ultimately, Moore’s open question argument is neither able to establish that “good” is 
not complex nor that it denotes something, and so it is not able to support the claim that it is a 
mistake to explain or define moral terms in naturalistic terms. 
2.3.2 Frege-Geach 
Despite Frankena's and Baumrin’s criticisms of Moore’s open question argument, the argument’s 
effect endured; many moral philosophers thought it eliminated naturalistic moral realism – the 
view that the goodness, immorality, kindness, deceitfulness, evilness, etc. of people, act, 
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circumstances can be explained in terms of natural properties, identified by the natural sciences 
or psychology, which are causal or detectable by the senses, and moral judgments, thus, may be 
true or false whether or not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances – as a 
viable theory, so the only naturalistically respectable theory of morality was some form of non-
cognitivism, the view that the mental states expressed by moral judgments are not beliefs. With 
non-cognitivism enjoying a dialectical advantage of prima facie plausibility, its critics focused 
on assessing the prospects of developing a complete non-cognitivist account of morality. Moral 
philosophers consider Peter Geach’s challenge to non-cognitivism the most important. 
Earlier I presented M2 — James wrongly takes from his brother — as an example of a 
moral judgment, Ayer and Stevenson would offer the following as interpretations of M2, 
respectively: 
AE2:  B! |James taking from his brother| 
SE2.1:  I disapprove of taking from one’s brother, do so as well. 
Something that is not truth evaluable is an essential element in the meaning of each of these 
examples, whether an expression of attitude or an attempt to influence. In a series of articles 
Peter Geach argues that because the different early expressivist approaches to moral language 
eschew truth-conditional semantics, they all run into a significant challenge in accounting for the 
sameness of meaning of moral terms and sentences across different moral practices. 
 Geach pointed out that propositions might be asserted or unasserted depending on 
whether or not they are part of larger propositions.18 Consider the following argument adapted 
from Geach (Geach-1965, 463): 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 “Assertion” (1965) is the locus classicus for Geach’s view on how non-truth evaluable theories 
of meaning are defective, but he had raised the same challenges in “Imperative and Deontic 
Logic” (1958) and “Ascriptivism” (1960). 
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G1. If it is bad to torment the cat, then it is bad to get your little brother to torment 
the cat. 
G2. It is bad to torment the cat. 
GC. Therefore, it is bad to get your little brother to torment the cat. 
 
In G1, the antecedent of the conditional – “It is bad to torment the cat” – is not asserted, or as 
Geach says, it occurs in an “unasserted” context (Geach-1965, 450). The presence of the 
proposition in a conditional means that there is no commitment to it being the case that 
tormenting the cat is bad; the first premise only claims a dependency – if the action in the 
antecedent is bad, so is the one in the consequent. Or, the proposition in the antecedent does not 
express an attitude since it is part of a conditional. In the second premise of the argument, “It is 
bad to torment the cat,” occurs in an asserted context; according to Geach, in traditional truth-
conditional semantics, the conclusion can be inferred from the first and second premises because 
the proposition, “It is bad to torment the cat,” has the same meaning in both premises; its 
meaning is determined by the conditions under which it would be true. Geach maintains that any 
semantics that is not truth conditional, like a non-cognitivist one such as expressivism, faces the 
challenge of explaining how the meaning of  “It is bad to torment the cat” remains the same 
between the first and second premises of the argument. 
Applying the boo-hooray operator I used to illustrate how to understand Ayer’s claim 
about the meaning of moral language to the second premise yields the following account of its 
meaning: 
AP2:  B! |Tormenting the cat|. 
Geach’s point is that there is no obvious way to account for the meaning of the proposition, “It is 
bad to torment the cat,” in G1 where it has the same meaning as in G2. In G2 the proposition can 
be given the expressivist interpretation because it is a straightforward expression of an attitude 
toward tormenting the cat, but in the antecedent of the conditional G1 there is no straightforward 
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expression of an attitude toward tormenting the cat; it at best expresses a qualified negative 
attitude toward tormenting cats. There are other kinds of propositions where moral judgments 
may be unasserted like negation and disjunction, and the attitude expressed must change with 
these propositions; the early expressivist – a person who thinks that the meaning of moral 
judgments cannot be explained without reference to their function apart from any descriptive 
content that is part of their meaning; the function of moral language can be to express emotions, 
attitudes, commands, etc. – should surely not interpret “It is not bad to torment the cat,” as H! 
|Tormenting the cat| (Shafer-Landau, 24). 
So, a major challenge for non-cognitivists like the expressivists is to explain how the 
meaning of moral propositions remains consistent across contexts. And, non-cognitivists must 
do this or argue that we should give up engaging in moral arguments like the one about 
tormenting cats; the latter option is undesirable because it would require abandoning an 
important feature of our moral practice.19 Schroeder raises a further implication of the Frege-
Geach problem; typically a theory of meaning can explain how more complex propositions can 
be assembled from smaller ones, and how speakers can understand them, by pointing, in part, to 
the consistency of meaning in the smaller propositions. But, an account of the meaning of moral 
language like the one early expressivists proposed may not be able to do this, and this will 
undermine its plausibility as an account of morality (Schroeder, 43). 
 The combination of Moore’s purported refutation of naturalistic moral realism and the 
nascent non-cognitivists’ desire to avoid a non-naturalistic account of morality spurred them to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Another issue follows from the Frege-Geach problem; usually inferences of the kind in the 
argument about tormenting cats are thought to be valid because the conclusion must be true if the 
premises are both true, but emotivists deny that, at least, P2 has a truth value. Even if there is a 
way to get consistency for the meaning of the antecedent in P1 and P2, there is this further 
problem. 
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develop a new theory about the meaning of moral language. A successful non-cognitivist moral 
semantics would be important evidence that moral antirealism is true. However, if we consider 
the Frege-Geach problem as a test of non-cognitivist theories, then it is very similar to Moore’s 
open question argument; both make predictions about a phenomenon that a moral theory should 
be able to account for, but then demonstrate the moral theory fails to do so. The difference 
between them is that the open question argument seems to decisively refute the possibility of 
accounting for the meaning of moral terms in naturalistic ones, but the Frege-Geach problem 
seems to be a challenge to non-cognitivists, people with the view that the mental states 
expressed by moral judgments are not beliefs, to revise their account until they get it right. 
Consequently, a significant portion of recent work in antirealist metaethics is non-cognitivists 
attempting to develop a moral semantics that solves the Frege-Geach problem with critics 
pointing out the flaws in these attempts.20 Like scientists who persist in revising their theories 
after they are falsified, non-cognitivists persist in their project under the expectation that they 
will someday succeed in developing a complete non-cognitivist moral semantics. The apparent 
motivation for this persistence is the conviction, stemming from confidence in Moore’s open 
question argument, that some form of non-cognitivism is the only viable candidate for 
explaining moral practice.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See, e.g., Hare-1970, Gibbard-1990 and Gibbard-2003, and Horgan and Timmons-2006 for 
non-cognitivist attempts to answer the Frege-Geach problem, and see Schueler-1988, Hale-1993, 
Unwin-1999, and Schroeder-2008 for examples of challenges to these answers; this list is not 
meant to be exhaustive. 
21 I acknowledge that the account of metaethics I am offering here omits the role non-naturalists 
played and are playing in the debate. The main reason for that is I, like the non-cognitivists, am 
sympathetic to a naturalistic metaphilosophy, but not all moral philosophers shares this 
metaphilosophy. Moore obviously was a non-naturalist, and so was W. D. Ross (see Ross). More 
recently Russ Shafer-Landau and Jonathan Dancy have defended non-naturalism (see Shafer-
Landau-2003, and Dancy-2006).  
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2.3.3 Kripke and Putnam 
In footnote 17, in subsection 2.3.1.2, I noted that part of the motivation for Moore’s open 
question argument is bewilderment that there is no definition of “good;” Baumrin suggests it is 
less likely that “good” is indefinable than that either nobody has discovered the right definition 
of “good” or that “good” is a term that denotes nothing. The work of Saul Kripke and Hilary 
Putnam provided an explanation as to why the right definition might be undiscovered. In Naming 
and Necessity Saul Kripke argued that the description theory of names — the theory that proper 
names refer because their users associate some descriptive content with the name that fixes its 
referent — is incorrect, and he proposed to replace it with, what has come to be called, a causal 
theory of reference. According to Kripke a proper name refers because it rigidly designates a 
person via an initial baptism and its transmission through a causal-historical chain of use. For 
example, the proper name “Aristotle” has as its referent the person who was initially dubbed with 
that name, and when the person who dubbed him “Aristotle” tells another person that this person 
is “Aristotle” the reference is transmitted — this transmission goes on and on. Kripke’s account 
of rigid designation helps to show that identity is not a relation that holds between names, it is a 
relation that holds between an object and itself, an important implication of which is that identity 
claims that are necessarily true may only be known a posteriori. 
 In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Hilary Putnam applied Kripke’s treatment of proper 
names to natural kind terms like “gold”, or “tiger”, or “water.” A traditional view interpreted 
these terms as descriptive — “gold” means the metal composed of the chemical element atomic 
number 79; “tiger” means the animal with a certain genetic makeup; “water” means a chemical 
molecule composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom joined by a covalent bond — 
and the description fixes their reference, so anything that fits the description is called by that 
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natural kind term. Putnam argues that this view must be mistaken since a person can associate 
the same descriptive content with multiple natural kind terms and yet use the terms to correctly 
refer to their natural kinds; for example, she may associate the description “yellow perennial 
flower” with both “Begonia” and “Heliopsis” and still be able to use these terms to refer to the 
appropriate natural kind. Putnam’s Twin-Earth thought experiment is further confirmation of the 
idea that the descriptive content cannot fix the referent of a term. In the Twin-Earth thought 
experiment Putnam proposes that if there was another planet in the universe identical in all 
respects to our own planet except that the liquid we call “water” is composed of molecules that 
are more complex than H2O, then “water” would not refer to the same natural kind on each 
planet even though the inhabitants would be in identical psychological states and have the same 
content in mind — clear, colorless, flavorless liquid that falls from the sky and collects in bodies 
— when they used the term. On Putnam’s view the meaning of a natural kind term is largely 
constituted by it reference, which is fixed by experts. 
 The combination of Kripke’s and Putnam’s views yields a causal theory of reference for 
natural kind terms. A baptism or dubbing of some example of a natural kind establishes the 
reference of a term for it, and then that term refers to anything that has the same underlying 
nature. When the initial baptizers share the term with other people this reference is transmitted. 
And people who do not know the underlying nature of the objects the same term refers to can 
still successfully use the term as long as they stand in a causal chain of reference transmission 
stretching back to the initial dubbing. 
Earlier, in subsection 1.2.1, I claimed that an important element of naturalistic moral 
realism is the claim that moral terms can be explained in naturalistic terms. When interpreted 
according to the scientific method, the open question argument is an experiment that falsifies this 
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prediction from naturalistic moral realism. Moore’s argument is that if a moral term and 
naturalistic terms refer to the same property, then they should be analytically, or a priori, 
equivalent. However, Moore argues we know that they are not analytically equivalent since for 
any moral term and any natural terms, it is an open question to ask whether an act or a person 
with those natural features also has the moral feature. For example, the question, “Giving to 
others maximizes happiness, but is it good,” is an open question. And, therefore the moral term – 
“good” in this example – and the natural term – “maximizing happiness” – do not refer to the 
same property. Kripke and Putnam’s causal theory of reference challenges the assumption that if 
terms are not analytically equivalent, then they cannot refer to the same property. 
On this way of thinking about Moore’s argument, it turns on the assumption that if two 
properties are identical, then the terms used for them, “good” and “happiness maximizing”, are 
analytically or a priori equivalent. However, the Kripke-Putnam line on natural kind terms posits 
that there may be different terms that refer to the same thing even though this is unknown to the 
users of those terms; the terms refer to something that is necessarily identical to itself, but the 
equivalency will turn out be a synthetic or a posteriori discovery. In essence the Kripke-Putnam 
line charges that Moore’s assumption conflates the concept of a property with the property 
(Putnam-1981, 207).22 Moore assumes that if a single item is referred to by different terms with 
distinct descriptive content, then a person who knows how to use the terms — has the concept — 
will know that the term refers to the same thing (Fenske, 302). Supposedly then, if it is an open 
question whether the different terms refer to the same property, it cannot be the case that they do. 
The Kripke-Putnam line on natural kind terms makes it possible that a person who knows how to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The reference is from reviewing Fenske, but a subsequent review of Putnam’s second volume 
collected works, Mind, Language, and Reality, shows he made a similar comment about Moore 
in “Language and Philosophy.” 
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use the term “good” and other naturalistic terms might not be aware that they refer to the same 
property (or properties), only discovering this later through empirical investigation.  
If the Kripke-Putnam line is correct, then the alternative Baumrin suggested – we have 
not discovered the right definition of “good” yet – has more credence. A version of naturalistic 
moral realism called Cornell Realism has latched on to the Kripke-Putnam line to argue that a 
moral term like “good” refers to a moral property, which is itself a natural property, that cannot 
be reduced to non-moral natural properties, but nonetheless supervenes on natural properties, and 
“good” is then transmitted through a causal chain of reference.23 
2.3.4 Mackie 
Subsection 2.3.2 posed a problem for moral antirealists:  the Frege-Geach problem challenges 
antirealists to develop a moral semantics in which moral language retains the same meaning 
across asserted and unasserted contexts. And subsection 2.3.3 explained how the causal theory of 
reference undermines that dialectical advantage of non-cognitivism – the view that the mental 
states expressed by moral judgments are not beliefs – by providing confidence that if 
naturalistic moral realists keep working at it, they can uncover which naturalistic properties are 
moral properties.24 This subsection will examine how J. L. Mackie’s error theory presents a 
problem of motivation for non-cognitivists:  why try to vindicate moral practice if moral 
properties do not exist? Why develop an account morality at all? 
Like all antirealists Mackie denies that moral properties exist, but he disagrees with non-
cognitivists who deny that moral language aims at describing a moral reality, and instead claim 
that it is non-truth evaluable language that expresses some sort of non-cognitive mental state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See, for example, Boyd, Brink-1989, and Sturgeon-1986a and Sturgeon-1986b 
24 The dialectical advantage that I claim non-cognitivists believed they enjoyed is just that 
naturalistic moral realism is untenable because of the open question argument.	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Mackie argues that moral language does aim at describing a moral reality, it does express a 
cognitive state, and it is truth evaluable — it’s just that all moral claims are systematically false. 
Mackie’s claim that moral language is descriptive of a moral reality that people mistakenly 
believe exists is known as error theory, and it challenges non-cognitivist moral antirealists to 
explain why their analysis of moral discourse as non-descriptive and non-cognitivist is correct. 
 This is a rough outline of Mackie’s argument for the error theory: 
E1.  Moral thought and language implies that there are objective values (Mackie-
1977, 48-49). 
E2.  There are no objective values (Mackie-1977, 15). 
EC.  Moral thought and language is fundamentally mistaken. 
 
To support premise E2 Mackie deploys the argument from queerness. The argument from 
queerness has both metaphysical and epistemological elements (Mackie-1977, 38): 
Q1.  If objective values exist, then they would be entities of a very strange sort, 
unlike anything else in the universe. (Metaphysical element.)25 
Q2.  Knowledge of objective values could only be a special sensory faculty, 
unlike any other form of knowing. (Epistemological element.)26  
Q3. A naturalistic account of the world cannot accommodate either special 
sensory faculties or objective values.27 
QC.  Objective values do not exist. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 According to Mackie, Plato’s form of the Good is an example of an objective value which is 
distinguished by it having an intrinsic “to-be-pursuedness” as part of its nature; the strangeness 
of objective values rests on the “metaphysical peculiarity of the supposed objective values, in 
that they would have to be intrinsically action-guiding and motivating” (Mackie-1977, 40, 49). 
26 Intuitionists like Moore, Ross, and Prichard proposed just such a faculty. 
27 In Mackie’s explicit formulation of the argument from queerness on page 38 Q3 is an 
enthymeme, but a few pages later he explains how the queerness can be drawn out by asking 
“about anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is linked with its 
natural features. …[I]t is not merely that the two features occur together. The wrongness must 
somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate 
cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’? And how do we know the 
relation that it signifies[?] …It is not even sufficient to postulate a faculty which ‘sees’ the 
wrongness:  something else must be postulated which can see at once the natural features that 
constitute the cruelty, and the wrongness, and the mysteriousness consequential link between the 
two” (Mackie-1977, 41, emphasis original).	  
	   69	  
In so far as the argument from queerness supports E228 — the denial of the existence of 
independent moral properties — non-cognitivists, people with the view that the mental states 
expressed by moral judgments are not beliefs, can go along with Mackie; but Mackie and non-
cognitivists disagree on premise E1. 
 According to non-cognitivists what moral language does is express a moral mental state 
that is an attitude of some sort, and since it is not meant to represent beliefs about the way the 
world is, it is not descriptive of the world. Mackie denies this, claiming that moral language does 
attempt to represent beliefs about the way the world is, and citing a litany of philosophers whose 
analysis of morality reflect this aspiration:  Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Sidgwick (Mackie-1977, 30-
31).29 Mackie appeals to more than authority to support his claim that moral language reflects 
some aspiration toward depicting moral reality. First, he examines the uses to which moral 
language is put, and second, he notes the consequences of denying moral reality. 
 Mackie thinks non-cognitivist and naturalistic theories of morality both capture part of 
the truth, but that each position derives most of its plausibility from the sense that the other is 
inadequate to our purposes for moral language (Mackie-1977, 32). So, non-cognitivism seems 
inadequate because there must be something external that establishes the authority of moral 
judgments; it lacks the objectivity of naturalism, which on the other hand seems inadequate 
because it cannot explain why moral judgments should be practical except by referring to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Mackie also supports E2 with an argument from relativity — the empirical fact of moral 
disagreement across cultures is evidence that there is no objective moral reality because the best 
explanation for this is that these moral customs simply “reflect adherence and participation in 
different forms of life”, not that these moral customs “express perceptions, most of them 
seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values” (Mackie-1977, 36-37).	  
29 In an interview Blackburn claimed that a key area where he thinks Mackie is wrong is in 
thinking that ordinary moral language points at moral reality. Blackburn thinks that philosophical 
analysis of moral language is wrong – it is philosophers who get it wrong when they claim moral 
language aims at describing moral reality; ordinary language talks as if there is one, and that is 
perfectly all right (Dall’Agnol, 102-103).  
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desires of the person who holds that moral judgment (Mackie-1977, 32-33).30 Mackie argues that 
the “ordinary user of moral language” wants to objectively characterize a particular action as 
good or bad in itself, but she also wants this characterization to involve some “call for action” 
(Mackie-1977, 33). Mackie illustrates this duality in the use of moral language when he suggests 
that a person who wonders whether his research on bacteriological warfare is good is not simply 
wondering about his attitude toward it — he is wondering about the research itself. 
 Mackie also points out that there is evidence that ordinary people tend to assume values 
really do exist. Many people who are exposed to the existentialist claim that human beings create 
their own values come to the conclusion that life is meaningless and purposeless, leaving them in 
despair. Mackie notes that the latter does not follow logically from the former, but the fact that 
for many people coming to believe that values are subjective produces this reaction is evidence 
that many people do experience morality as an objective phenomenon (Mackie-1977, 34). These 
two points offer reasons to think that moral practice aims — at least in part — at representing 
moral reality. 
2.4 Chapter Conclusion 
 The objectivist pretenses of moral practices, the Frege-Geach problem, and the causal 
theory of reference, present a trio of considerations that call for a reappraisal of the dialectic 
between moral realists – people who think that there are people, acts, circumstances that are 
good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc., and they would be so if human beings did not think 
them so, and moral judgments, thus, may be true or false whether or not they accurately describe 
such people, acts, or circumstances, and moral antirealists – people who think that human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Michael Smith’s analysis of the moral problem as the reconciliation of the objectivity of moral 
judgments, practicality of moral judgments, and the Humean theory of motivation echoes this 
(Smith-1994).  
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beings’ experience of people, acts, circumstances as good, immoral kind, deceitful, evil, etc. are 
not the product of features of the world that are themselves good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, 
etc. independent of human beings thinking them so. In the next chapter I will present 
Blackburn’s own explanation of how he conceives his moral antirealist project and an account 
and assessment of how he tries to achieve these aims. I will then argue that Blackburn’s work 
does not successfully address this important aim of metaethics.
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Chapter 3:  Blackburn’s Metaethics 
 
3.1 Blackburn’s Project 
In an interview in which he discusses quasi-realism, Blackburn characterizes expressivism as 
being on the retreat in the 1970s, and he attributes that principally to the influence of the Frege-
Geach argument (Dall´Agnol, 101).1 There he describes his project as an attempt to answer the 
Frege-Geach argument by “trying to give an account of the constructions, the contents of moral 
speech … to give an account of what we are doing when we use language in that way … that 
would be an explanation of what we are doing and a justification” (Dall´Agnol, 102). Beyond his 
sympathy for expressivism Blackburn appears to have an idiosyncratic reason for taking on this 
project (Dall´Agnol, 102). Blackburn interprets Mackie’s error theory as claiming that that 
“ordinary language is full of mistakes about what normative facts were” (Dall´Agnol, 102). Due 
to Wittgenstein’s influence Blackburn is uneasy with this; Blackburn thinks ordinary language is 
in perfect order, and ordinary thought is better than philosophical thought. So, Blackburn thinks 
he needs to address the Frege-Geach argument in order to vindicate ordinary talk and thought 
about morality, given an antirealist base. 
This is a rather idiosyncratic interpretation of error theory, which is typically interpreted 
as claiming that all moral propositions are false because none of their predicates refer to 
properties that exist; and Mackie seems to take ordinary language at face value in this argument. 
But, Blackburn objects that what Mackie and other philosophers have done to ordinary moral 
talk is foisted a metaethical theory, moral realism, on it (Dall´Agnol, 103). Blackburn thinks in 
ordinary moral talk, we talk as if there is a moral reality even though there is not one. This claim 
is confusing because Mackie would agree with it. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I will put off defining quasi-realism until the start of the next section. 
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Blackburn appears to be accusing moral philosophers of describing moral practice in such 
a way that certain metaethical views, like naturalistic moral realism, are elements of that 
practice, i.e., that a person who affirms that giving to others is good is also a realist about 
goodness. If moral philosophers do this, they are wrong to do so, but I don’t think Mackie is 
guilty of this; he appears to be interpreting moral language literally, which is a charitable 
interpretation. Blackburn is right, though, that philosophers should not assume that most people 
who engage in moral practice have any conscious metaethical views. In this essay’s conclusion I 
will argue that Blackburn’s argument against error theory, but in this chapter, I want to turn to 
Blackburn’s attempts at answering the Frege-Geach problem. 
3.2 Quasi-Realism 
In the interview cited above Blackburn explains that one of his motivations for trying to answer 
the Frege-Geach problem is his sympathy for expressivism; he thinks there is “something 
fundamentally right about giving an account of the meaning of moral language in terms of the 
attitude it expresses when we moralize” (Dall´Agnol, 102). Even though he is sympathetic to 
early versions of expressivism, Blackburn endorses a modified version of expressivism, 
projectivism, which he has defined as “the philosophy of evaluation which says that evaluative 
properties are projections of our own sentiments (emotions, reactions, attitudes, 
commendations)” (Blackburn-1984, 180). (This definition of projectivism is only meant to be 
provisional since in the subsequent chapter I will attempt to provide a nuanced analysis of the 
view.) Blackburn’s other motivation – vindicating ordinary moral talk – is evident in his 
description of quasi-realism:  “[It] is the enterprise of explaining why our discourse has the 
shape it does, in particular by way of treating evaluative predicates like others, if projectivism is 
true. It thus seeks to explain, and justify, the realistic-seeming nature of our talk of evaluations” 
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(Blackburn-1984, 180). Quasi-realism is less a theory than a research program – it is an attempt 
to provide a semantics for moral discourse that is consistent with projectivism and that, at the 
same, does not require a revision of moral discourse. In the next subsection, I will examine 
Blackburn’s first attempt at this task. 
3.2.1 Proto-quasi-realism 
Blackburn’s 1973 paper, “Moral Realism,” is principally known for the introduction of his 
supervenience argument against moral realism, but in the third section he addresses some of 
the challenges for antirealist theories of morality. He points out that it is easy to assume that a 
complete analysis of moral discourse has been provided when the meaning of moral predicates 
has been explained in terms of expressing speakers’ attitudes (Blackburn-1973, 123). The 
analyses of moral propositions in the previous chapter reflect this approach. However, Blackburn 
notes that philosophers have criticized this analysis because it is only sufficient to explain the 
meaning of moral language in straightforward assertions like “Courage is an intrinsically good 
thing;” the meaning of this moral judgment is explained as expressing approval for courage 
(Blackburn-1973, 123). However, this analysis cannot provide an account of the meaning of 
moral language when it is used in ways that are not straightforward assertions, as in the 
following examples:  “If courage is an intrinsically good thing, then organized games should be 
part of school curricula;” “No statement of the naturalistic properties of courage entails that 
courage is an intrinsically good thing” (Blackburn-1973, 123). In “Moral Realism” Blackburn 
develops his first antirealist moral semantics to address the use of moral language in these 
contexts. 
 Blackburn proposes that moral language be interpreted as the “propositional reflection” 
of moral attitudes (Blackburn-1973, 125). Consider one of Blackburn’s examples above: 
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Z. No statement of the naturalistic properties of courage entails that courage is an 
intrinsically good thing. 
 
Blackburn’s proposal is that this proposition makes a claim about the attitude of approval toward 
courage; the claim is that nobody who disapproves of courage, while knowing all there is to 
know about it, is guilty of a logical mistake. In the previous chapter, I presented antirealist 
analyses of moral propositions for the various antirealist moral theories discussed, but it is not 
obvious how to represent this proposition given Blackburn’s interpretation; a plausible candidate 
for interpreting the propositional reflection in Z seems to be: 
Z'. Approval of courage is not entailed by complete knowledge of courage. 
 
Blackburn defines a propositional reflection as “any statement that, while appearing to make a 
factual claim about states of affairs, their interrelations, and their logic, is actually making claims 
about attitudes, although none of the propositions involved in the statement is to be analyzed into 
one whose subject is an attitude” (Blackburn-1973, 125-126). 
Blackburn claims that his proposal is promising because it can be extended to 
hypothetical propositions like this one:  
B. If courage is an intrinsically good thing, then organized games should be part 
of school curricula. 
 
Ordinarily, a hypothetical claims that if one state of affairs obtains, then another one does, too, 
but Blackburn suggests that it would be a mistake to interpret B that way. B, too, is a 
propositional reflection; but, since both the antecedent and consequent involve moral 
propositions, it is a claim about a connection between attitudes:  B is the “claim that an attitude 
of approval to courage involves an attitude of approval toward organized games as part of the 
curriculum in every school” (Blackburn-1973, 126). It seems that B should be interpreted as 
follows:  
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B'. Approval of courage involves approval of organized games as part of school 
curricula. 
 
Blackburn says that it would be wrong to think that the former attitude involves the latter one as 
a matter of logic; instead, to demonstrate that approval of courage involves approval of 
organized games at school, it is necessary to show that organized games produce courage in 
students. Blackburn does not think that B and B' are different in this respect; he thinks that B is 
not true as a matter of logic, either – to prove it, we would have to show that organized games 
produce courageous students, just as for B'.  
Blackburn argues that there are several bases for holding “if … then…” propositions in 
both moral and natural discourses, and the notion of “involvement” he uses to analyze moral 
propositions as claims about attitudes is flexible enough to accommodate them. Blackburn 
claims that the notion of “involvement” at work here is one of consistency – a person cannot 
hold one attitude without holding the other attitude. This is supposed to be Blackburn’s solution 
to the Frege-Geach problem because it can preserve the validity of modus ponendo ponens 
(Blackburn-1973, 127). Under this analysis of moral language, “anybody asserting ‘P, and if P, 
then Q’ where P attributes worth to a thing expresses his attitude to that thing, and asserts that 
the attitude involves a further attitude or belief” (Blackburn-1973, 127). Once a person makes 
this assertion, there is a logical inconsistency in not holding the further attitude or belief, and 
according to Blackburn, this logical consistency is expressed when we say modus ponendo 
ponens is valid for B':  “its validity is a reflection of a possible logical inconsistency in attitude 
and beliefs” (Blackburn-1973, 127). 
3.2.1.1 Problems for Proto-quasi-realism 
In “Moral Realism” Blackburn’s answer to the Frege-Geach problem is to show that his 
“involvement” notion is flexible enough to preserve the modus ponendo ponens inference. 
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Originally, Blackburn says neither B nor B' are making logical claims, so his notion of 
“involvement” is not a matter of logic, but this is a strange solution because modus ponendo 
ponens is a logical rule of inference. Blackburn is not reproducing the logical inference, he is 
offering a justification for inferring Q from if P, then Q, and P. 
Blackburn’s comparison of B and B' as both not reflecting logical claims may be due to 
the fact that in many contexts people make connections that are not entailments, but which they 
nonetheless express, inexactly, via modus ponendo ponens. The fact that this practice is common 
in naturalistic discourse appears to provide cover for the practice in moral discourse. This 
interpretation casts Blackburn as answering the Frege-Geach challenge by denying that we are 
making actual logical inferences in moral discourse. In other words, Blackburn answers the 
Frege-Geach problem by denying that what seems to be a feature of moral discourse really is a 
feature of it. In chapter 1 I suggested that metaethical theories are meant to answer questions 
about moral practice, but on this interpretation Blackburn seems to be re-characterizing moral 
practice. I do not think this is what moral philosopher should aim to do in metaethics, but I will 
set aside this criticism for now because it is premature to argue that this is what Blackburn is 
doing. 
A problem for Blackburn’s comparison of B and B' is that the inference in B, can be 
interpreted as a matter of logic if B, “If courage is an intrinsically good thing, then organized 
games should be part of school curricula,” is supplemented with an enthymeme premise like the 
following:   
Intrinsically good things should be fostered in students. 
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Once this moral judgment is conjoined with B, that organized games should be part of school 
curricula is a matter of one or two logical inferences of the modus ponendo ponens variety. 
Consider: 
P1. If courage is an intrinsically good thing, then organized games should be part 
of school curricula. 
P2. Courage is an intrinsically good thing. 
P3. Intrinsically good things should be fostered in students. 
C. Organized games should be part of school curricula. 
If a suppressed premise underlies the inference in B, then inferences like B', “Approval of 
courage involves approval of organized games as part of school curricula,” can no longer deflect 
the charge that they are illicit by pointing to illicit inferences like in B. 
Blackburn does not have the option of claiming that B' can be supplemented with an 
enthymeme premise that generates the inference; it is hard to imagine how to express the 
enthymeme premise above in terms of approval. Compare the argument generated from B' when 
it is supplemented with an enthymeme premise: 
P1'. Approval of courage involves approval of organized games as part of school 
curricula 
P2'. Approval of courage. 
P3'. Approval of fostering approved things. 
C'. Approval of organized games as part of school curricula. 
 
The Frege-Geach problem draws attention to the fact that it is hard to see how a non-cognitivist 
interpretation of moral language can be preserved from asserted to unasserted contexts; 
Blackburn’s solution to the problem is to argue that moral language propositions involving 
unasserted contexts are just disguised assertions. But the more important insight of the Frege-
Geach problem is that antirealist accounts of moral language have difficulty preserving the 
functions that are accepted elements of moral practice; the Frege-Geach problem indicates that 
logical inferences are hard to preserve on the antirealist account by calling attention to moral 
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language in unasserted contexts. Blackburn seems to have focused on the propositions rather 
than the practice when devising his solution for “Moral Realism”; he seems to think that if he 
can provide an antirealist account of moral language in unasserted contexts, then he will have 
provided a solution. What Blackburn actually needs to do is preserve the practice of making 
logical inferences in moral discourse, and this solution seems to commit something like the 
fallacy of equivocation. 
In the second argument above, Blackburn transforms the proposition in which moral 
language occurs in an unasserted context into an assertion, but the assertion in P1' is no longer a 
moral assertion as P2' or P3' are moral assertions. The kind of assertion that P1' is now, is a 
belief. The inference that Blackburn asks us to make – approval of organized games on the basis 
of a belief about a connection between two attitudes of approval and the relevant attitudes – 
seems to depend on us being distracted into thinking P1' is an expression of attitude rather than 
belief because of the presence of a term like “approval.” Blackburn asserts that there can be 
logical consistency between attitudes and beliefs, but this is doubtful. There is no logical 
connection between having the attitude of approval to courage and approving of organized 
games as part of school curricula; nothing logically compels a person to have the latter attitude if 
she has the former one. Ultimately, this second criticism of Blackburn’s attempt to solve the 
Frege-Geach problem levels two charges at it:  (1) the supposed examples of non-logical 
inference in naturalistic discourse that provide cover for non-logical inferences in moral 
discourse do not exist, so this kind of inference in moral discourse requires a special justification; 
(2) even supposing that there is nothing illicit in using the form of modus ponendo ponens for 
non-logical inferences, Blackburn’s claim that logical consistency among attitudes and beliefs 
justifies its use is false since there is no such consistency among them. 
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 Another criticism, related to the idea that there is a form of equivocation at the heart of 
Blackburn’s proposed solution, is that it assumes that the positive moral evaluations in 
propositional reflections like B are identical to the moral attitudes of approval towards the 
distinct objects in B'. But prima facie B implies two different kinds of moral assessment toward 
the objects in it. The moral judgment, “Courage is an intrinsically good thing,” suggests a 
positive evaluation of courage, such that a situation would be improved by the presence of 
courage, while the moral judgment, “Organized games should be part of school curricula,” 
suggests a more rigorous evaluation, such that a situation will be made worse by the absence of 
organized games (presumably there will be less courage than is desirable). This kind of 
difference in moral evaluation is the difference between supererogatory acts and duties. Donation 
of a kidney to a stranger is good, it improves how things are, but moral evaluation of such an act 
typically stops there. (To be fair, we praise this act highly, but we do not suggest other people 
imitate it.) Duties, on the other hand, seem to be the kind of act that if we fail to perform them, 
then things are made worse off than they are; it is not just good that a lifeguard saves a drowning 
bather at the beach, it is her duty to do it. In B' the moral evaluation of courage and the moral 
evaluation of organized games is not differentiated, for both it is approval. Blackburn is wrong 
that B and B' have the same meaning since the former makes separate kinds of evaluation of its 
objects; while in B' they both receive the same evaluation. The only way Blackburn can avoid 
this criticism is to provide an argument that all moral judgments are expressions of one kind of 
attitude, and then specify that attitude.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Alexander Miller argues that emotivist theories face what he calls, the moral attitude problem – 
emotivists must specify what sort of feeling, emotion, attitude, etc. moral judgments express – 
and this is a particular challenging problem (Miller, 43). This criticism of Blackburn is inspired 
by Miller’s point, but it is different. I will return to the moral attitude problem when examining 
Blackburn’s subsequent revisions to his account of moral language. 
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3.2.1.2 Schueler on Proto-quasi-realism 
My interpretation of Blackburn’s initial answer to the Frege-Geach problem in “Moral Realism” 
is that it attempts to show that within naturalistic discourse non-logical inferences are discussed 
using the form of modus ponendo ponens, so it is not inappropriate to do the same thing in moral 
discourse. My criticism of this approach is that there is reason to think that the purported 
examples of non-logical inference in naturalistic discourse are actual logical inferences, but not 
for Blackburn’s analysis of moral discourse. In “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism” G. F. 
Schueler interprets Blackburn as trying to preserve modus ponendo ponens as a logical rule of 
inference for moral discourse (Schueler, 493), and he quotes Blackburn to support this 
interpretation:  “the validity of modus ponendo ponens as a rule of inference is preserved” 
(Blackburn-1973, 127). Schueler’s critique of this approach focuses on arguing that Blackburn’s 
treatment in “Moral Realism” cannot prove that the inferences examined here are genuine 
examples of modus ponendo ponens. Schueler takes Blackburn’s claim that his approach in 
“Moral Realism” is meant to preserve modus ponendo ponens at face value, while I interpret it as 
an early version of the approach I will examine in subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
Schueler focuses on the argument using B as a putative example of modus ponendo 
ponens:  
A. Courage is an intrinsically good thing. 
B. If courage is an intrinsically good thing, then organized games should be part 
of school curricula. 
C. Organized games should be part of school curricula. 
 
An example of modus ponendo ponens has the following logical form:  P; P → Q; therefore, Q. 
Schueler argues that if this is so, then Blackburn’s account cannot show that the argument in 
ABC is an example of modus ponendo ponens because A and B cannot have the logical forms 
that P and P → Q have in standard logical inferences (Schueler, 494). 
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According to Schueler, A will not have the same form as P once A is interpreted as 
Blackburn claims it should be. Schueler does not explain why A and P cannot have the same 
form, but I think he has something like the following in mind. In ordinary logical inferences, P is 
understood to be a straightforward proposition.3 But Blackburn cannot intend for A to be a 
straightforward proposition on his interpretation of moral claims – A is an expression of attitude 
rather than a proposition. So, however Blackburn intends for A to understood, it will not be a 
proposition like P, and cannot function the way P would in modus ponendo ponens. 
Schueler also claims that if B is understood as Blackburn proposes, it cannot have the 
logical form of P → Q. In a conditional, the truth functional connective “→” is used to join two 
independent propositions. But Schueler claims that the “gloss” Blackburn gives of B, B',  
“Approval of courage involves approval of organized games as part of school curricula,” could 
not have “→” as it main logical connective because it cannot be analyzed into two propositions 
that can be connected by “→” (Schueler, 494). If B' is a proposition, it is simple – it is not an 
example of two propositions being joined by “→”.  Schueler claims the same problem arises if B' 
has a logical form, and its logical form is the following: 
(x) [(x has an attitude of approval toward courage) → (x has an attitude of 
approval toward organized games as part of the curriculum in very school)] 
(Schueler, 494). 
 
This not an example of P → Q. If the universal quantification of B' were to be used as a 
logical premise in propositional logic, its logical form would be “R” – it would be a simple, and 
not truth functionally compound (Schueler, 494-495). This problem is damning since that would 
make the logical form of the reasoning from A and B to C, the following:  P; R; therefore, Q. 
And, that is definitely not an instance of modus ponendo ponens (Schueler, 495). Schueler does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I am using proposition in the logical sense of a sentence that affirms or denies a predicate of a 
subject and can have truth values. 
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not see how Blackburn can preserve ABC as an example of modus ponendo ponens since neither 
of Blackburn’s glosses on A or B have the logical form that the premises in a modus ponendo 
ponens argument are typically assumed to have.  
Schueler also considers a different possibility; even though the reasoning in ABC is not 
an instance of modus ponendo ponens, it might nonetheless be valid on different grounds. 
Schueler seems to have in mind the possibility that I examined above – there may be non-logical 
inferences that are valid. Schueler suggests that Blackburn may have this in mind when 
Blackburn proposes that B itself expresses a moral standard, or makes a moral claim (Blackburn-
1973, 127). In other words, B, like A, is a moral proposition because it expresses an attitude. On 
this interpretation, a person who utters B is not asserting a link between the two attitudes; she is 
instead expressing an attitude that having the attitude expressed in A involves having an 
additional attitude. (Schueler draws on a subsequent article of Blackburn’s, “Rule Following and 
Moral Realism” to characterize this as a commitment). Blackburn does think that once a person 
has expressed both attitudes in A and B, she is logically inconsistent, if she does not hold this 
further attitude (Blackburn-1973, 127).  
Schueler denies that this is logical inconsistency. If a person does not fulfill a 
commitment – in this case the commitment to having one attitude, if she has another – she acts 
wrongly, she fails to do what she should do; this may be a form of inconsistency, but it is not 
logical inconsistency. The reasoning involved in ABC is not valid since it is not an example of 
logical consistency. 
 In “Attitudes and Contents” Blackburn acknowledges the force of Schueler’s criticism, 
but even before that, in Spreading the Word, he had reformulated his response to the Frege-
Geach challenge. 
	   84	  
3.2.2 Early Quasi-realism 
In “Moral Realism” Blackburn tries to answer the Frege-Geach problem by arguing that like the 
realist, the antirealist can preserve the meaning of moral propositions from asserted context to 
unasserted context; the antirealist does this by claiming that moral propositions that are 
hypothetical propositions are disguised assertions of a link between moral attitudes, but not 
expressions of an attitude. This solution to the Frege-Geach problem does not hold up because 
the antirealist is not able to preserve the practices of moral discourse that realists can easily 
accommodate.  
In Spreading the Word Blackburn’s approach to answering the Frege-Geach problem 
shifts. In the intervening period between “Moral Realism” and Spreading the Word, Blackburn 
adopted projectivism as the explanation for why there is moral practice; roughly, projectivism 
is the view that there is a practice of judging acts good or bad because we project our attitudes 
onto those acts. The problem for this version of antirealism, is still the same; “[u]nasserted 
contexts show us treating moral predicates like others,” i.e., like naturalistic predicates 
(Blackburn-1984, 191). Blackburn thinks that projectivism must explain both what is our 
purpose when we state a sentence in which there is a moral judgment that is unasserted and why 
this is the particular sentence appropriate to serve that purpose (Blackburn-1984, 191). 
Blackburn’s new solution to the Frege-Geach problem is to argue that the hypothetical 
propositions, in which there are moral judgments that are unasserted, are expressions of attitudes, 
too. 
3.2.2.1 Conditionals as Conjunctions 
Blackburn claims that our purpose in uttering a sentence like, “If it is wrong to tell lies, it is 
wrong to get your little brother to tell lies,” in which a moral judgment is unasserted, is to 
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express an attitude to a moral sensibility. To support this claim he begins by pointing out that we 
frequently want to communicate multiple commitments, even when those commitments are 
distinct kinds of commitments; e.g., we want to communicate an evaluation and a belief like, “It 
is wrong to tell lies and your mother is going to be annoyed” (Blackburn-1984, 191). We do this 
by conjoining the two commitments with “and” Blackburn intends to propose that if “and” can 
conjoin an evaluation and a belief, it can conjoin two evaluations, and so conditionals are really 
conjunctions of evaluations. Blackburn admits, though, that squaring this proposal with the 
standard semantics of “and” is problematic. The standard semantic account of “and” is that “it 
stands between two sentences to make one larger sentence out of them; the larger sentence is true 
if and only if each smaller one is true” (Blackburn-1984, 191). A problem for his approach is that 
because he is a projectivist Blackburn thinks that moral sentences do not express propositions 
that are truth evaluable, and so prima facie it seems wrong to combine them via a device that is 
meant to link truth evaluable propositions. 
Blackburn argues that this is not genuinely problematic since “and” is commonly used to 
conjoin propositions – like commands – that no one thinks are truth evaluable; consider, “Fall in 
and stand at attention.” Nobody would argue that it is a mistake to join “Fall in” and “Stand at 
attention” with “and”, so Blackburn claims we should “expand the way we think of ‘and’.” He 
proposes that our understanding of “and” be expanded so that it “links commitments to give an 
overall commitment which is accepted only if each component is accepted” (Blackburn-1984, 
191-192). So, according to Blackburn, the purpose of conjoining commitments is to express an 
overall commitment to both.4 Blackburn does not appear to suggest that this overall commitment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Blackburn is imprecise in his use of the term “commitment” – it seems like a catch-all term for 
mental states when he calls beliefs and attitudes, habits, and prescriptions commitments 
(Blackburn-1984, 192). The imprecision is unfortunate because it is not clear whether the 
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is meant to express a commitment to holding the one constituent attitude if one holds the other 
constituent attitude. However, it seems to me that this must be part of the purpose of conjoining 
attitudes. What unites expressivists is their contention that moral language cannot be understood 
except by reference to its purpose. On a truth-functional analysis of “and,” its meaning is simply 
to unite statements of what is the case. For Blackburn’s analysis to be different than the truth-
functional one, his “and” must do more than unite attitudes; this suggests that the overall 
commitment expresses something like a judgment that a person should have both constituent 
attitudes, or a person should not have one constituent attitude and the negation of the other 
constituent attitude. 
This is an important amendment to Blackburn’s account of conjoining attitudes since he 
contends that the purpose of conditionals is to work out the implications of commitments by 
ranking sensibilities (Blackburn-1984, 192). Blackburn defines a moral sensibility as “a function 
from input of belief to output of attitude” (Blackburn-1984, 192, italics original). Blackburn 
argues that we must rank sensibilities since these have an immense influence on how people 
behave, which, in turn, impacts the quality of the world in which we live.5 If this is the case, then 
it seems that what particularly interests Blackburn about a sensibility is its output of attitudes, 
and so sensibilities should be ranked according to the attitudes that compose them. A sensibility, 
then, is, for all intents and purposes, a conjunction of attitudes. Ranking of sensibilities then is a 
matter of approving of this conjunction of attitudes, and the conditional forms, in which moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
conjunction of two different kinds of commitments – belief and attitude – can be an overall 
commitment to both or whether the components of an overall commitment must be the same type 
of commitment. It seems to me that the components of an overall commitment must be of the 
same kind, and that the overall commitment must be a similar kind of mental state as the 
components; the overall commitment to two conjoined beliefs is itself a belief, and the overall 
commitment to a conjunction of attitudes is a non-cognitive state. 
5 Something like the internalist view that beliefs cannot motivate behavior seems to be at play 
here; the outputs of a sensibility are attitudes, which motivate behavior.	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propositions are unasserted, are endorsements of these conjunctions.6 So, e.g., “If it is wrong to 
tell lies, it is wrong to get your little brother to tell lies,” is an endorsement of a sensibility which 
conjoins an attitude of disapproval of telling lies to an attitude of disapproval of getting one’s 
little brother to tell lies.7 
3.2.2.2 Expressive Language and Conjunction 
Blackburn points out that once he has explained the purpose of conditionals that include moral 
propositions, he will need to provide a semantics of this account since his analysis eliminates 
moral predicates from language; Blackburn proposes that there could be an expressive language, 
Eex (Blackburn-1984, 193). Eex explicitly represents the expressivist nature of moral judgments 
with what Blackburn dubs ‘hooray!’ and ‘boo!’ operators that are to be represented as “H!” and 
“B!” These operators can then be attached to descriptions of actions to express attitudes. In Eex 
moral judgments like, “Giving to others is kind,” and “It is wrong to tell lies,” would be 
expressed as follows: 
Eex1.  H! (giving to others) 
 
and 
 
Eex2.  B! (telling lies). 
 
Eex1 expresses an attitude of approval to giving to others, and Eex2 expresses an attitude of 
disapproval to telling lies. Blackburn has already pointed out that we want to be able to talk 
about and compare sensibilities, which are conjunctions of attitudes, so Eex will need ways of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This analysis is consistent with footnote 4 in which I suggested that the kind mental state of an 
overall commitment to the conjunction of two attitudes must itself be an attitude. 
7 A sensibility is more complex than the example of one in which an attitude of disapproval of 
lying is conjoined with an attitude of disapproval of getting one’s little brother to lie. For one, it 
will include indefinitely many more attitudes. But, it is a functional mechanism by which these 
attitudes are conjoined.	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doing this.  Blackburn proposes that bars, “| |”, be used to indicate that an attitude is being talked 
about. So, a reference to Eex1 would be represented as follows: 
Eex3.  |H! (giving to others)|. 
 
And, a semi-colon is to be used to denote that one attitude involves or is coupled with another 
attitude. The attitude in Eex2 may involve, or be coupled with, a disapproval of getting others to 
lie, which would be represented as follows: 
Eex4. B! (getting little brother to tell lies). 
 
Blackburn, then suggests that the view that these two attitudes are linked in this way would be 
represented as follows: 
Eex5. |B! (telling lies)|;|B! (getting little brother to tell lies)|. 
 
Since we are interested in ranking sensibilities that are conjunctions of attitudes, 
Blackburn’s Eex needs a way to represent conditionals that express endorsements of sensibilities. 
Blackburn finally proposes that the conditional, “If it is wrong to tell lies, it is wrong to get your 
little brother to tell lies,” be represented as follows: 
Eex6. H! (|B! (telling lies)|;|B! (getting little brother to tell lies)|). 
 
Eex6 expresses an attitude of approval to an attitude, which is composed of the attitude of 
disapproval to telling lies and the attitude of disapproval to getting little brother to tell lies.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Blackburn is ambiguous about the relationship between the two attitudes united by a semi-
colon in Eex5. The semi-colon is meant to indicate “that one attitude … involves or is coupled 
with another” (Blackburn-984, 194). However, involvement can be interpreted in multiple ways, 
while coupling suggests mere conjunction. Involvement could be interpreted as consistency, 
entailment, or psychological propensity. I do not think any of these interpretations will do. The 
consistency interpretation will have difficulty accounting for a person approving of an attitude 
that is consistent, even if he does not approve of the attitude. For example, some vaccines are 
developed from the tissue of aborted fetuses; consistency suggests that a person who disapproves 
of abortion also disapproves of using these vaccines. It seems plausible for a person to admire 
the attitude of another person even though they do not share it. Some would suggest that humility 
in the face of ethical questions requires such charity. And, interpreting “involvement” as 
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If we assume that Blackburn’s explanation of how the meaning of moral propositions can 
remain constant from asserted to unasserted contexts does not face any immediate challenges, the 
next question for it is whether this account of the meaning of moral propositions can preserve 
important features of moral practice, in particular modus ponendo ponens in moral argument. If it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
entailment cannot be correct, either. This seems similar to the notion of logical consistency that 
Blackburn suggested for “involvement” in “Moral Realism;” it would be subject to the same 
criticisms it faced in the previous section. This interpretation also suggests that having the one 
attitude necessitates having the other, but Blackburn admits that people can disagree over these; 
e.g., people can share the attitude that it is immoral to have discriminated against African 
Americans, but not share the attitude that they should receive preferential treatment now 
(Blackburn-1984, 193). Under the psychological propensity interpretation, the “involvement” 
may be a disposition to disapprove of getting little brother to tell lies as a consequence of having 
an attitude of disapproval to telling lies. This interpretation has the benefit of being compatible 
with Blackburn’s definition of a sensibility as a function from input of belief to output of 
attitude. I think this interpretation would be wrong, too, because it is possible that a person could 
have these attitudes independently from each other; this “involvement” interpretation of the 
semi-colon does not seem flexible enough to accommodate this scenario. I think the semi-colon 
is, therefore, best interpreted as a conjunction that conjoins attitudes. Blackburn claims that we 
are particularly interested in the outputs, the attitudes, of sensibilities since these are what 
generate behavior. If this is right, then really, what matter in a sensibility just are the attitudes; 
the connection between the attitudes, signaled by “involvement” are not so important. We want 
to evaluate attitudes because they manifest in behavior; so it seems that we are most interested in 
evaluating sets of attitudes, which are expressed by their conjunction with the semi-colon. 
This interpretation suggests a mistake or gap in Blackburn’s Eex. Under this interpretation 
in Eex5 and Eex6, the notation suggests a reference to the conjunction of two separate attitudes 
and an attitude of approval to two separate attitudes. Since, we want to refer to or evaluate the 
union of those two attitudes, the sensibility they compose, there seems to be a need for another 
device to represent that; I would propose brackets, [ ], to represent a sensibility. I think the 
notation in Eex5 is actually a reference to two attitudes, and I think the notation in Eex6 is actually 
approval of two attitudes, but Blackburn thinks they refer to or evaluate one sensibility 
composed of multiple attitudes.  To refer to a single sensibility or evaluate it, they should be 
represented as follows, respectively: 
 
Eex7. [|B! (telling lies)|;|B! (withholding the truth)|] 
 
and 
 
Eex8. H! ([|B! (telling lies)|;|B! (getting little brother to tell lies|]). 
 
These amendments to Blackburn’s semantics for Eex do not do anything to anticipate and avoid 
that criticism to follow, but I did want to draw attention to them.	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does, then Blackburn has a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, which would provide evidence 
to think moral antirealism is correct. For the realist, the following argument is a standard 
example of this logical inference: 
D. It is wrong to tell lies. 
E. If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
F. It is wrong to get little brother to tell lies (Blackburn-1984, 191). 
In Eex, the argument is represented as follows: 
G. B! (telling lies) 
H. H! (|B! (telling lies)|;|B! (getting little brother to tell lies)|) 
I. B! (getting little brother to tell lies) (Blackburn-1984, 195). 
 
According to Blackburn, the inference to I from G and H is an example of logical inference, and 
the projectivist can preserve this important feature of moral practice. The inference is a logical 
one because anyone who holds G and H must hold I, too, or his attitudes will clash; anybody 
who expresses the attitudes represented by G and H, but expressed the attitude represented by J: 
J. H! (getting little brother to lie), 
would have a “fractured sensibility” (Blackburn-1984, 195). This fractured sensibility would be 
represented as follows: 
Eex9. |B! (telling lies)|;|B! (getting little brother to tell lies)|;|H! (getting little 
brother to tell lies)|. 
 
And a fractured sensibility like this cannot be an object of approval because it cannot fulfill the 
practical purpose of evaluating things (Blackburn-1984, 195). Blackburn does not say why this is 
so, but it seems that since we want to rank sensibilities to encourage people to adopt the better 
ones, which will improve behavior, this sensibility is not susceptible to ranking since we would 
not to be able to begin to figure out where to place a sensibility with incompatible attitudes.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Interestingly, Blackburn cannot appeal to notion of contradiction to explain the inconsistency. 
It would be tempting to argue that the inference to I and G and H is valid because to make the 
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Blackburn preserves modus ponendo ponens as a feature of antirealist moral discourse and 
answers the Frege-Geach problem by claiming that if one holds G and H, then logical 
consistency requires holding I. 
Blackburn concludes this response to Frege-Geach problem by arguing that if an 
expressive language for moral discourse like Eex can do the same things as natural language does 
for naturalistic discourse, then the speakers of Eex will help themselves to the more elegant forms 
of expression of natural language to assist them in expressing “concern for moral improvement, 
clashes, implications, and coherence of attitudes” (Blackburn-1984, 195). In order to use the 
more elegant forms of natural language the speakers of Eex have to mimic naturalistic predicates 
by inventing moral predicates, which are rooted in attitudes. Blackburn does not think, then, that 
the fact that moral language has the same form as natural language is evidence that expressivist 
theories are wrong – it only highlights that people have adopted a form of language that meets 
moral discourse’s needs. 
3.2.2.3 Schueler’s problem for early quasi-realism 
Blackburn describes a failure to hold G and H, but not I, as a logical mistake; if this is so, then 
GHI is an example of a logically valid inference, and he has effectively responded to the Frege-
Geach problem. Crispin Wright claims that someone who holds G and H, but not I commits a 
mistake, just not a logical mistake. Wright argues that the essential component of a valid 
inference is the inconsistency of accepting the premises and denying the conclusion. And, while 
Blackburn tries to replicate this with the clash of attitudes, which arises from endorsing G and H 
and not endorsing I, Wright denies there is anything to call inconsistency in this. Wright says that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
inference to J would generate a contradiction, but Blackburn cannot makes this argument since 
contradiction is understood in terms of propositions with conflicting truth values, and, as an 
expressivist, Blackburn does not think that moral judgments have truth values. 
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what has happened when a person holds G and H, but not I is that he has failed to hold one of the 
combinations of attitudes they endorse; this is a moral failing, not a logical one (Wright-1988, 
33, italics original).10 
In “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism” Schueler arrives at the same conclusion 
independently.  Before pressing this criticism Schueler makes two points about how Blackburn’s 
approach to the Frege-Geach problem has changed from “Moral Realism” to Spreading the 
Word. First, as I noted above, in “Moral Realism” a conditional is an assertion that one attitude 
involves another, but in Spreading the Word the conditional is now an expression of attitude 
toward the conjunction of two attitudes. Schueler points out that Blackburn characterizes 
conditionals as commitments (see Balckburn-1984, 195), but “commitment” is a term that 
suggests a realist interpretation. If the conditional is still meant to express an attitude, Schueler 
claims that Blackburn cannot use “commitment” in its usual sense, and Blackburn owes an 
explanation of this different sense (Schueler, 498).11 Second, unlike in “Moral Realism” 
Blackburn does not claim in Spreading the Word to prove that the inference to I from G and H is 
an example of modus ponendo ponens, and Blackburn doesn’t claim the argument in GHI is 
valid. This second point spurs Schueler to examine what Blackburn says is going on in GHI. 
Blackburn says, “[I]t is a logical mistake that is made if someone holds the first two 
commitments, and not the commitment of disapproval of getting your little brother to lie” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In “Moral Blindness” Stefan Baumrin argues that a person who is morally blind, who fails to 
see why he should do what he morally judges as right, is guilty of failing to appreciate that the 
moral judgment implies the imperative (Baumrin-1963, 209). He suggested in comments that the 
moral failing Wright diagnoses is the same as a logical failing. I do not think this is correct 
because Baumrin is diagnosing the failure to live up to one’s moral judgments as the product of 
not accepting an imperative that is implied by the moral judgment. Here, for Wright there is no 
logical implication between the moral judgments. 
11 Schueler’s criticism here is similar to my observation in footnote 4 that Blackburn’s use of the 
term “commitment” is not precise. 
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(Blackburn-1984, 195). Like Wright, Schuler objects that having clashing attitudes or not doing 
what you commit yourself to doing are not logical mistakes, at least not as “logical mistake” is 
ordinarily understood (Schueler, 498-499). Schueler suggests a charitable interpretation of 
Blackburn as giving an antirealist account of what a logical mistake is within moral argument; 
Blackburn does after all show there is some kind of mistake being made by having a fractured 
sensibility (Schueler, 499). But, Schueler finds fault with this interpretation because he cannot 
see why Blackburn thinks someone’s attitudes would clash if she accepted G and H, but not I. 
Imagine that you had the following three attitudes:  disapproval of lying; approval of the view 
that disapproving of lying “involves” disapproving of getting one’s little brother to lie; approval 
of getting my little brother to lie. Schueler argues that Blackburn cannot explain what makes us 
think these attitudes clash. The most promising explanation would be to just say that 
disapproving of lying clashes with approving of getting my little brother to lie, but Schueler 
points out that this situation would make the conditional redundant. If the conditional is made 
redundant in the argument, then Blackburn is not providing an account of the inference to I from 
G and H that mirrors, at least, modus ponendo ponens (Schueler, 499). 
In order to generate the clash, the conditional – the attitude of approval towards the view 
that disapproval of lying involves disapproval of getting others to lie – is the key attitude, and it 
is the involvement claim that must do the job. Schueler does not know what “involvement” 
means. He notes that Blackburn describes this as a commitment to having the consequent 
disapproval from G and H (see Blackburn-1984, 195), but this runs into the criticism Schueler 
made before:  “commitment” invokes a realist construal, and without an antirealist construal of 
it, it begs the question (Schueler, 499). And, the other terms that Blackburn interposes for 
“involves” – “is coupled with” and “follow upon” (see Blackburn-1984, 194 and 195) – do not 
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do anything to explain how the attitudes clash. Schueler suggests a psychological gloss like the 
one I offered in footnote 8 – the connection between disapproving of lying and disapproving of 
getting others to lie is a psychological one, so that a person who had the one, could not help but 
have the other – but he also rejects it because it is false (Schueler, 499). Schueler thinks 
Blackburn is only able to say that the attitudes are different, not that they clash (Shuler, 500). 
Finally, Schueler argues that even if Blackburn can explain how a person who accepts G 
and H, but not I has a clash of attitudes, he cannot explain what is the mistake in having a 
fractured sensibility (Schueler, 500). Schueler points out that people often have fractured 
sensibilities; an athlete can approve of drinking beer since his experience of drinking it is one of 
enjoyment, and he can also disapprove of it since his experience of drinking it has impacted his 
performance.  There is a clash of attitudes here, but there is no fractured sensibility, or mistake; 
the only thing for the athlete to decide whether to have a beer or not, but there is nothing odd 
about having both attitudes. If Blackburn cannot even explain what the mistake is in having a 
fractured sensibility, he cannot claim there is a logical mistake in having one; he has not 
preserved modus ponendo ponens for antirealist moral discourse after all. 
3.2.2.4 Hale’s problems for early quasi-realism 
In a review of Spreading the Word Bob Hale raises similar objections to Schueler’s ones against 
Blackburn, but he proposes a revision that might defend the quasi-realist against them; Hale 
suggests that there needs to be a different interpretation of the conditional E in Eex. Recall that in 
DEF, E is 
E. If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
And in Eex, Blackburn proposed that the conditional be represented as Eex6, (H, in argument 
GHI): 
	   95	  
H. H! (|B! (telling lies)|;|B! (getting little brother to tell lies)|). 
 
Hale suggests that Blackburn is mistaken in treating the conditional as approval of a sensibility 
that combines disapproval of telling lies with disapproval of getting little brother to tell lies. Hale 
claims that the important thing about E for Eex is that it is a commitment to “disapproving of 
anyone who disapproves of lying but does not disapprove of getting little brother to lie” (Hale-
1986, 74). For Hale, a person who does not disapprove of getting little brother to lie does not, 
therefore, approve of doing so – they may have no attitude about it. Hale thinks Eex needs to be 
supplemented with a method for representing a lack of an attitude; he proposes that the negation 
symbol be used to indicate this. In Hale’s expanded semantics for Eex the lack of an attitude, 
positive or negative can be represented as “-|H! (x)|” and “-|B! (x)|,” and E should be represented 
as follows: 
Eex10. B! (|B! (telling lies)|;-|B!(getting little brother to tell lies)|) (Hale-1986, 74). 
 
So, Hale would propose that GHI should be represented as follows: 
 
G. B! (telling lies) 
H'. B! (|B! (telling lies)|;-|B!(getting little brother to tell lies)|) 
I. B! (getting little brother to tell lies). 
 
Now, any person who has the attitudes represented in G and H' is guilty of a simple 
inconsistency, if he lacks the attitude of disapproval of getting little brother to tell lies (and, this 
is so either by not having any attitude to getting little brother to tell lies, or by approving of doing 
so). Anybody who had the attitudes in G and H', but not I “would have a combination of attitudes 
of which he himself disapproves” (Miller, 63). According to Miller, Hale’s proposal would 
provide an intuitive account of the validity of the inference in GH'I:  anybody who committed to 
G and H', but not I would have an inconsistent set of attitudes, thereby preserving modus 
ponendo ponens (Miller, 63). 
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Hale thinks his reformulation of the conditional E for Eex can account for how there can 
be a clash of attitudes for a person who has the attitudes in G and H', but not I. Hale thinks that 
what happens when a person has the attitudes in G and H', but not I is he commits a moral 
failing; this moral failure consists in failing to make one’s actions conform to one’s attitudes, and 
there can be a principle that prescribes doing so (Hale-1986, 74). This inconsistency can be 
expressed as a principle about attitude inconsistency: 
Eex11. B!(|B! (x)|;x); 
 
Hale translates this as “Don’t do what you Boo” (Hale-1986, 74)! Hale supposes this moral 
failure might as well be called inconsistency (Hale-1986, 74). However, Hale points out that 
though Blackburn can now provide an account of moral inconsistency, this revision does not 
provide other kinds of consistency – presumably logical consistency. 
3.2.3 Late Quasi-realism and Commitment-Theoretic Semantics 
In “Attitudes and Contents” and, then, again, in Ruling Passions Blackburn cites Schueler’s and 
Hale’s doubts about the kind inconsistency he relies on to answer the Frege-Geach problem, and 
he attempts to provide an account of how attitudes can function in logical relationships, that is 
how they can have a role in a “theory of inference” (Blackburn-1988b, 189). According to 
Blackburn, the solution is to focus on the function of the indirect contexts in the propositions that 
generate problems for an antirealist semantics; their function is to express a “structure of 
commitments,” or what Blackburn calls being “‘tied to a tree’:  in a state in which he or she can 
only endorse some combination of attitude and belief” (Blackburn-1998, 71). According to 
Blackburn, when a person make an assertion in which there is an indirect context, the person is 
expressing how he is tied to a tree of commitments.  
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What Blackburn aims to do is to develop a logic of inferences for commitments, which he 
understands as a catchall term for mental states. Blackburn’s strategy for answering Schueler and 
Hale is to show that his new account, commitment-theoretic semantics, can provide an account 
of inconsistency for propositions that express beliefs or attitudes because both can be construed 
as commitments. So, if he can develop a logic of inferences for commitments that licenses the 
inferences we make with beliefs, then its accounts of consistency and inconsistency will be 
logical consistency and logical inconsistency. (Paraphrased from Miller §4.5) And if the 
commitment theoretic account generates logical consistency and logical inconsistency for beliefs 
qua commitments, it will do so for attitudes qua commitments. Let’s examine a case of modus 
ponendo ponens that is usually understood to involve propositions expressing beliefs: 
K. Citi Field is in Queens. 
L. If Citi Field is in Queens, then Citi Field is in New York. 
M. Citi Field is in New York. 
All of the propositions are descriptive and express facts, and their meaning can be explained in 
truth-conditional terms. Of particular interest is that L’s truth-condition can be explained in terms 
of its components’ truth-conditions:  L is true if and only if there are no situations in which the 
truth-condition of the antecedent obtains while the truth-condition of the consequent fails to 
obtain. And this is just what we would expect from the truth table for the material conditional: 
p q p → q 
T T T 
T F F 
F T T 
F F T 
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According to Blackburn, a person who utters K is expressing her commitment that the truth-
condition of K obtains. Now, let’s look at L; at first, it would seem that a person who utters L is 
expressing her commitment that there are no situations in which the truth-condition of the 
antecedent obtains while the truth-condition of the consequent fails to obtain. But Blackburn 
claims this commitment is more complicated than that:  “To avow a mental state is to express 
acceptance of certain norms. To avow anything of the form ‘If p then q’ is to commit oneself to 
the combination ‘Either not-p or q’” (Blackburn-1998, 72). So, according to Blackburn a person 
who utters L is, in effect, expressing her commitment that either it is not the case that Citi Field 
is in Queens (i.e., that the truth-condition of the antecedent does not obtain) or Citi Field is in 
New York (i.e., the truth-condition of the consequent does obtain). This is borne out when we 
compare the truth tables for the material conditional and disjunction, with ¬ p as a disjunct: 
p q ¬ p p → q ¬ p ∧ q 
T T F T T 
T F F F F 
F T T T T 
F F T T T 
  
Blackburn thinks that this interpretation of indirect contexts, like the one in L, can 
generate the kind of logical inconsistency that Schueler and Hale demand. According to 
Blackburn, he can explain this as a logical inconsistency because the people who express K and 
L and not-M “represents themselves as tied to a tree of possible combinations of belief and 
attitude, but at the same time represents themselves as holding a combination that the tree 
excludes” (Blackburn-1998, 72). So, a person committed to (p → q) is also committed to (¬ p ∧ 
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q), and “to be tied to that combination is to disavow the combination of p with not-q” 
(Blackburn-1998, 72).  
Blackburn’s interpretation of the material conditional as a disjunction would produce the 
following revision of KLM: 
K. Citi Field is in Queens. 
L'. Either Citi Field is not in Queens or Citi Field is in New York. 
M. Citi Field is in New York. 
 
Blackburn thinks that to hold p (K in the argument) and not-q (not-M in the argument) is 
unintelligible, and logic is our way of organizing intelligible combinations of commitments. So, 
given that K denies the truth of the first disjunct, if the disjunction in L' is to be true, then the 
second disjunct must be true, and the conclusion M, must follow; anybody who has the 
commitments expressed by K and L', but not the commitment expressed by M is guilty of logical 
inconsistency. 
Blackburn’s insight is that the disjunction in L' represents a branching among the 
commitments of a person who utters K and L', and this branching can be used to demonstrate the 
inconsistency involved in having those commitments and not having the commitment expressed 
by M. Let’s imagine someone who has the commitments expressed by K and L', but not M, and 
catalogue them: 
Catalogue of Commitments-I 
commitment that Citi Field is in Queens 
commitment either that Citi Field is not in 
Queens or that Citi Field is in New York 
lack of commitment that Citi Field is in 
New York. 
 
The combination of commitments in the catalogue of commitments is inconsistent only if each 
branch of the commitment issuing from the disjunction generates an inconsistent set of 
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commitments (Miller, 65). The middle commitment with its disjunct generates two branches, 
which should be represented as follows: 
Branch I-1 Branch I-2 
commitment that Citi Field is in Queens commitment that Citi Field is in Queens 
commitment that Citi Field is not in 
Queens 
commitment that Citi Field is in New York 
lack of commitment that Citi Field is in 
New York 
lack of commitment that Citi Field is in 
New York 
 
The illustration of these two branches helps us to see that a person who has the commitments 
catalogued above has an inconsistent combination of commitments. If this person has the 
combination on Branch I-1, then she is committed to a contradiction:  that Citi Field is in Queens 
and that it is not in Queens. And if she has the combination on Branch I-2, then she is committed 
to Citi Field being in New York and she is not committed to Citi Field being in New York. If this 
person accepted K and L', but not M she is logically inconsistent, and so if she makes the 
argument KL'M, she must be logically consistent. Since KL'M has the same truth-conditions as 
KLM anybody who makes the argument KLM is logically consistent, too; KLM is logically 
valid. Having demonstrated a logical consistency among these commitments, which are beliefs, 
the challenge for Blackburn is to export this approach to propositions expressing moral 
judgments, that is, to commitments that are attitudes; if he can, then Blackburn may have 
answered the Frege-Geach problem. 
3.2.3.1 Exporting Commitment-Theoretic Semantics to Moral Judgments 
Blackburn does not explicitly demonstrate how this commitment-theoretic semantics would be 
implemented for moral judgments and their deployment in indirect contexts like the DEF 
argument we looked at before:   
D. It is wrong to tell lies. 
E. If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
F. It is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
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To use the disjunction instead of the material conditional, DEF should be represented as follows: 
D. It is wrong to tell lies. 
E'. Either it is not wrong to tell lies, or it is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
F. It is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
 
It would seem that given that D denies the truth of the first disjunct, if the disjunction in E' is to 
be true, then the second disjunct must be true, and the conclusion F, must follow; anybody who 
has the commitments expressed by D and E', but not the commitment expressed by F is guilty of 
logical inconsistency. Now, the next thing to do is show through the catalogue of commitments 
and the branches that the combination of commitments represented in DE'F yields an 
inconsistent set of commitments on each branch, if a person accepts D and E', but not F. 
 But, how should the commitment in each proposition be represented; for example,  
are D and E' as follows, respectively? 
 
• commitment to the attitude that telling lies is wrong 
 
and 
 
• commitment either to the attitude telling lies is not wrong or to the attitude 
getting little brother to tell lies is wrong. 
 
This does not appear to be the correct representation because the way Blackburn formulates 
attitudes in Eex suggests that D and E should be represented as follows: 
• commitment to |B! (telling lies)| 
 
and 
 
• commitment either to |H! (telling lies)| or to |B! (getting little brother to tell 
lies)|. 
 
There is a problem in the disjunction since it is not clear how to render negation in the first 
disjunct; a person does not have to approve of telling lies to not be committed to disapproving of 
telling lies. In addition, Hale points out that it would be hard to figure out how to represent a 
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proposition that involved both a belief and an attitude like, “If John did it, he is to blame” (Hale-
2002, 146). It would seem quite strange for this proposition to be represented as follows: 
• commitment either to John did not do it or to |B! (John)|. 
Hale proposes that the best solution for how to represent the commitments of beliefs and 
attitudes in commitment-theoretic semantics is to take Blackburn at face value when he describes 
propositions as the objects of commitments, as for example, “‘If p then q’ is to commit oneself to 
the combination ‘Either not-p or q’” (Blackburn-1998, 72), and then to introduce the notion of 
acceptance of the beliefs or attitudes these propositions express (Hale-2002, 146). So, K (Citi 
Field is in Queens) and D (It is wrong to tell lies) would be represented as follows: 
• commitment to accepting the belief expressed by “Citi Field is in Queens” 
and 
• commitment to accepting the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies.” 
With this approach, we can catalogue the commitments of a person who accepts D and E', 
but does not accept F as follows: 
Catalogue of Commitments-II 
commitment to accepting the attitude expressed 
by “It is wrong to tell lies.” 
commitment either to not accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies” or accepting 
the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
lack of commitment to accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little brother to 
tell lies.” 
 
The next step is to examine the branches of commitments that arise from this set of commitments 
for consistency. However, Blackburn cannot use satisfaction of truth-conditions for establishing 
consistency as he did with beliefs; Hale points out that Blackburn recognizes this and proposes a 
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notion of consistency such that attitudes are only consistent “if they admit of simultaneous 
realization” (Hale-2002, 146). With this notion of consistency in mind, let’s look at the branches. 
Branch II-1 Branch II-2 
commitment to accepting the attitude expressed by 
“It is wrong to tell lies.” 
commitment to accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies.” 
commitment to not accepting the attitude expressed 
by “It is wrong to tell lies.”  
commitment to accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little brother 
to tell lies.” 
lack of commitment to accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little brother to tell 
lies.” 
lack of commitment to accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little brother 
to tell lies.” 
 
Like with the combination of commitments on Branches I-1 and I-2, we can see that a 
person who has the commitments catalogued above has an inconsistent combination of 
commitments. A person with the combination on Branch II-1 is committed to accepting a 
negative attitude toward telling lies, but he is also not committed to accepting the same attitude. 
Similarly, a person with the combination on Branch II-2 is committed to having a negative 
attitude toward getting little brother to lie, but he is also not committed to accepting the same 
attitude. The point is that at each point on the branch the person has some attitude, and this is so 
even when they lack commitment to an attitude. The person who has the combination of 
commitments on Branch II-1 has a negative attitude towards telling lies, but he also has, at least, 
a neutral attitude towards it, and these are not simultaneously realizable. And, the same is true 
for the other branch; this person has negative attitude towards getting little brother to lie, but he 
also has, at least a neutral attitude towards it. The person who accepts D and E', but not F is 
logically inconsistent, and so if he does make the argument in DE'F, he is being logically 
consistent. Having demonstrated a logical consistency among commitments, it appears that 
Blackburn has answered the Frege-Geach problem. 
 
	   104	  
3.2.3.2 Problems for Commitment-Theoretic Semantics 
Blackburn’s commitment-theoretic semantics is a novel response to the Frege-Geach problem, 
but it does not succeed in answering the Frege-Geach problem. There are two problems for this 
approach given its dependence on an analogy between belief propositions and moral 
propositions. First, Blackburn’s application of commitment-theoretic semantics to assertoric 
discourse is meant to give commitment-theoretic semantics an air of respectability; if it produces 
consistency for assertoric discourse, then this must be logical consistency.12 But, this argument 
from analogy holds only if commitment-theoretic semantics is the best semantics for assertoric 
discourse, i.e., if that is the best explanation of the meaning of conditionals in assertoric 
discourse. On this count, commitment-theoretic semantics comes up short since truth-
conditional semantics is a more straightforward account of meaning for assertoric discourse. 
Consider K, “Citi Field is in Queens,” again; on truth-conditional semantics, it is because ‘Citi 
Field is in Queens’ is true if and only if Citi Field is in Queens that the meaning of ‘Citi Field is 
in Queens’ is Citi Field is in Queens. On Hale’s revised version Blackburn’s theory, the meaning 
of “Citi Field is in Queens” is a commitment to accepting the belief expressed by the proposition; 
that is much more complicated. If this criticism is right, then the semantics of assertoric 
discourse and moral discourse will be distinct, and moral discourse will not be able to lay claim 
to logical consistency on identical grounds as assertoric discourse. 
3.2.3.3 Commitment-Theoretic Semantics and Modus Tollendo Tollens 
There is a stronger challenge for Blackburn than this; Hale points out that Blackburn may 
preserve modus ponendo ponens for moral discourse with commitment-theoretic semantics, but 
he does not preserve other logical theorems. For an antirealist semantics to be a genuine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I will use assertoric discourse to mean a discourse that involves propositions that state facts 
(express beliefs).	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alternative to truth-conditional semantics, it should be able to accommodate the widely 
accepted logical principles that the latter accommodates, but Hale argues that Blackburn’s 
approach will not accommodate modus tollendo tollens. 
Below are variations on arguments KLM and DEF reflecting modus tollendo tollens. 
¬M. Citi Field is not in New York. 
L. If Citi Field is in Queens, then Citi field is in New York. 
¬K. Citi Field is not in Queens. 
 
¬F. It is not wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
E. If it is wrong to tell lies, then it is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
¬D. It is not wrong to tell lies. 
 
To use the disjunction instead of the material conditional, ¬FE¬D and ¬ML¬K should  
 
be represented as follows, respectively: 
 
¬M. Citi Field is not in New York. 
L'. Either Citi Field is not in Queens or Citi Field is in New York. 
¬K. Citi Field is not in Queens. 
 
¬F. It is not wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
E'. Either it is not wrong to tell lies, or it is wrong to get little brother to tell lies. 
¬D. It is not wrong to tell lies. 
 
If Blackburn’s commitment-theoretic semantics is a viable alternative, it should be able to 
demonstrate that a person who endorses ¬M and L', but does not endorse ¬K, (and, likewise if 
she endorses ¬F and E', but does not endorse ¬D), has inconsistent commitments. 
To examine this let’s look at the catalogue of commitments, and its branches, for such a 
person. Hale suggests that the person who asserts the negation of the second disjunct in the 
disjunction be understood as rejecting the disjunct; so in ¬p ∧ q, a person who asserts ¬q is 
committing “to rejecting q (i.e., accepting ¬q, as opposed to merely not accepting q)” (Hale-
2002, 147). The catalogue for ¬ML'¬K and the catalogue for ¬FE'¬D are represented as follows, 
respectively: 
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Catalogue of Commitments-III 
commitment to rejecting the belief expressed by 
“Citi Field is in New York.” 
commitment either to not accepting the belief 
expressed by “Citi field is in Queens” or 
accepting the belief expressed by “Citi Field is in 
New York.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the belief 
expressed by “Citi Field is in New York.” 
 
 
Catalogue of Commitments-IV 
commitment to rejecting the attitude expressed by 
“It is wrong to get little brother to tell lies.” 
commitment either to not accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies” or accepting 
the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies.” 
 
And, their branches are represented as follows, respectively: 
 
Branch III-1 Branch III-2 
commitment to rejecting the belief 
expressed by “Citi Field is in New York.” 
commitment to rejecting the belief 
expressed by “Citi Field is in New York.” 
commitment to not accepting the belief 
expressed by “Citi Field is in Queens.”  
commitment to accepting the belief 
expressed by “Citi Field is in New York.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the belief 
expressed by “Citi Field is Queens.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the belief 
expressed by “Citi Field is in Queens.” 
 
 
Branch IV-1 Branch IV-2 
commitment to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
commitment to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
commitment to not accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies.”  
commitment to accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the 
attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell 
lies.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the 
attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell 
lies.” 
 
On branch 2 of each, it is obvious that there are commitments to attitudes that are not 
simultaneously realizable:  such a person would be simultaneously committed to rejecting and 
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accepting the same belief or attitude. However, it is not possible to identify the beliefs or 
attitudes that are not simultaneously realizable on branch 1 of either set of commitments. On 
branch 1 of both sets of commitments, the person is committed to “accepting ¬q [(i.e., rejecting 
q)], not accepting p, coupled with the non-acceptance of ¬p” (Hale-2002, 147); such a set of 
commitment is not inconsistent. The commitments to not accepting the belief expressed by “Citi 
Field is in Queens,” and the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies,” are essentially 
commitments to withhold acceptance or rejection of them until there is sufficient evidence to do 
so, and those are not inconsistent with a lack of commitment to reject either. Blackburn’s 
commitment-theoretic semantics cannot apparently account of logical inconsistency for modus 
tollendo tollens. 
Blackburn argues that p → q should be interpreted as ¬p ∧ q, and in the criticism just 
discussed Hale interprets that as a commitment either to not accepting that p or accepting that q 
(i.e. a commitment either to not accepting the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies” or 
accepting the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to get little brother to tell lies,” as E'). But Hale 
admits an alternative interpretation might be available:  either accepting that ¬p or accepting that 
q (a commitment either to reject the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies” or accepting 
the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to get little brother to tell lies,” as E'). So, the catalogue for 
¬FE'¬D and its branches could alternatively be represented as follows:  
Catalogue of Commitments-V 
commitment to rejecting the attitude expressed by 
“It is wrong to get little brother to tell lies.” 
commitment either to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies” or accepting 
the attitude expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies.” 
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Branch V-1 Branch V-2 
commitment to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
commitment to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
commitment to rejecting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to tell lies.”  
commitment to accepting the attitude 
expressed by “It is wrong to get little 
brother to tell lies.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the 
attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell 
lies.” 
lack of commitment to rejecting the 
attitude expressed by “It is wrong to tell 
lies.” 
 
It is obvious that on branch V-2 there is inconsistency, just as it was in branches in III-2 
and IV-2; but, unlike with branches III-1 and IV-1, there is an inconsistency on branch V-1:  a 
person with the commitments on that branch accepts an attitude that it is not wrong to tell lies 
while simultaneously not accepting an attitude that it is not wrong to tell lies. This interpretation 
of the disjunction does not vindicate commitment-theoretic semantics after all, though. 
Hale points out that this interpretation of the disjunction would generate contradictions 
for the law of identity: p → p. On this alternative interpretation of the material conditional, p → 
p, is meant to be interpreted as ¬p ∧ p – either accept that ¬p (i.e. reject that p) or accept that p 
(Hale-2002, 148). This is a very strong and substantial commitment:  for any claim, we should 
either reject it or accept it. But we may not be in a situation in which we have sufficient 
information to reject it or accept it. For this alternative interpretation of the disjunction to be the 
correct one, then it is either the case that there can never be a situation in which we have 
insufficient information to reject or accept a claim, or the law of identity is false; neither is 
plausible, so this interpretation must be incorrect. 
It is clear that the first interpretation of the disjunction cannot generate logical 
inconsistency for modus tollendo tollens, but Blackburn argues that he can defend the second. He 
claims that Hale misunderstands his re-interpretation of the material conditional as a disjunction; 
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a person who asserts p → q is actually expressing two commitments:  a commitment to accept 
that not p or accept that q, and a commitment to adopt one of the disjuncts, if the other is 
rejected, or abandon the first commitment all together (Blacbkburn-2002, 171). So, a person who 
says, “If it is wrong to tell lies, it is wrong to get little brother to tell lies,” is really expressing her 
commitment to accept that it is not wrong to tell lies or accept that it is wrong to tell lies, and to 
adopt whichever disjunct is not rejected, or to abandon the first commitment all together. First, it 
is doubtful that the proposition expresses anything so complicated, and if it did, it is up to 
Blackburn to explain just what kind of non-cognitive state this would be and what it would be 
like. Second, this solution is undesirably ad hoc compared to the alternative of truth-conditional 
semantics. Blackburn has tried to excuse this by suggesting that quasi-realism will have to earn 
the logical trappings of descriptive discourse for moral discourse on a case-by-case basis, and he 
calls this project “slow track quasi-realism” (Blackburn-1998b, 184-186, 197).  
3.3 Chapter Conclusion 
I doubt whether slow track quasi-realism can earn all the logical trappings of descriptive 
discourse for moral discourse with an antirealist semantics, but even if it can, because it is ad hoc 
it will suffer in comparison with a truth-conditional semantics for moral discourse. This is an 
important way in which moral antirealism is deficient compared to moral realism, and it will 
have to compensate by offering comparative advantages in other areas. Moral antirealism 
typically does this by pointing to its metaphysical advantages; in the following three chapters I 
will assess the metaphysical advantages that Blackburn’s metaethics are purported to possess 
over moral realism.
	   110	  
Part II:  Quasi-Realism’s Metaphysics 
 
Chapter 4:  Projectivism 
 
4.1 Establishing Projectivism 
In the previous chapter I noted that Blackburn characterizes quasi-realism as the attempt to 
reconcile our moral practices with a projectivist understanding of the moral realm. On his view, 
a “‘quasi-realist’… [is] a person who, starting from a recognizably antirealist position, finds 
himself progressively able to mimic the intellectual practices definitive of realism” (Blackburn-
1980, 15).1 Quasi-realism is Blackburn’s response to the need to account for moral practice 
given an antirealist base, and projectivism, what Blackburn calls the metaphysics of 
moralizing, is his account of that antirealist base. I am interested in this starting point of moral 
antirealism, denying that the putative elements of the moral domain, moral properties, exist, and 
this reflects my methodological prioritization of metaphysics. My aim in chapter 4 is to develop 
an account of projectivism, what Blackburn calls the metaphysics of moralizing (and which I 
characterize as its phenomenology), in his metaethics and raise some problems for it.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In “Morals and Modals” Blackburn makes a similar remark about the impetus for quasi-
realism when he writes, “It starts with a theory of the mental states expressed by commitments 
in the area in questions:  the habits, dispositions, attitudes they serve to express” (Blackburn-
1987, 55). In “How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist” Blackburn suggests that quasi-realism is what 
we should expect, if projectivism is correct (Blackburn-1988a, 167), and projectivism is 
motivated by naturalism because in projectivism the analysis of the mental state of someone 
“who has an ethical commitment makes natural sense” (Blackburn-1988a, 168). Earlier, I 
pointed out that Blackburn’s use of the term “commitment” is inconsistent with the typical 
realist construal of the term, and he owes an account of “commitment” that is consistent with 
antirealism. 
2 It may seem odd to categorize projectivism as the phenomenology of moralizing. However, I 
think it is apt since as I read Blackburn, his projectivism is a metaphysical theory in which 
moralizing is best understood as the product of mental phenomena by which we come to moral 
“awareness.” I think this characterization of projectivism is consistent with Blackburn’s 
description of projectivism as “a metaphysical view, … which explains what we do when we 
moralize” (Blackburn-1985b, 164). I call projectivism the phenomenology of moralizing 
because part of what projectivism is supposed to explain is the realist feeling of morality. 
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It is difficult to get a handle on what the theory of projectivism amounts to since 
philosophers often use “projection” metaphorically, Blackburn included.3 Blackburn’s 
explanation of projectivism echoes David Hume’s language, and Blackburn claims that his form 
of projectivism is consistent with Hume’s account of the way the mind spreads itself upon the 
world and how it guilds and stains natural objects with sentiment (T 1.3.14.25; SBN167; EPM 
App 1.246; SBN 294). A large portion of this chapter will be devoted to outlining Humean 
projectivism and two distinct versions of moral projectivism in Blackburn’s texts, and I will 
argue that the version Blackburn prefers is not Humean, after all. (However, first, I want to draw 
on the work of Richard Joyce and Peter Kail to establish the criteria that an account of a domain 
must satisfy for it to be a projectivist account, using examples of projection to support this 
characterization.) I will also use Mackie’s version of moral projectivism to serve as a point of 
comparison for assessing which form of Blackburn’s projectivism is Humean. This will help 
demonstrate that his preferred version of projectivism does not correspond to the Humean 
version, and if Blackburn is truly Humean, the alternative version of moral projectivism should 
be considered the moral projectivism that is his metaphysics of moralizing. 
4.2 Projectivism: the preliminaries 
In “Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?” Richard Joyce tries to devise a set of theses 
that are common to different forms of moral projectivism; the two theses he identifies are: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Richard Joyce makes the very point in “Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable?” Nelson 
Goodman made use of the metaphor of projection in Fact, Faction, and Forecast. There 
Goodman tried to explain how to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate projections (inferring 
that a concept from a known case applies to an unknown case on the basis of induction). Part of 
Goodman’s solution was to propose that a projection is legitimate if it involves projectible 
predicates, i.e., whose application is well-entrenched. Blackburn uses “projection” in a different 
manner – as a way of explaining why we have the experience of a property when the property is 
not actually present. It is odd that Blackburn uses the metaphor of “projection” without 
distinguishing it from Goodman’s use of the concept, especially since Blackburn examined 
Goodman’s new riddle of induction in “Goodman’s Paradox.” 
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1. We experience moral wrongness (e.g.) as an objective feature of the world. 
2. This experience has its origins in some non-perceptual faculty; in particular 
upon observing certain actions and characters (etc.) we have an affective attitude 
(e.g., the emotion of disapproval) that brings about the experience described in 1 
(Joyce-2009, 56).4 
 
These two theses comprise a view that Joyce dubs minimal projectivism, and when the list is 
supplemented with thesis 3, the resulting view is what Joyce calls metaphysical projectivism, 
which is a form of antirealism: 
3. In fact, moral wrongness does not exist in the world (Joyce-2009, 56). 
 
We must supplement theses 1, 2, and 3 to characterize a moral theory like Mackie’s error 
theory, which Joyce calls nihilistic projectivism, with a fourth thesis: 
4. When we utter sentences of the form “X is morally wrong” we are 
misdescribing the world; we are in error (Joyce-2009, 56-58). 
 
Joyce recognizes that a non-cognitivist form of projectivism like Blackburn’s will not feature 
these 4 theses; it will include 1, 2, and 3, deny 4, and replace 4 with a thesis of expressivism 
(Joyce describes it as the view that the function of a sentence like “X is morally wrong” is not to 
describe the world, but to express an attitude) (Joyce-2009, 57-58). In light of this version of 
projectivism, Joyce amends nihilistic projectivism to include the denial of expressivism. 
Blackburn has called projectivism the metaphysics of moralizing, so his metaethics comprises a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Joyce	  suggests	  that	  these	  two	  theses	  are	  compatible	  with	  moral	  realism,	  error	  theory,	  and	  non-­cognitivism.	  Projectivism with error theory and projectivism with non-cognitivism 
are the views of Mackie and Blackburn, respectively; a view that combines projectivism and 
realism is a view that Joyce claims R.M. Sainsbury attributes to Hume in his “Projections and 
Relations.” Sainsbury argues that Hume’s projectivist accounts of causation and morality are 
distinct and not parallel; the kind of projection that yields claims about causation lead us into 
error, while the different kind of projection that yields moral claims produce “literal truths” 
(Sainsbury, 134). According to Sainsbury, Hume has a relational theory of value that is not 
subjectivist, expressivist, or relativist (Sainsbury, 135). I doubt that Joyce is correct in 
characterizing this as a realist position. Such a characterization suggests that the 
realist/antirealist fault line should be drawn on the distinction between cognitivism coupled 
with a success theory and error theory and non-cognitivism, but, as noted in chapter 1, I take it 
that an essential element of realism is the mind-independence of the category of objects.	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metaphysical element, metaphysical projectivism, and a semantic element, quasi-realism, so his 
projectivism should be committed to theses 1, 2, and 3. If moral projectivism is constituted by 
these three theses, then they must be true, for moral projectivism to be true.  
I am going to assume thesis 1, which I understand as claiming that the phenomenology of 
moral experience is realist, is true, and I acknowledge that many people may find this 
controversial. I believe it is true because when I reflect on my own sensitivity to the moral status 
of a state of affairs it feels to me like the morality is real, but I am not going to argue that my 
experience is veridical. I defend making the assumption because projectivists like Mackie and 
Blackburn appear to accept it.5 They need the phenomenology of moral experience to be realist, 
along with the rejection of moral realism, to motivate the second thesis in moral projectivism; 
if thesis 1 is false, then moral projectivism is false, but then it being false would also threaten 
moral realism. Thesis 1 is a common starting point for some moral realists and moral 
projectivists; the former think that moral experience feels real because it is real, while the latter 
need to explain why it feels real, when it is not real. 
According to thesis 2, a person’s experience of morality as part of the world begins with 
an affective response to observing, say, an action and results in moral experience with a realist 
phenomenology. Joyce claims that thesis 2 is compatible with moral realism, which is what 
thesis 3 denies, but I doubt it is possible to consistently hold thesis 2 and be committed to moral 
realism because I believe a key element of moral realism is that morality is mind independent, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bertrand Russell seems to suggest that he feels like morality is real when he writes, “In 
opposing the proposal, I should feel, not only that I was expressing my desires, but that my 
desires in the matter are right, whatever that may mean. As a matter of argument, I can, I think, 
show that I am not guilty of any inconsistency in holding to the [expressivist account] of ethics 
and at the same time expressing strong ethical preferences. But in so feeling I am not satisfied.” 
(This is quoted from Olson, 90; the quotation is from Russell’s “Reply to my Critics” in The 
Library of Living Philosophers’ anthology The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell edited by P. A. 
Schilpp). 
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and thesis 2 would make it unacceptably mind dependent. But, if I grant it is possible, the realist 
moral projectivist and the antirealist moral projectivist will accept thesis 2 for distinct 
reasons. A moral projectivist who is a realist will accept thesis 2 because she has a view in 
which a moral property is not the kind of thing that can be detected by a perceptual faculty; a 
moral projectivist who is an antirealist will accept thesis because 2 because he has a view in 
which a moral property cannot be detected because there is no such thing as a moral property. 
My main point is that if it is possible for a moral projectivist to be a realist or antirealist, her 
metaphysical commitments about morality will be a core part of her projectivism; it will not be 
an add-on thesis to a core of minimal projectivism as Joyce suggests. Both the realist and 
antirealist projectivist must provide an explanation of how we come to have an experience of 
morality that feels real. Thesis 2 is an explanation of what is going on when a person has a moral 
experience, but there is no need for the explanation without the metaphysical commitments of 
realist and antirealist; and it is metaphysical because it proposes there is a process that causes 
the experience in thesis 1. 
Joyce identifies an affective response as the non-perceptual faculty origin of the 
experience of moral experience in thesis 1; this indicates that the moral experience is not 
identical to the affective response and is the culmination of a process. (This is one way in which 
moral projectivism is distinct from moral intuitionism, the view that human awareness of 
moral properties, in the realist sense, is constituted by direct, non-inferential appreciation of 
these properties. A moral intuitionist claims that there is a special non-perceptual faculty that 
detects moral properties directly, so that moral awareness is the activation of that faculty.) So 
moral projectivism is a theory that explains how a person comes to have a moral experience, 
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which is realist in character. Moral projectivism supplies this explanation through the 
metaphors of projection and projective mechanisms. 
Because Blackburn is a moral antirealist and I want to refute his theory I am interested 
in antirealist forms of moral projectivism, and given my remarks about projectivism, I want to 
propose the following preliminary reformulation of moral projectivism as the view that: 
i. moral experience has a realist phenomenology; 
ii. there are no features of the world that correspond to moral experience; 
iii. moral experience is a projection that has its origins in a non-cognitive 
response to features of the world, i.e., is the culmination of a projective 
mechanism that begins with a non-cognitive response to features of the world. 
 
An explanatory theory is only is good as its explanation, so the next step in developing an 
account of projectivism is to explain what a projection is. I will draw on Peter Kail’s account of 
what a projection is to explain this. Since I want to reject Blackburn’s moral projectivism I 
have to mine Blackburn’s texts to develop an account of Blackburn’s projectivism but because 
he identifies the metaphysical element of his theory with Humean projectivism, I must first 
articulate and examine Hume’s accounts of causation and morality to determine if they are forms 
of projectivism to draw on them to accomplish the task of articulating Blackburn’s version of 
moral projectivism. In addition, since the rejection of moral realism is an important element of 
antirealist moral projectivism, I must examine Blackburn’s case for why moral realism is 
false; I will do that in the following chapter, chapter 5. 
4.2.1 Kail on Projection 
In “Projection and Necessity in Hume” Peter Kail devotes himself to two tasks:  (1) making 
exegetical sense of Hume’s projectivism; (2) demonstrating that Hume’s projectivism is 
compatible with a skeptical-realist interpretation of Hume’s view of necessary connection (Kail, 
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24). I am interested in the first task, so I want to focus on Kail’s attempt to explain what it is to 
be a projection. 
Kail offers multiple quotes from Hume on necessary connection, but one is sufficient to 
provide a sense of its projectivist character: “… as we feel a customary connexion between the 
ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing is more usual than to apply to external 
bodies every internal sensation which they occasion” (Kail, 25, quoting EHU 7.61, SBN 78). 
Kail interprets projection to involve the “ascription of aspects of our minds to other items” (Kail, 
26). Kail suggests that Hume can be interpreted as offering two different explanations of 
necessary connection. In one explanation Hume claims “that there seems to be necessity in the 
world …, but since Hume tells us there isn’t any, he must explain the phenomenology. So he 
explains the phenomenology by saying we project our feelings onto the world” (Kail, 26). This is 
Hume as an antirealist about necessary connection. The other explanation is one in which Hume 
is a skeptical realist about necessary connection:  “if there is necessity, it is not revealed to us by 
experience, … and so we need to explain why it seems to us that it is” (Kail, 26). In both cases 
the motivation for proposing an explanation of the phenomenology as a projection is different, 
but in either case explaining the phenomenology as a projection is appropriate. Kail’s view of 
projectivism is that it is an explanatory theory; it is meant “to explain why the subject takes the 
world to be a certain way (either on the level of phenomenology or belief) when it is not possible 
to invoke the world being that way to explain why the subject takes it to be so” (Kail, 27-28). 
Kail and Joyce both agree realism and antirealism are compatible with the need to explain the 
phenomenology, which supports my reformulation of Joyce’s theses. 
Kail wants to unpack what a “projection” is, and he identifies various uses of the 
metaphor of projection:  Freudian projection of anger; passage of time as the projection of 
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changes in belief state; Feuerbach’s projective account of the Christian God; moral value as 
projection (Kail, 27). Kail proposes a schema of projection that underlies these “different modes” 
of projection, and he shows how these “different modes” fit within the schema to justify it. 
According to Kail, S’s commitment in a domain counts as a projection when: 
(a) the best explanation of the commitment does not advert to the putative facts or 
properties corresponding to the commitment;6 
(b) the commitment is not derived or sustained by inference; 
(c) the explanation of the commitment essentially involves appeal to 
psychological facts about S; 
(d) the phenomenology of the commitment does not intimate to the subject its best 
explanation” (Kail, 27).7 
 
Kail’s account in which a commitment is a projection is in tension with my reformulation of 
Joyce’s theses of projectivism, which casts moral experience as a projection. My first instinct is 
to try to reconcile the view, and one possible way to reconcile the two views is to identify the 
commitment with the experience. This would be a mistake because it is possible to distinguish 
experience and commitment; when I look at a pencil in a glass of water, I have the experience 
that it is bent, but I do not have the commitment (in this case belief) that it is bent. I think Kail 
has unnecessarily complicated the picture by introducing the notion that a commitment is a 
projection. 
The key question is:  what is the projection in projectivism? Once that is answered, then 
the task is to explain why moral experience has a realist phenomenology. One answer to the 
question is that moral experience is itself the projection. Kail appears to contemplate that the 
projection is a commitment. So, if Kail thinks the commitment is the projection, how does this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Kail uses the term “commitment” so as “not to beg any questions about the cognitive status of 
the [mental] state involved” (Kail, 49). I have already noted the variable ways Blackburn uses 
this term. I will use it here to explain Kail’s views.	  
7 This last condition reflects Kail’s view that a person who has a commitment that is, in fact, a 
projection will not be aware that the commitment is a projection. 
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contribute to the realist phenomenology of a moral experience? The only way I can imagine a 
commitment contributing to the phenomenology of an experience is if the commitment itself has 
a phenomenology, and if the experience is to have a realist phenomenology, the commitment’s 
phenomenology must be realist, too. This cannot be what projection is because a commitment 
with a realist phenomenology must be a belief – what else can it be; and, since a non-cognitivist 
antirealist projectivism must be able to encompass a view in which moral commitments are not 
beliefs, but non-cognitive states, this treatment of commitment as projection is not compatible 
with such a possibility. On the other had, the view that moral experience is a projection is much 
simpler – moral experience has a realist phenomenology because it is a projection. What needs 
to be explained is why a projection has a realist phenomenology. An important advantage of this 
is that it is open to the possibility that a moral commitment is a response to the phenomenology, 
which leaves space for Mackie’s projectivism and error theory and for Blackburn’s 
projectivism and quasi-realism. 
With these considerations in mind, I propose the following tentative amendment to my 
formulation of non-cognitivist antirealist moral projectivism; antirealist moral projectivism 
is the view that 
MPi. moral experience has a realist phenomenology; 
MPii. there are no features of the world that correspond to moral experience; 
MPiii. moral experience is a projection that has its origins in a non-cognitive 
response to features of the world, i.e., is the culmination of a projective 
mechanism that begins with a non-cognitive response to features of the world; 
MPiiia. a moral experience is a projection if its explanation essentially 
appeals to non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
MPiiib. the explanation of a moral experience is opaque to the subject. 
 
A general account of projectivism for domains other than the moral would be as follows:   
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Projectivism is the view that 
Pi. Experience in a domain has a realist phenomenology; 
Pii. there are no features of the world that correspond to the experience; 
Piii. the experience is a projection that has its origins in a psychological state, i.e., 
is the culmination of a projective mechanism that begins with a psychological 
state; 
Piiia. an experience is a projection if its explanation essentially appeals to 
non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
Piiib. the explanation of the experience is opaque to the subject. 
 
4.2.2 Projectivisms 
In the next subsection I want to defend the plausibility of this account of projectivism, and non-
cognitivist antirealist moral projectivism, by showing how examples of projectivism, which 
are not about morality, reflect the characterization in Pi-Piiib. 
4.2.2.1 Freudian Psychological Projection 
Freud introduced the psychological defense mechanism of projection, in which a person 
unconsciously attributes his “own threatening impulses, emotions, or beliefs onto other people or 
things” (Ewen, 35).8 And Jung proposed that a person’s “shadow” – the shameful and unpleasant 
elements of her personality that is repressed in the unconscious – “is projected onto other 
people” (Ewen, 91-94). In projection, a person may be angry with his spouse, but because it is 
inappropriate to be angry with the spouse he unconsciously suppresses the anger and comes to 
have the belief that the spouse is angry with him. Projection should be able to explain why the 
person has this belief, and on the analysis of projectivism I proposed in subsection 4.2.1 the 
phenomenology explains it – it feels like the spouse is angry to the person who is projecting. In 
conversation with two psychologists they agreed that their patients who engage in projection 
“perceive” the person on whom they are projecting as having the quality they are projecting on to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Freud first identified a defense mechanism of psychological projection in Totem and taboo 
(1912-1913). 
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them.9 Freud distinguished projection from displacement, a defense mechanism in which 
“feelings or behaviors are transferred, usually unconsciously, from one object to one that is less 
threatening” (Ewen, 35). An example of displacement would be a person who is angry at a 
superior at work, but directs this anger at a child at home (displacement may sometimes be 
conscious). 
 This kind of Freudian psychological projection is an example of projectivism because it 
meets the conditions I put forward at the end of subsection 4.2.1. First, the phenomenology of the 
experience where the man projects his anger on his spouse is realist; it feels to the man like his 
spouse is angry with him – this satisfies condition Pi. Second, the man’s spouse is not actually 
angry with him, so there is no feature in the spouse that explains the experience – this satisfies 
condition Pii. Third, the projection – the man’s experience of his spouse as angry – originates 
from the man’s own anger with his spouse, and an explanation of why he experiences this anger 
as his spouse being angry with him depends on other non-inferential psychological states (one 
explanation might be that the man was raised to be uncomfortable with anger) – these factors 
satisfy condition Piii and Piiia. Finally, all of this process takes place unconsciously, so the man 
is not aware that he is doing this – this satisfies condition Piiib. This is one example of a theory 
that appeals to projection and satisfies the conditions I put forward in subsection 4.2.1, but I must 
consider some others to provide more support for my formulation. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I am not aware of psychological studies on the phenomenology of anger projection, so I cannot 
say whether people who use this defense mechanism experience the person, on whom they 
project anger, as angry at them. However, on a personal anecdotal level, reflection on instances 
in which I have been able to recognize that I engaged in projection, do suggest to me that I 
believed that the person I was projecting onto was angry at me. 
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4.2.2.2 Anthropomorphic Projection 
Kail defines anthropomorphic projection as the “representation of non-human objects as 
possessing human attributes” (Kail, 32). Kail’s definition suggests the aesthetic device in which 
an artist depicts a non-human object as having human characteristics. Animals are often depicted 
in art, especially fables, to have human traits, e.g., the cunning fox or proud lion. A different 
example is in cartoons when weather systems are represented as human; one example is a cold 
wind that has a face and blows its wind from its mouth. I do not think these are examples of 
projectivism because I do not believe the artists who depict them or the art-goers who 
experience the depictions have an experience of the fox or the wind as if it really had those 
characteristics and, at least for the artists, the depiction of the objects as human is conscious. I do 
think that in raising the issue of anthropomorphism Kail has suggested a kind of projection that is 
anthropomorphic. I propose that anthropomorphic projection involves experiencing non-human 
objects as having human characteristics and the experience has a realist phenomenology. 
 Here is one example I have in mind:  many people attribute human characteristics to 
animals, but especially their pets. People characterize beavers as industrious, and I suspect many 
people do so because it does seem to them that the beaver has the characteristic of being a 
diligent worker. Of course, the most common examples of people attributing human 
characteristics to animals is with their pets:  my cat is indifferent to me; Michael Jackson’s Ben 
who needs a friend; the dog loyal to his master. A dog, man’s best friend, seem to be the pet 
most susceptible to projection. I do believe that some people do sincerely come to believe a dog 
misses its deceased master when the dog waits by the front door for a walk at the customary hour 
the master would walk it. I think a plausible explanation for why people have this belief is that 
they do experience the dog as really missing the master, and the experience is a projection 
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(condition Pi). The dog does not really miss the master – it is trained to wait for a walk 
(condition Pii). The experience has its origin in an emotion in the person, and the experience is 
arrived at non-inferentially (conditions Piii and Piiia). And, the person is not conscious of the 
process that gives rise to the experience (condition Piiib). I think the depiction of non-human 
objects as having human characteristics is different than the experience of non-human objects as 
having human characteristics; if the latter is a real phenomenon, then the explanation of it I 
suggested is a form of projectivism. 
  Belief in God is a phenomenon that some people have explained in terms of 
projectivism. Projectivism is a plausible explanation of belief in God when the belief is a 
response to an experience of God that has a realist phenomenology, but not all belief in God 
would be an example of projectivism. For example, some people may believe in God because 
they are convinced by any of the traditional arguments for God’s existence even though they do 
not experience God. On the other hand some people who believe in God claim to know God 
exists because they feel God in the world; projectivism is a possible explanation in such cases. 
Ludwig Feuerbach and Freud offered analyses of belief in God that roots it in projection.  
In The Essence of Christianity Feuerbach offers an analysis that explains the Christian 
experience of God as a projection, rather than just the general experience of God. Feuerbach 
examines the characteristics that God is supposed to have and identifies a human characteristic or 
need for which it is an analog; the point is to demonstrate that God’s characteristics arises from 
human psychology rather than a reaction to God revealing these characteristics. In The Future of 
an Illusion Freud offers an account of belief in God where we experience God as a part of the 
world because of a human need. According to Freud, humans have needs or fears that fathers 
fulfill or protect them from, but when they realize fathers cannot fulfill all of the needs or protect 
	   123	  
them from all dangers, they project an idealized father figure, God, on the world. (One might 
combine Freud’s and Feuerbach’s views to use Freud to explain why humans experience God as 
part of the world and use Feuerbach to explain why Christians experience God in the form they 
do.) Both of these explanations appear to fit the pattern I laid out for projectivism. 
I think it is plausible to interpret the experience of God as part of the world or as human-
like as having a realist phenomenology satisfying condition Pi. And, if there is no human-like 
God or no God at all, then Feuerbach’s and Freud’s explanations satisfy condition Pii. And, in 
both explanations the experience arises from features of human psychology and is not a product 
of inferences from the psychology, which satisfies conditions Piii and Piiia. And, finally the 
process by which this occurs is presumably unconscious, so these explanations also satisfy 
condition Piiib. 
4.2.2.3 Phantom Limb Sensation:  Projectivism? 
In the “The Perception of Phantom Limbs” neuroscientist V.S. Ramachandran and philosopher 
William Hirstein examined the phenomenon of phantom limb sensation. They reported that 
nearly all amputees experience phantom sensations of their limbs that were amputated and some 
people who are born without limbs report sensation of those limbs (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 
1605-1606). The subjects used terms like “vivid” and “perception” to discuss the 
phenomenology of these sensations, and they reported subjects describing the feeling of a ring or 
watchband on the phantom limb (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1605, 1607). If we understand this 
to reflect a realist phenomenology, then phantom limb sensations are candidates for a 
projectivist explanation. 
 A theory of phantom limb projectivism would immediately satisfy conditions Pi and Pii:  
the experience of phantom limb sensation has a realist phenomenology and there is no fact of 
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sensation in the limb since it has been amputated. The phantom limb sensation is a projection if 
the experience has its origins in a psychological state, is not arrived at via inference, and the 
subject is not aware of this process. I cannot fully present Ramachandran and Hirstein’s full 
theory, but they offer the following abstract schema to account for phantom limb sensation; the 
sensation depends on integrating experiences from the following five sources:  
i. from the stump neuromas, as taught by old textbooks; 
ii.  from remapping;… 
iii. the monitoring of corollary discharge from the motor commands to the limb; 
iv. a primordial, genetically determined, internal ‘image’ of one’s body; and 
v. vivid somatic memories of painful sensations or postures of the limb being 
‘carried’ over into the phantom (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1624). 
 
Because the five sources Ramachandran and Hirstein propose as being necessary to account for 
phantom limb sensation are or can be identified with psychological states, the schema does not 
imply that the sensation is the product of any inference between states or that their integration 
has to be conscious, this account would qualify as a version of projectivism. 
4.2.2.4 Projectivism and Disgust 
Proponents of a projectivist understanding of morality often compare their account to 
projectivist accounts of the disgusting. They cite the plausibility of explaining the 
disgustingness of, say, a child consuming his dried nasal mucus, as a projection of a person’s 
subjective response to it as an example for accounts of properties like goodness or badness to 
emulate. In Projection and Truth in Ethics John McDowell disputes the appropriateness of this 
comparison, but he does admit that projection seems to be a suitable explanation for why we talk 
as though disgustingness is a property of things, which they have “independently of their 
relations to us” (McDowell-1987, 1).  
Here is a different example of disgust; seafood is disgusting – I will not eat it. I have tried 
seafood (fish, mollusks, lobster) a few times, but I feel nauseous when I encounter seafood; it is 
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disgusting. I have had this aversion since childhood, and even though I know now that my 
disgust for seafood is about me and not about the seafood that has not changed the fact that when 
I find myself among friends who order oysters, and I resolve to eat one, I fail at the moment of 
truth. It seemed to me as a child, and now it still seems to me, that there is something in the 
oyster that is foul, loathsome; the only difference now is that I know the disgustingness is not, 
literally, in the oyster. McDowell describes projection’s aim as explaining “certain seeming 
features of reality as reflections of our subjective responses to a world that really contains no 
such features” (McDowell-1987, 5). This description captures my example of seafood’s 
disgustingness, but McDowell adds a condition to projectivist accounts:  the projected response 
has an explanatory priority to the property, i.e., we should be able to think about the response 
without making reference to the property.10 McDowell thinks the disgust I feel for seafood can 
be given this priority since it is a “self-contained psychological … [item], conceptualizable 
without any need to appeal to any projected … [property] of disgustingness…” (McDowell-
1987, 6). 
In characterizing projection as explaining what seem to be features of reality on the basis 
of responses he likens to psychological items, McDowell’s analysis meets conditions Pi and Piii 
of a general projectivism. However, the account includes the other elements, too. By positing a 
need to explain “seeming features of reality,” McDowell’s account indicates that need for 
explanation of those features because the features are not actually part of reality, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In “Values and Secondary Qualities” McDowell points out that a feature of projectivism is 
that “the response that, according to such a treatment, is projected onto the world can be 
characterized, without phenomenological falsification, otherwise than in terms of seeming to find 
the supposed product of projection already there” (McDowell-1985, 143). Here McDowell 
clarifies important features of a projectivist explanation of a seeming feature of reality:  it must 
be able to identify the mental process/state that is projected without reference to the feature; and 
it must do so without falsifying the phenomenology that it is attempting to explain. 
	   126	  
incorporates condition Pii to the account. It is not obvious that McDowell’s account includes 
condition Piiia and Piiib. Piiia claims that the projection is a psychological state that is not the 
product of inferences. McDowell is silent on whether the projection can be sustained 
inferentially, so his account does not reject Piiia. Piiib holds that the projectivist analysis is not 
evident to the subject, but when McDowell identifies there is a need for an explanation of the 
“seeming features of reality” he suggests that the projectivist explanation is not obvious. 
Before considering one last putative example of projectivism, I want to emphasize the 
addition McDowell has made to the elements of projectivist account of a phenomenon. 
McDowell requires that it must be possible to describe the projection without appealing to the 
feature of response it explains; my accounts of general non-cognitivist antirealist moral 
projectivism and general projectivism should be supplemented with the following conditions, 
respectively: 
MPiv. It is possible to characterize the non-cognitive state in terms other than the 
moral property whose experience it explains. 
 
Piv.  It is possible to characterize the psychological state in terms other than the 
property whose experience it explains. 
 
4.2.2.5 Comic Projectivism? 
One last example of a feature of reality that seems a prime candidate for a projectivist treatment 
is the comic, which Blackburn uses as an example in “Errors and the Phenomenology of Value” 
(and which McDowell criticized in Projection and Truth in Ethics). Blackburn explains the 
experience of “[f]inding things very funny” is a product of our “tendency to laugh which we 
project on the world” (Blackburn-1985a, 155). I think Richard Pryor is funny, and my favorite 
joke he tells is one in which he discusses his use of cocaine:  “I’m not addicted to coke… I just 
love the smell.” Drug addiction is a horrible disease, but whenever I watch him tell that joke, I 
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either laugh and laugh, or just think to myself, “That’s so funny!” A projectivist explanation of 
the funny may meet all the conditions to be an example of projectivism.  
Does my experience of finding Richard Pryor telling that joke funny, have a realist 
phenomenology, i.e., satisfy condition Pi? I am not sure it does, but I think it is plausible that it 
does have a realist phenomenology; a friend once told the joke, and I did not laugh, so perhaps it 
seems to me that the funniness is there in Pryor telling it. I am not a student of the theory of 
humor, but it is easy to suppose that funniness is not something in the world, so a projectivist 
explanation can fulfill the second condition, Pii. And, this explanation can appeal to a 
disposition, or maybe could even appeal to an unconscious emotion expressed by laughter, to 
explain why I experience Pryor telling the joke as funny, which does not suggest the process to 
me, so it appears like it satisfies conditions Piii, Piiia, and Piiib. A projectivist account of the 
comic must also be able to characterize the psychological state from which the projection arises 
in terms other than the experience it explains. McDowell doubts whether it is possible to 
characterize the subjective psychological response in terms that do not illegitimately appeal to 
comic notions; I will not say it is impossible to do so, but for an account of the comic to count as 
projectivist it must do so (McDowell-1987, 6). 
4.2.3 Moral Projectivism 
This canvassing of projectivist explanations of phenomena is not intended to be exhaustive, but 
it is meant highlight that for an explanation of the phenomena within a domain to be plausibly 
interpreted as a form of projectivism it should satisfy the conditions I proposed based on my 
review of Joyce, Kail, and McDowell. And, so I want to propose that for an explanation of the 
moral to count as an example of antirealist moral projectivism that is compatible with non-
cognitivism, it must meet these conditions: 
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MPi. moral experience has a realist phenomenology; 
MPii. there are no features of the world that correspond to moral experience; 
MPiii. moral experience is a projection that has its origins in a non-cognitive state 
that is a response to features of the world, i.e., is the culmination of a projective 
mechanism that begins with a non-cognitive response to features of the world; 
MPiiia. a moral experience is a projection if its explanation essentially 
appeals to non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
MPiiib. the explanation of a moral experience is opaque to the subject. 
MPiv. It is possible to characterize the non-cognitive state in terms other than the 
moral property whose experience it explains. 
 
In the remaining sections of the chapter, I want to use this as a standard by which to measure 
putative examples of moral projectivism; if a theory does not satisfy these conditions, it is not a 
form of moral projectivism. My attempt to excavate an account of moral projectivism in 
Hume and Blackburn will follow this schema.11 
4.3 Mackie’s Projectivism 
In chapter 2 I highlighted the considerations Mackie offers to support a realist semantics for 
moral language:  the phenomenology of morality is objective, it feels like it is out there. But, 
Mackie thinks his arguments from relativity and queerness establish that morality is not out 
there, it is not objective. According to Mackie, even though morality is not objective, it seems 
that way to us, and because it seems that way, our moral judgments reflect this – our moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In order to develop an account of Humean moral projectivism I will have to develop an 
account of Hume’s causal projectivism; in developing the latter account I will follow this 
schema of general projectivism: 
 
Pi. Experience in a domain has a realist phenomenology; 
Pii. there are no features of the world that correspond to the experience; 
Piii. the experience is a projection that has its origins in a psychological state, i.e., 
is the culmination of a projective mechanism that begins with a psychological 
state; 
Piiia. an experience is a projection if its explanation essentially appeals to 
non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
Piiib. the explanation of the experience is opaque to the subject. 
Piv.  It is possible to characterize the psychological state in terms other than the 
property whose experience it explains. 	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judgments are meant to be descriptive. Mackie’s error theory, the view that all of the 
propositions about a domain of inquiry are false because none of the purported elements within 
the domain exist, needs to be supplemented with an explanation of why it seems that morality is 
objective when it is not, and in a subsection of chapter 1 of Ethics:  Inventing Right and Wrong 
entitled “Patterns of Objectification” Mackie offers a projectivist explanation, which he links to 
Hume (Mackie-1977, 42). Blackburn agrees that Mackie is a projectivist, just one who does not 
think that moral language can be explicated via quasi-realism, his project of earning the right to 
deploy moral judgments in all the ways supported by descriptivism and realism even though the 
meaning of moral judgments is explained by referring to their function to express non-cognitive 
mental states (Blackburn-1984, 180). And, he also characterizes Mackie as sounding a “Humean 
theme” (Blackburn-1985a, 150). It appears that Blackburn views Mackie’s projectivism as 
substantially the same as his own, and that it is not a deviation from the Humean projectivism, 
with which Blackburn equates his view. If we can develop a picture of what projectivism is for 
Mackie, we will have a point of comparison for Blackburn’s theory. 
 Mackie proposes that we “understand the supposed objectivity of moral qualities as 
arising from what we can call the projection or objectification of moral attitudes” (Mackie-1977, 
42). Mackie compares this to the ‘pathetic fallacy’ – the “human tendency to read our feelings 
into their objects” (Mackie-1977, 42). The term was coined by English cultural critic John 
Ruskin in Modern Painters; the term is meant to identify the attribution of an emotion a human 
is experiencing to objects that cannot have those emotions, and some examples include sullen 
clouds or indifferent stones (Joyce-2010, 36). This habit would not qualify as an example of 
projectivism since in projectivism the object of moral judgment is not experienced as 
possessing a human emotion. Joyce points out that Mackie appears to try to explain this by 
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comparison with the attribution of foulness to a fungus, which arises from disgust (Joyce-2010, 
36). But, Joyce notes that this is not an apt comparison since to commit the pathetic fallacy with 
the fungus would involve attributing being disgusted to the fungus” (Joyce-2010, 37). Joyce 
suggests that the attribution of foulness to the fungus constitutes a projection, but this cannot be 
correct; what must happen is that the disgust causes us to experience the fungus as foul, and 
based on that experience we attribute foulness to the fungus. Joyce endorses this as what 
objectification or projection involves on Mackie’s theory. But, it is important to note that this 
picture reinforces the idea in element Piv. that the experience and the mental state from which it 
arise should be given distinct characterizations. 
 Mackie compares moral values with aesthetic values, claiming that both are “logically in 
the same position … with much the same metaphysical and epistemological considerations 
apply[ing] to them” (Mackie-1977, 43). And yet, he points out that the latter are “less strongly 
objectified” (Mackie-1977, 43). This suggests that Mackie thinks that an explanation of aesthetic 
judgments should be projectivist, too. I am not sure that this is correct because an aesthetic 
experience may not be able to satisfy the conditions of a projectivist account. For example, 
when I contemplate Rothko’s Orange, Red, Yellow, it does seem to me that my aesthetic 
appreciation for it is rooted in an affective response, which contravenes condition Piiib. in a 
projectivist account. But when I imagine what Jerry Sandusky did to children, it is not evident to 
me that my response to that has its roots in my emotions (and, this is true despite studying 
projectivist accounts of morality). While it is doubtful that an account of aesthetic judgments 
can be strictly analogous to one for moral judgments, Mackie’s comparison can help him explain 
why the phenomenology of moral experience has an objective character. Unlike with aesthetic 
judgments, it matters greatly to us that other share our moral judgments since these are used to 
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regulate human behavior and interactions (Mackie-1977, 43). And, in the rest of the passage 
Mackie provides different ways by which we can come to see something as having objective 
values, e.g.:  we can confuse our desire for something with its goodness; we fail to see the 
connection between an imperative and desire because the desire generating it is some social 
desire that is not our own; the objectivity is a holdover from when morality was believed to 
reflect divine law (Mackie-1977, 43-45). 
 Mackie’s theory satisfies the elements of projectivism catalogued in subsection 4.2.3. 
For Mackie, moral experience has an objective feel to it, a realist phenomenology (condition 
MPi.), and he denies that this can be explained with reference to instantiated moral properties by 
arguing against them with the arguments from relativity and queerness (condition MPii.). Then, 
he explains that this experience of moral properties arises from feelings, wants, or demands 
(condition MPiii.). Mackie does not explicitly state that the projection is not transparent to us 
(condition MPiiib.), but his conclusion that projection results in beliefs, which we express in 
moral judgments meant to describe the world, indicates that he is committed to this feature of 
projectivism. At the start of the passage entitled “Patterns of Objectification” Mackie places his 
projectivist explanation of morality in the Humean tradition, so if his account of moral 
awareness is an example of moral projectivism, it can serve as a comparison point for other 
putative examples of moral projectivism, the view that the moral properties which people 
engaged in moral practice reference do not exist independently of human beings, and that instead 
they are the product of non-cognitive reactions to natural properties. 
4.4 Humean Projectivism 
A recurring theme in Blackburn’s work is his insistence that his projectivism is Humean 
projectivism (see Blackburn-1981, 165; Blackburn-1984, 170-1, Blackburn-1993, 5). Blackburn 
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goes as far as claiming that his theory is a modern version of Hume’s moral theory (Blackburn-
1988a, 167). I already suggested that Blackburn is mistaken; to demonstrate this I will develop 
an account of Humean moral projectivism in subsections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3, and I will contrast it 
with Blackburn’s moral projectivism in section 4.5. 
4.4.1 Hume’s Moral Projectivism:  In His Own Words 
Most of Section I of Book III Part I of Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature concerns his 
arguments that moral awareness cannot be the product of reason alone; but at the end of this 
section Hume begins to explain the genesis of moral awareness. There he claims that if a person 
considers the act of murder in itself, she will never find viciousness in it; a person can only find 
the viciousness if she turns her attention inward, in which case she will find the viciousness in a 
sentimental reaction to the action (T 3.1.1.26; SBN 468-469). Hume notes that because the 
viciousness does not rest in the action, but in oneself, it is comparable to sounds, color, hot and 
cold, which “are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind” (T 3.1.1.26; SBN 469). 
 Given that the moral quality of an action resides not in the action, but in the perception, it 
must be either be an impression or an idea, and Hume claims it cannot be an idea by appealing to 
his argument that a moral quality cannot be discovered by reason, which involves the 
comparison of ideas only (T 3.1.2.1; SBN 470).12  According to Hume, this means that morality 
is a matter of feeling rather than judgment, though the relative gentleness of the impression may 
confuse us into thinking that it is just a less vivid idea (T 3.1.2.1; SBN 470). On this view, the 
“impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are nothing but particular pains or 
pleasures”, and consequently an “action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious … 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Hume distinguishes between two kinds of perceptions, impressions and ideas; the former are 
sensations or feelings caused by stimuli, while the latter are copies of impressions, and are the 
perceptions involved in thinking; the distinguishing mark of impressions is their greater intensity 
(see T 1.1.1). 
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because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind” (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471). So, 
for Hume it seems that when a person has the experience that another person is virtuous or an 
action is good, this is just to feel (have an impression of) pleasure of a particular sort, and this 
feeling is what makes up a person’s praise or admiration for the person or action (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 
471). Hume is very careful to say though that we do not infer that a person is virtuous or an 
action is good because we have the feeling of pleasure; we feel the person is virtuous because we 
feel that she pleases us in a particular manner (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471). In Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals Hume claims that a sentence that makes a moral pronouncement “depends 
upon some internal sense or feeling which nature has made universal in the whole species” (EPM 
1.137; SBN 173). Despite these claims the mechanism remains obscure. 
 At T 3.3.1 (SBN 574) Hume describes a sympathetic mechanism by which our moral 
sense is produced.13  Hume sketches the following picture by which we might come to call a 
person virtuous. To begin with he assumes that humans’ mental operations and feelings are alike 
(T 3.3.1.7; SBN 575). When we observe a person’s action, we immediately infer its cause, which 
is a passion, and then generate an idea of the passion, which in turn generates the passion itself in 
us (T 3.3.1.7; SBN 576).14 So, on this view we observe a person treating another person tenderly, 
and we immediately conclude that this tender behavior springs from the passion of love in the 
person; next, we generate an idea of this love, and the idea prompts in us love toward the person. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In the previous paragraph the move from the impression of pleasure or pain, arising from 
observing the features of a person or act, to the awareness of the person’s or act’s virtue or vice 
appears to be immediate. It is unclear whether it is immediate because impression of pleasure, 
say, is identical to moral awareness, or the former triggers the latter quickly. Here Hume 
describes a process in which the moral awareness is less immediate indicating that feeling 
pleasure at an action is not identical to feeling its virtue. 
14 At T 1.1.2.1 (SBN 7-8) Hume distinguishes between impressions of sensation, which arise 
from unknown causes (presumably external to us) and impressions of reflection, which are 
derived from ideas; and at T 2.1.1.1 (SBN 275) Hume says the passions and other emotions 
resembling them are impressions of reflection.   
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Since Hume claims the “approbation of moral qualities … proceeds entirely from a moral taste, 
and from certain sentiments of pleasure or disgust, which arise upon contemplation and view of 
particular qualities or characters,” it appears that in having the passion of love for that person and 
in feeling pleasure, we feel their virtuousness in admiring it (T 3.3.1.15; SBN 581). Despite this 
description of the mechanism of sympathy, the process by which we move from observation of a 
person or action to recognition of his or its virtue or vice remains opaque. Let’s look at Hume’s 
account in the Enquiry. 
 It is in Appendix I of the Enquiry that Hume discusses the role of sentiment in producing 
moral awareness. In discussing ingratitude, Hume claims that there is no matter of fact or 
relation that reason detects to which we could attribute vice; instead, it is a complex of factors 
observed by a spectator that moves the structure of his mind to produce a sentiment of blame 
towards the ingratitude (EPM App 1.237; SBN 287-8). Hume makes it clear that in his view 
“morality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality 
gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary” (EPM App 
1.239; SBN 289). Further elaborations on the idea that moral awareness springs from sentiment 
include the following: 
In these sentiments then, not in a discovery of relations of any kind, do all moral 
determinations consist (EPM App 1.241; SBN 291). 
 
But in all decisions of taste or external beauty, all the relations are beforehand 
obvious to the eye; and we thence proceed to feel a sentiment of complacency or 
disgust, according to the nature of the object, and dispositions of our organs (EPM 
App 1.242; SBN 291). 
 
The beauty is not a quality of the circle…. It is only the effect which that figure 
produces upon the mind, whose peculiar fabric or structure renders it susceptible 
of such sentiments…. Till such a spectator appears, there is nothing but a figure of 
such particular dimensions and proportions:  from his sentiments alone arise its 
elegance and beauty (EPM App 1.242; SBN 291-2). 
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These quotations do not do anything to elucidate the mechanism; all they do is establish the 
dependence of moral awareness on sentiment.  
Appendix 1 of the Enquiry concludes with a vague statement of the mechanism; taste, 
which appears to occupy the role of sympathy from the Treatise, “gives the sentiment of beauty 
and deformity, vice and virtue…. [It] has a productive faculty, and gilding or staining all natural 
objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation” 
(EPM App 1.246; SBN 294). Finally, here is the suggestion that sympathy projects our 
sentiments onto actions or persons, and in so doing produces something new in the action or 
person, something like a moral quality. Despite this description, it is incomplete because Hume 
does not explain the mechanism that constitutes moral projectivism in his theory; in the next 
subsection I will develop an account of the projective mechanism in awareness of causes in order 
to establish a model for an account of it in awareness of morality. 
4.4.2 Hume’s Causal Projectivism:  Cause as an Idea of Reflection 
Hume develops his projectivist account of cause in Book I Part III Section IV of the Treatise 
where he turns to the question, “What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are 
necessarily connected” (T 1.3.14.1; SBN 155)? Shortly later Hume identifies this relation of 
necessary connection with other terms like “efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, 
connexion, and productive quality”; and though, he does not include it in the list, “cause” is 
another term for this relation (T 1.3.14.4; SBN 157).15  
Hume claims that since all ideas are derived from impressions, to understand the idea of 
cause we must look for an impression that produces the idea, but he points out that when we 
examine a situation, in which one event is supposed to cause a second event, the only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In discussing the relation that putatively exists between two objects, one a cause and the other 
the effect, Hume tends to call the relation “necessary connection”; I will call it “cause”. 
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impressions we have are that (1) the two events are contiguous, and (2) the event called “cause” 
precedes the second (T 1.3.14.1; SBN 155). Hume argues that just as we cannot detect causation 
in a single putative instance of it, we cannot detect it in multiple putative instances; we still only 
detect the contiguity and succession of the two events (T 1.3.14.1; SBN 155). However, Hume 
argues that the repetition of this contiguity and succession among similar events produces an 
impression in us, which in turn produces the idea of cause in us (T 1.3.14.1; SBN 155). Hume 
writes, “For after a frequent repetition, I find that upon the appearance of one of its objects, the 
mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light 
upon account of its relation to the first object. ‘Tis this impression, then, or determination, which 
affords me the idea of necessity” (T 1.3.14.1; SBN 156). It seems that Hume think this frequent 
repetition of contiguity and succession of type-A and type-B events determines the mind to 
expect the type-B event every time we become aware of the type-A event, and this expectation 
gives rise to the impression of a stronger relation than contiguity or succession between type-A 
and type-B events; and the idea of cause arises from this impression. I am not now prepared to 
outline a breakdown of the projectivist processes by which we come to call one event the cause, 
but after examining Hume’s account further, I will do so. 
Hume spends several pages dispatching alternative accounts of how we come to have an 
idea of causation – including a theory claiming that the multiple resembling instances of events 
either discovers or produces cause in events – before returning to the task of providing his own 
account. Hume says, “Tho’ the several resembling instances, which give rise to the idea of 
power, have no influence on each other, and can never produce any new quality in the object, 
which can be the model of the idea, yet the observation of this resemblance produces a new 
impression in the mind, which is its real model for the idea of cause” (T 1.3.14.20; SBN 164-5). 
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Hume’s view seems to be the following:  we observe multiple instances of contiguous type-A 
and type-B events in which the latter succeed the former, and we also observe resemblance 
among these instances which produces an impression in the mind which serves as the model for 
the idea of cause. Two paragraphs later, Hume claims that this impression must be an impression 
of reflection, which gives us a hint on how to interpret this description.16 With the clue that the 
model for the idea of cause is an impression of reflection and the order of perceptions, we can 
begin to sketch a picture of the process by which we come to the idea of cause: 
1.  There are the impressions of sensation, which arise from our observation of 
several instances of type-B events succeeding type-A events. 
2.  These produce multiple ideas of sensation of instances of type-B events 
succeeding type-A events, which are copies of these impressions. 
3.  We notice the resemblance between these ideas, which causes a new 
impression – an impression of reflection – in the mind, which is the model of the 
idea of cause. 
4.  Awareness of this impression of reflection produces the idea – an idea of 
reflection – of cause. 
 
Despite this sketch, the last two steps remain vague; the nature of this impression of reflection 
and the move from it to the idea of cause must be unpacked further. 
4.4.2.1 Cause:  from Impression to Idea of Reflection 
Hume describes the new impression as an immediate felt “determination of the mind to pass 
from one object to its usual attendant, and to conceive it in a stronger light on account of that 
relation” or “that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its 
usual attendant” (T 1.3.14.20; SBN 165). It seems that this new impression is a habit of having 
the idea of a type-B event succeed the idea of a type-A event when presented with a type-A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 At T.1.1.2.1 (SBN 7-8), when Hume introduces his division of the perceptions, he claims that 
there are impressions of sensation and reflection, and there are ideas, which seem to be divided 
along the same lines – ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection. However, there is an order by 
which these come into the mind:  first impressions of sensation, then ideas of sensation, then 
impressions of reflection, and last ideas of reflection. 
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event, or the idea of one, and that the idea of the type-B event is all the more vivid, and like an 
impression of a type-B event, because of this customary habit. Essentially, the new impression is 
the disposition to have an idea of a type-B event whenever we observe or have the idea of a type-
A event. This equation of the new impression of reflection with a disposition is supported by 
Hume’s claim that (a) passions are examples of impressions of reflection and (b) that passions 
are the spring from which actions originate (T 2.1.1.1; SBN 275; T 2.3.3.4; SBN 415). 
 Hume goes on to claim that cause “is nothing but an internal impression of the mind, or a 
determination to carry our thoughts from one to another,” and that the idea of it arises from 
impression (T 1.3.14.20; SBN 165). This suggests that Hume does not think that cause is an 
existing power or force in the world, but that our practice of ascribing it to events arises from our 
disposition to have the idea of an event from observing, or having the idea of, another event 
which previously preceded it. According to Hume, “Upon the whole, necessity is something, that 
exists in the mind, not in objects” (T 1.3.14.22; SBN 165). The third step should now be clear as 
involving the development of a disposition to produce a more vivid idea of type-B events when 
presented with either a type-A event or idea of one. However, the fourth step is still unclear. 
 In the section on cause in the Treatise Hume moves so briskly from the just discussed 
account of how the idea of cause develops to an explanation of how we come to attach it to 
objects that the transition from the impression of reflection, which is a disposition to have the 
idea of an “effect” upon observing or remembering its “cause”, to the idea of cause remains 
obscure. The transition appears to proceed as follows. Having a disposition to call to mind the 
idea of an “effect” upon observing or recalling its “cause”, we become aware of how quickly we 
move from the one to other, and this serves as the model for the idea of cause. From this model 
we somehow manage to produce the idea that the type-A event necessarily brings the type-B 
	   139	  
event in its wake, or that the former is the cause of the latter. Ultimately, I want to provide a 
projectivist account of cause to serve as a comparative base for a projectivist account of 
morality, so I do not want to dwell on this transition too much, but in earlier and later passages of 
the Treatise Hume makes remarks that suggest what may be going on. 
When the mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one object to the 
idea or belief of another, it is not determin’d by reason, but by certain principles, 
which associate together the ideas of these objects, and unite them in the 
imagination. Had ideas no more union in the fancy than objects seem to have to 
the understanding, we cou’d never draw any inference from causes to effects, nor 
repose belief in any matter of fact. The inference, therefore, depends solely on the 
union of ideas (T 1.3.4.12; SBN 92). 
 
‘Tis natural for men, in their common and careless way of thinking, to imagine 
they perceive a connexion betwixt such objects as they have constantly found 
unite together; and because custom has render’d it difficult to separate the ideas, 
they are apt to fancy such a separation to be in itself impossible and absurd (T 
1.4.3.9; SBN 223). 
 
It appears that our imaginations associate the type-A and type-B events and unite them together 
in such a way that makes separating them impossible to our imaginations, and we come to have 
the idea of a causal connection between the events. Even though this account may not fully 
elucidate the transition from the impression to the idea, it should do enough to make plausible 
that the mind does produce the idea from the impressions. Now, I want to turn to Hume’s 
explanation of why it is we attribute cause to the type-A event itself. 
 Hume admits that his explanation that the origin of the idea of cause is within the mind 
will astonish people since it manifestly runs counter to how awareness of cause feels to us; it 
seems to us like we are aware of cause as something external to us that occurs between two 
events. After all, we talk about how the ball hitting the window caused the window to shatter; so, 
Hume has to explain the phenomenological aspects of causal awareness, and it is here that he 
introduces the element that makes his account of cause a projectivist account:   
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’Tis a common observation, that the mind has a great propensity to spread itself 
on external objects, and to conjoin with them any internal impression, which they 
occasion, and which always makes appearance at the same time these objects 
discover themselves to the senses. Thus … we naturally imagine a conjunction, 
even in place, betwixt the objects and qualities, tho’ the qualities be of such a 
nature as to admit of no such conjunction, and really exist nowhere (T 1.3.14.20; 
SBN 167). 
 
The question then is what happens when the mind spreads itself on external objects and conjoins 
the internal impressions with the object. Hume supplies some hints of the process: 
[W]e are led astray … when we transfer the determination of thought to external 
objects, and suppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them; that being a 
quality, which can only belong to the mind that considers them (T 1.3.14.22; SBN 
168). 
 
These relations, then, of causation, and contiguity in the time of their appearance, 
betwixt the extended object and the quality, which exists without any particular 
place, must have such an effect on the mind, that upon the appearance of one it 
will immediately turn its thought to the conception of the other. Nor is this all. We 
not only turn our thought from one to the other upon account of their relation, but 
likewise endeavour to give them a new relation, viz. that of a conjunction in 
place, that we may render the transition more easy and natural. For 'tis a 
quality…in human nature…that when objects are united by any relation, we have 
a strong propensity to add some new relation to them, in order to compleat the 
union (T 1.4.5.12; SBN 237).17 
 
From these quotations we should see that whatever happens in projection, it is a mental 
phenomenon, probably an act of imagination, a faculty, which operates by associating and 
separating ideas (T 1.1.4.1; SBN 10). Another reason to think that projection is an act of 
imagination is Hume’s claim that the mind conjoins objects with impressions; if the two are 
being conjoined, then it seems this is a mental act of association, i.e. an act of imagination. Hume 
seems to suggest that in projection we associate a perception with an object in the world. But, 
this cannot be right since Hume suggests that all we are ever aware of are our perceptions, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This last quotation comes at the conclusion of a passage in which Hume claims that if we 
contemplate a table on which a fig and an olive lie at opposite ends, we will have the idea of 
their respective tastes, and conjoin these with the qualities that rest in the fig and the olive so that 
we will think the taste is in the fig and olive, when they are really in our mind. 
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are either impressions or ideas (T 1.4.2.54; SBN 216).18 Another apparent problem with this 
spreading metaphor is that Hume says we connect the impressions with the objects, but Hume’s 
first account of the imagination as the faculty that associates ideas by resemblance, contiguity, 
and cause and effect seems to suggest that imagination can only take ideas as its objects (T 
1.1.4.1; SBN 10-11). However, later Hume defines a belief as “A LIVELY IDEA RELATED 
TO OR ASSOCIATED WITH A PRESENT IMPRESSION” (T 1.3.7.5; SBN 96). This textual 
evidence suggests that it is plausible to think that what Hume meant by his spreading metaphor, 
and what projection of cause consists of, is the mind associating an idea with a present 
impression of an object, thus producing a belief in which the idea is a part of the impression of 
the object. 
This suggests that on the projectivist account of cause what happens is that the mind has 
an impression of successive type-A and type-B events and the imagination associates them with 
the idea of cause it already has, thus producing a belief that event A causes event B. If that is 
correct, then the following should accurately capture what Hume thinks happens when we think 
one event causes another: 
(HCP1) the natural features of events causally interact with a person’s senses;  
(HCP2) these external stimuli produce impressions of sensations of the events in 
the mind; 
(HCP3) the impression of sensation of the first activates the disposition – an 
impression of reflection – to have the idea of the second event; 
(HCP4) which in turn calls to mind the idea of cause – an idea of reflection – in a 
lively way; 
(HCP5) the imagination unites the impressions of the events and the idea of cause 
that have been brought to mind in near instantaneous succession into a belief that 
the first event causes the second. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In the same place in the text, Hume claims it is a matter of fancy to think external objects 
resemble our impression of them. 
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With this picture of Humean causal projectivism in place, I will now sketch a picture of 
Humean moral projectivism, a version of the view that the moral properties which people 
engaged in moral practice reference do not exist independently of human beings, and that instead 
they are the product of non-cognitive reactions to natural properties. 
4.4.3 Humean Moral Projectivism 
Even though I reviewed Hume’s own words about the development of moral awareness in 
subsection 4.4.1, I want to restate a few key claims to draw out parallels between moral 
awareness and causal awareness. 
Hume claimed that we can never find the viciousness of the murder in the murder itself; it 
can only be found within a sentimental reaction, and so it is like other qualities – sound, color, 
hot or cold – that can only be found in the mind (T 3.1.126; SBN 468-469). This parallels 
Hume’s comparison of causal awareness to awareness of sound or smell in his projectivist 
explanation of why we think cause is external to us. In addition, this means that we should think 
of the source of our moral awareness as parallel to our source of awareness of cause – they both 
spring from an impression.19 Assuming that human’s mental operations and feelings are similar 
(T 3.3.1.7; SBN 575), Hume sketches the process by which we might call a person virtuous; it 
goes as follows:  we observe a person’s action and on the basis of the impression of sensation the 
action produces in us we immediately infer its cause, which is a passion; this generates in us an 
idea of the passion, which in turn via the mechanism of sympathy generates in us the passion 
itself toward the person – an impression of reflection (T 3.3.1.7-8; SBN 576-577).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The parallel is reinforced by the fact that one of Hume’s argument why moral awareness is a 
matter of sentiment is that moral awareness can motivate us, and only passions do this (T 3.1.1.6; 
SBN 457). In discussing the impression of reflection from which the idea of cause arises, I noted 
that it was a disposition, which moves us to action. 
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Again this parallels Hume’s claim that we come to think of one event causing another 
because witnessing the two events activates a disposition to have the idea of the second event 
producing the idea of cause. However, an important difference between Hume’s views on 
morality and cause is that it seems that the process by which we become aware of a person’s 
virtue terminates in the impression of reflection of passion, while our awareness of an event 
causing another is the combination of the idea of cause and the impressions of the events. Hume 
also said that what makes an action virtuous or vicious is that it causes an observer of the action 
to feel a particular sort of pleasure or pain, so that what really happens is that we think the action 
is virtuous or vicious because in witnessing the action, this causes an impression of reflection of 
pleasure or pain of a particular sort, and this impression is just what it is to be aware that the 
action is virtuous or vicious (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471). There are missing steps here. 
First, the sketch from T 3.3.1 that I outlined two paragraphs back neglects Hume’s theory 
of the “double relation of ideas and impressions” (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 286). Second, the sketch omits 
that moral awareness is constituted by that impression of reflection of pleasure or pain of a 
particular sort, which turns out to be approbation, which must be a passion, since moral 
awareness motivates and only passions motivate, or at least according to Hume. This is 
supported by Hume’s description of his hypothesis about morality in Appendix 1 of the Enquiry:  
“[M]orality is determined by sentiment. It defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality 
gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; and vice the contrary” (EPM App 
1.239; SBN 289). I think this is the new creation that Hume speaks of in Appendix 1 of the 
Enquiry where he offers a vague statement of the mechanism of moral projection: “[Sympathy] 
gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue…. [It] has a productive faculty, and 
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gilding or staining all natural objects with the colours, borrowed from internal sentiment, raises 
in a manner a new creation” (EPM App 1.246; SBN 294).20 
If the impression of approbation is the new creation and the feeling of a particular sort 
that constitutes moral awareness, it is still not clear what this particular sort of feeling is. For one, 
it must be a passion. Second, this feeling of a peculiar sort should not be identified with the 
passion that is supposed to be the mirror of the passion that inspires the person, whom we 
admire, to act. Hume suggests the approbation is a new mental state when he claims that 
sympathy stains natural objects with sentiment, i.e., the mirroring passion. So, what seems to 
happen is that sympathy generates both the passion that resembles the passion in the person 
whom we admire, and, on the basis of this passion, the approbation. Approbation has a peculiar 
phenomenological feel, and it strikes me that the peculiarity consists in the sympathy associating 
the passion with an impression of the person (remember that Hume claims all we are ever truly 
aware of are perceptions); this is what it means to feel her virtue (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471). And, this 
act of association by the sympathy is moral projection in Hume. Given these considerations, I 
suggest that the following sketch is an accurate account of Humean moral projection: 
(HMP1) the natural features of another person’s actions causally interact with a 
person’s senses;  
(HMP2) these external stimuli produce impressions of sensations of the actions in 
the mind; 
(HMP3) from these impressions of sensation the mind infers the person acted 
from some passion, producing the idea of the passion; 
(HMP4) in turn, the idea of the passion produces an impression of reflection of 
pleasure or pain; 
(HMP5) the sympathy generates the passion, which was inferred in the person; 
(HMP6) uniting the passion with the impression of the person, the sympathy 
generates approbation, which is moral awareness. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Hume actually is speaking of taste in the quotation, but I take it he is making an analogy of 
sympathy with taste, so I do not think it misrepresents Hume to make the parenthetical change in 
order to illustrate his view. 
	   145	  
With this account of Humean moral projection in place, I want to now turn my attention back to 
Blackburn’s moral projectivism. 
4.5 Blackburn’s Projectivism 
In this section I will sketch an account of Blackburn’s projectivism supported by his own words. 
My aim, as much as possible, is to work chronologically by cataloging Blackburn’s own 
descriptions of projectivism, offer interpretations of what they mean, and noting any substantive 
changes to the position. In the places where Blackburn is inconsistent about the nature of 
projectivism, I will suggest a resolution to it either by offering reasons to think one account is 
better than the other or by comparing the accounts to Hume’s version of projectivism, taking 
divergence from it to signal a possible mistake on Blackburn’s part. 
4.5.1 Blackburn’s Projectivism:  In His Own Words 
Blackburn is largely silent about projectivism in his first foray into the moral realism-
antirealism debate, “Moral Realism.” He makes only one remark that can be interpreted as 
reflecting projectivism, when he claims that a moral proposition is just a “propositional 
reflection” of an attitude even thought it appears to make a factual claim about states of affairs 
(Blackburn-1973, 125-6).21  This claim though contains the kernel of Blackburn’s theory that 
moral propositions are the outputs of a system, or mechanism, in which moral mental states play 
a crucial role, and these moral mental states are some kind of non-cognitive mental state.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Twenty-five years later, in Ruling Passions, Blackburn will harken back to this account of a 
moral proposition when discussing whether “projectivism” or “expressivism” or some other 
name is the best title for his theory of moralizing (Blackburn-1998, 77). 
22 In his essay “The Flight to Reality” Blackburn says that he will call the attitudes and feelings 
at the center of Humean theories of ethics “conative states” (Blackburn-1995, 36). A conative 
state is one of three mental states constitutive of the mind; the other two are cognitive states and 
affective states. A conative state is a mental state directed toward action like volition, desire, or 
disposition. An affective state is a mental state of experiencing feelings like emotions or moods. 
Both a conative state and an affective state are examples of a non-cognitive state. By labeling 
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It is in “Opinions and Chances” that Blackburn first provides details about the mechanics 
of projectivism. In that article he describes a process in which the natural features of the world 
impinge on the mind, which has a reaction to that stimuli in the form of attitudes, and in turn, in 
the crucial step, the mind manifests the reaction by “‘spreading itself on the world’” (Blackburn-
1980, 75). Blackburn explains that when a mind spreads itself on the world  “we regard the 
world as richer or fuller through possessing properties or things that are in fact mere projections 
of the mind’s own reactions” (Blackburn-1980, 75). This explanation suggests that projection 
involves the imposition of some property into our awareness of the world that cannot be 
accounted for by identifying a cause in the world that impinges on the mind. However, only a 
page later when he compares projectivism about moralizing, engaging in an activity 
constitutive of the practice of morality, to projectivism about cause, Blackburn suggests that 
projecting a cause is dignifying a regularity in a certain way (Blackburn-1980, 76). This suggests 
that projection in moralizing is dignifying attitudes in a certain way, and this might capture his 
previous claim that moral propositions are propositional reflections of attitudes; a moral 
proposition like, “Rape is evil,” dignifies our negative attitude toward rape in a certain way. 
Blackburn does not explain what is involved in dignifying an attitude in a certain way. 
4.5.1.1 Tension in Explaining Projection 
This contrast is the first example of a recurring tension in Blackburn’s explanation of 
projectivism; in different places Blackburn claims projection either is identified with voicing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the mental states at the heart of projective theories “conative states” Blackburn distinguishes 
them from emotions and moods; the effect is to distance moral mental states from emotion. I 
cannot be sure why Blackburn does this, but it may be that he wants to distinguish a projectivist 
theory from emotivism. Since I will quote Blackburn extensively in the material to follow, and 
“conative state” appears often in those quotes, I will use “conative state” rather than “non-
cognitive mental state” in the remainder of this chapter to be consistent with Blackburn’s 
terminology. 
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conative states via moral propositions or is identified as a further mental process. In “Rule 
Following and Moral Realism” Blackburn appears to back away from the idea that the projection 
consists in merely voicing moral propositions when he contrasts the realist with the Humean:  
“[The realist] holds that the moral features of things are the parents of our sentiments, whereas 
the Humean holds that they are their children” (Blackburn-1981, 165). This claim suggests that 
moral features are the products of attitudes, but these features seem like they would be something 
that are part of our awareness of the world, inserted into it by our minds. However, in the same 
article, Blackburn suggests that the reaction to external stimuli, which must be an attitude to be 
consistent with Blackburn-1980, is the output of the projective mechanism, thus making the 
attitude the projection (Blackburn-1981, 175). And, in the same place, Blackburn suggests that 
moralizing is a commitment to taking inputs from the naturalistic world to determine an output, 
suggesting the process is transparent to moralizers.23 Blackburn returns, though, to the theme in 
which moral awareness is not awareness of an aspect of the natural world, but something that is 
the product of mental phenomena:  “Someone with realist sentiments makes the world rich, but 
the interpreting mind lazy; someone with the opposite instincts makes the world poor, and the 
interpreting mind busy” (Blackburn-1981, 181). This characterization of the interpreting mind as 
busy suggests an active faculty that augments the stimuli of the external world; such an active 
faculty implies that there are intervening mental processes between the attitude and expression of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Again, Blackburn’s use of the term “commitment” is problematic. Later, Blackburn suggests 
that the moral mental states expressed by moral propositions are commitments, but then says to 
voice the moral proposition is the commitment (Blackburn-1981, 179). In some places a 
“commitment” seems to be the mental state expressed by a moral proposition (see Blackburn-
1984, 167, Blackburn-1987, 60, and Blackburn-1988a, 168), and yet other times he says a 
commitment is any mental state, belief or attitude, that gets expressed in propositional form; in 
other places it seems to be a disposition, which strikes me as not the same thing as an attitude 
(see Blackburn1984, 170-1), and then sometimes the commitment seems to be the moral 
proposition expressing something other than a belief (see Blackburn-1984, 167 and Blackburn-
1987, 55). 
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a moral proposition. This inconstancy in the nature of projection is a recurring feature of 
Blackburn’s account of projectivism. 
In Spreading the Word Blackburn gives an extended account of projectivism; suggesting 
it is a form of expressivism, the view that the meaning of moral judgments cannot be explained 
without reference to their function apart from any descriptive content that is parts of its meaning 
and the function of moral language can be to express emotions, attitudes, commands, etc., he 
claims that what expressivism seeks to do is give a causal explanation of moralizing 
(Blackburn-1984, 169). In Spreading the Word Blackburn almost always accounts for what 
constitutes projection as the use of moral propositions in moralizing to express attitudes. For 
example, he writes, “Suppose that we say we project an attitude or habit or other commitment 
which is not descriptive onto the world, when we speak and think as though there were a 
property of things which our sayings describe…. Projecting is what Hume referred to when he 
talks of ‘gilding and staining all natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal 
sentiment’, or of the mind ‘spreading itself on the world’” (Blackburn-1984, 170-1). And further 
on he claims that “[w]hen we announce A-commitments we are projecting, we are neither 
reacting to a given distribution of A-properties, nor speculating about one” (A-commitments and 
A-properties are moral commitments and moral properties) (Blackburn-1984, 182).  
Projection is the key mechanism in Blackburn’s metaphysics of moralizing, engaging in 
an activity constitutive of the practice of morality, and these quotations indicate that his 
considered assessment of projection is that it consists in the voicing of moral commitments. 
However, when Blackburn goes on to identify the elements of the projectivist metaphysics of 
moralizing he again vacillates on the nature of projection; he characterizes projectivism as a 
philosophy of evaluation that claims evaluative properties are projections of sentiment 
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(Blackburn-1984, 180). This is another instance in which Blackburn is inconsistent between the 
idea that projection merely consists of expression of attitude and the idea that projection involves 
some additional mental process, which imposes properties on the inputs from external stimuli. 
 Even though Blackburn is inconstant on the nature of projection, his discussion of 
projectivism in Spreading the Word does begin to sketch out the whole projectivist theory of 
what happens in moralizing. He suggests its elements and mechanisms when he claims it asks 
“no more from the world than what we know is there — the ordinary features of things on the 
basis of which we make decisions about them, like or dislike them, fear them and avoid them, 
desire and seek them out. It asks no more than this:  a natural world, and patterns of reaction to 
it” (Blackburn-1984, 182). Moreover, he says that establishing projectivism involves close 
examination of the nature of the attitude that is “spread on the world” and determining what 
makes such an attitude a moral attitude (Blackburn-1984, 192). This claim is ambiguous between 
projection as voicing and projection as mental process, too. And, this description of one of the 
projectivists’ tasks seems to assume that the nature of the mental state expressed by moral 
judgment is not belief, a view for which Blackburn has not yet argued.24 Blackburn goes on to 
characterize moralizing as the product of a moral sensibility that is “defined by a function from 
input of belief [or awareness] to output of attitude” and also by the interactions of attitudes 
(Blackburn-1984, 192).  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In chapter 5 I argue that Blackburn’s motivation of projectivism by hypothesizing that the 
moral mental states expressed by moral propositions are conative states does not seem to be part 
of good theorizing; Blackburn’s assumption here that a moral mental state is an attitude is 
perhaps the first instance in which he does this. 
	   150	  
4.5.1.2 Sketching the Tension in Blackburn’s Projectivism 
Since the second part of Blackburn’s Spreading the Word was his first extended analysis of the 
connection between the world and our talk of it, now is a good time to take stock of the picture 
of moralizing Blackburn has presented so far. 
Blackburn waivers on whether projection is merely the voicing of attitude or some other 
mental process, but if projectivism is to be the metaphysics of moralizing, then based on what 
Blackburn has claimed, so far, we can sketch the causal process of moralizing in either of two 
ways:   
(BP1) the natural features of an action causally interact with a person’s senses;  
(BP2) these external stimuli produce perceptual beliefs about the presence of 
certain natural features in the action; 
(BP3) these perceptual beliefs produce attitudes about the action as outputs; 
(BP4) we become aware of the attitudes as moral judgment in propositional form; 
(BP5) the attitudes are voiced by uttering moral judgment in propositional form. 
 
or 
 
(BP'1) the natural features of an action causally interact with a person’s senses;  
(BP'2) these external stimuli produce perceptual beliefs about the presence of 
certain natural features in the action; 
(BP'3) these perceptual beliefs produce attitudes about the action as outputs; 
(BP'4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude; 
(BP'5) we are aware of this attitude as a moral judgment in propositional form, 
and it is voiced by uttering moral judgments in propositional form.25 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Neither BP1-BP5 nor BP'1-BP'5 are complete as they are. These accounts of projectivism’s 
causal processes need to be supplemented since the beliefs alone do not produce the attitudes; the 
output of attitude is also determined by our natures, desires, and needs interacting with belief; 
these are part of a moral sensibility (as described in subsection 3.2.2), and according to 
Blackburn they limit what attitudes can be the output of this process since not all sets of attitudes 
can be coherent (Blackburn-1984, 197). In addition, in “Morals and Modals” Blackburn claims 
that the move from step (4) to step (5) is not a trivial one — not all attitudes will be projected, 
only the sufficiently strong ones. Apparently, we won’t move from step (3) to step (5) for any 
attitude because we are aware that our attitudes may be flawed due to defects in what must be 
our sensibility; the transition will only occur when the attitude is strong and we are convinced 
that the attitudes cannot be explained by a defect in our sensibility. It is unclear if this is a 
conscious process. And Blackburn further claims that this is not really a step:  “The ‘step’ from a 
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The first sketch of projectivism reflects the model of projection as voicing. The conscious 
manifestation of attitudes as moral judgments in propositional form, step BP4, is where 
projection occurs because a person who does not utter moral judgments, but silently thinks them 
is moralizing, engaging in an activity constitutive of the practice of morality, and if 
projectivism is the metaphysics of moralizing then this form of moralizing must be accounted 
for. The second sketch reflects the model of projection as mental process; in it, projection is a 
mental process that imposes the attitude onto the perceptual belief that caused it, so that the 
attitude comes to a person’s awareness as if it were part of the belief. Because adjudicating 
between these competing pictures of Blackburn’s projectivism is difficult due to the inconstancy 
in the account, I want to review more of Blackburn’s pronouncements on projection. 
4.5.2 Blackburn’s Projectivism:  In His Own Words – More Tension 
As noted, Blackburn regularly compares his projectivism to Hume’s, and he describes Hume’s 
account of causal necessity as the quintessential example of a projective theory (Blackburn-1984, 
210-1). And, then he later claims that his theory is a modern version of Hume’s moral theory 
(Blackburn-1988a, 167). In making these two claims Blackburn seems to indicate that Hume’s 
moral theory is projectivist in the same way that his causal theory is projectivist.26 Hume 
provides a detailed description of the process by which we come to judgments about cause, but 
he is more circumspect in accounting for the process by which we arrive at moral judgments. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fully integrated sentiment of sufficient strength to the moral expression now becomes no step at 
all:  the moral is just the vocabulary in which we express the state” (Blackburn-1987, 70). 
26 Sainsbury and Kail would find fault with Blackburn here since both argue that Hume’s 
projective accounts of causation and morality are distinct. I have no intention of investigating 
whether they or Blackburn are correct. What I am interested in is developing an account of 
projectivism that would be Blackburn’s. If Blackburn’s interpretation of Hume is wrong, that 
does not matter; what matters is that Blackburn thinks his interpretation of Hume gets 
projectivism right. 
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Blackburn describes Hume’s account of causation as one in which the “central thought is that 
dignifying a relationship between events as causal is spreading or projecting a reaction which we 
have to something else we are aware of about the events — Hume thought of this input in terms 
of regular succession of similar such events, one upon the other. Exposed to such regularity, our 
minds (cannot help but) form habits of expectation, which they then project by describing the 
one event as causing the other” (Blackburn-1984, 210-1). Once again Blackburn’s describes a 
projectivist process so that projection consists of expressing or voicing the reaction via 
judgments in propositional form. This account though is not consistent with the account of 
Humean causal projectivism I outlined earlier. 
As noted before, according to Blackburn, the genesis of moral awareness lies in conative 
states, the idea that the conative states are the parents of the moral features of things; the core 
idea in Blackburn’s projectivism, then, is that the moral mental state is a “state of mind [that] 
starts theoretical life as […] a stance, or conative state or pressure on choice and action” 
(Blackburn-1988a, 168). This suggests that the state of mind that is characteristic of moral 
awareness is not the same one as the initial conative state, that it has undergone some change, 
which reflects what I called projection as mental process. In the introduction to Essays in Quasi-
Realism Blackburn says that Humean projectivism is “the mechanism whereby what starts life 
as a non-descriptive psychological state ends up being expressed, thought about, and considered 
in propositional form” (Blackburn-1993, 5). Though it is unclear in this quotation what the 
“what” that is expressed in propositional form is, it is ambiguous in reflecting the models of 
projection outlined; there is nothing in it that is inconsistent with either BP1-BP5 or BP'1-BP'5. 
 There is ample textual evidence that Blackburn thinks that projection occurs when the 
conative state – a mental state characterized by being directed toward action, e.g., desires, 
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volitions, wishes – that is central to projectivism is expressed in propositional form as BP1-BP5 
reflects. In “Errors and the Phenomenology of Value” Blackburn equates projection with voicing 
an attitude when he explicitly says that “we ‘gild or stain’ the world by describing it as if it 
contained features answering to these” attitudes (Blackburn-1985a, 152). In “Morals and 
Modals” Blackburn claims that his preferred account of projection is the one in which when “we 
‘project’ … we use the ordinary propositional expressions of our commitments, saying that there 
is this causal relation, that natural law, this other obligation” (Blackburn-1987, 56). However, 
there is a further inconstancy in Blackburn’s account of projectivism when he claims that an 
antirealist picture of morality can be successful so long as it can be argued that moralizing “is 
visibly the upshot of a natural process of voicing and projecting the nonrepresentational states” 
(Blackburn-1993, 9). This suggests that projecting a conative state is something more than just 
voicing it.  
In the preface to Ruling Passions, Blackburn compares a person to a device, or an ethical 
sensibility, that takes inputs (i.e., facts about, say, an action), and produces outputs – attitudes – 
about that action; Blackburn identifies these attitudes as values (Blackburn-1998, 5-6). In this 
description, it is clear that the values are not to be located in the action outside of the observer, 
but it is unclear where the projection occurs; the output is just a conative state, but that does not 
seem to match the conditions of projectivism I proposed in subsection 4.2.3. Sorting out the 
mechanics by which we move from conative states to moral awareness turns out to be a 
challenge. If this account is to be similar to Humean projectivism, then there should be some 
notion that this output is then pressed upon the input. Perhaps, the projection comes into 
Blackburn’s account when the agent announces a moral judgment. Whatever occurs, this 
description implies that there is some process occurring, but it leaves the mechanism opaque. 
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4.5.3 Which Account of Blackburn’s Projection is Humean? 
If Blackburn’s aim is to develop an account of moral projectivism – the view that the moral 
properties which people engaged in moral practice reference do not exist independently of 
human beings, and that instead they are the product of non-cognitive reactions to natural 
properties – that is faithful to Hume’s, then it is important to examine whether his account does 
model the Humean picture of morality. At the start of subsection 4.5.2 I noted that I do not think 
Blackburn’s preferred version of projectivism, BP1-BP5, is Humean. But, to refer to one of 
Blackburn’s works out of order, his theory must model Humean moral projectivism; in “How to 
be an Ethical Anti-Realist” Blackburn does not just claim that his view is a moral version of 
Humean projectivism about causality; he claims that his projectivism is not new, just a 
“modern version of Hume’s theory of the nature of ethics” (Blackburn-1988a, 167). In this 
subsection I will compare the BP1-BP5 and BP'1-BP'5 accounts of Blackburn’s projectivism 
from subsection 4.5.1.2 with the account of Humean moral projectivism from subsection 4.4.3. 
Those accounts are as follows: 
(BP1) the natural features of an action causally interact with a person’s senses;  
(BP2) these external stimuli produce perceptual beliefs about the presence of 
certain natural features in the action; 
(BP3) these perceptual beliefs produce attitudes about the action as outputs; 
(BP4) we become aware of the attitudes as moral judgment in propositional form; 
(BP5) the attitudes are voiced by uttering moral judgment in propositional form. 
 
(BP'1) the natural features of an action causally interact with a person’s senses;  
(BP'2) these external stimuli produce perceptual beliefs about the presence of 
certain natural features in the action; 
(BP'3) these perceptual beliefs produce attitudes about the action as outputs; 
(BP'4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude; 
(BP'5) we are aware of this attitude as moral judgment in propositional form and 
it is voiced by uttering moral judgments in propositional form. 
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(HMP1) the natural features of another person’s actions causally interact with a 
person’s senses;  
(HMP2) these external stimuli produce impressions of sensations of the actions in 
the mind; 
(HMP3) from these impression of sensation the mind infers the person acted from 
some passion, producing the idea of the passion; 
(HMP4) in turn, the idea of the passion produces an impression of reflection of 
pleasure or pain; 
(HMP5) the sympathy generates the passion, which was inferred in the person; 
(HMP6) uniting the passion with the impression of the person, the sympathy 
generates approbation, which is moral awareness. 
 
BP1-BP5 and BP'1-BP'5 diverge at step 4; in the former, which I think is Blackburn’s preferred 
version, the projection that occurs in step 4, 
(BP'4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude, 
 
is the awareness of the attitude in propositional form, but in the latter, the projection that occurs 
in step 4, 
(BP'4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude, 
 
 is the imposition of the attitude on belief, which yields a new mental state. 
BP'1-BP'5 more closely models Humean projectivism than BP1-BP5 because step BP'4, 
the step in which projection occurs, is similar to the step in HMP1-HMP6 where projection 
occurs, step HMP6, 
(HMP6) uniting the passion with the impression of the person, the sympathy 
generates approbation, which is moral awareness. 
 
In both BP'4 and HMP6 there is a mental phenomenon in which two mental states are overlaid or 
united to generate a new mental state, but this phenomenon does not occur in BP1-BP5. In 
addition, BP1-BP5 cannot be an account of moral projection is because it does not satisfy all the 
conditions for moral projectivism, while BP'1-BP'5 and HMP1-6 do satisfy them. Those 
conditions were 
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MPi. moral experience has a realist phenomenology; 
MPii. there are no features of the world that correspond to moral experience; 
MPiii. moral experience is a projection that has its origins in a non-cognitive state 
that is a response to features of the world, i.e., is the culmination of a projective 
mechanism that begins with a non-cognitive response to features of the world; 
MPiiia. a moral experience is a projection if its explanation essentially 
appeals to non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
MPiiib. the explanation of a moral experience is opaque to the subject. 
MPiv. It is possible to characterize the non-cognitive state in terms other than the 
moral property whose experience it explains. 
 
Moral projectivism is supposed to explain why it is that moral experience has a realist 
phenomenology, and BP'1-BP'5 and HMP1-6 can explain why it does. In HMP6, it is the passion 
being overlaid on the impression that generates that realist phenomenology. In BP'4, the new 
attitude that is generated from the imposition of the first attitude onto the belief has the realist 
phenomenology because of that interplay. On the other hand, in step BP4 there is no 
interposition of the attitude with a mental representation of the world to generate the realist 
phenomenology. If there is nothing in BP1-BP5 to explain the realist phenomenology, there is 
no role for a projection to play in the theory, and it is not an example of moral projectivism. 
4.5.3.1 Blackburn:  Projection is Voicing 
So, it seems we should conclude that BP'1-BP'5 is Blackburn’s all things considered account of 
projectivism due to its similarity to Humean projectivism. However, Blackburn appears intent 
on resisting an account of projection in which projection is some further mental phenomenon 
springing from the attitude via another mental process. For example, he claims that a projectivist 
“will not accept any charge that we tendentiously inflate our sentiments into metaphysical 
discoveries (discoveries about the independent structure of the world of obligations), precisely 
because he denies that in our awareness of duty and obligation we are in fact making such 
discoveries” (Blackburn-1987, 60). This suggests that the sketch that best reflects Blackburn’s 
view of the metaphysics of moralizing is BP1-BP5. If Blackburn’s version of moral 
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projectivism is BP1-BP5, then his moral projectivism is neither Humean nor moral 
projectivism after all.  
Blackburn often criticizes other philosophers for misinterpreting Hume, and he would 
likely argue that I have incorrectly interpreted Hume, and if suitably interpreted, Hume’s view 
will make projection voicing as in BP1-BP5 (Blackburn-1990, 94). But, I do not think I am 
wrong, and one reason is that the projectivism of BP1-BP5 does not threaten to generalize into 
idealism, whereas Humean projectivism about morality does generalize to other areas, 
causation, for example. Moreover, Blackburn is aware that a challenge for projectivism is to 
establish a boundary for fixing which of the features of the world of which we are aware are 
projections, or it risks making all of natural reality “‘noumenal’” (Blackburn-1984, 212-3; 
Blackburn-1993, 5). If projectivism, in its best form, is local idealism as opposed to global 
idealism, which must be resisted by establishing a line between domains that are to be explained 
via projectivism and those that are not, then it does not seem that Blackburn’s projection as 
voicing is consistent with projectivism. First, Blackburn’s moral projectivism a la BP1-BP5, in 
which projection is voicing, does not appear to pose a risk of extending to other domains. 
Second, a version of projectivism that is consistent with idealism would suggest that the 
phenomenal awareness is the projection of the mental states caused by noumenal reality onto the 
mental states representative of noumenal reality, and BP1-BP5 does not suggest this. 
Projectivism is meant to be the metaphysics of moralizing upon which quasi-realism – 
Blackburn’s project of earning the right to deploy moral judgments in all the ways supported by 
descriptivism and realism even though the meaning of moral judgments is explained by 
referring to their function to express non-cognitive mental states – is based, so Blackburn must 
have an account that is truly projectivist. However, Blackburn’s apparent preferred account of 
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projectivism is not Humean, and I am not sure it is projectivism, at all; BP1-BP5 seems no 
different than early versions of expressivism. If Blackburn is serious about being a Humean, 
then we should take BP'1-BP'5 to be his theory of the metaphysics of moralizing; but, his 
repeated insistence that projection is mere voicing suggests that we should take BP1-BP5 to be 
his view. Ultimately, I will argue that the BP'1-BP'5 version of projectivism must be quasi-
realism’s metaphysics of moralizing, engaging in an activity constitutive of the practice of 
morality. I will review Blackburn’s remarks about projectivism in general before I press that 
case. 
4.5.4 Blackburn on Projectivism in General 
Since Blackburn wrote the entry on projectivism in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
examining his remarks there may help to determine the best way to understand projectivism 
within the quasi-realist program. 
 There Blackburn says that the term “projectivism” is used to characterize “philosophies 
that agree with Hume that ‘the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on the world,’ that 
what is in fact an aspect of our own experience is treated as a feature of the objective order of 
things. Such philosophies distinguish between nature as it really is, and nature as we experience 
it as being” (Blackburn-1998c).27 The same tension I already noted in Blackburn recurs here; the 
projection can rest either in a mechanism that treats the world as if it has a feature in it that it 
does not or in a mechanism that causes our experience of the world to have a feature in it the 
world does not. Whatever projection is, Blackburn claims that projectivism involves the 
commitment that some aspect of the world is not independent of us. The distinction must be that 
some of the features of our experience of the world are the products of aspects of the world and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This quotation suggests that Blackburn is quoting Hume, but it is incorrect; at T 1.3.14.25 
(SBN 167), Hume says, “the mind has a great propensity to spread itself on external objects.” 
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some of the features of our experience of the world are the products of our mental activity. 
Blackburn sketches two accounts of the projectivist mechanism, and I will describe them to 
reflect this distinction.  
There is the “simple and forthright” mechanism “of displacing, or relocating, what is in 
fact a feature of our experience, and making it into a feature of the world” (Blackburn-1998c). 
This formulation appears to reflect the notion of projection in psychological projection, but it 
does not clearly articulate the metaphysics of projection because it is metaphorical. This 
description is not careful enough for two reasons. First, the dislocation of a feature of experience 
cannot be made into an aspect of the world unless Blackburn takes naive realism to be the 
paradigm form of realism. Blackburn must mean that a feature of an experience x is dislocated 
onto/into experience of the world. Second, Blackburn is not clear on what the experience is:  is it 
(1) a conative mental state; (2) the empirical experience of belief prompted by the world; (3) 
some further mental state in which the conative mental state is impressed upon the empirical 
experience of belief so that we think the feature was caused by an aspect of the world? Clearly, if 
antirealism is correct, it cannot be option (2). Either of the other two interpretations of the 
experience here are consistent with BP1-BP5 and BP'1-BP'5. However, the notion that projection 
involves a “dislocating” or “relocating” suggests that interpretation (3) is the right way to think 
of experience on the “simple and forthright” version of projectivism. On this view, projection 
involves the projection of a conative state, a mental state characterized by being directed toward 
action, e.g., desires, volitions, wishes, onto experience of the world; and if that is right, then the 
“simple or forthright” mechanism of projection reflects BP'1-BP'5. 
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Blackburn contrasts the “simple and forthright” version of projectivism with the 
“contemporary” version.28 On the contemporary version of projectivism “the mind manages to 
make the world look as though some things have beauty, for example, without the really 
beautiful objects being in the mind itself; instead, some kind of pleasure or delight is objectified, 
it then appearing that there is a feature of things correlated with it” (Blackburn-1998c). Once 
again, this analysis is metaphorical, so much so that I do not know how to unpack it, and it 
scarcely seems to be different from the simple and forthright analysis. However, Blackburn 
explains that on this view projectivism is a tripartite theory, and he identifies the parts as 
follows:  the real properties of an object; the pleasure or delight those features arouse; our 
propensity to voice that pleasure in a descriptive form. The metaphysics of this account would be 
that an aspect of the world stimulates a conative state, which we voice in descriptive form; such 
a picture reflects BP1-BP5. 
“Simple and forthright” projectivism and “contemporary” projectivism track what I 
called projection as mental process and projection as voicing, respectively, and so the tension 
between them recurs in the Routledge entry. Blackburn apparently wants to be a “contemporary” 
projectivist, but in the next subsection I will offer a few reasons to think that it is not a tenable 
position.  
4.5.5 Moral Projectivism for Blackburn 
In the two possible versions of Blackburn’s moral projectivism that I sketched out, the 
projective step is the fourth in both; in BP1-BP5 the projection is merely awareness of the 
attitude in propositional form, and in BP'1-BP'5 the projection is attaching the attitude to one of 
the beliefs that contributed to its generation. Blackburn does appear to want the mechanics of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 I take it that the contemporary version of projectivism Blackburn proposes here is supposed to 
reflect the version of projectivism he puts forward in his own philosophy. 
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projectivism to be the BP1-BP5 version, but I think his inconstancy in characterizing 
projectivism reflects that this version deviates from familiar forms of projectivism. Ultimately, 
Blackburn must commit to BP1-BP5 or BP'1-BP'5 as the metaphysics of moralizing, and I think 
he should choose the latter for several reasons. 
For one, though, I do not think this is decisive, the BP'1-BP'5 version of moral 
projectivism is the familiar account of projection from Psychology. In subsection 4.2.2.1 I 
described psychological projection as a defense mechanism in which a person unconsciously 
ascribes his own threatening thoughts or emotions to the external world, usually another person 
who is less threatening, and it feels as though this other object does in fact have those thoughts or 
emotions. Here projection is a mental process that causes a person to experience his own internal 
emotions as something outside of himself and in the world; Blackburn’s insistence that 
projection is not an inflation of sentiment into metaphysical discovery is at odds with the 
psychological account, unlike HMP1-6 and BP'1-BP'5. That a philosophical theory of projection 
is at odds with a psychological one obviously does not mean that the former is wrong, but 
Blackburn’s account of projection would be idiosyncratic, at least, and he never acknowledges 
this. 
Second, an account of projectivism should leave theoretical room for a view like 
Blackburn’s and a view like Mackie’s, but there seems to be no room for Mackie’s view within 
BP1-BP5. On the other hand, there is no reason why BP'1-BP'5 should automatically lead to 
error theory; it will only do so if moral judgments are interpreted as expressive of beliefs. 
Blackburn admits an affinity between his and Mackie’s metaphysics (Blackburn-1984, 180). 
Blackburn though does not think that moral language involves us in error because it is not used 
to represent the world; philosophers introduce the error when they theorize that moral judgments 
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are used to do so. It is an empirical matter whether the users of moral language use it to express 
attitudes or represent moral states in the world; BP'1-BP'5 leaves that matter open. 
The third reason to think that Blackburn’s projectivism should be the BP'1-BP'5 version 
is – to reprise the claim of subsection 4.5.3 – that this version is more Humean than BP1-BP5. In 
the Routledge entry Blackburn gives a characterization of Hume’s view consistent with BP1-
BP5; he says, “Hume’s view [is] that, faced with some feature of character such as temperance 
and cheerfulness, the mind feels a pleasure which it voices by deeming those features virtues” 
(Blackburn-1998c). This is an oversimplification. He goes on to link this interpretation to the 
text:  “When we do this we ‘gild or stain’ objects with the ‘colours borrowed from internal 
sentiment’, and thereby ‘erect in a manner a new creation’” (Blackburn-1998c).29 It is odd that 
Blackburn draws on this quotation from Hume to support contemporary projectivism since the 
text seems to suggest a mental process that draws on attitudes as a resource to produce a further 
mental state, as opposed to a process that moves from attitude to voicing it. The textual evidence 
from Hume indicates that only BP'1-BP'5 is consistent with Humean projectivism. Moreover, 
Kail claims that Hume’s account of causation is an example of ersatz response projection, a form 
of projection in which a person’s commitment is a response to a phenomenology that is best 
explained by referring to the person’s mental life. If Hume’s account of morality should be 
consistent with his account of causation, as Blackburn supposes, then it should be a version of 
ersatz response projections. In step BP'5, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The full quotation from Hume is:   
Thus the distinct boundaries and offices of reason and of taste are easily 
ascertained. The former conveys the knowledge of truth and falsehood:  the latter 
gives the sentiment of beauty and deformity, vice and virtue. The one discovers 
objects as they really stand in nature, without addition or diminution: the other has 
a productive faculty, and gilding and staining all natural objects with colours, 
borrowed from internal sentiment, raises in a manner a new creation (EPM App 
I.246; SBN 294). 
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(BP'5) we are aware of this attitude as moral judgment in propositional form and 
it is voiced by uttering moral judgments in propositional form, 
 
it is plausible to see the moral judgment, which constitutes awareness, as a response to the 
phenomenology of step BP'4, 
(BP'4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude. 
 
In BP1-5, step BP4, 
(BP4) we become aware of the attitudes as moral judgment in propositional form, 
 
is the only step where the commitment as a response to phenomenology could occur, but since 
there is nothing to generate the phenomenology in that step, it cannot occur there; and there is 
nothing there to suggest the commitment is a response to phenomenology since the commitment 
seems identical to the attitude, which is a response to beliefs about the external world. If this is 
so, then there is more reason to think that BP1-BP5 is not Humean projectivism, and if 
Blackburn wishes to be Humean, then his projectivism must be BP'1-BP'5. 
A fourth reason to think that BP'1-BP'5 is the only plausible Humean and projectivist 
account of moral awareness than BP1-BP5 is the point I made in subsection 4.5.3; prima facie 
BP'1-BP'5 can account for the realist phenomenology of moral awareness. If part of moral 
awareness involves the feeling that there is evil in another person’s action like a rape, then BP'1-
BP'5 can account for this and BP1-BP5 cannot. 
There is a final reason to reject BP1-5 as an account of moral experience. This reason 
does not claim that it fails to satisfy the conditions of moral projectivism; instead it claims the 
account is incomplete. Blackburn needs to offer some further qualification to step BP5, which 
claims that we internally voice or externally voice conative states via propositional form. If that 
is the case, Blackburn needs to explain why it is only the conative states constitutive of moral 
	   164	  
practice that get voiced this way; how are they different from other conative states such that 
they get voiced propositionally? After all, wishing must be a conative state, but it is not voiced 
in propositional form. It stands to reason if valuing is a conative state, then it should be voiced 
in the same manner as wishing. Or, if only it should be voiced in propositional form, what makes 
valuing different from wishing such that the former merits this manner of voicing? This will be a 
difficult task since a key way Blackburn draws the distinction between moral mental states and 
beliefs is through the metaphor of “direction of fit” (Blackburn-1988, 185, 190, 191; Blackburn-
1998, 81). The direction of fit between belief and the world is that beliefs are meant to fit the 
world, whereas between moral mental states and the world, it is the reverse. In articulating the 
difference between valuing and wishing, Blackburn must not change the direction of fit for either 
mental state. 
4.6 Chapter Conclusion 
Ultimately, I think that BP'1-BP'5 – 
(BP'1) the natural features of an action causally interact with a person’s senses;  
(BP'2) these external stimuli produce perceptual beliefs about the presence of 
certain natural features in the action; 
(BP'3) these perceptual beliefs produce attitudes about the action as outputs; 
(BP'4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude; 
(BP'5) we are aware of this attitude as moral judgment in propositional form and 
it is voiced by uttering moral judgments in propositional form 
 
– is what  Blackburn’s projective account of the metaphysics of moralizing must be. Now 
contrast this account of moral awareness with what a moral realist – someone who thinks that 
there are people, acts, circumstances that are good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc., and they 
would be so if human beings did not think them so, and moral judgments, thus, may be true or 
false whether or not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances – would 
propose: 
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(RMA1) the natural features of an action, which are moral features, causally 
interact with a person’s senses;  
(RMA2) these external stimuli produce beliefs about the presence of certain 
natural features, which are moral features, in the action; 
(RMA3) we are aware of this belief in propositional form and it is voiced by 
uttering moral judgments in propositional form.30 
 
The metaphysical challenge that the moral realist faces is identifying the natural features that 
are the moral features, and moral realists’ difficulty in meeting this challenge is, no doubt, the 
source of skepticism about moral properties. Moral antirealism – the view that human beings’ 
experience of people, acts, circumstances as good, immoral kind, deceitful, evil, etc. are not the 
product of features of the world that are themselves good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc. 
independent of human beings thinking them so – is supposed to have a metaphysical advantage 
over moral realism in its ontological economy of ruling out that there are moral properties. But, 
if the metaphysics of moral antirealism is moral projectivism, then this would at best only be 
an economy of things, and not events. BP'1-BP'5 must postulate more steps in the mechanism of 
moral awareness (this is true even when allowing for the further complexity to RMA1-RMA3 I 
noted in footnote 30 since BP'1-BP'5 is complicated by the variety of factors which contribute to 
the production of an attitude I discussed in footnote 25). And, at worst, BP'1-BP'5 may actually 
add a new ontological item into the mix; I will not press the point, but the attitude which is 
generated by the impression of an attitude onto perceptual belief may be new, distinct, additional 
kind of attitude. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This realist model of moral awareness is simplified because it does not take into account that 
the shift from the recognition of the natural features to the recognition they are moral features 
may be mediated by other beliefs (compare the idea in Cornell Realism that our observation of 
the moral features in natural properties is theory laden), but this should not be considered a 
complicating factor since the transition from belief to belief is an accepted mental process 
(Boyd).  
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 Blackburn’s projectivism proposes at least two extra distinct steps in the process of 
moral awareness:  (1) a mental process produces an attitude from the resources of perceptual 
beliefs; (2) this attitude is then – through some kind of loop in this system – impresses upon the 
perceptual belief generating another attitude. It is also likely that there is some further process, 
(3), by which this attitude is consciously represented as a belief. In addition, the mental state that 
results from the impression of the attitude on the perceptual belief appears prima facie to be 
unique – is it some hybrid mental state, a cross between a belief and an attitude? 
 I do not know what kind of experiments would be necessary to determine whether a 
process like the one in BP'1-BP'5 or RMA1-RMA3 occurs when we come to moral awareness, 
but without such evidence I doubt that purported ontological economy of moral projectivism is 
sufficient to gain a metaphysical advantage over moral realism. If we set aside these 
complications for a moment, Blackburn would claim that projectivism still has a metaphysical 
advantage over moral realism:  projectivism is better able to explain why moral features are 
supervenient on natural features. In chapter 5 I will argue that projectivism does not bear a 
metaphysical advantage over moral realism when it come to explaining the supervenience of 
the moral on the natural. Then, in chapter 6 I will raise three problems for projectivism that 
BP'3-BP'5 generate. Projectivism must be able to explain the special nature of the attitudes that 
arise in step BP'4 and which are fit for expression in moral judgment in step BP'5; this is the 
moral attitude problem, and Blackburn does not have a satisfactory account. In addition, 
Blackburn must also explain how we can be justified in treating these attitudes as judgments 
capable of being true, and he does not succeed in doing this. And last, I will point out that 
Blackburn is not able to support his claim that the judgments arising from attitudes are mind-
independent.
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Chapter 5:  Undermining the Motivation for Projectivism 
5.1 Projectivism’s Advantages? 
In chapter 3 I criticized Blackburn’s attempts to solve the Frege-Geach problem through his 
quasi-realist semantics. Blackburn’s inability to develop a satisfactory antirealist semantics 
counts against adopting his antirealist theory of morality over a realist theory. In this chapter I 
examine Blackburn’s principal argument for why his projectivist theory of morality is preferable 
to a realist one, the supervenience argument. Supervenience is the relation by which one level 
of properties is connected to another level of properties in which the second level of properties 
determines the first level, but the first level is not reducible to the second level of properties; the 
rough idea is that if one level of properties A, supervene on another level of properties B, then for 
any two things that are identical at the level of B properties, they are also identical at the level of 
A properties.1 (In subsection 5.2.1 I present Blackburn’s fist account of supervenience.) 
Blackburn identifies projectivism as the metaphysical complement to quasi-realism in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Blackburn distinguishes between two forms of supervenience, (S) and (S2): 
 
(S)  A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 … Nn if M is not identical 
with any of N1 … Nn nor with any truth function of them, and it is logically 
impossible that a thing should become M, or cease to be M, or become more or 
less M than before, without changing in respect of some member of N1 … Nn. 
 
(S2)  A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 … Nn if M is not identical 
with any of N1 … Nn nor with any truth function of them, and it is logically 
impossible that two things should each possess the same properties from set N1 … 
Nn to the same degree, without both failing to possess M, or cease to be M, or both 
possessing M, to the same degree (Blackburn-1973, 115). 
 
(S) supervenience reflects a view of how a property of one item is contingent upon other 
properties of that same item; for example, a steak’s temperature is a function of its stored heat 
energy – the temperature of the steak is supervenient upon that because its temperature cannot 
change unless there is a change in its heat temperature. (S2) supervenience reflects a view of 
how two (or more) distinct items possession of the same property is contingent upon them 
possessing other properties in the exact same respect; two steaks that have the same temperature, 
135°F, must be exactly alike in their stored heat energy.	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metaethical theory, and he thinks his projectivist theory of morality can explain the 
supervenience of the moral on the natural better than a realist one. I will first present the three 
variations of the argument that Blackburn has offered in the literature, and I will then offer 
critiques of each argument. I will conclude that Blackburn’s supervenience argument does not 
present an insoluble problem for moral realists.  
 I want examine the role of the supervenience argument in motivating a need to develop 
projectivism as an explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the natural. Blackburn 
understands the supervenience argument as a metaphysical argument against moral realism 
(Blackburn-1984, 182). The intuitive idea there is that if moral realism is true, it should be able 
to explain a feature of the world – supervenience, but it struggles to explain it, while 
projectivism can easily accommodate it. This is supposed to be an advantage for projectivism 
over moral realism. Ultimately, I want to argue that moral realism can account for 
supervenience, so projectivism does not have this advantage.  
5.2 Arguments Against Moral Realism 
In Spreading the Word, Blackburn identifies three “motives” or arguments for projectivism; 
they are economy, supervenience, and internalism (Blackburn-1984, 182-189).  
Blackburn claims that projectivism is preferable to moral realism because of its 
ontological economy; it “asks no more from the world than … this:  a natural world, and patterns 
of reaction to it” (Blackburn-194, 182). This sounds like Quine’s principle of ontological 
parsimony from “On What There Is”; there Quine claimed that this was a desideratum of 
theories, and that if of two theories, both equally supported by evidence, one posits fewer 
entities, then we should adopt that theory. Blackburn’s appeal to ontological economy can only 
be convincing if projectivism and moral realism are equally well supported by evidence and 
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equally good at explaining and predicting observations. Blackburn does not spend much time on 
this argument, and I think it something of a hedge:  if the comparison of projectivism and moral 
realism cannot conclude with a judgment that the former has other advantages over its rival, then 
it, at least, has the advantage of ontological economy.2 
Blackburn’s supervenience and internalism arguments are meant to demonstrate the 
advantages of a projectivist theory by presenting two phenomena for which moral realism is 
not supposed to account. If either argument is successful against moral realism, then the 
argument from ontological economy is moot. In Spreading the Word, Blackburn is a bit sheepish 
about advancing the internalism argument because it is unsubtle (Blackburn-1984, 188-189). 
There Blackburn argues that our moral commitments – moral mental states – are frequently used 
to explain our actions, but if moral commitments are beliefs, this explanation would be 
incomplete; on the other hand, there is no incompleteness in the explanation of our actions, if 
moral mental states are desires or attitudes. If Tom has the moral commitment that lying is evil, 
and this is a belief, then to explain why Tom told the truth, we would need to supplement this 
belief by attributing to Tom a desire not to lie. On the other hand, if Tom has the moral 
commitment that lying is evil, and this is a desire not to lie or a negative attitude toward lying, 
then to explain why Tom told the truth, all one needs to do to explain it is attribute the desire not 
to lie or a negative attitude toward lying to Tom. 
 Blackburn’s claim that an explanation of action that rests solely on attributing beliefs to 
the actor is incomplete reflects an assumption that the Humean Theory of Motivation – the idea 
that beliefs are motivationally inert – is true. Blackburn’s claim that an explanation of action 
resting on solely attributing a desire can be complete reflects an assumption that motivational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In less charitable moments, I take the argument from ontological economy to obliquely express 
a prejudice against the possibility of moral realism. 
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internalism – the idea that moral commitments are intrinsically motivating – is true. Blackburn 
makes this latter commitment explicit when he claims, “It seems to be a conceptual truth that to 
regard something as good is to feel a pull towards promoting or choosing it, or towards wanting 
other people to feel the pull towards promoting or choosing it” (Blackburn-1984, 188).  
There are several ways of responding to motivational internalism’s challenge for moral 
realism:  by making motivational internalism a conceptual necessity, motivational 
internalists risk being out of step with our recognition that people can be diverted from acting 
according to their moral commitments because of distorting influences; the possibility of the 
amoral person, who is not motivated by his own sincere moral commitments (such a being would 
be a significant challenge to motivational internalism); denying the Humean Theory of 
Motivation. The literature on this topic is vast, with many moral philosophers making the case 
for and against motivational internalism, and it is not my intention to expand on it in this work. 
But, Blackburn does not emphasize this argument in making the case against moral realism, and 
I will follow suit. (I take it that the lack of consensus on the question motivates this strategy.) 
Instead, Blackburn focuses on his supervenience argument as the most significant challenge for 
moral realism. 
5.2.1 Blackburn’s Supervenience Arguments 
As I noted in subsection 4.5.1, “Moral Realism” was Blackburn’s first foray into the 
debate over moral realism; there he introduced his attempt to answer the Frege-Geach problem, 
and he also included his supervenience argument against moral realism. In the first chapter I 
characterized antirealists as trying to explain morality given the success of the open-question 
argument, but I pointed out in subsections 2.3.1.1, 2.3.1.2, and 2.3.2 that the work of Frankena, 
Baumrin, and Kripke and Putnam had undermined the effectiveness of the open-question 
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argument. While I have quoted Blackburn as positioning himself within the tradition of 
antirealist moral philosophers reacting to the open-question argument, by introducing the 
supervenience argument Blackburn all but admits that the case against moral realism cannot be 
made on purely linguistic grounds. Blackburn’s supervenience argument is a metaphysical 
challenge to naturalist and non-naturalist versions of moral realism. The argument is (roughly) 
that moral realism is committed to (a) the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral – for 
two situations to differ with respect to their moral evaluation, they must also differ with respect 
to non-moral properties – and (b) the lack of entailment thesis – “There is no moral proposition 
whose truth is entailed by any proposition ascribing naturalistic properties to its subject” 
(Blackburn-1973, 116). Blackburn believes that these two commitments represent a challenge to 
understanding morality; the idea is that if no naturalistic description entails any moral evaluation 
(commitment (b)), then it should be possible for the very same kind of naturalistic state of affairs 
to sometimes be good and sometimes bad (Shafer-Landau-2003, 85). However, this possibility is 
exactly what supervenience is thought to rule out.  
5.2.1.1 Blackburn’s Original Supervenience Argument 
Blackburn claims that a realist just has no way to reconcile these two claims, but a projectivist 
understanding of morality is able to accommodate both (a) and (b). Blackburn claims that some 
set of naturalistic properties gives rise to a person’s attitude to something, and it is not possible 
for him to have a different attitude to another thing when he believes the same set of naturalistic 
properties are present. This is because it is not the naturalistic properties that cause the attitude, 
only that the attitude is a response to the awareness of the naturalistic properties. If this is the 
case, then the naturalistic properties do not entail a moral attitude; yet, it is impossible for a 
person to have different attitudes to two things when he is aware of the presence of the same 
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naturalistic properties in both (Blackburn-1973, 122).  Since “Moral Realism” in 1973, 
Blackburn has revisited this argument in Spreading the Word and “Supervenience Revisited.”3 
5.2.1.1.1 Supervenience 
At the beginning of section II of “Moral Realism” Blackburn puts forth the gist of his argument 
as first identifying two putative features of moral truth, and second demonstrating that the two 
features generate intractable problems for moral truth (Blackburn-1973, 114).4 The first feature 
of moral truth that Blackburn is referring to is supervenience; moral properties are supervenient 
upon natural properties. He introduces two senses of supervenience, S and S2; the former sense 
refers to a feature applying to the same thing over time, while the latter sense refers to the same 
feature applying to different objects, which are identical in all other respects. He defines them as 
follows: 
(S)  A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 … Nn if M is not identical 
with any of N1 … Nn nor with any truth function of them, and it is logically 
impossible that a thing should become M, or cease to be M, or become more or 
less M than before, without changing in respect of some member of N1 … Nn. 
 
(S2)  A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 … Nn if M is not identical 
with any of N1 … Nn nor with any truth function of them, and it is logically 
impossible that two things should each possess the same properties from set N1 … 
Nn to the same degree, without both failing to possess M, or cease to be M, or both 
possessing M, to the same degree (Blackburn-1973, 115). 
 
(S) claims that anything that remains the same in respect to its possession of the members of N1 
… Nn, must remain the same with respect to its possession of M, while (S2) claims that if any two 
(or three, etc.) things are identical with respect to possessing members of N1 … Nn, then they 
must be identical with respect to possessing M. Blackburn does not offer an argument that moral 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In Spreading the Word and “Supervenience Revisited”, Blackburn couched the argument in 
terms of bans on mixed worlds and modal logic (some philosophers have taken to calling this 
argument the modal argument against moral realism). 
4 Blackburn does not claim the argument is original, attributing his knowledge of it to Casimir 
Lewy; Blackburn indicates his careful explication of the argument is its first appearance in print. 
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properties supervene on natural ones, evidently taking it that it is obvious; he writes only, “It is 
widely held that moral properties are supervenient or consequential upon naturalistic ones” 
(Blackburn-1973, 114). In addition, Blackburn says that there is no need to distinguish between 
(S) and (S2) when discussing the supervenience of moral properties on natural ones, since when 
he discusses this phenomenon, he will mean “supervenient” in both senses (Blackburn-1973, 
115). 
5.2.1.1.2 Non-entailment 
The second feature of moral truth that Blackburn discusses is non-entailment, and he says that 
this feature is even more widely believed than supervenience. The idea of non-entailment is that 
whether something possesses a moral property, good or bad, is not entailed by its possession of 
any set of naturalistic properties (Blackburn-1973, 116). He formally defines non-entailment as 
follows: 
(E)  There is no moral proposition whose truth is entailed by any proposition 
ascribing naturalistic properties to its subject (Blackburn-1973, 116). 
 
Blackburn does not want non-entailment to be confused with other views about moral properties, 
like the view that moral properties are not identical to natural ones, or the view that they “have 
no criteria in a Wittgensteinian sense” (Blackburn-1973, 116). Blackburn takes pains to 
distinguish non-entailment from these other claims. Even though an identity of natural with 
moral properties would yield an entailment from natural to moral properties, and entailment of 
moral properties to natural ones, Blackburn explains that (E) is not the denial of an identity 
between natural and moral properties; believing that an entailment would generate an identity (so 
that denying entailment is a denial of identity) is wishful thinking (Blackburn-1973, 116). 
Moreover, Blackburn points out that (E) is not claiming that there cannot be a naturalistic 
property that is necessarily a reason for ascribing a moral property (Blackburn-1973, 116). 
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5.2.1.1.3 The Incompatibility of Supervenience and Non-Entailment 
Given (S), (S2), and E, Blackburn points out three commitments a moral realist has:  (1) a moral 
proposition’s truth consists in the existence of a state of affairs which the proposition describes; 
(2) no set of natural facts entails the existence of this state of affairs, i.e. (E); (3) the endurance of 
a set of natural facts entails the endurance of the moral state of affairs, e.g., (S) and/or (S2).  
Reflecting on the conjunction of realism and (S) and (E), Blackburn asks us to consider 
some thing, A; A has a specific set of natural properties and relations. In addition, A has some 
degree of moral worth; it is good. On the realist picture, the claim, “A is good,” describes a state 
of affairs, A’s goodness. A being good is not, though, entailed by its natural properties and 
relations, i.e. “it is logically possible that A should be as it is in all naturalistic respects, yet this 
further state of affairs [A being good] not exist” (Blackburn-1973, 118). But, according to (S), it 
is logically impossible for A to cease being good without some change in its natural properties or 
relations; this is just very strange to Blackburn. It is apparently a completely contingent matter 
that A has the natural properties and relations it does and that A is good; if that is so, then why is 
it logically impossible for A to remain as it is in all its natural properties and relations, but cease 
to be good? The natural properties and relations A possesses did nothing to logically guarantee 
that A is good, so it is difficult to understand why their continued endurance should logically 
guarantee A continuing to be good. Blackburn thinks it is mysterious how these three 
commitments, (1), (2), and (3), can simultaneously be true. 
Blackburn also explains the challenge given (S2). According to (E), A may possess some 
set of natural properties and relations and it may also be good, but A’s being good is a further 
fact that is not entailed by its natural features. According to (S2), if B is identical to A in 
possessing the same set of natural properties, then it is logically impossible for B not to be good, 
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also. But, there is no reason why this must be the case since B’s being good is not entailed by B’s 
possession of those natural properties and relations. Supposing A’s goodness came along for free 
with its natural properties and relations, there is nothing inconsistent in supposing that B did not 
also get goodness for free with its natural properties and relations. And yet, (S2) does claim that 
it is inconsistent to suppose that A and B be identical in all their natural properties and relations, 
but be different in their moral properties. 
Blackburn thinks that the trouble for moral realism lies in the fact that other examples of 
the correspondence theory of truth do not have the same trouble in explaining (E) and (S) or (S2). 
A correspondence theory of truth claims basically that the truth of a proposition consists in the 
existence of a state of affairs, which it reports, and Blackburn claims that such a proposition 
should be (S) or (S2), but not (E). Consider C; C is a single oxygen atom covalently bonded to 
two hydrogen atoms cooled to 0°C, or lower, in standard atmospheric pressure with a crystalline 
structure. This proposition entails the following one:  C is ice. Now consider D; D is a single 
oxygen atom covalently bonded to two hydrogen atoms at standard ambient temperature and 
pressure. This last proposition entails the following one:  D is water. The propositions, C is ice, 
and, D is water, entail the following proposition:  C is denser than D. That C is denser than D is 
supervenient on C being ice. Now, if there is F, and F is a single oxygen atom covalently bonded 
to two hydrogen atoms cooled to 0°C, or lower, in standard atmospheric pressure with a 
crystalline structure, then this entails that F is ice, and it would be consistent to suppose that F is 
denser than D. It is because other examples of a correspondence theory do not take on (E), that as 
long as C or F do not change in any way, it is consistent to expect that both would be denser than 
D. When it comes to morality, though, it is different; the natural properties of something do not 
entail its moral properties, but we expect that as long as the natural properties remain the same, 
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the moral properties will, too. Blackburn admits that this is not inconsistent in itself, but he 
asserts that it is not a position one would enjoy holding; for moral realists, supervenience must 
be some brute logical fact. 
Blackburn concludes his discussion of the problem supervenience poses for moral 
realism by pointing out that a weaker claim than (E) in conjunction with (S) and/or (S2) raises 
the same issue: 
(E')  There are some moral propositions that are true, but whose truth is not 
entailed by any naturalistic facts about their subject (Blackburn-1973, 120). 
 
Blackburn points out that this weakening does not permit moral realists to claim that the moral 
truths their theory analyzes are ones whose truth is entailed by natural facts because to do so 
introduces a duality of kinds of moral truths, the more interesting kind – the ones that are not 
entailed by natural facts – being left unanalyzed. In addition, Blackburn thinks that by deploying 
(E') with (S) and (S2), it allows him to sidestep the argument that it is possible to derive an 
“ought” from an “is”, i.e. that “is” can entail “ought.” (See Searle.)  (E') is meant to allow that 
some times you can get moral truths from natural truths, but just the same, other times you 
cannot, and yet the moral proposition is true. 
5.2.1.1.4 Blackburn Defends Non-entailment 
Blackburn considers two objections to (E'). The first objection he considers is that if he is 
committed to (E'), then he is committed to denying that that some natural qualities are 
necessarily good (Blackburn-1973, 120). It is not obvious to me why supporters of neo-
naturalism would think (E') and this claim are mutually exclusive, but Blackburn seems to admit 
the suspicion may be warranted. Blackburn denies though that this claim implies that all moral 
truths are entailed by naturalistic facts; he says he cannot see how the neo-naturalist claim could 
entail all moral truths, even when it is complemented with the view that human injury is 
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necessarily bad and human benefit is necessarily good. He points out that two people could 
disagree about the moral merits of a state of affairs. Say, I set out to become the Nathan’s Hot 
Dog Eating Champion expecting that I will feel a satisfied sense of accomplishment next 
Independence Day. One person may say that whether I am satisfied or dissatisfied by achieving 
this goal makes no moral difference to the state of affairs; a state of affairs in which I am a 
satisfied champion glutton is no morally better than one in which I am unsatisfied. The other 
person may say that satisfaction at achieving a trivial, or inappropriate, goal does make a moral 
difference to the state of affairs; a states of affairs in which I am satisfied at becoming the 
Nathan’s Hot Dog Eating Champion is morally better than one in which I am unsatisfied. 
Blackburn says he cannot see how the neo-naturalist claim that certain qualities are naturally 
good and the naturalistic facts can help us determine which of these two people’s views is true. 
Blackburn’s point is that the neo-naturalist claim may be able to demonstrate some moral truths 
on the basis of naturalistic facts, but not all. 
 The second objection to (E') which Blackburn considers is to deny that there can be moral 
truth beyond any entailment by naturalistic facts, i.e., that if the naturalistic facts do not entail 
any moral truth, there is no moral truth. On this view the claim, “The moral worth of a state of 
affairs in which Paul is a satisfied Hot Dog eating champions is better than one in which he is 
not” is neither true nor false, and similarly, the negation of this claim is neither true nor false. If 
this objection is successful, then the disagreement over the merits of a state of affairs is not a 
moral disagreement. Blackburn points out that this objection would prove too much for the 
moral realist who wishes to deny (E'), since this objection is a departure from realism 
(Blackburn-1973, 121). According to Blackburn, a feature of moral realism is that the law of the 
excluded middle applies, so that for any proposition and its negation, one must be true and the 
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other false. If the law of the excluded middle does not apply, then whatever position the objector 
to (E') has in mind will not be realist. Blackburn judges that at least (E') is established. 
5.2.1.1.5 Supervenience and Non-cognitivism 
Blackburn now returns his attention to the supervenience claims, (S) and (S2), i.e., moral worth 
is supervenient upon naturalistic properties. Blackburn points out that while there may not be an 
argument that the moral supervenes on the natural, he doubts that any moral philosopher, 
whether realist or antirealist, would want to deny supervenience (Blackburn-1973, 121). 
Blackburn goes so far as to suggest supervenience should be accepted as an axiom of metaethics 
(Blackburn-1973, 121).5 For the moral realist accepting supervenience raises a major problem:  
given (E'), how can he explain this feature of moral reality? One option for the realist is to deny 
supervenience, but Blackburn thinks that the consequence of doing so is to make moral 
propositions trivial (Blackburn-1973, 121). In addition, Blackburn suggests that the problem 
generates added leverage against moral realism because there is a straightforward way for 
antirealists to account for it. 
 According to Blackburn, a non-cognitivist account of morality, which roots moral 
judgments in attitudes, is particularly well suited to explain supervenience. Blackburn claims 
that attitudes are among the mental states that the natural properties of an object or an action 
cause in their observer, and these attitudes are the source of moral judgments ascribing moral 
properties to these objects or actions. And, according to Blackburn, it is not possible for a person 
to hold an attitude toward something because of its natural properties and not hold the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Calling supervenience an axiom of metaethics is an exaggeration; there are at least two recent 
works I can find that deny supervenience:  Hills-2009 and Harrison-2013. Both though deny 
supervenience in the service of defending versions of moral realism that are not naturalistic. I 
am not prepared to argue whether or not supervenience is an axiom of metaethics, but many 
forms of moral realism try to accommodate it, and Blackburn denies that they can. 
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attitude toward another thing, which she believes has the same natural properties; if she does, 
then it is not because of the natural properties of its object that she has the attitude in the first 
case (Blackburn-1973, 122). If a person projects a moral property onto an action, and this moral 
property has its origin in an attitude, which is a response to natural features of the action and 
which cannot vary in the response to the same natural features of a different action, then the 
supervenience of moral properties on natural ones is explained. Blackburn argues that anyone 
who offers different moral judgments about two actions identical in all natural respects is 
actually engaged in caprice and not moral judgment. This explanation of supervenience is not 
open to the realist according to Blackburn.6 Suppose we replace all instances of “attitude” with 
“belief” in the foregoing non-cognitivist account of supervenience. Blackburn points out that 
all this would explain is why a person believes that two objects identical in all naturalistic 
respects are identical in their moral properties; what it does not explain is why it is the case that 
two objects identical in all naturalistic respects are identical in their moral properties (Blackburn-
1973, 122). It might be that the person’s psychology is such that she has this belief even though 
it is not the case. What Blackburn has done is to create two different explanatory projects for the 
realist and the antirealist:  the realist has to explain how moral properties supervene on natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In comments, Stefan Baumrin said Blackburn doesn’t know the people he knows. I doubt that 
many of us have not met people whose moral judgments are not consistent in essentially similar 
contexts, but who insist they are making moral judgments. Blackburn would probably claim that 
these people are deluded, lying, or changed in some way, but I doubt he can insist that all cases 
can be explained away in this manner; there seem to be cases where two objects can be identical 
in relevant respects, but a person not have the same attitudes toward them, e.g., the person who 
loves one of identical twins, but not the other, or a child’s attachment to a transitional object that 
cannot be substituted for. 
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one, while the antirealist has to explain how a person comes to have the habit of forming the 
same attitude to objects alike in all natural properties.7 
5.2.1.2 Blackburn’s Mixed Worlds Supervenience Argument 
 Blackburn returns to the supervenience argument in Spreading the Word:  Groundings in 
the Philosophy of Language; there he contrasts it with other arguments for projectivism, 
economy and internalism, by calling it a “metaphysical” argument (Blackburn-1984, 182). 
There he reviews the notion of supervenience:   
The idea is that some properties, the A-properties, are consequential upon some 
other base properties, the underlying B-properties. This claim is supposed to be 
that in some sense of necessary, it is necessary that … if two situations are 
identical in their B-properties they are identical in their A-properties. A-properties 
cannot (in this same sense) vary regardless of B-properties (Blackburn-1984, 182-
183). 
 
Blackburn recognizes there are different strengths of necessity, but he thinks that moral 
properties seem to supervene on natural properties as a matter of conceptual necessity:  “It is 
conceptually impossible to suppose that if two things are identical in every other respect, one is 
better than the other” (Blackburn-1984, 183).8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ultimately, Blackburn wants to be able to say that the moral judgments that arise from such 
habits of attitude are true. To be able to claim this, it must be the case that we should have this 
habit. I cannot find a place where Blackburn argues that we should have this habit, but in 
subsection 5.2.1.1 I will consider Blackburn’s explanation for why we have this habit.	  
8 Blackburn does not define conceptual necessity, so it is hard to assess his claim that this is 
conceptual necessity:  two things identical in all natural respects are identical in moral respects. 
As I understand it, a conceptual necessity is a relation that holds in virtue of the meanings of the 
words expressing it. For example, the following is conceptual necessity:  Kant is a bachelor, 
therefore he is an unmarried man. It is not obvious to me that the following is a conceptual 
necessity:  x and y are identical in all natural respects, therefore x and y are identical in all moral 
respects. Perhaps Blackburn has a different sense of conceptual necessity in mind, say, that we 
cannot imagine two states of affairs alike in all natural respects, but different in moral respects. 
This cannot be either, many people can imagine this; many people think that Abraham’s (near) 
sacrifice of Isaac is morally different than any other human sacrifice because of God’s 
disposition toward it. 
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Drawing on his initial explanation of supervenience as a consequential relation of A-
properties on B-properties, Blackburn introduces the notion of a complete description of a 
thing’s B-properties:  B*. He characterizes supervenience as B*/A supervenience and defines it 
as follows: 
B*/A supervenience – necessarily if there is a thing which is B* and A, then 
anything else which is like it in being B* is like it in being A as well. There is no 
possible world in which one thing is B* and A, but other things are B* and not A 
(Blackburn-1984, 183). 
 
Blackburn points out that another, stronger, relationship between B* and A is possible; he says 
there could be a rigid relationship between B* and A in which necessarily, if something is B*, it 
is also A; i.e., in all possible worlds, if a thing is B*, it is A. B*/A supervenience is weaker 
because with this relationship it is possible that in another possible world for things that are B* 
not to be A; this relationship only requires that in any possible world in which it happens that 
something that is B* is A, all the other things that are B* are A. Blackburn calls the stronger 
inter-possible world relationship, B*/A necessity (Blackburn-1984, 184).9 Blackburn reiterates 
that B*/A supervenience is a conceptual necessity, but he does not think that B*/A necessity is a 
conceptual necessity because he thinks that determining which moral properties arise from a set 
of natural properties requires a standard that cannot be established by conceptual means alone 
(Blackburn-1984, 184). 
 With the use of the possible worlds metaphor, Blackburn now reintroduces the 
supervenience problem for moral realism. Blackburn defines a possible world as “a complete 
state of affairs corresponding to the various possibilities involved” (Blackburn-1984, 184). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Blackburn’s account of distinction between supervenience and necessity employs the metaphor 
of possible worlds, and so it seems to draw on Klagge’s method for explaining these ideas, but 
Blackburn does not reference the article. This isn’t surprising since Blackburn’s book was 
published in March 1984, and Klagge’s article in July 1984, but I wonder if Blackburn was 
aware of Klagge’s paper being in development.  
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Blackburn claims that if B*/A supervenience is true, then all of the possible worlds can be 
divided into two kinds:  there is the kind in which all the things that are B* are A; and, there is 
the kind in which none of the things that are B* are A. Blackburn claims that there is another 
kind of possible world that has been left out – the possible world in which there are things that 
are B* and A and things that are B* but not A; Blackburn calls this a mixed world. Prima facie it 
seems like a mixed world is possible; if there is a possible world in which x is B* and A, and a 
possible world in which y is B* and not A, then it should be possible that x and y occupy the 
same world. B*/A supervenience bans a mixed world like this, and Blackburn thinks that moral 
antirealists have an explanation for why there is such a ban on mixed worlds when it comes to 
moral properties, but moral realists do not. 
 Blackburn’s antirealist explanation for why a mixed world is not possible is quite 
simple. According to a moral antirealist, moral properties do not exist, so if they do not exist, 
they cannot supervene on natural properties, so the reason there cannot be a possible world in 
which something is B* and A and another in which something is B* and not A is that there is no 
possible world in which anything is A. There are no A-properties that supervene on B*. 
Blackburn still has to explain why we observe this supervenience constraint in our moral 
practice; after all, if I make a negative moral judgment about my friend’s daughter tormenting a 
dog, I make the same one about my goddaughter tormenting a dog.  
According to moral antirealists like Blackburn, the announcement of a moral judgment, 
or A-commitment, is not a reaction to or speculation about moral properties, A-properties 
(Blackburn-1984, 186). When we make moral judgments, we are projecting, and supervenience 
should be explained in terms of constraints on proper projection. These constraints are 
established by the purpose of projection, which Blackburn characterizes as a “guide to practical 
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decision-making” (Blackburn-1984, 186). So, in our moral practice, our moral judgments 
supervene on the natural properties, but this is because there is some type of rule, which governs 
making moral judgments, and it requires us not to make different ones about things that have the 
same natural properties.10 
 On the other hand, Blackburn thinks that the moral realist will have a very difficult time 
explaining why there is a ban on mixed worlds. A moral realist will have some notion of a 
moral property, or A-property, but she also has the notion that this moral property will not track 
across possible worlds in which there is B*. Now, when she considers a possible world in which 
a thing being A supervenes on it being B*, this will seem to be a mysterious fact for which she 
has no explanation (Blackburn-1984, 185). If pressed for an explanation why in this possible 
world, but not in another, does A supervene on B*, she will have no explanation. Blackburn 
compares it to a situation in which a person in one place being B* and thinking of a dog and 
another person in a different place being B* and thinking of an aunt not being able to travel to 
the same place; such a situation seems mystifying. 
5.2.1.3 Blackburn’s Modal Supervenience Argument 
 A year after presenting the mixed world argument in Spreading the Word Blackburn 
returned to his supervenience argument in “Supervenience Revisited” to press a revised version 
which takes advances in modal logic into account. Blackburn asks us to imagine a domain of 
judgments as F judgments, and the truths and facts of that domain will be F truths and F facts; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Blackburn has explained supervenience as a matter of projection being constrained by a rule 
that our projections not differ without a difference in natural properties. This explanation works 
so long as projections are equated with moral judgments, but in chapter 4 I challenged this 
understanding of projection. Blackburn may not have a ready to hand explanation of 
supervenience once projection is properly understood. In addition, supervenience no longer 
seems like a conceptual necessity if the relationship between moral judgments and natural 
properties is dictated by a rule that could have been different. Perhaps it is a conceptual necessity 
that we have such a rule, but I will explore this in more depth in subsection 5.3.2.3. 
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and he proposes that we assume that the truths expressible in the F vocabulary “supervene upon 
the truths expressible in an underlying G vocabulary (Blackburn-1985, 130-131).11 To say that F 
truths supervene on the G truths is to say, “in some sense of ‘necessary’ it is necessarily true that 
if an F truth changes, then some G truth changes” (Blackburn-1985, 131).12 Blackburn next 
proposes that a truth that some object or event is F supervenes upon a specific total set of G 
truths, which he characterizes as the object or event being G*. While it is vague what truths can 
go into composing G*, and there is a difficulty in characterizing them, Blackburn says, 
intuitively, they are the natural states that bring it about that the object or event is F (Blackburn-
1985, 131). The natural states that bring it about that an object or event is F are the G states that 
underlie an F state. Blackburn characterizes supervenience as a relation such that if an object or 
event is in some F state, it is in that state because it is also in some underlying G state. 
 Blackburn, then, introduces “N” and “P” to represent necessity and possibility, 
respectively. With these notations he introduces the following formula for supervenience: 
(S) N((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)) (Blackburn-1985, 131). 
 
Blackburn interprets this as claiming that if something exists and it is F and it is G*, and it being 
G* underlies it being F, then anything else that is G* will also be F. However, there is nothing in 
this claim to suggest that a thing cannot be F without being G*. This kind of necessity is weaker 
than the following kind of necessity: 
(N) N(x)(G*x ⊃ Fx) (Blackburn-1985, 131). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The use of terms like “judgment”, “truth”, and “fact” is not meant to represent any 
commitment that these things are genuine or real. 
12 The supervenience relationship could be cashed out in terms of facts:  “necessarily, if two 
situations are identical in point of G facts, then they are identical in terms of F facts” (Blackburn-
1985, 130).	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This claims that necessarily for any thing, if it is G*, then it is F. (S) does not entail (N). Finally, 
since (S) does not entail (N), Blackburn introduces the possibility that something exists that is 
G*, but not F, and a person who holds (S) may hold (P), too: 
(P) P(∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx) (Blackburn-1985, 132). 
On such a theory it is possible that whatever G state underlies a particular F state might not have 
done so. Blackburn’s point is that a theory which endorses both (S) and (P), or what he calls the 
(S)/(P) combination, generates a mystery for how the combination is possible – a mystery which 
is better solved by theories which are antirealist about F judgments than those that are realist. 
Blackburn returns to his mixed worlds metaphor to put the mystery into relief. (S) 
stipulates that in any possible world, if there is an object or event that is F, and its being G* 
underlies its F-ness, then any other object or event in that same possible world that is G* is F; 
(P) entails that there are possible worlds in which an object or event is G* and not F. Blackburn 
calls the former worlds G*/F worlds, and the latter, G*/O worlds (Blackburn-1985, 134). (S) has 
a further implication:  there are no possible worlds that are mixed, i.e., in which some object or 
event is G* and F and some object or event is G* and not F. Blackburn calls the mixed worlds 
G*/FvO worlds. Blackburn argues that the limit on possible worlds to G*/F and G*/O worlds 
appears to be arbitrary, violating “a principle of plentitude with respect to possibilities” 
(Blackburn-1985, 135). 
Blackburn now turns to the matter of evaluating whether our moral practice involves a 
commitment to the (S)/(P) combination, and he finds that it does. First, he introduces analytic 
necessity, which he defines in two ways:  (a) a proposition whose truth can be determined by 
conceptual means alone; (b) a proposition whose denial would betray a lack of competence with 
the vocabulary in the utterer (Blackburn-1974, 136). Blackburn proposes that analytic necessity 
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is the kind of necessity in play for (S) when it comes to moral practice because he takes it to be a 
conceptual truth that moral claims supervene on natural claims, and so anyone who did not 
notice or observe this would betray their lack of competence within moral practice (Blackburn-
1985, 137). So Blackburn revises his formalization of (S) to (Sa): 
(Sa) AN((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)). 
Blackburn argues that we should not hold (Na), 
(Na) AN(x)(G*x ⊃ Fx),  
the analytic corollary to (N), in addition to (Sa) because (Na) holds that it is evidence of 
competence in moral practice to adopt whatever standard is expressed by (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx). 
Blackburn points out that it is a common assumption that people can be competent in moral 
practice even if they hold different standards, for example, two people who endorse 
utilitarianism but differ over what intrinsic value to maximize would recognize each other as 
morally competent (Blackburn-1985, 137). If the common view is that (Na) is wrong, then (Pa) 
should reflect the common view: 
(Pa) AP(∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx).13 
So, in moral practice, we are committed to the (Sa)/(Pa) combination, and the problem of 
supervenience remains:  if it is analytically necessary that in any possible world, if there is an 
object or event that is F, and its being G* underlies its F-ness, then any other object or event in 
that same possible world that is G* is F, and there are analytically possible worlds in which an 
object or event is G* and not F, why can’t there be a world in which one object or event is G* 
and F and another object or event that is G* and not F? Blackburn explains that (Sa) is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In both the original appearance of “Supervenience Revisited” in Exercises in Analysis and its 
reproduction in Essays in Quasi-Realism, (Pa) is formalized as AP (∃x)(G*x & Fx), but this must 
be a mistake since (P) is formalized as P (∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx). 
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constraint that we adopted in response to the role that moral practice plays in our lives, “guiding 
our desires and choices among the natural features of the world” (Blackburn-1985, 137). The 
moral realist cannot explain (Sa) in the same way since the moral realist must take (Sa) as 
describing how the moral world is, not as a standard for assessing moral competence. 
5.3 Criticizing the Supervenience Arguments 
The crux of Blackburn’s supervenience argument is that there are two, apparently, non-
negotiable commitments people have:  (1) whatever a particular state of affairs’ moral worth is, it 
could have been different; (2) if two distinct states of affairs have no natural differences between 
them, they have the same moral worth. Despite the widespread consensus they enjoy, Blackburn 
thinks they are in tension. Imagine a state of affairs that is so far unrealized; (1) holds that its 
goodness or badness is up in the air right until the moment it is realized – it could have gone 
either way. Once that state of affairs is realized with its attendant, say goodness, any other 
subsequent state of affairs that is identical is also good; this is just to state (2). The problem is 
that (2) entails that the following scenario is impossible:  the previously unrealized state of 
affairs is simultaneously realized in two different states of affairs with different moral worth. It is 
odd that this is impossible:  if an unrealized state of affairs has no moral worth prior to its 
realization, why can’t it have a different moral worth for each simultaneous realization of it? 
Blackburn challenges moral philosophers to develop some way of reconciling the two 
commitments, and he claims that the projectivist reconciliation he proposed is better than moral 
realist reconciliations. 
The moral realist’s obvious retort to Blackburn is, so what? You have reconciled two 
commitments that moral realists do not need to reconcile since they do not hold both 
commitments. The rest of this chapter mainly focuses on exploring whether moral realists must 
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hold (1) or (2), but I will conclude by considering Shafer-Landau’s critique that the 
supervenience argument goes too far. 
5.3.1 Denying (1):  whatever a particular state of affairs’ moral worth is, it could have been 
different 
 
The corollaries to claim (1) in Blackburn’s original, mixed worlds, and modal supervenience 
arguments are, respectively: 
(E') There are some moral propositions that are true, but whose truth is not 
entailed by any naturalistic facts about their subject; 
 
(W) There is a possible world in which something is B* and A, and there is 
another possible world in which something is B* and not A; 
 
(P) P(∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx).14 
 
(P) claims that it is possible that something exists that is G*, but not F. Like James 
Klagge, Ian McFetridge, David Brink, and Russ Shafer-Landau, who all counsel the 
moral realist to abandon commitment (1), I think that the most promising response to 
Blackburn’s supervenience argument is to avoid or deny the commitments these 
propositions express, so let’s have a look at doing so. 
5.3.1.1 Avoiding (E'):  There are some moral propositions that are true, but whose 
truth is not entailed by any naturalistic facts about their subject. 
 
Blackburn’s supervenience argument in “Moral Realism” did not get serious scrutiny until 
James Klagge’s “An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties.”15 Klagge’s response to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 In Spreading the Word, where Blackburn introduces his mixed world supervenience argument, 
he does not put forward a specific commitment about the possible relationship between moral 
and non-moral properties, rather he derives the problem from noting that moral philosophers 
accept B*/A supervenience, but not B*/A necessity; “… it does not seem a matter of conceptual 
or logical necessity that that any given total natural state of a thing gives it some particular moral 
quality” (Blackburn-1984, 184). I am introducing (W) here to illuminate the symmetry among 
the arguments. I take (W) to represent the kind of claim that generates problems for 
supervenience in the mixed world argument. 
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the supervenience argument denies that there is a puzzle because Blackburn has not proven that 
(E') and (S2) reflect moral realists’ commitments.  
Klagge starts by criticizing Blackburn’s interchangeable use of the terms “entailment” 
and “strict implication”, so he offers a single interpretation of the terms (Klagge-1984, 373). 
Since an entailment, “involve[s] some connection of content or meaning,” a strict implication 
should be understood in the same way, and the customary understanding of the connection is one 
that can “be derived solely by means of the laws of logic and the meaning of words” (Klagge-
1984, 373). Finally, he thinks that the use of “strict implication” and “logical impossibility” is 
not meant to signal a difference since a “proposition strictly implies another if it is logically 
impossible for the first to be true and the second false” (Klagge-1984, 373). Having proposed an 
equivalence in meaning among the terms, Klagge offers these reinterpretations of (E') and (S2): 
(KE')  There are some moral propositions that are true, but whose truth cannot be 
derived by the laws of logic and the meaning of words, from any propositions 
ascribing natural properties to the subject; 
 
(KS2)  If two things possess the same naturalistic properties to the same degree, 
then from this fact we can infer, by the laws of logic and the meanings of words, 
that they possess the same moral properties to the same degree (Klagge-1984, 
374). 
 
 As we have seen Blackburn characterizes supervenience as a conceptual or logical 
necessity, but Klagge argues that Blackburn’s argument for supervenience is an argument for a 
weaker relation than the one described by (KS2). Blackburn contends supervenience must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 R. F. Holland considers Blackburn’s argument in a review of Morality and Moral Reasoning:  
Five Essays in Ethics, the collection in which Blackburn’s “Moral Realism” first appeared. 
Holland’s primary criticisms of the supervenience arguments are that Blackburn offers a straw 
man characterization of moral realism, on which he illicitly imposes a correspondence theory of 
truth, and does not explain what he means by “naturalistic” (Holland, 270). Holland’s critique 
does not respond to the charge that moral realism has a difficulty in explaining supervenience; 
instead, it suggests that, first, an alternative (undescribed) version of moral realism may not 
have this difficulty, and, second, supervenience could be easily explained if Blackburn provided 
a more precise explanation of “naturalistic.”  
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true because to deny it is to admit that the moral worth of courage can change even if all its 
natural properties remain the same; and consequently, nothing depends on courage’s moral worth 
shifting when its connection to the natural properties is unaltered (Blackburn-1973, 122). In light 
of this Klagge interprets Blackburn as defending a supervenience that holds that naturalistically 
indiscernible objects are necessarily morally discernible (Klagge-1984, 374).16 Next, Klagge 
argues that Blackburn’s defense of supervenience only defends a necessity that is weaker than 
the conceptual necessity that Blackburn insists characterizes supervenience; a person could 
insist that naturalistically indiscernible objects are necessarily morally indiscernible, without 
holding that this relationship be derived by the laws of logic and the meanings of words (Klagge-
1984, 374, Blackburn-1973, 115-116). 
Blackburn’s argument has left the moral realist with the option of characterizing the 
connection between moral and natural properties as a synthetic necessity, which can be captured 
by the following: 
(WSS) It is impossible that two things should differ in some moral respect 
without differing in some naturalistic respect. 
 
If (E') and (WSS) represent the commitments of moral realists, then (1) – a moral proposition’s 
truth consists in the existence of a state of affairs which the proposition describes – and (2) – no 
set of natural facts entails the existence of this state of affairs, i.e. (E) – are no longer in tension:  
the supervenience claim is one about the connection between properties, it is not a claim about a 
connection between propositions about those properties. Klagge dissolves the tension between 
the two claims by pointing out that the tension only arises from not paying attention to the 
different kinds of necessity at play. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In his text Klagge interprets Blackburn as arguing that a person who denies (S2) “must allow 
that naturalistically indiscernible objects might be morally discernible” (Klagge, 374). 
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 So far, my discussion of Klagge’s article suggests that it would be more suited to 
discussing it in the subsection of this chapter where I explore the possibility of realists 
disowning commitment (2), but Klagge proposes that the tension can be reintroduced if (E') is 
reformulated more like (1): 
(A') A thing could have had different moral properties from those it actually has 
even if all its natural properties had been the same (Klagge-1984, 375). 
 
(A') and (WSS) would be in tension; it would be a challenge for the moral realist to reconcile 
them. But, Klagge argues that there is no reason to believe that (A') is true, and I am inclined to 
agree with him. In fact (A') seems to be a mere denial of naturalistic moral realism. Klagge 
suggests that a moral realist should reject (A') and adopt the following commitment: 
(NC) If a thing of a certain naturalistic description has certain moral properties, 
then it is impossible that it should have been different in some moral respect 
without being different in some naturalistic respect (Klagge-1984, 376). 
 
There is no tension between (NC) and (WSS), since (NC) explains why it is that two objects 
cannot differ in some moral respects without differing in naturalistic respects. 
 Ian McFetridge points out that he and Klagge agree that the primary move to make 
against Blackburn’s supervenience argument is to deny (E'), which he characterizes as holding, 
“There are moral truths which are not strictly implied by any truth ascribing naturalistic 
properties to their subjects” (McFetridge, 245 n3, 247). McFetridge formalizes this by use of a 
universal quantifier as follows (“M” and “N” range over moral and naturalistic properties, 
respectively; “w’” and “a’” are variables for possible and actual worlds, respectively; and “Mxa” 
should be read as “x is M in a”, etc.): 
(L'). (∃x)( ∃M) [Mxa & ∼ (∃N)(Nxa & (∀w)(Nxw → Mxw))] (McFetridge, 249). 
 
McFetridge argues that Blackburn’s supervenience claim holds, “Moral properties are 
supervenient on naturalistic properties in the sense that it is logically necessary that, if two 
	   192	  
objects agree in all their naturalistic properties, then they agree in all their moral properties” 
(McFetridge, 247). He formalizes this claim as follows: 
(XYWW). (∀w)(∀x)(∀y) [(∀N)(Nxw ↔ Nyw) → (∀M)(Mxw ↔ Myw)] 
(McFetridge, 248).17 
 
McFetridge calls this “intra-world” supervenience, which holds “that for any objects x, y, if in 
any possible situation they share all their naturalistic properties, then in that possible situation 
they share all their moral properties” (McFetridge, 248). McFetridge thinks that in addition to 
intra-world supervenience, we are ordinarily committed to “cross-world” supervenience: “if in 
a possible world an object is naturalistically just as it is in the actual world, then it is in the 
possible world morally just as it is in the actual world” (McFetridge, 248): 
(XXWA) (∀x)(∀w) [(∀N)(∀w)(Nxw ↔ Nxa) → (∀M)(Mxw ↔ Mxa)] 
(McFetridge, 249). 
 
McFetridge thinks that since we are committed to (XXWA), and because some assumptions 
about naturalistic properties make (XXWA) and (L') incompatible, then we must be committed 
to rejecting (L'). 
 McFetridge cites Jaegwon Kim’s notion of a “maximal” naturalistic property, and he says 
that we ought to assume “that all the objects with which we have to deal have in the actual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  (L') should be read as follows: 
 
There exists some x and some moral property M such that x is M in the actual 
world and there does not exist some natural property N such that x is N in the 
actual world and for all possible worlds if x is N in that possible world, then x is 
M in the actual world. 
 
(XYWW) should be read as follows: 
 
For all objects x and y in all possible worlds, if, for all natural properties N, x is N 
in that possible world if and only if y is N in that possible world, then, for all 
moral properties M, x is M in that possible world if and only if y is M in that 
possible world.	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world” have such a property (McFetridge, 250). The idea is that “every object actually has some 
naturalistic property … which is so determinate in every possible naturalistic respect that no 
further naturalistic properties can be ‘added’” (McFetridge, 250). He calls this property N*, and 
claims, “if x has N* in the actual world, and also has N* in some possible world w, then x in w 
shares all its naturalistic properties with x in the actual world,” and he formalizes this as 
(NMA) (∀x)(∃N) [Nxa & (∀w)(Nxw → (∀N*) (N*xa ↔ N*xw))] (McFetridge, 
250). 
 
Given this assumption and (XXWA), both of which are common commitments we have, we 
ought to abandon (L'). (L') claims that some object has a moral property in the actual world, but 
that there is no naturalistic property that it has in the naturalistic world that guarantees if x has 
that naturalistic property in another world, then x has that moral property. This should hold for 
the N* property that x has in the actual world, too. So, a consequence of (L') is that there is a 
possible world in which x is N*, but not M. Therefore, (L') allows for a world in which x is N* 
and M and another world where x is N* and not M, but that possibility flouts (XXWA), which is 
a common moral commitment:  (L') must be false. Moral realists are able to avoid the 
supervenience objection because they can deny that (1) is true. 
5.3.1.2 Avoiding (W):  There is a possible world in which something is B* and A, and there 
is another possible world in which something is B* and not A. 
 
 Russ Shafer-Landau also argues that the moral realists’ obvious maneuver against 
Blackburn’s supervenience argument is to deny (1), and he pursues this strategy by rejecting the 
lack of entailment thesis represented by (W):  There is a possible world in which something is B* 
and A, and there is another possible world in which something is B* and not A. Shafer-Landau 
cashes this out as the claim that “no set of non-moral truths entails any particular moral 
evaluation” (Shafer-Landau-2003, 85). He expresses bewilderment that Blackburn thinks moral 
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realists are committed to rejecting this entailment, since he interprets this entailment as 
metaphysical entailment (Shafer-Landau-2003, 85).  
In an earlier work, he suggests that Blackburn’s lack of entailment assumption is a 
hangover from the open-question argument; this assumption is false because “the sense of 
‘wrong’ isn’t identical to the sense of any particular description of natural properties, since we 
are speaking here of supervenience relations, not identity” (Shafer-Landau-1994, 148). Shafer-
Landau quotes from one of Moore’s replies to his critics, “[I]f a thing is good (in my sense), then 
that it is so follows from the fact that it possess certain natural properties, which are such that 
from the fact that it is good it does not follow conversely that it has those properties” (quoted in 
Shafer-Landau-2003, 85). Shafer-Landau characterizes the relationship between moral properties 
and natural ones as “an asymmetrical relationship of dependence;” the idea is that moral 
properties are multiply realizable by natural properties – different combinations of natural 
properties can give rise to the same moral properties, so the moral properties will not exist 
without the natural properties, but the presence of a moral property does not entail the presence 
of any particular combination of natural ones (Shafer-Landau-2003, 85). 
Shafer-Landau, therefore, simply rejects (W), claiming, “[A] duly specified set of 
nonmoral properties metaphysically must give rise to a certain moral property” (Shafer-Landau-
2003, 85). The entailment relationship suggested by this is one in which non-moral properties 
constitute “metaphysically sufficient” conditions for the instantiation of moral properties, and the 
ban on mixed world is explained by the fact that anything that is B* entails that it is A (Shafer-
Landau-2003, 85). 
Shafer-Landau considers a possible response that Blackburn has already made:  shifting 
the necessities from metaphysical to conceptual ones. In this argument, it is conceptually 
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necessary that moral properties supervene on non-moral properties, but it is conceptually 
possible for the same combination of non-moral properties to underlie different moral properties. 
The problem is that supervenience implies that a competent participant in moral discourse 
recognizes that if something has certain non-moral properties and a particular moral property, 
then anything with the same non-moral properties has the same moral property, but lack of 
entailment implies that a competent participant in a moral discourse can imagine a world in 
which something has those non-moral properties, but a different moral property. How can this 
be? Shafer-Landau argues that it is quite simple:  “people can conceive of many things that are 
not metaphysically possible” (Shafer-Landau-2003, 86). When competent participants in moral 
discourse imagine worlds that are not possible – worlds in which objects are B* and not A, even 
though being B* necessitates being A – it is because of  “a limitation on our appreciation of the 
relevant metaphysical relations” (Shafer-Landau-2003, 86).18 Shafer-Landau’s response to the 
shift of modality is to continue to deny (W), but explain its resilience in moral practice. 
Now, let’s look at attempts to deny (P):  (P) P(∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx). 
5.3.1.3 Avoiding (P):  P(∃x)(G*x & ∼  Fx). 
The “modal argument” against moral realism represents a refinement of the supervenience 
argument that blunts the force of the objections to (1) I just reviewed.19 Blackburn argues that 
even if the shift to synthetic necessities provides moral realism a way to reconcile (1) – a moral 
proposition’s truth consists in the existence of a state of affairs that the proposition describes –  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 I take this limit to reflect the fact that we have not, so far, identified the non-moral properties 
that necessitate the moral ones, rather than a principled limit that we are unable to do so. 
19 It appears that Robert Elliot was the first person to characterize Blackburn’s supervenience 
argument as a modal argument (Elliot-1987, 133). While each version of the argument is 
essentially modal, I have reserved the term to describe the form of argument Blackburn pressed 
in “Supervenience Revisited” due to Blackburn’s own description of it taking advantage of 
advances in modal logic (Blackburn-1985, 130). 
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and (2) – no set of natural facts entails the existence of this state of affairs, i.e. (E), there is still 
the problem of explaining how in moral practice it is analytic that the moral judgments 
supervene on naturalistic descriptions and it is possible for a moral judgment to be different 
given the same naturalistic description. 
The new challenge is for moral realists to explain how to reconcile (Sa) and (Pa): 
(Sa) AN((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)) 
 
and 
(Pa) AP (∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx).20 
Robert Elliot introduces another assumption into this mix, E: 
(E) (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx) (Elliot-1987, 133). 
Elliot, pursuing a similar strategy to Blackburn’s other critics, argues that there could be another 
possible version of supervenience that participants in moral discourse are committed to that 
rules out (Pa): 
(?) N ((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ N(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)) (Elliot-1987, 133). 
  
 The supervenience that (?) represents is the same kind of supervenience I have already called 
“cross-world” or “intra-world” supervenience. Elliot argues that the argument for (Sa) can be 
extended to argue for the denial of (Pa).  
Elliot’s argument makes the point that the considerations Blackburn offers in support of 
(Sa) also support (?). Once (?) is established, it and (E) entail N(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)), which is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Remember, Blackburn argues that we should not hold the negations of (Pa), (Na) AN(x)(G*x ⊃ 
Fx), because (Na) holds that it is evidence of competence in moral practice to adopt whatever 
standard is expressed by (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx). Blackburn points out that is a common assumption that 
people can be competent in moral practice even if they hold different standards, for example, two 
people who endorse utilitarianism but differ over what intrinsic value to maximize would 
recognize each other as morally competent (Blackburn-1985, 137). If the common view is that 
(Na) is wrong, then (Pa) should reflect the common view. 	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denial of (Pa). Recall that Blackburn makes the case that it is an analytic or conceptual constraint 
on competency within moral practice that moralists treat cases, which are identical in all their 
natural properties, as identical in their moral properties. To flout the constraint would be violate 
the purpose of morality:  “to choose, commend, rank, approve of, or forbid things on the basis of 
their natural properties” (Blackburn-1985, 137). Elliot, echoing Blackburn’s point in Spreading 
the Word, points out that to flout the constraint is to engage in a practice that is not moralizing 
(Elliot-1987, 135; Blackburn-1984, 186). 
Elliot’s argument proceeds by way of a thought experiment:  imagine you are asked 
whether an actual state of affairs, Sw, is good; noticing that G* characterizes Sw, you judge that 
Sw is good. Now, you are asked to imagine a possible world that is not actual, and within this 
possible world there is a state of affairs, Sp, which is also characterized by G*; if asked, whether 
Sp is good, you will judge that it is (Elliot-1987, 135). Elliot argues that whatever causes you to 
judge that Sw is good because G* underlies it, should cause you to judge that Sp is good because 
G* underlies it, and the “should” is conceptual (Elliot-1987, 135). Given that the states of affairs 
that G* underlies are in the actual world and distributed across the possible worlds, failing to 
judge Sp good after judging Sw is good would violate the conceptual constraint on moral practice 
in the same way that judging Sw', which G* underlies in the actual world, is bad would violate it. 
Apparently, then, part of being competent in a moral practice is observing (?). So, (?) like (Sa) is 
a conceptual truth, is analytic. Given, (?) and (E), a person competent in moral practice will deny 
(Pa), and the (Sa)/(Pa) combination that Blackburn argued was a problem for moral realists can 
be avoided. 
5.3.2 Denying (2):  if two distinct states of affairs have no natural differences between them, 
they have the same moral worth. 
 
The corollaries to (2) as they appear in Blackburn’s texts are as follows: 
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(S2)  A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 … Nn if M is not identical 
with and of N1 … Nn nor with any truth function of them, and it is logically 
impossible that two things should each possess the same properties from set N1 … 
Nn to the same degree, without both failing to possess M, or cease to be M, or both 
possessing M, to the same degree. 
 
B*/A supervenience – necessarily if there is a thing which is B* and A, then 
anything else which is like it in being B* is like it in being A as well. There is no 
possible world in which one thing is B* and A, but other things are B* and not A. 
 
(S) N((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)). 
 
Before, examining these propositions, I want to note that though Blackburn suggests that the 
supervenience of the moral on the natural is an axiom of metaethics, and that realists should be 
reluctant to abandon this conviction, there is an important way to deny (2) that I will not examine 
closely. As Klagge points out, a Divine Command Theorist would not have any difficulty 
supposing that two actions could possess all the same naturalistic properties, but not the same 
moral ones (Klagge-1984, 374-375). Blackburn acknowledges this objection, but dismisses it, 
first, as incoherent, and second, as promiscuously including the divine among the natural. The 
second reply seems to miss the point of the objection; Klagge does not propose that the divine is 
natural. Rather, he suggests that there are competent moral practitioners who do not accept the 
supervenience of the moral on the natural. The first, quick reply that the objection is incoherent 
reflects Blackburn’s view that his metaethical project is to make sense of morality from a 
naturalistic perspective; since he believes that the only the resources he has available are natural 
properties and naturalistic language, he will not countenance explanations and objections 
appealing to the divine. Because I am interested in the divide between moral realists and moral 
antirealists of the naturalistic variety, I will accept Blackburn’s terse rejection of this objection. 
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5.3.2.1 Avoiding (S2):  A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 … Nn if M is 
not identical with and of N1 … Nn nor with any truth function of them, and it is 
logically impossible that two things should each possess the same properties from set 
N1 … Nn to the same degree, without both failing to possess M, or cease to be M, or 
both possessing M, to the same degree. 
 
As I noted in subsection 5.3.1.1, Klagge criticizes Blackburn for looseness in his use of logical 
terms, and reinterprets (S2),  
(S2)  A property M is supervenient upon properties N1 … Nn if M is not identical 
with and of N1 … Nn nor with any truth function of them, and it is logically 
impossible that two things should each possess the same properties from set N1 … 
Nn to the same degree, without both failing to possess M, or cease to be M, or both 
possessing M, to the same degree, 
 
as (KS2) to reflect his attempt to instill some consistency in their use: 
(KS2)  If two things possess the same naturalistic properties to the same degree, 
then from this fact we can infer, by the laws of logic and the meanings of words, 
that they possess the same moral properties to the same degree. 
 
I also noted in subsection 5.3.1.1 that Klagge points out that Blackburn’s defense of 
supervenience suggests that at its core is a commitment to naturalistically indiscernible objects 
being morally indiscernible. Although this can be supported by a weaker relationship than logical 
necessity, Blackburn repeatedly insists that it is logical impossibility that precludes 
naturalistically indiscernible objects from being morally discernible (Blackburn-1973, 115-116). 
The real force of Klagge’s Divine Command Theory objection to supervenience can now be 
identified:  if it is possible to conceive of moral properties supervening on God’s will rather than 
natural properties, then it is not a matter of logical impossibility that moral properties can vary 
without a variance in natural ones. Klagge’s conclusion is cautious:  the moral realist does not 
have to accept the supervenience that Blackburn seems to have in mind in (S2) or (KS2), but she 
should hold on to the condition that “naturalistically indiscernible objects cannot be morally 
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indiscernible” (Klagge-1984, 375). The trick is to establish a different statement of 
supervenience that captures this condition. 
Klagge points out that if the connection between moral and naturalistic properties is not 
logical as Blackburn proposes, then it is synthetic, not analytic. Klagge proposes (WSS), 
synchronic supervenience, as an alternative to (S2): 
(WSS)  It is impossible that two things should differ in some moral respect 
without differing in some naturalistic respect (Klagge-1984, 375). 
 
Klagge notes that once it is no longer a matter of logical impossibility that two objects share all 
their naturalistic properties, but not moral ones, i.e., “naturalistic indiscernibility does not entail 
moral indiscernibility,” there is no reason to be surprised that propositions describing an object’s 
natural properties do not entail propositions about it moral properties (Klagge-1984, 375). As 
already noted in subsection 5.3.1.1, even though Blackburn can reformulate the lack of 
entailment thesis into (A') to generate a tension with (WSS), Klagge has a rebuttal for this move.  
McFetridge makes the point that Blackburn’s (S2) generates a tension with the lack of 
entailment thesis only if it is interpreted as weak, or intra-world, supervenience, which he 
formalizes as  
(XYWW) (∀w)(∀x)(∀y) [(∀N)(∀w)(Nxw ↔ Nyw) → (∀M)(Mxw ↔ Myw)]. 
 
But, McFetridge insists that strong, or inter-world, supervenience, which he formalizes as 
(XXWA) (∀x)(∀w) [(∀N)(∀w)(Nxw ↔ Nxa) → (∀M)(Mxw ↔ Mxa)], 
 
is just as much a part of ordinary moral competence as weak supervenience.  
At first, it might seem as though strong supervenience and the lack of entailment thesis 
are straightforwardly incompatible. After all, if strong supervenience is the view that “if in a 
possible world an object is naturalistically just as it is in the actual world, then it is in the 
possible world morally just as it is in the actual world,” and the lack of entailment thesis is the 
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view that “[t]here are moral truths which are not strictly implied by any truth ascribing 
naturalistic properties to their subjects,” then it would seem that the truths ascribing naturalistic 
properties to subjects in the actual and possible worlds should imply a moral truth common to the 
subjects. McFetridge points out that strong supervenience does not entail that a proposition 
ascribing a natural property to a subject strictly implies any moral truth since it is compatible 
with strong supervenience that something could have a moral property while having no natural 
properties (McFetridge, 249). This is the reason that McFetridge introduces (NMA), “if x has N* 
in the actual world, and also has N* in some possible world w, then x in w shares all its 
naturalistic properties with x in the actual world.” (XXWA) and (NMA) entail the rejection of 
the lack of entailment thesis. 
As noted in subsection 5.2.1, Blackburn provides no direct argument for supervenience, 
claiming instead that it is constitutive of moral competence, but he seems to take for granted that 
supervenience is weak. McFetridge cites an example from Hare to support strong 
supervenience being a part of moral competence. In the example, a person offers a positive 
moral evaluation of an action, but a negative moral evaluation of a hypothetical action that is 
identical in all respects. Hare argues that such a scenario would betray a logical flaw; it is not 
possible to have a moral distinction between the actual and hypothetical actions without some 
other difference. On McFetridge’s analysis, the moral realist does have a problem explaining 
the combination of (XXWW), (NMA), and lack of entailment; but she has no problem explaining 
the combination of (XXWW), (XXWA), (NMA), and lack of entailment since the combination is 
ruled out by (XXWA) and (NMA) entailing the denial of lack of entailment. McFetridge’s 
conclusion is that moral realists must take strong supervenience to be the case; the effect of the 
argument is to press Blackburn to argue against strong supervenience to defend his 
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supervenience argument. I cannot identify a place where Blackburn offers an argument against 
strong supervenience.  
5.3.2.2 Avoiding B*/A Supervenience:  B*/A supervenience – necessarily if there is a 
thing which is B* and A, then anything else which is like it in being B* is like it in 
being A as well. There is no possible world in which one thing is B* and A, but other 
things are B* and not A. 
 
As noted in subsection 5.2.2, Blackburn defines B*/A supervenience as follows: 
[N]ecessarily if there is a thing which is B* and A, then anything else which is 
like it in being B* is like it in being A as well. There is no possible world in 
which one thing is B* and A, but other things are B* and not A. 
 
This feature of morality is supposed to generate a problem for moral realists given it is correct 
to assume a lack of entailment, as expressed by (W): 
There is a possible world in which something is B* and A, and there is another 
possible world in which something is B* and not A. 
 
The problem the moral realist faces is how to explain why B*/A supervenience obtains, if 
something being B* does not fix its being A. 
 Blackburn had contrasted B*/A supervenience with B*/A necessity: 
[I]n all possible worlds, if a thing is B*, it is A (Blackburn-1984, 183). 
 
Blackburn appears to assume, without argument, that weak supervenience is a feature of 
morality, but strong supervenience is not. Blackburn thinks that moral realists are committed to 
weak supervenience (B*/A supervenience), but not to strong supervenience, and this is where 
the mixed world supervenience argument gets its traction; in effect, Blackburn is demanding 
realists provide an explanation for why the weaker relation should hold if the stronger does not. 
As noted in subsection 5.3.1.2, Shafer-Landau argues that realists ought to deny (W), 
lack of entailment, and they should insist “that a duly specified set of non-moral properties 
metaphysically must give rise to a certain moral property.” But, this is simply to claim that 
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anything with certain natural properties also has certain moral properties, and that is what B*A 
necessity claims. Moral realists ought to be committed to B*/A necessity, or strong 
supervenience; and, being committed to B*/A necessity explains why realists are committed to 
B*/A supervenience since the stronger relationship implies the weaker one. 
For moral realists, at least, B*/A necessity must appear to be a much more plausible 
metaphysical claim than (W) is. B*/A necessity and (W) are contradictory; the former claims that 
being B* fixes whether something is A in all possible worlds, while the latter claims that it does 
not. Consider the following set of B properties:  a violent, non-consensual sexual act between an 
adult man and a 5 year-old girl. Such a set of B properties, has the A property of being evil, say. 
Now, B*/A supervenience is uncontroversial; wherever in this world that set of B properties is 
instantiated, the A property, evil, is also instantiated. A regrettable fact of our world is that such 
acts are not uncommon, but in all instances they are evil. B*/A necessity holds that in any 
possible world in which the B properties of being a violent, non-consensual act between an adult 
man and a 5-year old girl are instantiated, then the A property of evil is also instantiated. On the 
other hand, (W) holds that there could be two worlds which are identical in the instantiation of 
those B properties, but which are not identical in their instantiation of the A property of evil. 
Michael Ridge calls such a phenomenon “bare normative difference” (Ridge-2007, 335). Ridge 
characterizes the phenomenon as inconceivable, but from the moral realist’s perspective, it 
would seem that (W) is quite metaphysically strange, and much more controversial than B*/A 
necessity. Moral realists have better metaphysical grounds for accepting B*/A necessity than 
they do for (W). 
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5.3.2.3 Avoiding (S):  N((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃  (y)(G*y ⊃  Fy)). 
As noted in subsection 5.3.1.3, the modal argument Blackburn puts forward in “Supervenience 
Revisited” reworks the, so-called, mixed worlds argument by taking advantage of developments 
in modal logic. Here is a quick recap of the modal argument. 
Supervenience is a relation between paired domains of properties F and G (i.e., the 
moral and non-moral, respectively), such that necessarily “if something x is F, and G* underlies 
this, then anything else in the physical or natural (or whatever) state G* is F as well,” where G* 
is some specific total collection of G truths: 
(S) N ((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)). 
This kind of necessity is weaker than the following kind of necessity: 
(N) N (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx). 
Since (S) does not entail (N), Blackburn introduces the possibility that something exists that is 
G*, but not F, and a person who holds (S) may hold (P), too: 
(P) P (∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx) (Blackburn-1985, 132). 
On such a theory it is possible that whatever G state underlies a particular F state might not have 
done so. Blackburn’s point is that any theory about the domains of F and G which endorse both 
(S) and (P), or what he calls the (S)/(P) combination, generates a mystery for how the 
combination is possible – a mystery which is better solved by theories which are antirealist 
about F judgments than those that are realist. 
The previous discussion of Klagge’s and Elliot’s responses to the supervenience 
argument demonstrated that both (S) and (P) must reflect the same modality for the argument to 
generate the tension; if there is equivocation in the modality, there is no worry for the moral 
realist. So, the (S)/(P) combinations that presumably generate a problem must be (Sa)/(Pa) and 
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(Sm)/(Pm) combinations, where the subscripts of “a” and “m” refer to analytical and metaphysical 
modalities. Shafer-Landau argues that for moral realists, supervenience encompasses both the 
strong and weak form of it, which rules out the (Sm)/(Pm) combination, and Blackburn admits the 
moral realist has this option (Blackburn-1985, 136).21 Shafer-Landau points out that 
Blackburn’s response to this is to simply shift the modality of his supervenience argument to the 
analytical one, and this is the supervenience argument that Elliot addresses. 
For Blackburn, what makes a proposition analytic, or a conceptual matter, is that denying 
it, or failing to abide by it, betrays a lack of competence in moral practice which the proposition 
is about, and (Sa), 
(Sa) AN ((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)), 
possesses this quality, but not (Na), 
(Na) AN (x)(G*x ⊃ Fx). 
For the analytic supervenience argument to be in play, (Na) must be ruled out so that its 
negation, (Pa) can be combined with (Sa). Blackburn’s argument against (Na) is that (Na) implies 
there is some particular moral commitment that is constitutive of moral competence. Blackburn 
rejects this implication as implausible since it appears that two people obeying the constraints on 
moralizing can come to different conclusions given the same complete set of non-moral facts 
without one being convicted of being seriously confused, and this is because they adopt different 
standards (Blackburn-1985, 137). So, (Sa)/(Pa) combination holds that (1) it is analytically 
necessary that if something, x, is F, and x being G* underlies this, then anything else that is in 
the G* state is F, too, and (2) it is analytically possible that some other thing is G*, but not F. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Blackburn characterizes the strong form of metaphysical supervenience as (Nm) MN (x) (G*x 
⊃ Fx). Given this, and Blackburn’s characterization of (P) as P (∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx), (Pm) should be 
formalized as MP (∃x)(G*x & ∼ Fx). (Nm) and (Pm) are contradictory, so the moral realist can 
blunt the metaphysical supervenience argument by insisting on (Nm). 
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Just how such a combination can be possible is a problem for the moral realist, but not for the 
antirealist.22 
Elliot thinks that the best option for the moral realist is to deny that such a combination 
is possible, and he proposes that the realist do so by arguing that the considerations that support 
(Sa) also support another claim, (?) 
(?) N ((∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx)) ⊃ N (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy)). 
(Sa) is intra-world, or weak, supervenience, but (?) is inter-word, or strong, supervenience. So, 
Elliot, like Klagge and Shafer-Landau, addresses Blackburn’s supervenience argument by 
making the case that Blackburn’s argument does not accurately reflect the moral realist’s 
supervenience commitment. If (?) is the case, then N (y)(G*y ⊃ Fy), which is identical to (Na), 
is the case, and this rules out the possibility of the (Sa)/(Pa) combination. What distinguishes 
Elliot’s argument in the dialectic is his move to make the case that the reasons to suppose (Sa) is 
the case also back (?) being the case. 
Elliot outlines the case for (Sa) roughly as follows. The practice of moralizing, as 
Blackburn describes it, involves ranking behaviors and things, on the basis of their natural 
properties, to guide choices. If behaviors or things with identical natural properties had different 
rankings, these rankings could not serve as a guide to choosing behaviors or things because we 
would not know when to choose a behavior or thing with certain natural properties. 
Consequently, our moral practice requires that behaviors or things with the same natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 According to Blackburn, (Sa) is a constraint integrated into our moral practice because of “the 
whole purpose for which we moralize, which is to choose, commend rank, approve, or forbid 
things on the basis of their natural properties … and to guide desires and choices among the 
natural features of the world” (Blackburn-1985, 137). 
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properties be ranked the same, or (Sa).23 Elliot thinks that this same reasoning supports assigning 
the same ranking to a behavior with certain natural properties in another possible world as the 
behavior with identical natural properties in this world possesses. 
Earlier in subsection 5.3.1.3, I outlined the thought experiment that Elliot deploys to 
support his claim that the conceptual constraint on moralizing should be extended from intra-
world to inter-world contexts. Recall there that (Sa) represents a conceptual constraint on 
moralizing; an activity would not be moralizing, if it involved assigning different moral 
assessments to actions, say, with identical natural properties. A person engaging in moralizing in 
the actual world, and observing this conceptual constraint, must make the same moral 
assessment, F, of two actions who possess the identical natural properties, G*. Now, the same 
person is asked to contemplate a different possible world, one in which there is an action 
identical in its natural properties, G*; if the person is engaging in moralizing, the conceptual 
constraint of supervenience will yield a moral assessment of this action as F. She cannot assess 
it as ∼F. But, Blackburn’s (Pa) implies that it is conceptually possible for her to contemplate such 
a different possible world and assess the action as being ∼F. A person can imagine a possible 
world in which an action that is G* and ∼F, but if she is, she is no longer observing the 
conceptual constraint of (Sa), and, therefore not engaging in moralizing; but, this is not the same 
as (Pa). 
Elliot’s thought experiment indicates that however the conceptual constraint operates on 
moralizing, it supports (Sa) and (?). And, when paired with Elliot’s (E), 
(E) (∃x)(Fx & G*x & (G*x U Fx), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This is not an exact summary of the argument for (Sa) in Elliot, but I believe it accurately 
reflects its spirit (Elliot, 135). 
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(?) implies N(y)(G*y ⊃ Fy), which is ∼(Pa). The moral realist is not committed to the (Sa)/(Pa) 
combination because she is committed to (Sa) and (?), which rules out (Pa). 
Blackburn’s supervenience argument gets its force because of an apparently strange gap 
in realists’ commitments:  being committed to weak, but not strong supervenience. The realist 
responses reviewed here have been to argue that strong supervenience is a feature of moral 
realism. In section 5.4 I want to review one more possible response to the supervenience 
argument. 
5.4 Companions in Supervenience Guilt 
 Shafer-Landau outlined the companions in guilt response to Blackburn’s supervenience 
argument in his article, “Supervenience and Moral Realism,” and again in his book, Moral 
Realism:  A Defense. Shafer-Landau’s first response to the argument was to argue, to the effect, 
that moral realists are committed to a strong metaphysical supervenience, which rules out 
metaphysical lack of entailment. He noted that Blackburn has responded to this move by shifting 
the modality from metaphysical to conceptual. So, Shafer-Landau proposes that the 
supervenience claim be read as 
(S1):  if a concatenation of natural properties once underlies a moral one, then it 
must (in that world) always do so (Shafer-Landau-2003, 87). 
 
And, in addition, let us assume that (S1) is a conceptual truth. Now, the supervenience problem 
is meant to arise due to the conceptual truth of the lack of entailment thesis:  no set of natural 
properties entails the presence of any particular moral property. The difficulty in accounting for 
(S1) and lack of entailment is thought to support moral antirealism. 
Shafer-Landau points out that (S1) can be generalized to describe the relation of 
supervening and subvening properties in other domains (Shafer-Landau-2003, 87). A general 
statement of supervenience might be expressed as follows: 
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(GS):  if a class of base properties subserves a distinct property, once it has done 
so, it must (in that world) always do so. 
 
(GS) is a conceptual truth, if (S1) is a conceptual truth. So, for a number of connections between 
domains, the relationship is supervenience:  the mental supervenes on the physical and the 
chemical on the atomic (Shafer-Landua-2003, 87), or the image on a computer screen supervenes 
on a binary code. Shafer-Landau points out that there do not appear to be any entailment 
relations linking the physical to the mental, the atomic to the chemical, or the computer screen 
images to binary code.24 So, for these domain pairings, we also have a lack of entailment thesis 
(Shaefer-Landau-2003, 87). But, if (GS) is a conceptual truth about the relationship between the 
mental-physical, chemical-atomic, and screen image-binary code, and there is no entailment 
between the domains, then the mental, chemical, and screen image are not real, and best 
explained by projectivism. A consequence of Blackburn’s supervenience argument is that if it 
is correct, then we should conclude that a vast number of domains beyond just the three 
described are not real; this implication seems dubious, to say the least, which suggests that 
Blackburn’s supervenience argument does not prove what he claims. 
 Shafer-Landau notes that Blackburn devotes the third section of “Supervenience 
Revisited” to stopping the expansion of his supervenience argument (Shafer-Landau-1994, 151). 
Blackburn recognizes, like his commentators, that for the argument to work the supervenience 
claim and the lack of entailment thesis must be in the same modality, so his response to 
supervenience creep is to argue that when it comes to these other relations, they do not have the 
same modality. Blackburn’s approach for addressing the mental-physical and chemical-atomic 
supervenience problem is the same. When it comes to the metaphysical supervenience of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 That there is no conceptual truth entailing the computer screen image from binary code is 
probably the most unassailable claim, but the other two non-entailments seem to hold, too. 
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mental on the physical Blackburn accepts that the mental realist should accept strong 
metaphysical supervenience, which rules out the metaphysical lack of entailment. But, 
Blackburn denies that the mental realist is committed to conceptual, or analytic, supervenience 
of the mental on the physical. He argues that “it is [not] constitutive of competence in the mental 
language that we recognize the supervenience of the mental on the physical” and it does not 
follow analytically “from change in a mental state that there is change in an underlying physical 
state” (Blackburn-1985, 139). 
 Shafer-Landau argues that in this defense Blackburn mischaracterizes the supervenience 
claim (Shafer-Landua-1994, 152). Intentional or not, Blackburn has oversold the supervenience 
claim in this defense. His characterization of the supervenience claim here amounts to the claim 
that a distinct property supervenes on the base property. That is not a conceptual truth because 
some people do deny that mental supervenes on the physical, or that the moral supervenes on the 
natural (Divine Command Theorists). But, the supervenience claim is that necessarily if 
something has some base properties, and it also possesses a distinct property that it possess in 
virtue of having those base properties, then anything else with the same base properties also has 
the distinct property (Shafer-Landau-1994, 152). That supervenience claim is a conceptual truth, 
and so Blackburn cannot block the creep of antirealism that his supervenience argument 
generates. 
5.5 Chapter Conclusion 
The supervenience argument is meant to provide a rationale for projectivism that is 
independent of the open-question argument and the early moves to moral antirealism. But, in 
this chapter I have argued that the supervenience argument is not the problem for moral 
realism that Blackburn assumes, and, consequently, projectivism does not possess the prima 
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facie metaphysical advantage over moral realism that Blackburn claims. In chapter 6 I will 
argue that the account of projectivism I developed in chapter 4 faces challenges that indicate we 
should doubt that it is the metaphysics of moralizing.
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Chapter 6:  The Problems of Projectivism 
 
6.1 Projectivism’s Problems 
In chapter 5 I critiqued the supervenience argument, which constitutes Blackburn’s 
metaphysical case against moral realism, and found that it does not provide moral antirealism 
a metaphysical advantage over realism. This is significant since without the supervenience 
argument the only prima facie metaphysical plausibility antirealism enjoys over moral realism 
is ontological economy, but ontological economy should only count in a theory’s favor when a 
rival theory is its equal in explaining the data. Moral realism has a semantic advantage over its 
rival; it has a better explanation of the semantic data of moral practice than antirealism, and 
since this advantage is not cancelled out by the supervenience argument, the apparent 
ontological economy of antirealism cannot count decisively in its favor.1 In chapter 4 I outlined 
what I take to be the mechanism that constitutes a projectivist account of moral awareness. In 
the rest of this essay, I will examine whether such an account is independently plausible. 
Ultimately, I hope to show that (a) Blackburn’s development of projectivism is not motivated by 
good naturalistic practices, the scientific method; (b) projectivism cannot identify which attitude 
is the moral attitude; (c) projectivism cannot provide an objective moral standard; (d) 
projectivism cannot provide a mind-independent moral standard; (e) projectivism does not have 
the resources to explain why error theory is wrong without undermining itself.2 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 One may wonder about the epistemological comparison between moral realism and different 
moral antirealism. I will not assess the epistemological advantages or disadvantages of the two 
kinds of theories since they don’t bear the same epistemological burdens. 
2 The first four problems for projectivism are significant in so far as Blackburn wants 
projectivism to address them, and they are examined in this chapter. I will address problem (e) in 
the conclusion of this essay. 
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6.2 A Naturalistic Motivation for Projectivism? 
Blackburn wants an account of moralizing that squares with naturalism (Blackburn-1998, 49 
and Blackburn-1984, 182). Given this, his theorizing about moralizing should hew to good 
naturalistic practices, or the scientific method. The supervenience argument against moral 
realism can be interpreted this way; it identifies an aspect of moral practice that needs to be 
explained, and then claims that moral antirealism is a better account of moral practice than 
moral realism since it can explain the phenomenon, and moral realism cannot. I have already 
argued that the supervenience argument does not undermine moral realism. The upshot of this 
is that Blackburn needs a new motivation for moral antirealism, since, after all, Blackburn 
admits in Spreading the Word that he needs to provide “motives” for starting projectivism at 
reasonable odds to its rivals (Blackburn-1984, 182). Two of those motives were economy and 
supervenience, leaving Blackburn with internalism to motivate moral antirealism. Blackburn is 
sheepish about this argument, admitting that it “is not quite as compelling as it looks” given 
moral realists like Philippa Foot’s insistence that “there is no straight inference from moral 
commitment to desire” (Blackburn-1984, 188-189). 
6.2.1 Blackburn’s Naturalistic Motivation for Projectivism 
Blackburn claims that that the first step in developing a projectivist account of morality is 
identifying the kind of mental state that is expressed by a moral judgment so that it can be 
contrasted with belief (Blackburn-1993, 9). Blackburn is aware that critics will claim that the 
propositional form with which we voice a mental state is inextricably linked to the nature of the 
mental state, and the fact that a moral proposition has a propositional form that is descriptive is 
evidence that the mental state it expresses is belief (Blackburn-1993, 9). Blackburn does not try 
to make the case that moral judgments are evidence that the moral mental states are attitudes, and 
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not beliefs.3 Instead, he proposes that a Humean, like himself, is in the game if he can distinguish 
the finished project of moral judgment from its beginning, and show that moral judgment “is 
visibly the upshot of a natural process of … projecting … non-representational states” 
(Blackburn-1993, 9). 
But, without the motivation of economy, supervenience, or internalism, why should 
Blackburn hypothesize that moral mental states are not beliefs? Blackburn’s proposal that moral 
judgments are the output of a projectivist mechanism, which originates in a mental state that is 
conative, appears to be unscientific idle speculation. Blackburn’s attempt to motivate 
projectivism implicitly invokes speculation when he proposes that in assessing the theory "let us 
suppose that the picture is correct. Then how far can it go to capture the elements in our thinking 
which at first sight seem explicable only on a realist metaphysic” (Blackburn-1981, 174)? 
Another example in which his development of projectivism appears speculative is when rejects 
inferring that moral propositions have no truth conditions from the assumption that they express 
attitudes, preferring, rather, that if we interpret a moral proposition as expressing an attitude and 
see it as having no truth-conditions, the philosophy improves, so the proposition must not be 
descriptive (Blackburn-1984, 170).4 This motivation is inadequate; it is as if idle curiosity 
generates projectivism. 
The charge that projectivism is unmotivated is perhaps unfair since there is a way of 
motivating it open to Blackburn. Recall, that the general outline of projectivism in chapter 4 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In fact, there is textual evidence in Blackburn to indicate that he may not see this as a necessary 
at all — he thinks it is incredibly difficult to define mental states (Blackburn-1998, 52).	  
4 Blackburn does not make the same explicit claim in “The Flight to Reality”, but there he 
describes the projectivist project as describing the socially embedded attitudes that constitute 
ethics, and seeing how moral propositions are to be understood if they are thought to express 
attitudes (Blackburn-1995, 50). In both cases, Blackburn seems to indicate that projectivism is 
spawned by conjecture. 
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does not claim that motivating projectivism requires the falsification of a realist theory. Instead, 
the impetus for developing projectivism is an inability to provide an account of our 
commitments in a particular domain in which the elements of the domain are real. The 
phenomenology that gives rise to the commitments suggests realism, but realist explanations are 
unsuccessful or unsatisfactory for some reason. A more judicious claim is that the data, which 
moralizing alone provides, is not a sufficient basis on which to develop the projective 
hypothesis, and Blackburn needs to motivate projectivism by pointing out the ways in which 
realism is unsatisfactory. 
However, Blackburn seems to indicate that reflection on moralizing alone is enough to 
suggest why we should theorize about it in a way that puts attitudes in the center of our theory:  
“The question becomes whether … it is the notion of an attitude or that of a belief that gains the 
central role. When we try to think intelligently about ethics as an aspect of life, do we need to 
think first in terms of belief in virtue, duty, and so on (call this representationalism), or do we 
need to think first in terms of certain kinds of pressure on action” (Blackburn-1995, 50)?5 
Blackburn claims that upon reflection, ethics is “more a matter of knowing how (to behave), or 
knowing whom (to defer to, or punish, or admire), or knowing when (to act, or withdraw), than a 
matter of knowing that something is the case” (Blackburn-1998, 49). It is not clear how 
reflecting on morality and interpreting it as knowing how/whom/when rather than knowing that is 
supposed to spur the insight that morality is not cognitive especially since there are examples 
that suggest that morality, at least sometimes, seems to be knowing that.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Blackburn’s supervenience argument might be his attempt to indicate that a realist account of 
the moral domain is unsatisfactory, thereby motivating projectivism. I think the supervenience 
argument is meant to have more force than to indicate there could be a better explanation of the 
moral than realism; it is meant to suggest that realism is false. In addition, those advancing the 
argument need to have projectivism in mind already since it is supposed to gain plausibility by 
its consistency with supervenience. 
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Another example where Blackburn indicates reflection on ethics is supposed to be 
sufficient to suggest a non-cognitive interpretation of ethical thought is his assertion that valuing 
is not the same as describing. The mental state of a person who values something is distinct from 
belief, and Blackburn claims this valuing is the essential phenomenon of ethics, and 
projectivism reflects this insight because it is a theory that explains how ethical thought 
functions (Blackburn-1998, 49). None of this does anything to suggest that those mental states of 
valuing are non-cognitive or conative states.6 A naturalistic moral realist could agree that 
valuing is the essential phenomenon of ethics, but he would argue that the right way to 
understand this phenomenon is as at heart a cognitive reaction to natural features of the world, 
similar to assessing the weight of an object. And the fact that our moral judgments typically take 
a descriptivist propositional form supports that these are cognitive activities yielding belief. 
Blackburn’s argument seems to depend on interpreting valuing as a mental state that is conative, 
but this is exactly what is in question in the stand off between projectivists and moral realists. 
If Blackburn says that we can develop the hypothesis of projectivism from the fact that we 
moralize, then he seems to be begging the question; there needs to be some reason to think that 
moral mental states are non-cognitive. 
6.2.2 Values as More Stable than Beliefs 
Blackburn obliquely makes the case for why a moral mental state, such as valuing, is conative 
when he offers a basis for identifying the distinctive conative state of valuing. A distinctive 
mark of valuing, which supposedly distinguishes it from other conative states like desiring, is 
that a person resists the destabilization of her values (Blackburn-1998, 67). On Blackburn’s view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In fact, this reflection invites the Euthyphro question:  do we value things because they are 
valuable, or are they valuable because we value them? The first answer suggests realism, while 
the second answer implies value is mind-dependent, an outcome Blackburn wants to avoid, as we 
shall see.	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moral mental states are mental states that a person is reluctant to alter. As Blackburn puts it, if 
we imagine the general scope of a person’s concerns, her values are those concerns she is 
concerned to preserve (Blackburn-1998, 67). To value something is “to have a relatively stable 
disposition to conduct practical life … in a particular way:  it is to be … set in that way, and 
notably set against change in this respect” (Blackburn-1998, 67, italics original). Blackburn’s 
claim is that valuing is like other conative states, but it is peculiarly resistant to change. 
Blackburn is, again, assuming that the moral mental state identified as valuing is a 
conative one. While Blackburn does not establish that the kind of mental state that concern is, is 
conative, I grant that it is likely to be a conative one. There are two problems with this analysis. 
First, Blackburn’s analysis of value does not illuminate anything; he may as well define value as 
“a desire one desires to preserve”, or concern as “a value one values preserving.” This analysis 
makes value into a conative state that a person subjects to a (the same) conative state; this does 
not clarify the nature of the moral mental state of valuing – it only contributes mystery. A second 
problem for this analysis is that it cannot be used to distinguish moral mental states from other 
beliefs. One feature of a belief is that we are resistant to changing it without sufficient evidence, 
and the standard for altering a moral mental state requires the most evidence.7 In fact, one could 
argue that if what is distinctive about valuing is its resistance to change, then valuing is more 
likely to be a form of belief since, prima facie, beliefs are less susceptible to change than desires, 
which are subjective.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Even when there is evidence, we may not wish to change the belief; e.g., consider those people 
who believe that the earth is flat despite evidence that it is spherical. 
8 The metaphor of description of fit used to distinguish belief and desire may be used to 
undermine the prima facie presumption that belief is less susceptible to change. If belief is 
expected to match reality, and reality is to be made to match desire, this might suggest that belief 
is the more fungible mental state since it is the one expected to change more readily than desire. 
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6.2.3 Instability in Values:  Converts and Changing Values  
Ultimately, I think Blackburn’s analysis of value as a distinctive mental state that we are 
reluctant to change undermines his claim that moral mental states are conative in two ways.  
First, the importance of the endurance, or persistence, of moral commitments in his analysis 
precludes genuine transformation of values. Blackburn argues that a moral mental state, which is 
supposed to be a conative state, must be enduring for it to be a value; he argues that a person 
who manifests different values tomorrow than today “is not someone who has many values albeit 
for a short time each, but someone who has no real values at all” (Blackburn-1998, 67).9 While 
this insight into value is undeniable, the emphasis on persistence cannot be squared with the 
phenomenon of the sincere moral convert. Blackburn admits that values can change, but he 
claims with values this shift can only occur over time with allowances for lapses in the shift 
(Blackburn-1998, 67). This allowance coincides with our sense that the initial values a person 
develops are inculcated over time. But, there are examples of converts whose values change 
dramatically and quickly. Blackburn derides the values of such converts as “off-color” 
(Blackburn-1998, 67). This is a flippant objection. Moral evaluation and aesthetic evaluation are 
often compared because the latter seems particularly suitable for an antirealist interpretation 
despite its descriptivist form; it would be a mistake to insist that a person whose aesthetic 
evaluations shift quickly and dramatically after taking an art course had no aesthetic values to 
begin with.10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
After all, there would be something perverse about a moral crusader who changed his desires 
because reality was resistant to change. 
9 In a comment to a draft of this dissertation, Stefan Baumrin remarked on the irony of this 
statement by asking, “What could this possibly mean for [Blackburn]?”	  
10 Stefan Baumrin raised this example in comments to a draft of this work. 
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The only way Blackburn can preserve his analysis of values as conative states we are 
reluctant to alter is to dismiss the values of converts. But, there are cases of genuine converts 
whose values change dramatically. Saint Paul went from endorsing killing Christian apostles to 
becoming a martyr. And, many converts to Islam come to judge drinking alcohol as immoral. An 
objection to these examples is that they are the product of religious conversion. I think they still 
stand as examples of moral conversion because the religious conversion represents a change in 
belief, which spurs the change in values, but here is another example. When I was a freshman in 
high school, I believed the beneficiaries of the social welfare programs instituted in Presidents 
Roosevelt and Johnson’s New Deal and Great Society, respectively, to be lazy malingerers 
chronically relying on “welfare.” Consequently, I judged them to be undeserving of public 
assistance, and morally opposed such programs. As a sophomore in the debate society, I was 
assigned to research the demographics of public assistance programs, and the statistics led to an 
immediate change in my moral judgment about such programs. I went one morning from the 
commitment that such programs were unjust, to the opposite commitment, which seems 
attributable to acquiring new beliefs. This example, like the religious examples, highlights the 
role that change in belief has with respect to change in value, and identifying values with beliefs 
appears better suited to explaining these sudden change in values. Blackburn’s analysis of moral 
mental states as persistent conative states cannot offer the same explanation for moral 
conversion, and must, implausibly, deny the sincerity of all moral conversion. This is the first 
way that the analysis undermines itself. 
The second, and perhaps more damaging, way the analysis undermines itself is by this 
countenance of moral judgments changing. Obviously, Blackburn cannot deny that moral 
judgments can, and do, change, but he does not have a ready explanation of why or how 
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conative states should change. If a moral judgment is a belief, then it should change along with 
changes in facts or beliefs relevant to it. And, the change in moral judgment should be consistent 
with the change in belief. So, for example, a person may hold the moral judgment that it is wrong 
to injure human beings, but not non-human animals, and he should change this judgment if he 
learns that some non-human animals feel pain (provided the moral judgment, “Injuring human 
beings’ wrongness is due to the pain”). But, I cannot see prima face how Blackburn could insist 
that the moral judgment must change in the same way, if it is not a belief; mental states that are 
not beliefs appear to be arbitrarily variable, and moral judgments are not, and should not be, 
arbitrarily variable. In section 6.5 I will examine Blackburn’s attempt to impose some sort of 
objectivity on moral mental states. Without an explanation of what moral conative states should 
be sensitive to in order to change, Blackburn’s analysis of valuing as a conative state resistant, 
but still liable, to change is undermined. 
The analysis of Blackburn’s attempt to identify valuing as a conative state indicates that 
reflection on moral activity is not sufficient to generate a hypothesis of projectivism. I think this 
counts against projectivism when trying to assess the rival theories of realism and 
projectivism; because the development of realism is sensitive to the data of moralizing it 
comports with our best scientific practice. Ultimately, a key task for Blackburn in developing a 
projectivist theory of moralizing will be to explain why it is consistent with good scientific 
practice to develop the projectivist hypothesis from the data of moralizing, i.e., moral practice.  
6.3 The Moral Attitude Problem 
In the last section I argued that Blackburn’s proposal of projectivism to explain morality runs 
afoul of good naturalistic practice because it is motivated neither by the falsification of realism 
nor reflection on moral practice. In considering the latter possibility I noted that Blackburn tries 
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to motivate the possibility that moral judgments are conative or non-cognitive mental states by 
distinguishing them from other conative states as being peculiarly resistant to destabilization. 
This move highlights that if a moral mental state, or value, is to be identified as conative or non-
cognitive, then it cannot be just any conative or non-cognitive state – it must be a particular one. 
The need to identify a form of conative or non-cognitive state that moral judgments express is 
also put into relief by the variability in the terms we have seen Blackburn use to characterize it:  
desire, attitude, disposition, concern, etc. And, even if we could hone in on one mental state, it 
could take many forms, e.g., revulsion; it is important not to underestimate the difficulty of 
identifying the unique conative or non-cognitive state that is expressed in a moral judgment.11 
6.3.1 Early Expressivism and the Moral Attitude Problem 
In An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Miller initially raises the moral attitude problem 
against early expressivism, a species of non-cognitivism, which essentially claims “moral 
judgments do not express beliefs, but rather non-cognitive sentiments, emotions, or feelings” 
(Miller, 43). Since early versions of expressivism try to account for the meaning of moral 
propositions in terms of the mental states they express, and it claims that the mental states are 
non-cognitive, it must be able to specify which kind of non-cognitive state – sentiment, 
emotion, or feeling – is the moral one, or it will not account for the meaning of moral 
propositions. The challenge for early forms of expressivism like emotivism is to identify the 
distinctive moral sentiment or feeling which is suited to being expressed in moral judgments, and 
Miller suggests two possibilities:  (a) the moral sentiment is irreducibly moral, simply 
unanalysable and sui generis; (b) the moral sentiment is analyzable in term of non-moral 
sentiments (Miller, 44).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Stefan Baumrin brought the point that different examples of a single mental state may take 
different, unique forms to my attention. 
	   222	  
Option (a) will not do for two reasons. First, if a moral judgment expresses an irreducible, 
sui generis, unanalysable moral feeling, then option (a) blocks an account of moral judgment in 
terms of regular feelings, which is just what early expressivists want (Miller, 44). Second, Miller 
points out that Wright has criticized option (a) because careful attention to our moral experience 
does not establish that moral judgment has a distinctive irreducible, sui generis, unanalysable 
feeling – different people are likely to disagree over whether it does (Miller, 45). He quotes 
Wright:  “[I]t seems to me very moot whether there is … any distinctive mode of moral 
emotional concern, identified purely phenomenologically and distinguished from what we feel 
for other kinds of value” (Miller, 45; in Wright-1988, 11-12, italics original).12 Drawing upon 
Wright, Miller considers that an irreducible moral sentiment can be made intelligible 
independent of moral judgment in the example of a child who is not able to make moral 
judgments, but still has a distinctive moral feeling (Miller, 45). Miller cites Wright to offer a 
rebuttal:  it is underdetermined whether a child’s distress upon witnessing a jockey whip a 
racehorse is a moral disapprobation since the child’s distress could be fear or anxiety (Miller, 45-
46; Wright-1988, 12-13). 
If it is not possible to identify, or make intelligible, a distinctive moral feeling, then early 
expressivists must take option (b) and understand moral judgments as expressing non-moral, 
garden-variety feeling. This option can be criticized on two fronts, too. First, taking this option 
appears to eliminate moral judgment altogether. If moral judgments just express garden-variety 
feeling, then all judgments seem to be of the same kind, there is no judgment that is distinctively 
moral (Miller, 46). My judgments about Jerry Sandusky’s actions (wicked) and the novel Fifty 
Shades of Grey (trash) are the same kind of judgment; they may differ in intensity, but they are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 It is interesting to note that Wright takes the opposite line of Blackburn that reflection on 
moral experience suggests that moral judgment has a particular feel. 
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the same qualitatively (Miller, 46). This effectively eliminates the category of the moral, when 
the non-cognitivist is seeking to explain the moral.13  
The second problem with option (b) is that it can be rebutted with an open-question style 
argument:  If we suppose that moral judgments are analytically equivalent to expressions of non-
cognitive sentiment, then the proposition, “Paul judged Sandusky’s actions as wicked,” is 
analytically equivalent to “Paul expressed a negative non-cognitive feeling for Sandusky’s 
actions”; anybody who wonders, “Paul expressed a negative non-cognitive feeling for 
Sandusky’s actions, but did he judge Sandusky’s actions wicked,” would betray conceptual 
confusion; but it is an open-question whether a person who expresses a non-cognitive feeling for 
an action makes a moral judgment about the action (since to say he does always make a moral 
judgment has the opposite effect of eliminating moral judgment – it turns all expressions of 
feeling into moral judgments, which would be proving too much); so, moral judgments cannot be 
analytically equivalent to expressions of non-cognitive feeling (Miller, 48).14 If the open-
question argument’s refutation of non-naturalistic moral realism is presumed to open the way 
for non-cognitivism, its application to non-cognitivism must equally count against non-
cognitivism. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Miller points out that an early expressivist like an emotivist could still try to carve out space 
for moral judgments as a distinctive expression of feeling by distinguishing the particular reasons 
for the expression of feeling to mark out moral judgments. However, Miller points out, as we 
have seen in chapter 2, that emotivists often support their account by pointing the ways in which 
the purest moral arguments cannot be resolved by appeals to reasons. 
14 Miller also provides a variation on this open-question argument, derived from Darwall, 
Gibbard, and Railton (1992) that applies to Stevenson’s version of emotivism in which a moral 
judgment expresses an expectation that others share the non-cognitive feeling it expresses (49-
51).	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6.3.2 Projectivism and the Moral Attitude Problem 
The moral attitude problem needs to be recast when applied to Blackburn’s projectivism since 
he does not want to characterize moral judgments as expressing a non-cognitive feeling; rather 
projectivists can earn the right to use descriptivist language on the basis of a theory that puts a 
non-cognitive mental state at the center of the story. Miller frames the challenge for Blackburn as 
giving “a characterization of the type of attitude assumed, ab initio, to be expressed by moral 
judgments” (Miller, 88). In discussing Blackburn’s attempt to motivate projectivism simply by 
reflecting on moral experience, I already identified one way Blackburn tries to distinguish moral 
non-cognitive states from mere non-cognitive states – a value is a concern a person is concerned 
to preserve. Earlier in Ruling Passions, Blackburn has another proposal besides that one. 
Only a few pages into Ruling Passions Blackburn proposes to analyze a mental state that 
is involved in a moral reaction, a moral judgment (Blackburn-1988, 9). Blackburn considers a 
judgment of a moral transgression, and he takes its public nature to point in the right direction for 
an analysis. Blackburn proposes that we think of non-cognitive states occupying steps on a 
staircase of “practical or emotional ascent” (Blackburn-1998, 9). At the base of this staircase are 
“idiosyncratic likes and dislikes”, tastes, e.g., but higher up the staircase are more insistent non-
cognitive states like a “hostility to some kind of action” which is “a primitive aversion to it or a 
disposition to be disgusted by it” (Blackburn-1998, 10, 9). Further up the staircase are reactions 
to these reactions; if a person has a reaction to some behavior, a second person can have a 
reaction to that reaction. On the one hand, the second person may be peeved with the first 
person’s reaction, and express that the behavior is not the first person’s business; this reaction is 
not a moral reaction (Blackburn-1998, 9). On the other hand the second person may share or 
“feel ‘at one’” with the first person’s reaction; but Blackburn supposes that the reactions may not 
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stop there, and the second person may feel strongly about encouraging the same reaction in 
others (Blackburn-1998, 9). In this last case, Blackburn claims the second person would be 
treating the behavior that precipitated all these reaction as a public matter, i.e., a moral issue, and 
this last reaction is a moral one (Blackburn-1998, 9). Blackburn proposes that further up this 
staircase there could be reactions such that sharing the reaction is compulsory, felt as hostility to 
those who do not share it, and so on, so that this reaction is compulsory, felt as hostility to those 
who share the reaction, but are not hostile to those who do not (Blackburn-1998, 9). He 
concludes:  “The staircase gives us a scale between pure preference, on the one hand, and 
attitudes with all the flavour of ethical commitment, on the other” (Blackburn-1998, 9). 
The metaphor of the scale is either unfortunate or it reveals plainly that what 
distinguishes moral non-cognitive states from non-moral ones is the intensity with which we 
experience them. If this is what distinguishes them, then Blackburn’s analysis of moral non-
cognitive states in terms of emotional ascent is clearly subject to the first objection to option (b), 
the moral sentiment is analyzable in term of non-moral sentiments, as well. The non-cognitive 
states expressed by moral judgments are just emotions then, only further up a scale of emotional 
intensity, but one in which the emotions are qualitatively indistinct. As I already pointed out this 
eliminates moral judgment all together.  
Suppose the metaphor of the scale is just an unfortunate mistake, and the emotional 
ascent reflects a shift in complexity that distinguishes moral non-cognitive states from non-moral 
ones.15 Miller brings back the “boo” and “hooray” operators to characterize these non-cognitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Blackburn is maddeningly enigmatic about the nature of the non-cognitive states that play a 
role in moral judgment. He writes, “While I think there is no doubt about the central ethical role 
of disgust, anger, and contempt, it is easy to oversimplify the reactions involved. Ethics is not 
always emotions:  a prohibition or permission can be issued in a perfectly clinical frame of mind. 
… Rather, ethics involves the full dynamic range of our practical natures. … As Gilbert Ryle put 
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states (Miller, 89). So, at the base of the staircase are the simple idiosyncratic likes and dislikes:  
e.g., H!(ice cream) and B!(Fifty Shades of Grey). The first reaction Blackburn identified as moral 
might be represented as the following combination (if the behavior was an intentional killing):  
B!(intentional killing) and H!(everyone having the attitude B!(intentional killing)). Miller points 
out that this will not do since it would not provide a way to distinguish between aesthetic 
judgments or tastes; consider that I might have this combination of non-cognitive states: B!(Fifty 
Shades of Grey) and B!(anyone who has the attitude H!(Fifty Shades of Grey)). Instead, what is 
potentially needed is a complex non-cognitive state, represented by B!M(intentional killing), in 
which the subscript “M” represents that a complex non-cognitive state is taken to be a moral 
mental state:  B!M(intentional killing) = B!(intentional killing) & H!(everyone having the attitude 
B!(intentional killing)) (Miller, 89).16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it, ethics involves the ‘tempers, habits, dispositions, moods, inclinations, impulses, sentiments, 
feelings, affections, thoughts, reflections, opinions, principles, prejudices, imaginations and 
fancies’” (Blackburn-1998, 13). Blackburn might be interpreted here to be conceding to 
complexity of ethics by identifying several kinds of non-cognitive states, each of which has its 
own staircase of emotional ascent. This concession raises all sorts of problems for the 
complexity of the metaphysics of projectivism that I outlined in chapter 4. But, Blackburn may 
also be interpreted here to be suggesting the kind complexity of moral attitudes reflected by 
Miller’s approach; the moral attitude may have a different feel, dispassionate, say, then the anger 
that is part of the complex combination of which the moral attitude is composed.   
16 I want to interrupt here to raise a preliminary criticism to this approach. The B! and H! 
operators do not specify which non-cognitive state they represent, only that it would be a 
negative and positive one, respectively. In footnote 15 I quoted Blackburn citing, with approval, 
Ryle’s characterization of the variety of mental states that are a part of ethics; included there 
were such mental states as moods and fancies. The promiscuous inclusion of these kinds of non-
cognitive states in an account of moral mental states points to a shortcoming of Blackburn’s case 
for projectivism. Prima facie, some kinds of non-cognitive mental states are not appropriate to 
ground moral judgments, fancies or moods, for example (even when the fancy is a complex 
combination of fancies and moods). A plausible projectivist account of morality, which roots 
moral judgment in non-cognitive responses, must rule out some non-cognitivist responses as 
candidates for that base. A theory that did this, and supplied criteria for which non-cognitivist 
responses can be at the heart of understanding moral judgment, would go a long way in 
explaining moral practice. Blackburn seems oblivious to this requirement.	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Miller points out that this cannot be the correct analysis of the moral judgment since on a 
non-cognitivist account my moral judgment about intentional killing expresses a negative non-
cognitive state toward intentional killing and it expresses my approval of everyone else sharing 
the same type of non-cognitive state (Miller, 89). If the non-cognitive state, (B!(intentional 
killing)), that everyone else has, and which I approve of, is disgust at the mess of a intentional 
killing, that would not do to express my moral judgment. Miller proposes that this can be 
corrected by refining the formulation as follows:  B!M(intentional killing) = B!(intentional 
killing) & H!(everyone having the attitude B!M(intentional killing)). The problem with this is that 
the explanation of the moral judgment is circular since it includes a reference to moral judgment 
in its explanation; and, since any attempt to define the “B!M(intentional killing)” inside the 
parentheses will repeat the circularity, emotional ascent cannot provide an account of moral 
judgment (Miller, 89). 
As I noted in subsection 6.2.2, Blackburn identifies a concern a person is concerned to 
preserve as a potential candidate for a moral non-cognitive state (Blackburn-1998, 67). Miller 
calls this the “stable sentiment” analysis of moral non-cognitive states (Miller, 89). The 
following is an interpretation of Miller’s formalization of a moral judgment endorsing giving to 
others:   
H!M(giving to others) = (H!(giving to others) & H!(stable [H!(giving to others)])).17 
Miller claims there is a conceptual connection between making a moral judgment and expecting 
others to share the non-cognitive state toward the object of the judgment, but it is possible to 
imagine a competent speaker who hears Jones judge, “Giving to others is good,” or “H!M(giving 
to others),” and still wonders whether Jones expects him to share  in the non-cognitive state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The form of this analysis for positive and negative moral judgments are, respectively as 
follows:  H!M(x) = (H!(x) & H!(stable [H!(x)])); B!M(x) = (B!(x) & H!(stable [B!(x)])). 
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H!(x) (Miller-90-91).18 Miller concludes that since the meaning of H!M(giving to others) does not 
respect this conceptual connection, it cannot be the correct analysis of moral judgment (Miller, 
91).19 
6.3.3 Smith and the Moral Attitude Problem 
Miller suggests that if the stable-sentiment analysis of moral attitudes is unsuccessful, then an 
analysis of moral judgment in terms of higher-order sentiments may succeed, though he is 
explicit in not attributing the view to Blackburn (Miller, 91, 293). In a review of Ruling 
Passions, Michael Smith seems to have little reservation in interpreting Blackburn’s analysis as a 
higher-order one when he compares the desires and aversions Blackburn picks out as the non-
cognitive states expressed in moral judgment to the “addict’s desire to take drugs” (Smith-2002, 
157). The essential non-cognitivist claim is that moral judgments express desires and aversions, 
but Smith wonders which ones. Answering this question is more difficult than typically supposed 
because both it must not be the case that when we express any old desire or aversion, we express 
a moral judgment, and when we do express moral judgments, we must express desires and 
aversions (Smith-2002, 157). So, the challenge for Blackburn is to explain (i) what aversions and 
desires are particularly suitable for expression in a moral judgment, and why, and (ii) how are 
such desires and aversions distinct from those unsuitable for expression in a moral judgment 
(Smith-2002, 157).20 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 This argument is like the one I noted Miller had for Stevenson’s version of emotivism. It 
depends crucially on an association between internalism and non-cognitivism. 
19 Miller points out that this analysis is subject to the same charge of circularity as the emotional 
ascent analysis; the non-cognitive state that the moral agent wishes to remain stable must be a 
moral one. The proper formalization of a positive moral judgment is not as represented in 
footnote 17; it is as follows: H!M(x) = (H!(x) & H!(stable [HM!(x)])). Now, this analysis also 
offers a definition of moral judgment that appeals to the moral.	  
20 Smith raised the same challenge for non-cognitivists in a general way in the fourth section of 
his earlier work, “Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics” (2001). I 
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Smith explains that this question is difficult to answer because whatever mental state a 
moral judgment expresses, this mental state has some of the functional features of beliefs, and 
desires and aversions are typically distinguished from beliefs on the basis of their difference in 
these functional features (Smith-2002, 158). A belief’s function is to represent how things are, 
and it does this (partially) by being pre-connected to other beliefs and perceptions, which provide 
epistemic support, and without which the belief should disappear (Smith-2002, 158). A desire’s 
function is to represent how things are to be, or how things should be; it is not pre-connected to 
other desires, which provide it with some equivalent of epistemic support (Smith-2002, 158). A 
desire is connected to beliefs about how to fulfill the desire, and with which it would produce 
action; when these beliefs are not present, the desire does not disappear, but it remains dormant 
(Smitth-2002, 158). Internalism provides some of the motivation for thinking that the mental 
states expressed by moral judgments are desires – a person who says, “Giving to others is 
moral,” seems disposed to share, just as a person with some desire seems disposed to act. 
However, whatever mental state this person is in, it is pre-connected to other mental states that 
provide support for it; moral judgments are in need of justification, much in the same way that 
mental states that are obviously beliefs need justification, and this is an important reason for 
thinking moral judgments are beliefs (Smith-2002, 158). The difficulty, then, for Blackburn is to 
identify non-cognitive states that have the same functional features of belief, a cognitive state, in 
being connected to other desires and aversions, which provide them with the equivalent of 
epistemic support (Smith-2002, 159).21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
will focus on the case he makes against Ruling Passions’ analysis in his contribution to a series 
of reviews on Ruling Passions in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research in 2002. 
21 The example of an addict highlights the difficulty of this. An addict has a desire for a drug, 
and this desire is nested among many others:  desire for the pleasure of the high; desire for easing 
withdrawal symptoms; desire for the emotional or intellectual insight of the high. And, yet 
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Smith points out that there can be a nexus of connections among desires, which provides 
the equivalent of epistemic support for a desire. Desires and aversions are responsive to 
information; e.g., a high-school baseball player who desires to dip tobacco (like his professional 
idols), but does not know what dip tastes like, is open to the criticism that his desire would go 
away with using dip. Desires and aversions are also expected to fit together in roughly coherent 
ways, so that if a desire undermines the coherence of a set of desires, it is subject to criticism; 
consider a person who wishes to improve their physical fitness, but also does not want to 
exercise. Smith claims it is not implausible to suppose that a desire or aversion can have a 
functional feature of being connected to other desires and aversions in an equivalent to epistemic 
support, but when Blackburn tries to explain “the special nature of the desires and aversions that 
we express when we make normative claims,” he must stipulate they are part of a nexus of 
informed, coherent, and unified desires and aversions (Smith-2002, 159).22 If Blackburn cannot 
do this, then whatever desires or aversions are supposed to be expressed in moral judgment 
cannot be the mental state expressed in moral judgment. 
 Smith quotes extensively from the passages on pages 9 (which I quoted earlier in 
subsection 6.3.2) and 67 of Ruling Passions, and he interprets these passages as offering a 
higher-order analysis of moral judgment; he writes, “Blackburn thus clearly thinks that he made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
desires are mental states that can be independent of this nexus, so that even though all the other 
desires support the desire for the drug, it is possible for the addict not to desire the desire for the 
drug (Smtih-2002, 159). 
22 “[A] set of desires and aversions is ‘sufficiently’ informed and coherent and unified … when 
the links among the desires and aversions in that set are similar in number and quality to the 
minimum number and quality of epistemic links among beliefs to tolerate for the ascription of 
belief” (Smith-2002, 160). I take it that Smith is making a comparison to justified belief, a belief 
is justified when it fits into a network of beliefs that are sufficient to support the belief; similarly, 
a desire is justified, i.e. suitable for expression in moral judgments, when it fits into network of 
other desires and aversions that are sufficient to support the desire. However, the standard for 
supplying justification of desire cannot be significantly different than the standard for justifying 
belief.	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a case for the idea that someone who has the higher order attitudes or dispositions he describes is 
in a state of mind that is best described as a normative commitment:  having the higher-order 
attitudes entails having the normative commitment” (Smith-2002, 160). Smith proposes an 
example of someone who has the complex of attitudes that Blackburn discussed in his emotional 
ascent analysis of moral judgment:  a person who “has a desire that people keep their promises, 
and who shares many other people’s anger at those who fail to keep their promises, and who 
feels disposed to encourage others to share that same anger, too, and who feels disposed to be 
angry at those who don’t share the anger” (Smith-2002, 161). Smith claims, and I agree, that it is 
possible to imagine that this person also regards these attitudes as illegitimate, or wishes he did 
not have them (Smith-2002, 161).  
This person may believe the attitudes are innate or were inculcated by his parents, but all 
the same wish he did not have those attitudes because his life would go better if he did not have 
them. Such a person would be like the unwilling addict; only he would be an unwilling moralist. 
The addict has a nexus of desires for a drug that can be coherent, but it is also possible to 
characterize the addict as an unwilling addict because it is possible to interpret a desire 
independent of that nexus – the desire not to desire the drug – as the addict’s genuine desire.23 
Similarly, with the person who has the nexus of attitudes about promise keeping, it is possible to 
interpret his attitude that the nexus is illegitimate as his genuine attitude. How can Blackburn 
distinguish the attitude of the willing moralist, who thinks his nexus of attitudes about promise 
keeping is legitimate, as the moral attitude, but not the attitude of the unwilling moralist, who 
thinks his nexus of attitudes about promise keeping is illegitimate? I don’t see how Blackburn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 It is not uncommon for an addict’s family to have this perspective:  “Jimmy on drugs is not the 
real Jimmy; my Jimmy doesn’t want to be addicted.” In some cases this is hope, wishful 
thinking, or denial, but in other cases it may be belief. 
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can do this without denying that an unwilling addict is a real possibility. The problem with this 
kind of hierarchical, higher-order analysis of moral judgment is that there is no basis for saying 
the attitude in which the person rejects the ones below is not within the informed, coherent, and 
unified nexus of desires and aversions, which compose the set of desires and aversions suitable 
for being expressed in moral judgments. 
6.3.3.1 How Blackburn Could Respond to Smith 
Smith concedes that Blackburn has an obvious reply to his objection:  simply stipulate that the 
complex of desires and aversions that he claims are expressed in moral judgments are the ones 
which compose the set of desires and aversions suitable for expression in moral judgments 
(Smith-2002, 161). Smith thinks the reply is both wrong and an embarrassment, but before I 
explain why Smith thinks this, I want to pause to review the problem Smith poses for Blackburn.  
Smith noted that a moral judgment seems to have a functional feature that a belief 
definitely possesses – a belief stands in a network of connections between perceptions and other 
beliefs that give it epistemic justification. If a moral judgment does not express a belief, but 
rather a desire, then Blackburn must explain how a desire can have the functional feature of 
being similarly supported. Smith proposed that a desire could also stand in a network of support 
from other desires and aversions, which would give this desire, expressed in a moral judgment, a 
similar kind of support that a belief has. The next step is to identify which desire in such a nexus 
would be suitable for being expressed in a moral judgment. Smith interprets Blackburn’s 
metaphor of a staircase of emotional ascent as reflecting a hierarchical, higher-order analysis of 
this network of desires in which a desire at a suitable level is the one expressed by a moral 
judgment. However, the examples of the unwilling addict, whose desire not to desire a drug is 
independent of his nexus of addictive desires, and the unwilling moralist, who desires not to have 
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any of the putative moral desires, indicate that there is no basis for establishing a standard for 
which desires are part of the nexus from which a higher-order desire suitable for expression in a 
moral judgment comes. 
Smith concedes that while Blackburn may not have a standard for determining the set of 
desires that form the nexus, he could stipulate the set; Smith sees two problems with this 
response. First, Smith thinks that this reply would be embarrassing because it is tantamount to an 
admission of the truth of cognitivism. The stipulation claims, in effect, that what makes a 
particular desire or aversion justified is its membership in the set of desires, sufficiently 
informed, coherent, and unified, to be suitable for expression in moral judgment; but, to claim 
this a person must believe the desire is situated within a set of informed, coherent, unified desires 
and aversions, i.e. she must believe the desire is justified (Smith-2002, 161).  To claim a desire is 
justified is a normative claim, but it is a normative claim that is a belief, and non-cognitivism is 
supposed to rule this possibility out (Smith-2002, 161). Smith’s analysis of the embarrassment 
indicates that he believes that for a person to be in position to express a desire in a moral 
judgment, she must also believe the desire is justified, i.e., by being part of an informed and 
unified and coherent set of desires. Smith does not make this explicit, but it comes to the fore 
when he explains why stipulating that the desire expressed in moral judgment is part of such a 
set does not answer his criticism that being a higher-order desire among a nexus of desires and 
aversions does not establish the desire is suitable for expression in moral judgment. 
 Turning away from the so-called embarrassment, let’s examine why the stipulation fails 
to respond to the objection that the location of non-cognitive states on a staircase of emotional 
ascent cannot serve as the basis for establishing whether it is a member of the set of non-
cognitive states sufficiently informed, coherent, and unified to be suitable for expressing in 
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moral judgments. If Blackburn stipulates that the complex of desires and aversions that he claims 
are expressed in moral judgments are the ones which compose the set of desires and aversions 
suitable for expression in moral judgments, then he would have to be committed to something 
like the following:  when a person makes a moral judgment he expresses a desire that occupies 
the appropriate spot on the staircase of emotional ascent, but he also has other desires and 
aversions that occupy the same level on the staircase of emotional ascent, which together with 
the desire expressed in the moral judgment form a sufficiently informed and coherent and unified 
set (Smith-2002, 161).24 It is at this point that Smith’s conviction that the person must also 
believe the desire has these qualities becomes central to why the stipulation fails. 
Smith points out though that it is possible to imagine a person who has one of the 
appropriate higher-order desires and believes that it is a member of a set of sufficiently informed, 
coherent, and unified desires and aversions, but who also believes she would not have this desire 
if her set of desires and aversions was “maximally” informed, coherent, and unified. This person 
would not believe the original desire is justified, even though it would meet the criteria for being 
suitable for expression in moral judgment (Smith-2002, 162). The implication is that for a desire 
to be suitable to being expressed in moral judgment it must meet a very high standard; in 
addition to being a suitably higher-order desire connected to other suitably higher-order desires 
and aversions in a relation of support, the person who expresses the desire must believe it is a 
member of a maximally informed, coherent, and unified set of desires and aversions (Smith-
2002, 162). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I want to be careful here to note that Smith is hypothesizing about (1) what Blackburn’s 
response must be to the criticism that the location of a desire or aversion on a staircase of 
emotional ascent cannot serve as the basis for establishing whether it is a member of the set of 
non-cognitive states sufficiently informed, coherent, and unified to be suitable for expressing in 
moral judgments, and (2) what else Blackburn must be committed to if Blackburn were to make 
the stipulative response Smith proposes. 
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 So, according to Smith, Blackburn must suppose that a person who makes the moral 
judgment, “Giving to others is kind,” is expressing a desire that is a suitably higher-order desire 
that is connected in a relation of support to other suitably higher-order desires, and the person (at 
least implicitly) believes that he would have the same desire if he had a maximally informed, 
coherent, and unified set of desires and aversions (Smith-2002, 162). But, if, in order to give 
desire the same functional feature as belief, this what Blackburn is committed to, then Smith 
thinks Blackburn should just go ahead and embrace subjectivism, just adopt the view that a 
person who makes a moral judgment is just expressing the belief that the desire is maximally 
justified (Smith-2002, 162-163).  
From Smith’s perspective, the only thing that is keeping Blackburn from being a 
subjectivist is the insistence that a moral judgment expresses a desire. Smith’s challenge for 
Blackburn was to explain how desires and aversions could mimic belief-like functions by being 
joined to other desires and aversions in something like epistemic support. But, on the view Smith 
thinks Blackburn must be committed to, it is the belief that a desire is part of a maximally 
informed, coherent, and unified set of desires and aversions that is providing all of the support 
when we make moral judgments, not desires and aversions; if beliefs are the mental states 
fulfilling the belief-like functions of justifying, then non-cognitive states do not appear to playing 
the role Blackburn’s projectivism demands. With desires and aversions appearing to play little 
to no role in moral judgment, subjectivism better reflects the role mental states play. Blackburn, 
obviously does not have to embrace subjectivism since he does not have to embrace the reply of 
stipulating that the desire expressed in a moral judgment is part of the set of desires suitable for 
expression in moral judgment, but then he will owe us a means of determining at what point on a 
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hierarchical, higher-order analysis a desire becomes suitable for being expressed in moral 
judgment. 
6.3.3.2 How Blackburn Does Respond to Smith 
In a reply to Smith, Blackburn indicates that he takes himself to have an answer to Smith’s 
charge that the stipulation that a desire is in the set of moral desires suitable for expressing in 
moral judgments paves the way for a slide into subjectivism. Smith takes it that part of making a 
moral judgment involves possessing the belief that the desire expressed in the moral judgment is 
justified, but this belief cannot be present unless the moral agent believes the desire would be 
part of a maximally informed, coherent, and unified set of desires and aversions. If the agent 
does not believe this, then the agent cannot believe the desire is justified, and cannot be making a 
moral judgment. What Smith has, in effect, done is give conditions for when a person may 
express his desire in a moral judgment – when he believes the desire is part of the maximally 
informed, coherent, unified set of desires; and, when he does not have this belief, he should not 
express the desire in a moral judgment.  
Blackburn takes this to be a matter of fallibility, and he points out that belief and 
recognition of fallibility can coexist (Blackburn-2002b, 175). So, a person can be aware that his 
sense of sight occasionally induces false beliefs (e.g., in the case of illusion), but he can still 
believe he sees a book before him in the present situation. Belief cannot coexist with the belief 
that fallibility is letting him down in the present situation. If a person believes now, at this 
moment, that his fallibility is getting the best of him, he should abandon the belief; “belief that p 
… cannot … coexist with the belief that ‘if I were better informed, I would not believe that p’” 
(Blackburn-2002b, 175).   
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Blackburn points out that the desires and aversions associated with moral judgment are 
similarly vulnerable to human fallibility. A desire or aversion can coexist with a person’s 
fallibility, but “it cannot coexist with the thought that … [it] is indeed, here and now, letting … 
[him] down, so that a better attitude would conflict with … [his] own” (Blackburn-2002b, 175). 
So, a desire is “vulnerable to the thought that a better person, or better system of norms, would 
not share them” and Blackburn takes the vulnerability of belief and desire to be parallel 
(Blackburn-2002b, 175). Blackburn has loosened the standard for expressing a desire in moral 
judgment; on his view, it is only when a person has the belief that her desire is fallible that she 
may not express a desire in moral judgment. For Smith, unless she believes her desire, in fact, is 
a member of the best set of desires, she should not express it in a moral judgment. 
I am wary of Blackburn’s equivocation between belief being destabilized by the belief 
that a better informed person would not have the belief, and desire being destabilized by the 
thought that a better person would not have the desire. The latter instability seems to arise from 
contemplating the possibility that there are better sets of desires, whereas the former instability 
only arises in the presence of the belief that there are better informed sets of beliefs. If belief and 
desire are to be parallel, and to fulfill the same functional role, their stability should be dependent 
on the same degree of epistemic certainty, so I propose this fallibility be understood as follows: 
BF. A belief cannot persist in the presence of the belief that a better informed 
person would not have the belief.  
 
DF. A desire cannot persist in the presence of the belief that a person with better 
desires would not have the desire.  
 
Ultimately, Blackburn should be able to show that a feature of moral judgments, fallibility, 
which seems to be a feature of belief, can be explained in terms of desires and aversions. 
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Before I examine Blackburn’s case for this I think there are two prima facie problems 
with the response he has crafted. First, Blackburn claims that the non-cognitive states associated 
with moral judgment are fallible. This is begging the question since Blackburn has not provided 
a means for distinguishing which non-cognitive states are associated with moral judgment. Yes, 
moral judgments are fallible and subject to revision; if non-cognitive states are what are 
expressed in moral judgment, then those states that are proposed as candidates should be fallible 
and revisable. Blackburn assumes that there are specific non-cognitive states that are expressed 
in moral judgment, even though he has given no indication which states those are, or how to 
distinguish them. Second, it is not obvious that a person’s desires are fallible or revisable, as DF 
claims. It is too easy to imagine cases in which a person fully believes that there are better people 
with better desires than her own, but whose “inferior” desire still persists. The unwilling addict 
who desires drugs, and admits her desire for drugs is not one a person with better desires would 
possess, is one example; and, so is a person who enjoys the taste of cheap beer, even though he 
admits that a person with better taste would not enjoy it. What Blackburn suggests is that the 
special characteristic of the desires and aversions expressed in moral judgment is that they 
disappear when a person believes there are better desires.25 I doubt that non-cognitive states 
could be so sensitive to the non-cognitive states of others.  
 Blackburn begins to try to show that it is possible for us to recognize the fallibility of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In addition, it seems like the mental states that moral judgments express should be sensitive 
not just to beliefs about other non-cognitive states, but also sensitive to straightforward belief. 
For example, a moral judgment about responsibility for an action should be sensitive to belief 
about the age of the agent. But, it is, again, obvious that some non-cognitive states are just not 
sensitive to this; a vegan can still desire a pint of Guinness even though she knows isinglass is 
used in its production. All of this is to drive home Smith’s point about how difficult it is for non-
cognitivists to identify a non-cognitive state that is a candidate for being the mental state 
expressed in moral judgment:  it is going to be a very peculiar non-cognitive state because it has 
to have the features beliefs have without being belief. 
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desires that constitute moral judgment by asking, “What counts as fallibility” (Blackburn-2002b, 
175)? He argues that positive non-cognitive states, like esteem and privilege, directed toward 
qualities like informedness, coherence, unity, maturity, balance, etc. set the standard (Blackburn-
2002b, 175). According to Blackburn, there is a standard to which a person can compare his 
desire to determine if it is fit for expressing in moral judgment, but that standard is a system of 
desires and aversions, with certain qualities like being informed, coherent, and unified, that is 
esteemed (Blackburn-2002, 176). Blackburn distinguishes between two beliefs: 
(a) belief that a more unified, or informed system would not contain my attitude, 
 
and 
 
(b) belief that a more unified, or informed system would not contain my attitude 
coupled with privileging such a system (Blackburn-2002, 176). 
 
According to Blackburn only (b) can contribute to the fallibility of desire. It seems that 
Blackburn thinks the privileging of the system, which is a non-cognitive state, answers both of 
Smith’s charges – that at least one moral judgment is a cognitive state, the belief that a desire is 
justified, and that non-cognitive states do not play a functional role in justifying a desire as 
suitable for expression in moral judgment. It answers the first because the system is established 
as the system by a non-cognitive state. And, it answers the second because the desire expressed 
in moral judgment is justified by privileging the system of which it is a member. 
6.3.3.3 Blackburn’s Response Fails 
The coupling of the belief about the merits of the system with privileging the system seems 
redundant. Blackburn proposes that a person can believe there is a better system of attitudes than 
his own and that this mental state is different than one in which a person believes there is a better 
system of attitudes than his own and he privileges this system more than his own system. I 
cannot see what this addition actually adds to the mental state; the person who believes there is a 
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better system of attitudes than his own, already privileges that system. Consider a reformulated 
account of desire fallibility that conforms with (b): 
DFb. A desire cannot persist in the presence of the belief that a person with better 
desires would not have the desire coupled with privileging that person’s desires. 
 
Again, it would appear that implicit in the belief that a person with better desires would not have 
the desire is the normative prioritization of that set of desires, which is what the privileging is 
supposed to establish. But, if the prioritization is already established, then the non-cognitive state 
of privileging does not seem to do anything, and a desire, aversion, or attitude is not playing the 
belief-like role it must to explain the belief-like character of those desires, aversions, or attitudes 
expressed in moral judgment. 
Blackburn is trying to respond to Smith’s charge that Blackburn cannot explain how a 
desire can be justified as part of the maximally best set of desires without belief being at the root 
of the project, and he is not successful. Blackburn has not answered the moral attitude problem – 
he has not identified nor provided a means for identifying the non-cognitive states, which are 
expressed in moral judgment. What Blackburn seems to have in mind is that an attitude 
expressed in moral judgment is one that cannot persist in the presence of an attitude, which 
disapproves of the set of attitudes of which the first attitude is a member. This suggests that there 
is a standard for comparing sets of attitudes to, and this standard should be established on a non-
cognitivist basis if non-cognitivism is to be plausible. 
6.4 Moral Mind-Independence 
In section 6.3 I examined how the moral attitude problem – the difficulty of identifying and 
defining the qualities of the non-cognitive state that is expressed in moral judgment – raises 
problems for projectivism, and which it must address to be a complete metaphysics for quasi-
realism. Another important problem for projectivism is explaining how morality can be mind-
	   241	  
independent on a projectivist account of morality. That morality is mind-independent features in 
the rebuttal of two moral theories:  cultural relativism and Divine Command Theory. Cultural 
relativism is frequently defined as the view that an action is morally right for a culture, if the 
culture thinks it is; and, the view is criticized for holding that thinking an action is morally right, 
makes it morally right. And, Socrates’ challenge to Euthyphro’s definition of piety, “Is the pious 
loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods,” highlights the 
implausibility of supposing something has a property in virtue of somebody’s beliefs or feelings 
about it (Plato, 14). The ensuing discussion suggests that to suppose so implies some mysterious 
metaphysics since a thing will only come to be the object of whatever belief or feeling a person 
has about it; Plato’ remark, “The god-beloved is then not the same as the pious … nor the pious 
the same as the god beloved,” indicates that while the gods love sacrifices, their love does not 
impart piety to the sacrifice (Plato, 16). The upshot is that if a person thinks an action is moral, 
the action simply becomes thought to be moral, which is not the same as it being moral. 
 Nick Zangwill points out the need for a definition of mind-independence that does not 
beg the question in favor of realism, and he proposes that it be understood “in terms of a certain 
conditional relation which fails to hold between the values of things and our judgments about 
them” (Zangwill-1994, 206). He proposes that mind-independence be understood as the 
conjunction of two theses:  value judgments do not necessitate values; values do not necessitate 
value judgments (Zangwill-1994, 206). These theses are reflected in the following conditionals, 
respectively: 
(i) It is not that case that if we think that X is bad then it is bad, 
(ii) It is not the case that if X is bad then we think that it is (Zangwill-1994, 206). 
 
The mind-dependence of morality, on the other hand, is reflected by the following conditionals, 
respectively: 
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(iii) If we think that X is bad then it is bad, 
(iv) If X is bad then we think that it is (Zangwill-1994, 207). 
 
To describe the thesis that (i) and (ii) express as the mind-independence of morality is to be loose 
with terminology since on a moral theory like utilitarianism morality seems to be mind-
dependent since whether action is moral or immoral depends on whether it produces more or less 
happiness – mental states – in people (Zangwill-1994, 207). The mind-independence of morality 
reflects the idea that the moral value of a state of affairs does not depend on a judgment that it 
has that moral value (Zangwill-1994, 207-208). 
The mind-independence of morality appears to be a feature of moral practice, and 
Blackburn wants quasi-realism to account for this feature. But, given the sketch of mechanism 
of projectivism I outlined in chapter 4, and Blackburn’s own Humean characterization of moral 
qualities as the children of our sentiments, it appears suspect that Blackburn can give an account 
of mind-independence from a projectivist base (Blackburn-1981, 165). It is easy to imagine 
Blackburn being tempted to give up the mind-independence of morality, but he is insistent that 
he needs to preserve it; he said projectivism would be refuted if it has us believing, “If we had 
different attitudes it would not be wrong to kick dogs” (Blackburn-1981, 179). Comparing facts 
about kicking dogs being wrong and trees causing shade, Blackburn claims the latter is mind-
independent, and that projectivists do not have to deny the former is (Blackburn-1984, 215-
216); and he claims that one of the failings of subjectivism is that it makes morality dependent 
on the attitudes of people engaging in moral practice (Blackburn-1980, 76).26 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Blackburn has reaffirmed this approach in subsequent works; see Blackburn-1984, 217-219 
and Blackburn-1985, 156-157. 
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6.4.1 Blackburn’s Account of Moral Mind-Independence 
As noted in the last paragraph, Blackburn agrees projectivism would be absurd if a projectivist 
must believe, “If we had different attitudes it would not be wrong to kick dogs.” Blackburn 
explains that the counterfactual does not express a belief, rather it expresses a moral judgment:  
“The counter-factual ‘If we had different attitudes it would not be wrong to kick dogs’ expresses 
the moral view that the feature which makes it wrong to kick dogs is our reaction” (Blackburn-
1981). Blackburn then claims that the projectivist need not hold this moral view, rather he, like 
the ordinary person, thinks it is the pain it causes that makes kicking dogs wrong; “[H]e approves 
of a moral disposition which, given this belief as input, yields the reaction of disapproval as an 
output; he does not approve of one which needs a belief about our attitudes as an input in order 
to yield the same output, and that is all that gets expression in the counterfactual” (Blackburn-
1981, 179). Blackburn denies that projectivism implies the mind-dependence of morality 
because the conditionals that suggest mind-independence are actually moral judgments 
themselves expressive of attitudes. 
 Zangwill describes this approach of shifting the mind-independence and mind-
dependence conditionals from expressing beliefs to expressing a “substantive moral view” as an 
“internal reading technique” (Zangwill-1994, 208). The shift constitutes an internal reading since 
a conditional expresses moral a commitment situated within a moral sensibility or perspective. 
The conditionals (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), each express a higher-order attitude, not a belief. For 
example, conditional (iii) expresses a higher-order attitude of approval for dispositions to form 
attitudes to X on the basis of beliefs about attitudes to X’s natural properties instead of just on 
the basis of beliefs about X’s natural features (Zangwill-1994, 208). On the other hand 
conditional (i) expresses a contrary moral judgment; it expresses the higher-order attitude of 
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disapproval for dispositions to form attitudes to X on the basis of beliefs about attitudes to X’s 
natural properties instead of just on the basis of beliefs about X’s natural features, (or it 
expresses approval for dispositions to form attitudes to X on the basis of beliefs about X’s 
natural features). As Zangwill point out, this analysis of mind-independence and mind-
dependence conditionals interprets them as incompatible higher-order moral attitudes to forming 
dispositions in a particular way. 
Again, the mind-independence of morality appears to be a feature of moral practice, and 
since Blackburn wants quasi-realism to account for these features, he claims that he can capture 
this feature by having the projectivist reject conditional (iii), which expresses a higher-order 
attitude of approval for dispositions to form attitudes to X on the basis of beliefs about attitudes 
to X’s natural properties instead of just on the basis of beliefs about X’s natural features, because 
it expresses a moral attitude which is repugnant. Smith points out that there are two criteria for 
rejecting conditionals like (iii), if we think that X is bad then it is bad, and (iv), if X is bad then 
we think that it is:  1. being a member of a repugnant moral sensibility; 2. repugnance for this 
moral sensibility can be expressed within a projectivist framework.  
Before critiquing Blackburn’s suggestion that the mind-independence of morality is a 
higher-order moral attitude, I want to make two points about these criteria. First, the judgment 
that conditionals (iii) and (iv) are members of a repugnant moral sensibility seems to be a belief 
that there is a sensibility with certain members and (iii) and (iv) are among them. If this is so, 
then the analysis may be susceptible to the same objection that Smith raised against higher-order 
analyses for identifying moral attitudes – the non-cognitive state no longer plays a primary role 
in the expression of the moral judgment, rather a cognitive state does, and it becomes hard to see 
how Blackburn’s view remains a form of antirealism. Second, satisfying criterion 2 will depend 
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on the projectivist’s ability to rank moral sensibilities definitively; in section 6.5 of this chapter I 
raise doubts that projectivists have the resources to do so. Assuming for the sake of the 
argument that Blackburn’s proposal for preserving mind-independence is successful, he must be 
able to explain the satisfaction of criteria 1 and 2 on projectivist grounds. 
6.4.2 Zangwill on Blackburn’s Moral Mind-Independence 
Zangwill notes that there is a whiff of hocus-pocus to Blackburn’s internal reading technique, but 
the trouble is explaining why it is hocus-pocus, and one way of doing that is to claim that the 
mind-independence of morality is a kind of commitment that is different from other moral 
commitments – the former is more like a moral principle than a substantive moral opinion 
(Zangill-1994, 209-210). One way to explain this difference in status is to point to the 
“generativity” of moral mind-independence. Zangwill points out that Blackburn’s internal 
reading technique, surprisingly, can account for the difference in status between mind-
independence and ordinary moral commitments. 
The mind-independence of morality must be generalizable to an infinite number of 
particular cases, and, “It is not the case that the wrongness of anything depends on my attitudes,” 
is a formulation of it that highlights its generativity (Zangwill-1994, 210; emphasis original). 
Mind-independence must work as a general principle that we can use to infer that the morality of 
any state of affairs does not depend on the attitudes we have toward them. Blackburn needs to 
provide a projectivist account of the principle that preserves this generative quality:  “together 
with the relevant beliefs, the one principle must yield a potential infinity of attitudes” (Zangwill-
1994, 210). The key is that Blackburn must be able to formulate a general basic statement of 
moral-mind independence in projectivist terms that lets us infer the particular expressions of 
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mind-independent moral judgments, i.e., “It is not that case that if we disapprove of kicking dogs 
then it is bad.” 
 Recall the general example of mind-independence, “It is not the case that the wrongness 
of anything depends on my attitudes.” Since Blackburn explained mind-independence as 
expressing a higher-order attitude of disapproval for dispositions to form attitudes to X on the 
basis of beliefs about attitudes to X’s natural properties instead of just on the basis of beliefs 
about X’s natural features (or expressing approval for dispositions to form attitudes to X on the 
basis of beliefs about X’s natural features), he may appear to have the resources for providing a 
projectivist version of the general principle. Zangwill claims that generative mind-independence 
can be explained from a projectivist base:  “We have a disapproval of a general function from 
beliefs about attitudes to X to attitudes to X; and we have an approval of a general function from 
beliefs about X to attitudes to X (Zangwill-1994, 211; emphasis original). 
This formulation can capture the generativity of moral mind-independence, and Zangwill 
concedes that the formulation can distinguish commitments like, “It is not the case that if we 
disapprove of kicking dogs then it is bad,” from ordinary moral commitments like, “Kicking 
dogs is bad,” because the former occupy an important place in the logical structure of a system 
attitudes (Zangwill-1994, 211). The suggestion that its place in a system distinguishes the mind-
independence claims from ordinary moral claims is supported by Blackburn’s discussion of other 
projectivist non-moral claims: 
The utterance ‘whatever I or we or anyone else ever though about it, there would 
still have been … [causes’] can be endorsed even if we accept the projective 
picture, and work in terms of an explanation of the sayings which gives them a 
subjective source. The correct opinion about these things is not necessarily the 
one we happen to have, nor is our having an opinion or not the kind of thing 
which makes for correctness. The standard governing projection makes it 
irrelevant, in the way that opinion is irrelevant to the wrongness of kicking dogs 
(Blackburn-1984, 219). 
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Zangwill remains uneasy with this account of moral mind-independence because he thinks it 
does not capture the real status difference between ordinary moral commitments and the mind-
independent commitments, which he thinks is a conceptual status. 
 He supposes that the mind-independence has a status that is something like a conceptual 
truth; part of being a competent practitioner of morality is to realize that if we thought kicking 
dogs for fun was moral, that would not make it moral, and any person who did not realize this 
would not be participating in our moral practice (Zangwill-1994, 211). He makes the case that 
the mind-independence of morality is a conceptual truth via a property he calls the normativity of 
moral judgments. Zangwill claims that the normativity of moral judgment is an agent’s 
commitment to correctness in making the judgment; due to this, she understands that her 
judgment may be correct or incorrect (Zangwill-1994, 214). So, in making a moral judgment an 
agent is aware her judgment may be correct or incorrect; if she is aware of this (and she reflects 
on this fact), then she knows that a moral judgment is not correct just in virtue of her making it. 
And, this is just what the mind-independence of morality is committed to. Zangwill then argues 
that the internal reading technique Blackburn applies to the mind-independence of morality 
makes it a special kind of substantive moral truth, but still a substantive moral truth like, 
“Kicking dogs for fun is wrong;” this means that the internal reading technique cannot capture 
the conceptual truth status of moral mind-independence (Zangwill-1994, 213). If the mind-
independence of the moral is a conceptual truth, and if Blackburn’s account of mind-
independence makes it a substantive moral truth, then Blackburn has not preserved a feature of 
morality within his projectivist metaphysics. 
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6.4.2.1 Defending Blackburn Against Zangwill 
In his review of recent developments in metaethics, Alex Miller claims that Zangwill’s 
arguments for the conceptual status of moral-mind independence and the non-conceptual status 
of Blackburn’s version of mind-independence are unconvincing. Zangwill’s argument for the 
non-conceptual status of Blackburn’s account of mind-independence appears to be the following: 
P1.  Mind-independence is a substantive moral truth (per Blackburn). 
P2.  If a commitment is a substantive moral truth, then it cannot be a conceptual 
truth. 
C.  Mind-independence cannot be a conceptual truth. 
 
When Miller claims that Zangwill’s argument that Blackburn’s analysis of mind-independence 
as a substantive moral truth implies it cannot be a conceptual truth is unconvincing, he 
presumably denies P2. And his objection to P2 is that it involves an unargued application of 
Moore’s open question argument, and therefore depends on the implausible assumption that a 
substantive conceptual analysis is impossible (Miller, 76-77). Miller does not elaborate on this 
objection, so I am not positive I fully understand it since it seems to miss the point. I take it that 
Miller wants to deny that just because a moral mind-independence claim is a substantive moral 
truth, it is not a conceptual one, and so Blackburn’s account of mind-independence does preserve 
it as a feature of moral practice despite Zangwill’s objection. 
Miller appears to believe that Zangwill is claiming that because substantive moral truths 
are non-trivial they cannot be conceptual truths because conceptual truths are trivial. Miller 
implies as much when he claims to read “substantive” as “informative and potentially 
controversial” (Miller-77). And Miller argues that this contrast depends on the open question 
argument, which is invalid given the no-interesting analysis objection to the open question 
argument – i.e., an implication of the open question argument is that there are no correct non-
trivial conceptual analyses. 
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6.4.2.2 Responding to Miller 
Though it is confusing that Zangwill calls substantive moral truth controversial, I do not believe 
that Zangwill is trading on this distinction to make the case that substantive moral truths cannot 
be conceptual ones. A conceptual truth is a commitment, the acceptance of which is constitutive 
of competence in a practice. So, a commitment is a conceptual truth if failing to accept it means 
that competent participants in a practice would judge such an agent not to be competent in the 
practice. For example, the following claim is a conceptual truth:  A gelding is a castrated male 
horse. A person who doesn’t accept that claim is not competent in the practice of raising horses, 
and horsemen would judge a person who does not know what a gelding is as incompetent in 
horse raising, as not a horseman. Conceptual truths are not controversial among competent 
participants in a practice because accepting them is evidence of competency in the practice; but, 
other commitments can be controversial among competent participants in practice. For example, 
some horsemen may think geldings make better horses for jump races than flat races, but a 
person who thinks the opposite cannot be straightaway judged as incompetent in horse raising. 
Ordinary moral commitments like, “Abortion is moral,” are not conceptual truths because 
they are controversial in the sense that people who accept this commitment cannot accuse those 
who do not of being incompetent in moral practice. The others’ refusal to accept, “Abortion is 
moral,” cannot be evidence of their failure to understand the meaning of the words in the claim, 
nor can it be evidence they do not understand the practice of morality. According to Blackburn, 
making moral judgments is “moralizing” which is not done by conceptual means, and can be 
done poorly (Blackburn-1984, 184). What seems clear from Blackburn’s internal reading of 
moral independence is that it is just ordinary moralizing (Blackburn-1981, 179; Blackburn-1984, 
218; Blackburn-1988, 73). Per Blackburn’s view, because moral mind-independence is an 
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ordinary moral commitment it is controversial in the sense that two people who disagree about it 
are still both competent in the practice of moralizing, one of them just does it poorly, or has poor 
morals. The real question is whether a moral mind-independence commitment like, “It is not the 
case that the wrongness of anything depends on my attitudes,” is just an ordinary old moral 
commitment like, “Abortion is moral,” or a conceptual commitment like, “A gelding is a 
castrated male horse.” 
Miller interprets Zangwill’s argument for why moral mind-independence is a conceptual 
truth to be that (i) normativity is a conceptual truth – it is constitutive of competence in moral 
practice – and (ii) normativity implies moral mind-independence. Miller’s objection is that 
normativity does not imply mind-independence since a moral judgment can be normative and it 
still be empirically true “that if we judge that X is good, then X is good” (Miller, 76). Miller’s 
rebuttal appears to assume that Zangwill’s argument is the following; 
P1. If moral judgments are normative, then morality is mind-independent. 
P2.  Moral judgments are normative. 
C.  Morality is mind-independent. 
 
And, Miller’s rebuttal is to deny that P1 is true since it is possible for moral judgments to be 
normative and for morality to be mind-dependent, and then claim that all that is necessary for 
normativity is the conceptual possibility that a moral judgment is incorrect. 
This interpretation of the argument is too simple; Zangwill’s argument is as follows: 
P1.  A person making a moral judgment aims at correctness (normativity). 
P2.  A person can only aim at correctness, if he knows that either the judgment 
can be correct or the judgment can be incorrect. 
P3.  If a person knows a judgment can be incorrect, then the person knows that 
just by making a judgment, he does not make a correct judgment. 
P4. If a person knows that just by making judgment, he does not make a correct 
judgment, then he knows judging something so does not make it so. 
C. If a person knows judging something so does not make it so, then he knows it 
is not the case that if I judge X is good, then X is good. 
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Miller wants to block the inference from normativity to moral mind-independence by insisting 
that mind-dependence is compatible with normativity. Miller argues that they are compatible so 
long as it is conceptually possible for a moral judgment to be incorrect. So Miller’s claim is that 
in a world in which if we judge X is good, then X is good, there can also be normativity if it is 
conceptually possible for the judgment “X is good” to be incorrect. In Zangwill’s argument there 
cannot be normativity without the knowledge that a moral judgment might be correct or that it 
might be incorrect, so for Miller’s objection to be successful that knowledge – knowledge that a 
moral judgment might be correct or that it might be incorrect – must be compatible with mind-
dependence. 
I am skeptical that it is possible for there to be a world in which if a person judges X is 
good, then X is good, and yet the same person knows it is possible his judgment “X is good” 
could be incorrect, and vice versa. If a feature of one’s cognitive abilities was that thinking cats 
are dogs made it so that cats are dogs, how could one know it is possible that “Cats are dogs” is 
incorrect? I cannot see why it should be any different for morality; if thinking that kicking dogs 
is bad makes it so that kicking dogs is bad, how could one know it is possible that “Kicking dogs 
is bad” is incorrect? It doesn’t seem possible that it could be incorrect given that thinking it 
makes it correct. But, if mind-dependence and knowing it is possible for a judgment to be 
incorrect are incompatible, then Miller is wrong – mind-dependence and normativity are not 
compatible; and so if morality is normative, it must be mind-independent, which is a conceptual 
truth. And, Blackburn’s analysis of moral mind-independence as an ordinary moral truth does 
not capture this. 
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6.4.3 Moral Agnosticism and Mind-Independence 
Even if Blackburn is correct that the claim that morality is mind-independent can be given an 
internal reading in which it is an ordinary moral judgment expressing an attitude, this raises a 
new, different problem for a projectivist to address. Given Blackburn’s solution to the Frege-
Geach problem, Blackburn claims, “Morality is mind-independent,” and, “Morality is not mind-
independent,” actually express the following, respectively: 
PMI:  H! (sensibility that H!/B! a state of affairs because of beliefs about the state 
of affairs). 
PMD:  H! (sensibility that H!/B! a state of affairs because of beliefs about 
attitudes toward the state of affairs and belief about the state of affairs). 
 
Both of these judgments express a determinate attitude towards a sensibility in which attitudes 
toward, say, an action depend on belief about attitudes toward the actions and belief about the 
action. But, it must be possible for a person to wonder or be agnostic about the mind-
independence of morality, and I cannot see how Blackburn can accommodate this. 
Consider what an agnostic would say about morality and mind-independence:  “I don’t 
know if morality is mind-independent or mind-dependent;” how could Blackburn account for 
this in a projectivist framework? Blackburn might propose the following: 
PMIA:  I don’t know if I H!(sensibility that H!/B! a state of affairs because of 
beliefs about the state of affairs) or H!(sensibility that H!/B! a state of affairs 
because of belief about attitudes toward the state of affairs and belief about the 
state of affairs). 
 
This interpretation is implausible because people are usually aware of their attitudes. And if 
Blackburn thinks agnosticism about moral mind-independence is a case where a person would be 
unaware of his attitude, he would have to explain why it is this kind of unusual attitude. As an 
alternative, Blackburn might suggest that the agnostic endorses a sensibility that does not 
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generate attitudes toward something on the basis of just beliefs about it or on the basis of beliefs 
about attitudes toward it and beliefs about it: 
PMIA':  H!(sensibility that neither H!/B! a state of affairs because of beliefs about 
the state of affairs nor H!/B! a state of affairs because of belief about attitudes 
toward the state of affairs and belief about the state of affairs). 
 
This is an even more implausible interpretation of the agnostic’s view because it is not even clear 
if it is coherent and I suspect Blackburn would repudiate this as a repugnant attitude. The latter 
point is important because whatever judgment Blackburn would form towards it, it is properly 
the subject of judgment – it is either part of repugnant sensibility or part of an appropriate 
sensibility. But, being agnostic about a claim should actually preclude the possibility of being 
correct or incorrect about that claim. Any attempt to assimilate agnosticism about mind-
independence into the internal reading favored by the projectivist framework will eliminate its 
distinctive feature:  its suspension of judgment between the competing positions. Similar 
problems will arise if Blackburn tries to formulate wonder about mind-independence in the 
internal reading. These difficulties indicate that the internal reading approach does not capture 
the mind-independence of morality. 
It is possible to explain the failure of the internal reading to provide a plausible account 
of mind-independence from a projective framework as trying to treat metaethical statements as 
ordinary ethical ones. Blackburn’s internal reading tries to convert a metaphysical metaethical 
issue into an ordinary moral one, and it fails. The internal reading may not be able to 
accommodate other metaethical claims, and further undermine the projectivist proposal, too. I 
cannot be sure it will, but at least for the problem of mind-independence Blackburn’s attempt at 
incorporating mind-independence into a projectivist framework generates a new problem for 
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him, provided his approach succeeds:  now Blackburn must provide a way to wonder about 
mind-independence.27 
6.4.4 The Problem of Evil and Moral Mind-Independence 
Part of Blackburn’s project is to demonstrate that virtually, if not, all of our moral practice can be 
preserved in a projectivist framework. I think a particular version of the problem of evil, the 
traditional argument that God does not exist, poses a difficulty for Blackburn’s analysis of mind-
independence such that his analysis blocks one version of the problem, which would keep 
Blackburn from preserving an important element of moral practice. 
 In “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” William L. Rowe introduced 
the evidential problem of evil. The evidential problem of evil does not argue as Mackie does in 
“Evil and Omnipotence” that the existence of evil and God are logically incompatible; instead, it 
argues that the existence of evil is evidence against God’s existence – it lowers the probability 
that there is a God.  
Rowe’s argument can be outlined as follows: 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing greater good or permitting 
some evil equally bad or worse. 
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense 
suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater 
good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 
3. There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being (Rowe, 
336).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Blackburn appears to appreciate the need to provide a way of asking metaethical questions 
when he writes that locating the wrongness of an action in natural properties is moral judgment, 
and talk of dependency is moral talk, but, “This is not, of course, to deny that ‘external’ 
questions make sense – the projectivist plus quasi-realist package is an external philosophical 
theory about the nature of morality. But external questions must be conducted in a different key 
once this package is brought in” (Blackburn-1988a, 173). Blackburn evinces no worry about 
providing this different key, as if he is unaware that the package just got bigger – it is now 
projectivism plus quasi-realism plus whatever it takes to ask external questions. 
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The intense suffering Rowe refers to is natural evil, and it is distinguished from moral evil, 
which is the byproduct of human action. As an example of natural evil, Rowe describes a 
scenario in which a fawn is trapped in a forest fire, is burned, and suffers terribly from the burns 
before dying several days later (Rowe, 337). Rowe implies that no human being observes this 
instance of natural evil, and so it cannot contribute to any greater good that explains why God 
does not prevent it. The evidential problem of evil is an important evolution in the traditional 
argument against God’s existence because of the emphasis it places on natural evil. It draws our 
attention to phenomena that are normatively good or bad that might ordinarily slip our attention; 
what is evil in Rowe’s scenario is not God’s failure to prevent or shorten the fawn’s suffering, 
but the suffering itself. The shift of emphasis to natural evil represents a new, stronger challenge 
to traditional theism because natural evil often does escape human observation, so it cannot 
serve any greater good connected to free will as moral evil does. 
 A naturalist like Blackburn should want to avoid undermining the evidential problem of 
evil, and to do so he must be able to fit its insight that certain natural phenomena are good or bad 
into our moral practice from a projectivist basis; I do not think that Blackburn can do this while 
respecting moral mind-independence and maintaining a distinction between projectivism and 
realism. 
 Theodicists may respond to Rowe’s example of the suffering fawn as an instance of 
natural evil that counts as evidence against the existence of God by claiming that natural evil is 
permitted by natural laws so that humans may learn from it and choose how to respond to it, but 
that God cannot interfere with it coming to pass without disrupting the natural order, which 
would not serve a greater good. I do not find this response plausible, but the atheist can answer it 
by pointing to other forms of natural evil that humans have no prospect of observing. What I 
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have in mind is the animal pain that existed before human beings evolved, and in particular the 
pain that dinosaurs suffered during the events that precipitated their extinction. Whatever event 
or events initiated the extinction of dinosaurs, it is probable that their deaths were preceded by 
tremendous pain and suffering, and these states of affairs constitute examples of natural evil. 
Blackburn’s projectivism cannot account for the evilness of this pain and suffering, and so 
morality is mind-dependent on his theory. 
 Recall the sketch I drew of the projectivist mechanism implicit in Blackburn’s work 
based on his explicit appeal to Hume as a model from subsection 4.5.1.2: 
(BP'1) the natural features of an action causally interact with a person’s senses;  
(BP'2) these external stimuli produce perceptual beliefs about the presence of 
certain natural features in the action; 
(BP'3) these perceptual beliefs produce attitudes as outputs; 
(BP'4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude; 
(BP'5) we are aware of this attitude as moral judgment in propositional form and 
it is voiced by uttering moral judgments in propositional form. 
 
This is Blackburn’s account of how moral judgments are generated, and without this process 
there would be no moral practice. An account of the evilness of a fawn’s suffering that a human 
being encounters would be the following: 
(NE1) the natural features of a state of affairs causally interact with a person’s 
senses (the fawn’s moans);  
(NE2) these external stimuli produce perceptual beliefs about the presence of 
certain natural features in the state of affairs (the fawn is in pain); 
(NE3) these perceptual beliefs produce attitudes as outputs; 
(NE4) these attitudes are impressed on the perceptual beliefs yielding some 
further mental state, which is also an attitude (disapproval for the fawn’s pain); 
(NE5) we are aware of this attitude as moral judgment in propositional form and it 
is voiced by uttering moral judgments in propositional form. 
 
So far, this sketch could account for the evilness of natural states of affairs that human beings 
encounter. (And, for the sake of argument in this section, I grant that Blackburn may be able to 
develop a projective account of the evilness of certain contemporaneous natural states of affairs 
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that are qualitatively similar to the fawn’s suffering we encounter, but which we do not in fact 
encounter.) But, I cannot see how Blackburn can account for the evilness of a state of affairs in a 
scenario in which there is no person with the kind of mechanism that would respond to the input 
of the natural features of the fawn’s suffering with an output of an attitude toward it. 
Consider the pain and suffering of dinosaurs dying off as they go extinct; so far as we 
know, no beings had evolved a psychology capable of proceeding from step (NE1) to (NE5). For 
the evidential problem of evil to have traction, dinosaur pain and suffering must be examples of 
natural evil, and yet given Blackburn’s projectivist account, it is hard to see how they could 
count as such. Without a psychology in which attitudes develop, dinosaur pain and suffering 
appears to have no moral status. And, it seems plainly false to suppose that beings could 
retroactively project their attitudes onto the action, an act of "retrojection," if you will. 
Blackburn’s theory appears to require the contemporaneous presence of a being with a 
psychology sufficient to undergo the process outlined in (NE1) to (NE5) for natural evils to be 
evil. Moral realism does not require such a psychology, and this is how morality fails to be 
mind-independent in a crucial sense on the projectivist picture.28 
 Blackburn has repeatedly claimed that it is the features of a thing that makes something 
wrong, not our attitude to that thing:   
“What makes it wrong to kick dogs is the cruelty or pain to the animal” 
(Blackburn-1984, 218). 
 
“What makes cruelty abhorrent in not that it offends us, but all those hideous 
things that make it do so” (Blackburn-1988, 172). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In commentary on a draft this, Stefan Baumrin suggested Blackburn deny that “evil” applies to 
natural events to reject this attempt to show projectivism makes moral mind-dependent. That 
move would avoid this criticism, but it would eliminate from moral practice, an element that is 
part of ordinary moral practice – finding natural events evil. Since Blackburn wishes to preserve 
ordinary moral practice on a projectivist basis, this should not be an attractive response for him. 
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“Cruelty is not wrong because we disapprove of it, but because it causes pain and 
anguish” (Blackburn-1998, 74). 
 
The natural question is to ask how cruelty, pain, the hideous things, and anguish make kicking 
dogs or cruelty wrong. One option is to claim cruelty, pain, hideous things, and anguish are bad 
in themselves, and these properties have some transitive effect on actions. Of course this option 
concedes moral realism, and Blackburn cannot take it. Another option is to say the badness of 
cruelty, pain, hideous things, and anguish is due to our attitudes to them; and, this seems to be 
the option Blackburn must take. Blackburn seems to ignore that people do consider certain 
natural states of affairs to be bad, so he has not recognized that he cannot explain the wrongness 
of kicking dogs just by pointing to the pain it causes dogs, the pain must be bad, and a 
projectivist must account for this. That the second option is Blackburn’s only viable way for 
explaining the wrongness of kicking dogs reinforces the need to account for natural evil within a 
projectivist framework, and the challenge of doing so. 
Blackburn has managed to account for the mind-independent wrongness of kicking dogs 
by exploiting the badness of the pain it causes, but the problem of natural evil requires him to 
account for the mind-independent badness of pain. Blackburn does not provide such an account 
even though the challenge is put to him in a different way in the appendix of questions at the 
back of Ruling Passions. There, the first two questions raise the prospects of morality in the 
absence of moral practitioners. Blackburn denies this would eliminate morality: 
“But even if there is no discourse, bad things could still be going on. If you 
describe for me a possible situation in which there is no moral discourse, but 
people are kicking friendly dogs, then that’s a situation in which they are doing 
some thing wrong” (Blackburn-1998, 311). 
 
“According to me, ‘moral truths are mind-dependent’ can only summarize a list 
like ‘If there were not people (or people with different attitudes), then X …’, 
where the dots are filled in by some moral claim about X. One can then only 
assess things on this list by contemplating the nearest possible world in which 
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there are no people or people with different attitudes but X occurs. And then one 
gives a moral verdict on that situation” (Blackburn-1998, 311). 
 
This would sound like special pleading if it were to be extended to the case of natural evil; and, a 
comparison to a projectivist account of the humorous – are there really funny things going on if 
there is no people to find things funny – further illustrates this. 
 6.5 Moral Objectivity 
In Spreading the Word Blackburn describes quasi-realism as attempting to earn a right to moral 
truth while acknowledging the subjective basis of moral judgments – attitudes, desires, needs, 
etc. But, he also acknowledges that this can trigger concerns that morality will turn out to be 
relative or subjective (Blackburn-1984, 197). In an appendix of questions to Ruling Passions an 
interlocutor presses why subjectivity is a particularly acute problem:  if morality is subjective, it 
would not be possible “to account for the common-sense notion that people may be mistaken in 
their moral views,” a scenario which Blackburn wishes to avoid (Blackburn-1998, 317). 
Blackburn does not think there is any problem for a person to think someone else’s moral 
judgment is mistaken, the real challenge is for a person to be able to think his own moral 
judgment is mistaken (Blackburn-1998, 318). If Blackburn can develop an account of moral 
fallibility from his projectivist resources, he thinks he can also develop an account of moral 
truth, which will allow him to avoid the problem of subjectivity. 
 In the same appendix another interlocutor questions the worth of accommodating truth-
aptitude for moral judgments; the interlocutor suggests that Blackburn resist the need for moral 
truth by arguing that it is not appropriate to the domain, just as in the case of aesthetics, and to 
accommodate only gives in to realist confusion. Blackburn’s reply to the interlocutor is 
ambivalent between two possible responses. First, Blackburn points out that the question 
assumes that there is a unique genuine property of truth that only applies to physical or scientific 
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descriptions of the world, and that it is incorrect to attribute truth to other descriptions even when 
they are “‘correct’ in their own terms” (Blackburn-1998, 318). Blackburn indicates that he 
doubts it is possible to defend a unique genuine property of truth, but he thinks that if it is 
possible, moral judgments are not truth-apt. Second, Blackburn suggests that it is possible to 
adopt the deflationary theory of truth. On a deflationary theory of truth, a proposition like, 
“Snow is white,” is true if and only if snow is white. If we adopt a deflationary theory of truth, it 
becomes easy to accommodate truth-aptitude for morality; asserting that a moral judgment is true 
simply signals a commitment to or endorsement of an attitude:  “‘Giving to others is kind’ is 
true,” endorses a positive attitude towards giving to others (Blackburn-1998, 318). 
The first response Blackburn considers is a metaphysical response, while the second is a 
philosophy of language response, and despite the fact that Blackburn appears tempted by the 
deflationary theory of truth, I do not intend to take up the debate about whether deflationary 
theories of truth can accommodate truth-aptitude.29 It is the metaphysical response that I intend 
to examine. 
Later in the appendix to Ruling Passions, an interlocutor charges Blackburn with merely 
defending a “right to talk ‘as if’ there were moral truths … [even though] there aren’t any 
really” (Blackburn-1998, 319). Blackburn’s response is strident: 
No, no, no. I do not say that we can talk as if kicking dogs were wrong when 
‘really’ it isn’t wrong. I say that it is wrong (so it is true that is wrong, so it is 
really true that it is wrong, so this is an example of moral truth, so there are moral 
truths) (Blackburn-1998, 319). 
 
Blackburn argues that the challenge is misplaced because it assumes there is a unique, genuine 
“metaphysically heavyweight” account of what moral truths really are, and all Blackburn has 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 In an interview, Blackburn endorses the deflationary theory of truth; see Gordon and 
Wilkinson, eds. For more on this debate see Smith-1994b; Smith-1994c; Divers and Miller-1994; 
Horwich-1994; Jackson, Oppy, and Smith-1994.	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furnished is a meager alternative, which only licenses us to talk as if there are moral truths, 
really. Blackburn again expresses his doubt that it is possible to develop an account of real truth, 
which is the “TRUTH” of science, but he claims that even if it is possible, all it proves is you 
cannot bump into rights or duties. In drawing a contrast between TRUTH and truth, Blackburn is 
suggesting that there is no concept of truth that applies across every domain; instead for each 
domain there is a concept of truth that is correct on its own domain specific terms. Blackburn 
thinks it is possible to construct a notion of moral truth from projectivism that avoids selling out 
to realism (Blackburn-1984, 196). 
6.5.1 Constructing Moral Truth 
Blackburn thinks the fear that a projectivist morality will be relativist or subjectivist can be 
allayed by “developing a concept of moral truth out of the materials to hand:  seeing how given 
attitudes, given constraints upon them, given a notion of improvement and of possible fault in 
any sensibility including our own, we can construct a notion of truth;” facts about human 
psychology can constrain the moral judgments we form just as facts about human senses can 
constrain what we may believe (Blackburn-1984, 197, 198). Earlier in Spreading the Word, 
Blackburn speculated that the notions of improvement and coherence and consistency, which he 
developed to address the Frege-Geach problem, might be suitable for developing a concept of 
truth for moral judgments (Blackburn-1984, 197). 
 Blackburn proposes that we hypothesize a “best possible set of attitudes”, M*, which is 
“the limiting set which would result from taking all possible opportunities for improvement of 
attitude” (Blackburn-1984, 198). And, then a moral judgment, m, is true if it expresses an 
attitude, U, which is a member of M*: 
 m is true = U is a member of M* (Blackburn-1984, 198). 
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So, the moral judgment, “Giving to others is kind,” is true if a positive attitude toward giving to 
others is a member of M*. 
 Immediately after proposing this account of moral truth Blackburn considers the 
possibility that there might not be a unique best possible set of attitudes – there might be another 
set of attitudes that is equally as good as M*, but which does not contain U; if there are two 
equally superior sets of attitudes, then m will be both true and false, since it will express both an 
attitude which is a member of M* and an attitude which is not a member of a set of attitudes that 
is equally good as M* (Blackburn-1984, 198-199). If such a scenario is possible, then the 
definition violates the consistency constraint on truth, and moral truth cannot be constructed. 
Blackburn characterizes this as “the deep problem of relativism[:]… the suspicion that other 
equally, admirable sensibilities, over which I can claim no superiority of my own, lead to 
divergent judgments” (Blackburn-1984, 199). If there can be equally good sensibilities to mine, 
then I have no right to think of my moral judgments as true, which will undermine my moral 
commitments. 
 Blackburn responds to this possibility by arguing that for a situation in which it appears 
that there are two sets of attitudes, which are co-best, but inconsistent, it is not actually the case 
that the two sets of attitudes are co-best – there is a unique set of attitudes that is superior to them 
both. To explain why this is the case Blackburn deploys the internal reading move that he used to 
account for mind-independence; Blackburn argues that to suppose that two sets of attitudes are 
co-best is to have an attitude to each that it is beyond improvement, and he thinks that this third 
attitude is unsustainable. To illustrate the point, Blackburn uses an example from Hume; he asks 
us to imagine two literary critics, each of whom has taken all opportunities to refine his literary 
sensibility (Blackburn-1984, 200). One esteems Ovid as the greatest writer, and the other 
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esteems Tacitus as the greatest writer. Their sensibilities are assigned the respective variables 
M*o and M*t; “Ovid is the greatest writer” is assigned the variable mo, and “Tacitus is the 
greatest writer” is assigned the variable mt; and Uo is the variable representing the attitude of 
highest esteem for Ovid, and Ut is variable representing the attitudes of highest esteem for 
Tacitus. 
 Blackburn points out that a person who supposes that the two literary critics’ sensibilities 
are co-best is committed to the following: 
(1) mo is true (= Uo is a member of M*o) 
(2) mt is true (= Ut is a member of M*t) 
(3) M*o and M*t cannot be improved upon. 
 
Blackburn denies that a person should be committed to (3), which essentially expresses an 
attitude towards M*o and M*t, once she is aware of (1) and (2); a person who is aware of both 
M*o and M*t can imagine an improved set of attitudes over both sets of attitudes (Blackburn-
1984, 200). This improvement could include a new attitude, Ub:  Ovid and Tacitus are equally 
good writers, whose works contain features, which appeal to different people. If this new set of 
attitudes, say M*b, is judged to be an improvement over M*o, M*t, and whatever set of attitudes 
includes the attitude expressed by (3), then M*b is the set of attitudes that establishes a moral 
judgment’s truth – a moral judgment is true if it expresses an attitude which is a member of M*b. 
Blackburn’s point is that divergence in sensibility which yields new morally indiscernible 
sensibilities should be a trigger to try to imagine a sensibility which is an improvement over the 
divergent ones, and which indicates that there is a moral truth about the subject on which the 
sensibilities diverge (Blackburn-1984, 200). 
 Blackburn calls the points at which an imperfect, but improving, sensibility yield 
different sets of attitudes “nodes”, and the worry is that the branches flowing from each node 
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will be inconsistent, but impossible to distinguish as better or worse. Blackburn applies the 
internal reading technique to propose that the attitude that two inconsistent sets of attitudes 
cannot be improved upon can be subsumed to generate a new set of attitudes; this new set of 
attitudes can be compared to the originals, or it can be the impetus for imagining a different 
improved set of attitudes to the originals, the actual standard for establishing moral truth. He 
writes:  
[A]n evaluative system should contain the resources to transcend the tree 
structure; evidence that there is a node itself implies that it is wrong to maintain 
either of the conflicting commitments. It is itself a signal that the right attitude … 
is not that expressed by either of these partial perspectives (Blackburn-1984, 201). 
 
Blackburn does not explicitly require that we are able to imagine an improved set of attitudes 
over the originals, but he does insist that the fact of a node serves as a signal that there is a not-
yet-arrived-at truth. The prospect of this not-yet-arrived-at truth, nonetheless, forces us to engage 
in moral practice as though there is a moral truth even in the face of inconsistent, but apparently 
morally indiscernible sets of attitudes. 
6.5.2 Problems with Constructed Moral Truth 
Iain Law summarizes Blackburn’s argument for moral truth as follows: 
1. We make second-order moral judgments which are in fact expressions of 
attitudes to other attitudes. 
2. Therefore we can see some attitudes and combination of attitudes (sensibilities) 
as inferior and need of improvement. 
3. We can conceive that our own attitudes might need improvement. 
4. We can conceive of a single set of most possibly improved attitudes (M*). 
5. For a moral statement to be true is for the attitudes it expresses to be a member 
or M*. (Law, 190) 
 
Law does not think Blackburn can provide a notion of possible improvement necessary to sustain 
2 and 3, the judgment that sensibilities improve or deteriorate, as opposed to the observation that 
they change (Miller, 87). And without a notion of possible improvement, Blackburn cannot make 
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the move to moral truth. Law’s challenge to Blackburn is for him to explain how we can move 
legitimately from the fact that we disapprove of another person’s approval of kicking cats to 
conceiving of that other person’s attitude of approval of kicking cats as inferior, needing 
improvement:  “Why, just because a sensibility is different from mine (I do not endorse all its 
attitudes), does that give me the right to see it as inferior? Why do I not just see it as different” 
(Law, 190)? 
 Law points out that for moral realists, it is easy to explain why an alternative sensibility 
is inferior:  it gets the moral facts wrong, unlike mine. He thinks that the only way Blackburn can 
explain why I judge an alternative sensibility as inferior is because it clashes with my sensibility 
(Law, 190). And, Law points out that if the genesis of any assessment of inferiority for a 
sensibility is clash with my sensibility, then it will be impossible for me to assess my own 
sensibility as needing improvement since it will never clash with itself (Law, 191).30 
 Law cites Nicholas Sturgeon’s interpretation of Blackburn as relying on standards for 
evaluating sensibilities that are not in agreement with one’s own sensibility as a possibility for 
how we go from recognizing that our attitudes do not coincide with others, and forming attitudes 
about those attitudes to judging those attitudes to be inferior (Law, 191). Blackburn’s remark, 
“…[N]ot all such sensibilities are admirable. Some are coarse, insensitive, some are plain 
horrendous, some are conservative and inflexible, others are fickle and unreliable; some are too 
quick to form strict and passionately held attitudes, some too sluggish to care about anything,” 
suggests that he has standards in mind that are not just agreement or disagreement with one’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I think Law presses the case too far by claiming that Blackburn cannot get 3 from 1. I imagine 
that Blackburn would argue that once I am aware of other people’s moral fallibility, I must 
contemplate my own possible moral fallibility, which would provide the impetus to consider that 
my attitudes might need improving. But, I take Law to be pressing the key point that Blackburn 
needs to provide an account of how we go from recognizing that our attitudes do not coincide 
with others, and forming attitudes about those attitudes to judging those attitudes to be inferior. 
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own attitudes (Blackburn-1984, 192). Sturgeon thinks, though, that Blackburn must have a moral 
standard in mind, and perhaps that is what Blackburn is committed to when he talks about 
sensibilities failing to be admirable or horrendous. Law claims that Blackburn cannot have a 
moral standard for ranking sensibilities in mind because a moral standard could only be cashed 
out as either agreement with the moral facts or agreement with a moral sensibility (Law, 192). 
The former is obviously not an option for an antirealist like Blackburn, and the latter generates 
the problem of how to see one’s own sensibility as needing improvement. In fact, Law argues 
that Blackburn cannot possibly have a moral standard in mind when explaining how we move 
from second order judgments to assessing an attitude as inferior since that move is meant to build 
toward a moral standard, M* (Law, 192). 
6.5.3 Defending Constructed Moral Truth 
Miller tries to defend Blackburn against Law’s criticism by offering two rebuttals. First, Miller 
charges that Law is mistaken to assume that what is needed to rank attitudes or sensibilities is a 
single standard; Miller suggests that we may make use of various standards at hand to rate 
attitudes or sensibilities on a case-by-case basis (Miller, 87). The second rebuttal claims that we 
may make use of moral claims to justify our rating of another person’s attitude or sensibility as 
inferior from ours; as human beings, we are thrust into moral practice and we have no choice but 
to use the moral resources available to us to evaluate other’s attitudes – we are not in a position 
in which our ethical views are suspended, forcing us into neutrality. Blackburn is likely to 
endorse this second rebuttal in particular since he often cites the example of Neurath’s boat to 
support how the assessment of attitudes from a moral perspective is not viciously circular.31 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Blackburn-1981, 176; Blackburn-1993, 374; Blackburn-1998, 275, 313, 318. Simon 
Kirchin quotes Blackburn-1981 and cites Blackburn-1993 to make the same point in his response 
to Law’s article; he argue to the effect that ranking sensibilities is moralizing, which involves a 
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6.5.4 Rejecting Constructed Moral Truth 
To begin to see why Miller’s defense of Blackburn is unsuccessful we must shift our focus from 
sensibilities to a single attitude. One reason for doing this is that Blackburn is ambiguous about 
what a sensibility is. For example, he defines a moral sensibility as “a function from input of 
belief to output of attitude” (Blackburn-1984, 192 italics original), which suggests that a 
sensibility must be understood on three levels – the input of belief, the mechanism into which the 
belief is fed and which transforms it into an output of attitude, and the output of attitude. 
However, just a few pages later Blackburn suggests that a sensibility is a collection of attitudes; 
having just defined the best possible set of attitudes, M*, he uses the word “sensibility” in place 
of “set of attitudes” to acknowledge it is challenging “to define the idea of a unique best possible 
sensibility” (Blackburn-1984, 198). Another reason to shift the focus is that the question is not 
just how can we compare sensibilities, but how can we compare attitudes. Kirchin diagnoses 
Law’s objection to Blackburn as follows:  Attitudes are the basic building blocks of quasi-
realism, but it does not appear possible to rank them, or the sensibilities constructed from them, 
since there is no standard for comparing them and judging them as inferior or superior (Kirchin, 
123).32  
In subsection 6.5.2 I noted that Law outlines Blackburn’s argument for how to construct 
moral truth as follows: 
1. We make second-order moral judgments which are in fact expressions of 
attitudes to other attitudes. 
2. Therefore we can see some attitudes and combination of attitudes (sensibilities) 
as inferior and need of improvement. 
3. We can conceive that our own attitudes might need improvement. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
commitment to responding to certain features of the world with a particular reaction, and relying 
on this commitment is not circular (Kirchin, 124). 
32 Both Law and Kirchin appear to accept without comment Blackburn’s equivocation on 
sensibility, and thus understand a sensibility as a collection of attitudes. 
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4. We can conceive of a single set of most possibly improved attitudes (M*). 
5. For a moral statement to be true is for the attitudes it expresses to be a member 
or M*. (Law, 190) 
 
Law identified a problem in 2 and 3 – it is unclear how to generate a notion of improvement, but 
Kirchin thinks the root of the problem is 1:  how can we begin to compare attitudes different 
from our own (Kirchin, 124)? Like Kirchin, I think the challenge for Blackburn is to explain how 
we make the shift from having attitudes to moralizing, having attitudes that we regard as moral 
ones by which we can compare attitudes. 
Miller’s defense of Blackburn depends on distinguishing two tasks:  (i) explaining how 
moral judgments express attitudes and (ii) justifying some moral judgments as true (Miller, 86). 
Miller assumes that earning a right to moral truth is exclusively a justificatory enterprise, and 
once Blackburn is engaged in a practice of justification, he can take advantage of moral 
judgments and standards (Miller, 86, 88). Miller makes the distinction in the context of 
responding to one of John McDowell’s criticism of Blackburn. 
6.5.4.1 McDowell on Truth in Ethics 
McDowell characterizes projectivism as the attempt to explain “certain seeming features of 
reality as reflection of our subjective responses to a world which really contains no such feature” 
(McDowell-1987, 158). So far, this corresponds to the essentials of projectivism outlined in 
chapter 4. An important element of projectivism is that it should be able to characterize the 
response in terms other than the feature that is a product of the response (McDowell-1987, 158). 
In some cases, projection is the appropriate account of an apparent feature of reality, e.g., the 
cases of disgust and nausea. Miller quotes McDowell’s explanation of why projectivism is a 
plausible account of disgust and nausea:  “[W]e can plausibly suppose that these are self-
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contained psychological items, conceptualizable without any need to appeal to any projected 
properties of disgustingness or nauseatingness” (McDowell-1987, 157 in Miller, 83). 
 Projectivists compare ethical responses to comical responses; there is no comic feature 
in a joke, but we nonetheless judge, “It is funny,” which is comparable to moral practice.33 The 
comic is supposed to be particularly apt for a projectivist analysis, and if it can be so analyzed, 
the prospects for a projectivist analysis of the ethical would be brighter. McDowell argues by 
analogy that we cannot explain ethical responses without referring to the ethical properties since 
we cannot do so for the comic; without this explanation, there is no projectivist explanation of 
the comic, or the ethical. McDowell claims that we cannot identify what is projected onto the 
world that leads to a judgment that a joke is funny.34 He rejects the possibility that what is 
projected is the inclination to laugh because this may reflect embarrassment rather than 
amusement. And amusement is not a candidate for the response, which is projected onto the 
world and gives rise to the judgment that something is comic, since amusement is best 
understood as finding something funny or comic. We are not explaining how a joke appears 
funny, if our explanation is that we projected the inclination to find it funny onto the joke:  
“…[I]t undermines a projective account of a concept if we cannot home in on the subjective state 
whose projection is supposed to result in the seeming feature of reality in question without the 
aid of the concept of that feature, the concept that was to be projectively explained” (McDowell-
1987, 158). 
6.5.5 Rejecting Constructed Moral Truth, Continued 
McDowell’s objection to a projectivist account of ethics is to challenge projectivists to describe 
the nature of the output, which is a subjective response to inputs, without invoking the putative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Blackburn-1985, 155, which I discussed in subsection 4.2.2.5.	  
34 McDowell’s discussion of this problem can be found at McDowell-1987, 158. 
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moral property; but he suggests that this challenge cannot be fulfilled since the subjective 
response that leads to a comic judgment cannot be explained without reference to the comic 
property, and the prospect of doing this was supposed to boost the prospects of moral 
projectivism. Miller grants that Blackburn does not appear to have a response to this challenge, 
and so far as I can tell, he does not address the challenge (Miller, 85). In a footnote (11) to 
subsection 4.2.3 I outlined a projectivist account of a putative feature of reality, and one element 
it must respect was Piv: 
Piv.  It is possible to characterize the psychological state in terms other than the 
property whose experience it explains.35 
 
Blackburn has not satisfied the condition in Piv. that requires the account to avoid referencing 
the putative feature of reality being explained; until he or a quasi-realist sympathizer can do so, 
he has not provided a projectivist explanation of the comic or the ethical.  
To defend Blackburn against Law’s criticism Miller distinguishes the explanatory 
challenge McDowell has proposed from the justificatory work of earning a notion of truth from 
within moral practice, and he argues Blackburn does not have a difficulty with the latter task 
since from within moral practice he can take advantage of moral judgments to rank attitudes, and 
derive rankings of sets of attitudes from this. Miller does not seem to think that it is terribly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The full outline is: 
 
Pi. Experience in a domain has a realist phenomenology; 
Pii. there are no features of the world that correspond to the experience; 
Piii. the experience is a projection that has its origins in a psychological state, i.e., 
is the culmination of a projective mechanism that begins with a psychological 
state; 
Piiia. an experience is a projection if its explanation essentially appeals to 
non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
Piiib. the explanation of the experience is opaque to the subject. 
Piv.  It is possible to characterize the psychological state in terms other than the 
property whose experience it explains. 	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important for Blackburn to pursue the explanatory project since Miller suggests that psychology 
might supply a characterization of the subjective response that explains the putative comic or 
ethical feature (Miller, 85). But this underestimates the importance of the explanation; 
McDowell’s objection also compounds the difficulty Blackburn faces in responding to the moral 
attitude problem, discussed in section 6.3:  in identifying and explaining why which sentiment, 
emotion, attitude is suitable for expression in moral judgments, the quasi-realist must avoid 
referring to moral properties in the explanation. 
I think insights from McDowell and Kirchin reveal a significant challenge to 
projectivism that Blackburn and Miller overlook. Law points out, on Blackburn’s analysis, it is 
because we make second-order moral judgments that we can judge an attitude as inferior or 
superior. But, Kirchin points out that the key challenge is to explain how we can begin to rank 
attitudes, how we can make second-order moral judgments. We cannot begin to make second-
order moral judgments until we make first-order moral judgments; we cannot have attitudes to 
the attitudes that are candidates for expression as moral judgments until we have attitudes that 
are candidates for expression as moral judgments. And, I take McDowell’s criticism along with 
the moral attitude problem to show that it is quite difficult to identify the attitude that is the 
moral attitude and to describe its nature without appealing to the moral feature it underlies, as a 
projectivist analysis must. The focus on the attitude suggests there needs to be both an 
explanation for how we come to form attitudes to attitudes and how we earn the right to these 
attitudes; part of the story is being left out when we start at premise 1 of Blackburn’s argument 
for constructing moral truth:  We make second-order moral attitudes, which are in fact 
expressions of attitudes to other attitudes. 
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What I have in mind is this. Suppose a projectivist can identify the attitude that is a 
candidate for expression in moral judgments and explain its nature without referring to the moral 
property. If moral disagreement is to be possible, then there should be a contrary attitude that is 
also a candidate for expression in moral judgment. And, these contrary attitudes should be 
flexible enough to feature in judgments that fall on either side of the line of finding an action to 
be moral or immoral; let’s call them a pro-attitude and anti-attitude, respectively. Now, consider 
two people, one with a pro-attitude toward action x, and the other with an anti-attitude toward 
action x. Once they are aware of each other’s attitudes, what comes next? Kirchin focuses on 
premise 1 in the argument for moral truth because he thinks it is easy to see that once we are 
engaged in comparing one attitude to another we are moralizing, and we can use moral 
judgments to rank the attitudes, and go on to develop a standard of moral truth from there. What 
Kirchin, Law, Miller, and Blackburn all appear to take for granted is the shift from awareness of 
another person’s attitude to critically appraising that attitude is an act of moralizing. 
It is not clear why once the two people are aware of each other’s conflicting attitudes they 
will automatically begin to critically appraise each other’s attitudes. It seems possible that the 
two people only notice the difference in their attitudes, and let the matter rest there. In the case of 
disgustingness, which is thought to be a property particularly appropriate for a projectivist 
analysis, there is no expectation for people whose attitudes diverge on the disgustingness of 
eating crickets, say, to rate each other’s tastes as inferior or superior. So, before the moral 
projectivist can launch the argument for moral truth, he must provide an explanation of why 
and/or how the shift from observing differences in attitudes to rating the different attitudes 
occurs when the attitudes are moral ones.  
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Miller is optimistic that psychology may be able to provide a naturalistic account of the 
attitude that is expressed in moral judgment without referring to the moral property, and maybe 
we should be optimistic that psychology will supply an account of why and how this happens for 
moral attitudes and not gustatory ones, but I am not optimistic. However, Blackburn’s argument 
for moral truth alone cannot establish moral truth; it needs to be supplemented with the 
explanation I call for. I suspect Miller and Blackburn will call for optimism that this explanatory 
demand can be satisfied, and insist that the justificatory task is the more important one, and the 
argument for moral truth completes it. This is premature; the projectivist has another 
justificatory task:  if the projectivist explanation of the putative moral features of reality is 
completed, and their subjective source is revealed, then Blackburn as a quasi-realist has to earn 
the right to the moral practice. Once the moral phenomenology which gives rise to our moral 
practice is revealed to be a projection, the quasi-realist has to earn the right to the practice – he 
has to justify pressing on with the practice rather than abandoning it. There is no use in 
constructing moral truth, if we have no right to the practice of which it is a part. In the 
conclusion to this paper, following this chapter, I will press this point. 
6.6 Chapter Conclusion 
I may be laboring the point, but if projectivism is supposed to be a rival metaphysics of 
moralizing to realism, then Blackburn’s theory faces several hurdles before it can be considered 
a genuine rival.  In addition to developing an outline of the mechanism (which I argued was less 
plausible the realist mechanism in chapter 4), Blackburn first needs to develop a motivation for 
proposing this alternative mechanism of moral awareness that is supported by naturalistic 
practices. But, supposing he can do this, the prospects for developing a full-blown projectivist 
rival to moral realism are still dim. Blackburn must be able to identify the attitudes that are the 
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moral attitudes expressed in moral judgments, and he needs to be able to specify their nature 
without reference to the putative moral feature of reality the judgment suggests. Next, he needs 
to be able to develop a moral projectivism that does not make morality mind-dependent. And, 
finally Blackburn needs a projectivist explanation and justification of the shift from observing 
different attitudes to ranking these attitudes. The arguments of this chapter have demonstrated 
that Blackburn has not yet succeeded in overcoming these hurdles.
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Conclusion 
C.1 Projectivism and Error Theory 
I have done my best to demonstrate that moral projectivism is not as simple a metaphysical rival 
to moral realism as one might suppose. Blackburn presupposes a mechanics of moral awareness 
without arguing on its behalf, and this mechanics is a prima facie less plausible account of moral 
awareness than moral realism given the realist character of popular moral practice. If you are 
attracted to a projectivist metaphysics of morality, as Blackburn is, it seems odd to want to 
preserve moral practice as it is by developing an exotic moral semantics meant to justify this 
moral practice. The question for a projectivist like Blackburn is this:  once you are certain that 
moral terms do not refer, and can use projection to explain how we came to employ them, why 
don’t you admit that we are simply mistaken about morality? Mackie embraced the mistake, and 
proposed the error theory, but Blackburn, a fellow projectivist, did not, and he owes an 
explanation of why, despite projectivism, we should not be error theorists.1 
 At the end of the last chapter, I claimed that part of the formidable challenge Blackburn 
faces in developing projectivism is to explain how we go from acknowledging differences in 
attitudes to comparing them (the shift to second-order attitudes, which marks his version of 
moralizing), but given the option of error theory, he must also explain that this is not a 
mistake.2 Joyce classified projectivism based on commitment to or rejection of certain theses: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mackie’s position and Ayer’s position about ethics may appear to be similar, but they are 
different. Both accept that there are no moral properties, but they draw different conclusions 
about moral practice from this. Mackie claims that when a person utters a moral judgment she 
intends to predicate a moral property of a subject, but because moral properties do not exist, the 
proposition she utters is false. Ayer claims that moral propositions are neither true nor false, they 
are meaningless, and when a person utters a moral judgment she is expressing her feelings. 
2 I do not think Mackie is right that moral terms do not refer nor that projection explains why we 
employ moral terms, but I think he is right to draw the conclusion that if those things are true, 
then people engaged in moral practice are engaged in a massive error. If I was an antirealist, I 
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1. We experience moral wrongness (e.g.) as an objective feature of the world. 
2. This experience has its origins in some non-perceptual faculty; in particular 
upon observing certain actions and characters (etc.) we have an affective attitude 
(e.g., the emotion of disapproval) that brings about the experience described in 1. 
3. In fact, moral wrongness does not exist in the world. 
4. When we utter sentences of the form “X is morally wrong” we are 
misdescribing the world; we are in error (Joyce-2009, 56).3 
 
In effect, Blackburn must stake out some room for quasi-realism by showing that it is possible 
to be a projectivist who endorses 1, 2, and 3, but denies 4. The challenge for Blackburn is to 
construct a bulwark against projectivism sliding into error theory that observes condition 
MPiii. of the criteria for projectivism, which I established in subsection 4.2.3: 
MPiii. moral experience is a projection that has its origins in a non-cognitive 
response to features of the world, i.e., is the culmination of a projective 
mechanism that begins with a non-cognitive response to features of the world; 
MPiiia. a moral experience is a projection if its explanation essentially 
appeals to non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
MPiiib. the explanation of a moral experience is opaque to the subject. 
 
Blackburn’s attempts to block error theory run afoul of MPiiia and MPiiib. 
C.2 Error Theory and Bad Faith 
What Blackburn must do is explain why a person who believes 1, 2, and 3 does not have to 
believe 4. “Errors and the Phenomenology of Value” is the article in which Blackburn most 
clearly presses his case against error theory, specifically Mackie’s version. The first move 
Blackburn makes against error theory is to accuse error theorists of inconsistency, or what 
Crispin Wright calls bad faith (Wright-1996, 2); Bart Streumer notes the similarity of 
Blackburn’s objection to Wright’s bad faith objection (Streumer, 208). And, Miller, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
don’t think I could or would try to preserve moral practice, as it is now constituted; and, as hard 
as moral antirealists have tried to do this, in my opinion, they have not been successful. 
3 Joyce’s catalog of projectivisms include:  minimal projection, the endorsement of 1 and 2; 
metaphysical projectivism, the endorsement of 1, 2, and 3; nihilistic projectivism is the 
endorsement of 1, 2, 3, and 4; non-cognitivist projectivism, the endorsement of 1, 2, and 3, the 
denial of 4, and supplement of expressivism (Joyce-2009, 57-58) 
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responding to Wright’s criticism of error theory, describes the charge of bad faith as an indirect 
challenge to error theory, which seeks to expose an internal tension for it (Miller, 118). 
 Blackburn summarizes Mackie as claiming that ordinary moral judgments involve an 
assumption that there are objective values, despite there being no such values; he then chastises 
Mackie for not acting appropriately in light of these beliefs:  since Mackie believed our moral 
vocabulary was in error, he should have replaced it or used it differently, but Mackie does not 
propose an alternative for our moral vocabulary, and instead he proceeds to use our erroneous 
moral vocabulary (Blackburn-1985a, 150-151). Blackburn thinks Mackie is up to something 
“fishy” when he moralizes despite his error theory (Blackburn-1985a, 152). The bad faith 
charge aims to expose the following tension in an error theorist:  if an error theorist genuinely 
believed that moral judgments are descriptive and that there are no real properties, then he would 
give up making moral judgments, but he does not give it up, so he must not really believe either 
that moral judgments are descriptive or that there are no real properties. Non-cognitivists like 
Blackburn dissolve the tension in moral practice by claiming that our moral judgments are not 
descriptive, but express attitudes. 
 The obvious response is that people behave in all sorts of ways that are incompatible with 
their beliefs. A person, who believes the snow will make his commute longer, should leave 
earlier for work, but for any number of reasons, he will not. An error theorist’s failure to 
abandon making moral judgments does not constitute evidence that there is something wrong 
with error theory. But suppose that it did, which of the claims doesn’t an error theorist really 
believe? The moral realist will be happy to suggest that the error-theorist does not really believe 
there are no moral properties, and Blackburn will suggest that the error theorist does not believe 
moral judgments are descriptive; if they agree that the error theorist’s failure to quit making 
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moral judgments is best explained by a failure to believe one of the theory’s commitments, 
neither seems to be in a position to argue for their position on the basis of this slender 
“evidence.” 
The bad faith objection does reveal the need for an explanation of why the error theorist 
does not change his behavior to conform to his beliefs. Again, Blackburn’s diagnosis is that they 
do not really believe that moral judgments are descriptive. But the projectivist-error theorist, 
e.g., Mackie, has a more plausible explanation:  there is a psychological impediment to changing 
the behavior. The phenomenology of moral experience is one of objectivity, and projectivism 
explains that experience as a psychological trick arising from an affective attitude (compare this 
to Hume’s account of the experience of causation).4 So Mackie would counter Blackburn by 
arguing that even when we are aware of how moral experience arises, we are misled by its 
phenomenology into acting like it is real and continuing to make moral judgments. And this 
explanation also has the advantage of explaining why our moral judgments are descriptive – they 
express a belief that a projection causes us to have. In contrast, Blackburn can explain moral 
experience via projection, but he must also supply another explanation – an explanation of why 
those projections cause us to express attitudes as moral judgments. The bad faith line of 
argument does not establish that error theory is wrong, and if it did, I think it is more likely to 
undermine the belief that there are no moral properties. 
 Jonas Olson argues that the so-called “freshman objection to expressivism” – “[t]hat if 
expressivism were true anything would be morally permissible” – at its core poses a problem for 
expressivists (Olson, 89). Even sophisticated philosophers pressing the case for expressivism 
admit the theory leaves an unsatisfying impression. Olson cites Bertrand Russell: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Sixty years ago Maurice Mandelbaum wrote an analysis of the characteristics of different kinds 
of moral judgments, which he titled The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (1955). 
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In opposing the proposal, I should feel, not only that I was expressing my desires, 
but that my desires in the matter are right, whatever that may mean. As a matter 
of argument, I can, I think, show that I am not guilty of any inconsistency in 
holding to the [expressivist account] of ethics and at the same time expressing 
strong ethical preferences. But in so feeling I am not satisfied (Olson, 90)5 
 
And, he also quotes Blackburn admitting that “[t]here is still that nagging feeling that on this 
[expressivist] metaphysic ‘there are no obligations, and so on, really (otherwise, why call the 
position antirealist?)” (Olson, 90-91).6 Blackburn misdiagnoses the source of the unease, and 
Olson follows him; it is not the metaphysics of projectivism that create a problem for moral 
phenomenology, it is connecting it to a non-descriptivist – expressivist or quasi-realist – 
semantics for moral judgments. It is surprising that Olson makes this mistake since he quotes 
Mackie pointing out that “[non-cognitivist] analyses ‘leave out the apparent authority of ethics” 
(Olson, 91).7 
 Blackburn must argue against Mackie’s error theory to demonstrate that a person should 
be a projectivist-quasi-realist, not a projectivist-error theorist. In pressing the bad faith 
objection to error theory, Blackburn charges that error theorists don’t really believe the two 
key tenets of error theory. However, by pressing error theorists, who come to the view via 
projectivism, to abandon descriptivism Blackburn pushes them into a position that falsifies the 
phenomenology of morality, which in turn undermines the projectivist explanation of morality. 
If the phenomenology is realist, it is difficult to see why a person would develop an antirealist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The quotation is from Russell’s “Reply to my Critics” in The Library of Living Philosophers’ 
anthology The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell edited by P. A. Schilpp. 
6 The quotation is from Blackburn-1985, 157. Earlier in the same article, Blackburn writes that 
while he believes the combination of projectivism and quasi-realism (read expressivism) 
supports and explains our moral practice, it still leaves people unsettled; they doubt that this is 
the true account of our inclination to adhere to moral codes. He compares nineteenth century 
philosophers to projectivists; the former found it hard to do ethics without God, while the latter 
find it hard to do ethics without objective moral properties. “It is the objective feel or 
phenomenology that people feel threatened by projectivism” (Blackburn-1985, 153). 
7 The quotation is from Mackie, 33. 
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semantics for expressing the experience. But this exposes a tension for Blackburn since he wants 
to be a projectivist, and yet that appears incompatible with his quasi-realism. Perversely, 
Blackburn’s bad faith argument would push the projectivist-error theorist into choosing 
between the phenomenology and antirealism, with, I think, the projectivist-error theorist 
giving up antirealism, while at the same time invalidating the projectivist metaphysics which is 
to replace a realist metaphysics for morality. 
C.3 Error Theory and Revisionism 
 A second charge Blackburn makes is that an error theorist should revise his moral 
practice, but since Mackie did not, this casts doubt on error theory (Blackburn-1985a, 150). 
Blackburn claims, in effect, if you believe error theory, you should not make moral judgments, 
but it is not obvious why this is so. Blackburn would have to justify this by claiming that you 
should never act in ways that are inconsistent with your beliefs. It is usually good to act in ways 
that are consistent with your beliefs, e.g., you arrive at the station before 9:00 pm because you 
believe the train departs then. But, then there are instances when acting in ways incompatible 
with your beliefs are appropriate:  believing the experimental cancer therapy will not work, but 
still taking it; believing marriage frequently results in divorce, but marrying; believing a 
publisher will not accept a manuscript, but sending it anyway. Error theorists might suggest 
that continuing to make moral judgments is worthwhile despite not believing them true.8 
 Suppose Blackburn is right that the error theorist must revise moral practice, and 
imagine, as Blackburn does, that Mackie has revised his practice to conform to error theory, 
and is not engaged in moral practice, but rather he is  “schmoralizing” (Blackburn-1985a, 150). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This is just the case that moral fictionalists like Joyce (Joyce-2005) and Nolan, Restall, and 
West make (Nolan, Restall, West-2005). This answer will not do for Blackburn since he is on 
record as denying that all his quasi-realism achieves is to permit us to “talk as if kicking dogs is 
wrong, when ‘really’ it isn’t wrong. I say that it is wrong…” (Blacknurn-1998, 319). 
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Mackie’s schmoralizing reflects the practice of making schmoral judgments, which resemble 
moral judgments in the deployment of identically shaped and sounding terms. To paraphrase 
Streumer’s interpretation of the revision suggestion, Mackie has stopped using normative 
predicates to ascribe normative properties, and started using these predicates to express 
something different. Blackburn argues that since in such a situation it would be impossible to tell 
whether Mackie is schmoralizing or moralizing, there is no distinction between the two 
activities, and they are in fact the same practice; what Mackie would be doing is moralizing with 
a different theory (Blackburn-1985a, 150). If this is so, then the practice of moralizing, and its 
realist shape, cannot provide evidence for error theory in the form of supporting the belief that 
moral judgments express beliefs. Blackburn proposes that his quasi-realism supports the same 
practice of moralizing, so it is just as likely that moral judgments express attitudes. 
 The first response to this criticism is that it is only as good as quasi-realism; if quasi-
realism does not support the practice of moralizing then it is not an alternative to error theory 
for projectivists. Chapter three of this work provided reason to think that quasi-realism is not 
sufficient for supporting moral practice. Error theory is the only viable option for a projectivist 
since quasi-realism cannot support the thesis that moral judgments express attitudes. The second 
response is that it is not altogether obvious that two groups of people who use terms and engage 
in activities that are identical in shape, sound, or form but have different meaning or significance 
are engaged in the same practice. I have in mind the practices of neo-pagan reconstructionists 
who replicate ancient pagan practices. In light of contemporary scientific knowledge, I cannot 
imagine that the terms and activities have the same meaning for modern practitioners of 
paganism as for ancient ones, and so their practices while identical in shape, sound, and form 
	   282	  
must be significantly distinct. But, if this is correct, then it is possible that schmoralizing is not 
moralizing, and whatever quasi-realists do is not moralizing either. 
C.4 Error Theory and Eliminativism 
The bad faith argument does not undermine the plausibility that there are or can be genuine 
error theorists, and the revision argument does not demonstrate either that any practice identical 
in shape or form is moralizing or that there is a plausible alternative to believing that moral 
judgments express belief, given the failure of quasi-realism. But, as I discussed in chapter 6, the 
position that given projectivism moral practice needs to be revised, in the form of schmoralizing 
or quasi-realism, must be motivated, when there is the alternative of abandoning moral talk 
altogether. 
 Usually when we come to the conclusion that the putative entities or forces of a domain 
of discourse do not exist, the typically response is to stop using them. For example, people who 
deny there is any causal interaction between astronomical phenomena and human behavior 
abandon astrological talk, and when experiments revealed that some objects gained mass when 
burned, the phlogiston theory of combustion was abandoned. So, a challenge for any moral 
antirealist is to explain why if none of the entities of the moral domain of discourse exist, we 
shouldn’t do away with making moral judgments; the view that advocates such a policy is 
eliminativism. 
Blackburn may argue that the domains of discourse that are explained by projectivism 
are different than those that reflect attempts to explain the natural world by postulating 
independent forces or objects. These unique domains of discourse are different because internal 
mental activities explain them, and there is nothing inappropriate about preserving these 
domains. However, there are some domains of discourse like religion and psychological 
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projection, which many people think projectivism plausibly explains, and yet they still advocate 
eliminativism about religious talk or counsel a patient to stop talking about other people being 
disappointed in him when he is projecting his own disappointment. Blackburn ought to explain 
why morality is different than religion or psychological projection; he might compare morality to 
aesthetics to do so. 
Aesthetics is another domain of discourse that projectivism may plausibly explain, but 
there is little call for eliminativism about aesthetic discourse. Projectivists about aesthetics 
could, in theory, continue aesthetic discourse in good conscience as long as it is accompanied by 
a revision to the language; in turn, Blackburn could insist that the moral and aesthetic are 
analogous in this way, and it is appropriate to revise moral practice along his quasi-realist line.  
This comparison will fail because there are two important dissimilarities between 
aesthetics and morality. First, aesthetics – as it plays out in our lives – seems to be much more 
tolerant about divergent aesthetic judgments than morality, realist or quasi-realist, can hope to 
be. People engaged in aesthetic discourse do not face the same pressure to resolve disagreements 
in aesthetic judgment; fans of Dizzy Gillespie’s trumpet playing and fans of Miles Davis’ 
playing can dissent over who is superior, but their arguments over Gillespie’s and Davis’ merits 
are more good natured than moral arguments. The second way in which aesthetics and morality 
are not similar is that the projectivist and quasi-realist combination threaten to undermine the 
phenomenology of morality, but not aesthetics. As I argued in section C.1, the projectivist-
quasi-realist combination yields unease that there is nothing to ethics, but it is hard to imagine 
the same unease in aesthetics; we are more ready to accept that beauty is in the eye of the 
beholder than morality is. Blackburn still faces the challenge of explaining why eliminativism 
about morality is not the best solution for a projectivist. 
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C.5 Neither Revisionism nor Eliminativism 
Mackie’s error theory competes with Blackburn’s quasi-realism as a supplement to 
projectivism; it is possible to be a projectivist and error theorist or a projectivist and quasi-
realist, and Blackburn wants to argue we should be the latter, not the former. Blackburn seems 
to think that an error theorist should ask herself, “If moral judgments are systematically false 
because there are no moral properties corresponding to moral predicates, what should I do about 
moral talk?” The error theorist appears nonplussed by this question, she is pragmatic about 
moral talk:  it is useful, so I will go on using it fictionally. Blackburn’s arguments against error 
theory suggest that he thinks this response is intellectually dishonest or embarrassing; this 
response saves moral practice without justification. On the other hand, Blackburn saves moral 
practice by revising it with his quasi-realist project, which he thinks earns the right to continue 
using the same shapes, sounds, forms of moral practice.  
Explaining why we should not be eliminativists, if we are projectivists, would justify 
the revisionist quasi-realist project (there are justificatory challenges within the quasi-realist 
project itself, which I discussed in sections 6.5 and 6.6, i.e., how to make morality mind-
independent and how to construct moral truth), but Blackburn has not yet faced up to the 
challenge of eliminativism. The challenge reflects an assumption that prima facie analyses of 
moral judgments should be truth-conditional and following from a projectivist account of their 
origin some philosophers diagnose those who make moral judgments with error because the 
predicates in their judgment have no referents. But, the bad faith, revisionism, and eliminativism 
objections reflect a further diagnosis of compounded error – the continued deployment of moral 
judgments. Blackburn might consider rejecting the prima facie privileging of truth-conditional 
analyses of moral judgments.  
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So, Blackburn might contend that the actual and most plausible and natural analysis of 
moral judgments is the quasi-realist one; this inverts the typical conception of an antirealist 
project:  an analysis of moral judgments that is not truth-conditional is the impetus for an 
antirealist metaphysics which uses projectivism to explain moral awareness. (This order of 
theoretical development rejects the contrast I drew between realists and antirealists; the former 
are trying to match the metaphysics to their moral practice, while the latter are trying to match 
the moral practice to their metaphysics.) This approach would reject both revisionism and 
eliminativism as responses to projectivism because there is no error to correct in the first place:  
we know we are not expressing beliefs when we make moral judgments.9 There is scant evidence 
that Blackburn has this view, but I find some textual support for this in Ruling Passions when 
Blackburn describing projectivism writes, “[T]he moral proposition is created or invented or 
emerges naturally as the focus for our practical transactions,” and that “[w]e crossed Frege’s 
abyss by creating the ethical proposition” (Blackburn-1998, 70, 73).10 Both, quotations suggest 
we intentionally developed or invented moral judgments, and Blackburn could plausibly 
maintain that we did so to express attitudes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Another way of putting this is to suggest that for Blackburn, quasi-realism motivates 
projectivism – if moral judgments should be interpreted as quasi-realism requires, then 
projectivism is needed to explain that mental states that underlie moral judgments; but for the 
error theorist the situation is reversed:  coming to understand that moral mental states are 
projections motivates an error theoretic account of moral judgments. If so, then the case for 
Blackburn’s projectivism is only as good as the prospects for completing the quasi-realist 
project, which I have argued are not good.  
10 Earlier textual evidence to support this interpretation can be found in Spreading the Word: 
“[An expressivist language] would invent a predicate answering to the attitude, and treat 
commitments as if they were judgments, and then use all the natural devices for debating truth. If 
this is right, our use of indirect contexts does not prove that an expressive theory of morality is 
wrong; it merely proves us to have adopted a form of expression adequate to our needs” 
(Blackburn-1984, 195).    
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I suspect Blackburn was tantalized by the prospect that it is transparent to us that a moral 
judgment expresses an attitude. Blackburn did not pursue this argument in any depth, but it 
would have generated more challenges to do so.11 One problem he would have to address is if 
this process is transparent, why are there people, like me, who believe their moral judgments do 
express beliefs. A second issue he would face is whether it is possible to intend to express beliefs 
when uttering moral judgments. However, there is a larger problem for Blackburn; this approach 
is not compatible with projectivism. If the possibility of privileging a quasi-realist (or any 
expressivist) analysis of moral judgment were dependent on the origin of moral judgments being 
transparently non-cognitive, then Blackburn would have to give up projectivism to gain the 
privilege for quasi-realism. Recall, a metaphysics of morality that is projectivist must have 
these characteristics: 
MPi. moral experience has a realist phenomenology; 
MPii. there are no features of the world that correspond to moral experience; 
MPiii. moral experience is a projection that has its origins in a non-cognitive state 
that is a response to features of the world, i.e., is the culmination of a projective 
mechanism that begins with a non-cognitive response to features of the world; 
MPiiia. a moral experience is a projection if its explanation essentially 
appeals to non-inferential psychological facts about its subject;  
MPiiib. the explanation of a moral experience is opaque to the subject. 
MPiv. It is possible to characterize the non-cognitive state in terms other than the 
moral property whose experience it explains. 
 
While it is not obvious that it is impossible to reconcile the transparency of our moral judgments 
originating in subjective attitudes with the objective phenomenology of morality, I cannot begin 
to imagine how it would be done; if Blackburn tries to reject error theory on these grounds, he 
risks falsifying the phenomenology. But, it does seem impossible for Blackburn to avoid error 
theory by arguing that we are and have been aware that our moral judgments start out as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Blackburn says that a person engaged in moral practice can know the “genesis” of this activity 
in “Morals and Modals” (Blackburn-1987, 72).	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attitudes and respect condition MPiiib; if we know our moral judgments are projections, then it 
seems the experience is not opaque, and a projectivist analysis of moral awareness is incorrect. 
Blackburn would have to develop a new, different metaphysics of morality. 
C.6 Conclusion and Future Considerations 
At the outset of this essay I urged that because meta-ethical positions should be assessed as a 
package of metaphysical and semantic theories, we should only accept one meta-ethical position 
over another if we can accept both elements of the package. Some would suspect that the 
realism-antirealism debate in meta-ethics is at a stalemate since, traditionally, the semantic 
element in the realist package is thought to be more plausible than in the antirealist package, 
and the metaphysical element in the antirealist package is thought to be more plausible than in 
the realist package. In the early chapters of this work I outlined how the open-question argument 
spurred a generation of moral philosopher to research antirealist moral semantics by casting 
doubt on the possibility of a realist moral metaphysics; but I also pointed how arguments from 
Edwards, Baumrin, and Kripke and Putnam challenged the open-question argument, renewing 
the prospects of a realist moral metaphysics for the following generation.  The supposed 
stalemate consists of antirealists trying to develop a semantics while realists try to develop a 
metaphysics, leaving us with no reason to choose one over the other. 
The upshot of this essay is that with respect to one possible antirealist position, 
Blackburn’s projectivism and quasi-realism combination, there is no stalemate – moral 
realism is more plausible. It is generally granted that the realist package has an attractive and 
acceptable semantics for morality, and in chapter 3 I demonstrated that quasi-realism is still not 
a satisfying alternative the realist account. If Blackburn wants, at least, to preserve the status quo 
of meta-ethical stalemate, he must be able to point to some metaphysical advantage for 
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antirealism. I have argued that the advantage cannot merely be denying moral properties and 
supporting antirealism with appeals to ontological parsimony; antirealists must describe the 
mechanism by which we come to moral awareness. I think Blackburn recognizes this need and 
proposes moral projectivism as the metaphysics of his meta-ethics. 
Blackburn does not develop an account of this metaphysics; instead he invokes 
comparisons to Hume’s moral and causal metaphysics to gesture at a picture of moral 
projectivism. In chapter 4 I tried to construct an account of what Blackburn’s moral 
projectivism would probably look like by drawing on Hume’s account of causation and general 
accounts of the elements of a projectivist account for a domain of human experience. To 
conclude that chapter I argued that projectivism is metaphysically suspect itself before going on 
to argue in chapter 5 that projectivism does not have any metaphysical advantage over realism 
in explaining how the moral supervenes on the natural. Subsequently, in chapter 6, I suggested 
that even if the projectivist account of moral awareness in chapter 4 is correct, it is incompatible 
with features of moral practice Blackburn wants to preserve. And, finally, in this conclusion, I 
argued that Blackburn cannot reject error-theory without undermining his projectivism. 
The net effect is that Blackburn is unable to provide a consistent metaphysical element 
for his meta-ethical package. And, when this is paired with a semantic element that suffers in 
comparison to the semantic element in the realist package, there is no stalemate – realism is a 
more plausible meta-ethical position than Blackburn’s. 
This essay does not raise the following question, which I hope to address in the future:  if 
projectivism is the correct metaphysics in the domains of morality, modality, and aesthetics, as 
Blackburn suggests in “Morals and Modals,” how many other domains should we bring under 
the umbrella of a projectivist metaphysics? I worry – and Blackburn acknowledges this 
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problematic – that he will not be able to draw a line between the domains for which projectivist 
metaphysics is correct and those for which it is incorrect, reducing us to idealism (Blackburn-
1984, 212). Blackburn believes that idealism is untenable because if we do not know the actual 
features of the world on which reactions depend, we do not have an explanation for the 
projections. I cannot see where Blackburn makes the case for which features of reality are not 
projections, and why they are not, so a future project is to try to marshal the case for which 
feature of reality are not projections from the resources Blackburn supplies, and examine if it is 
plausible. Another project that this dissertation suggests, then, is an exploration of whether 
empirical data supports a projectivist metaphysics or what kinds of empirical studies would be 
needed to test the hypothesis; to pursue this project would require drawing on the experimental 
methods developed in cognitive science and experimental philosophy. 
Ultimately, I hope to have demonstrated that moral realists have a new line of attack 
against non-cognitivist antirealists, pressing them to explain the metaphysics that are paired 
with their semantic theories, and then scrutinizing them. This raises the prospect of future 
projects in metaethics:  developing the metaphysics of other antirealist meta-ethics and 
critiquing them.
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Glossary of Terms 
 (as used in this essay) 
 
Antirealism:  a philosophical view which is typically defined in opposition to realism; this view 
denies that the objects of human experience and their qualities exist independent of humans 
thinking about them. (See realism.)  
Cognitivism:  the view that the mental states expressed by moral judgments are beliefs. 
Conative state:  a mental state characterized by being directed toward action, e.g., desires, 
volitions, wishes. 
Constructivism:  the view that within moral practice humans do not recognize mind 
independent moral facts; instead moral practice is a constructed system of principles or rules 
regulating human interactions. 
Descriptivism:  the view that the meaning of sentences can be explained in terms of what they 
are about; when applied to moral practice, it is the view that the meaning of moral judgments can 
be explained in terms of being about moral properties. This view is typically contrasted with 
expressivism. 
Eliminativism:  the view that if the elements of a domain do not exist, then reference to them 
should be purged from our discussion of the domain. 
Emotivism:  the view that a moral judgment expresses a mental state identified as a feeling or 
emotion rather than a proposition. 
Error theory:  the view that all of the propositions about a domain of inquiry are false because 
none of the purported elements within the domain exist. 
Expressivism:  the view that the meaning of moral judgments cannot be explained without 
reference to their function apart from any descriptive content that is part of their meaning; the 
function of moral language can be to express emotions, attitudes, commands, etc. 
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Immaterialism:  the view that denies materialism. 
Intuitionism:  (a) the metaethical view that knowledge that certain moral propositions are true or 
false, in the realist sense, is constituted by direct intuition, and not by inference contra; (b) this 
views should not be conflated with the Kantian idea that intuition is the faculty of the 
understanding by which a representation of an object acquired by the senses is converted to an 
appearance which is the object of experience for the subject. 
Logical positivism:  a philosophical movement characterized especially by its commitment to 
verificationism, the view that a statement can only be cognitively meaningful if it is analytic or 
empirically verifiable. 
Materialism:  the view that everything that exists is composed of matter. 
Metaphysical moral realism:  the view that the goodness, immorality, kindness, deceitfulness, 
evilness, etc. of people, act, circumstances can be explained in terms of supernatural properties, 
e.g., God’s will; moral judgments, thus, may be true or false whether or not they accurately 
describe such people, acts, or circumstances. 
Moral antirealism:  the view that human beings’ experience of people, acts, circumstances as 
good, immoral kind, deceitful, evil, etc. are not the product of features of the world that are 
themselves good, immoral, kind, deceitful, evil, etc. independent of human beings thinking them 
so. The various versions of moral antirealism offer different accounts of these experiences. 
Moralize:  to engage in an activity constitutive of the practice of morality. 
Moral projectivism:  the view that the moral properties which people engaged in moral practice 
reference do not exist independently of human beings, and that instead they are the product of 
non-cognitive reactions to natural properties. 
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Moral realism:  the view that there are people, acts, circumstances that are good, immoral, kind, 
deceitful, evil, etc., and they would be so if human beings did not think them so; moral 
judgments, thus, may be true or false whether or not they accurately describe such people, acts, 
or circumstances. 
Moral relativism:  the view that the moral status of a person or action is determined by a culture 
or society’s attitude toward it. 
Moral skepticism:  the view that objective values do not exist. 
Motivational internalism:  the view that moral commitments are intrinsically motivating. 
Naturalistic moral realism: the view that the goodness, immorality, kindness, deceitfulness, 
evilness, etc. of people, act, circumstances can be explained in terms of natural properties, 
identified by the natural sciences or psychology, which are causal or detectable by the senses; 
moral judgments, thus, may be true or false whether or not they accurately describe such people, 
acts, or circumstances. 
Non-cognitivism:  the view that the mental states expressed by moral judgments are not beliefs. 
Non-naturalistic moral realism:  the view that the goodness, immorality, kindness, 
deceitfulness, evilness, etc. of people, acts, circumstances cannot be explained in an non-moral 
terms even though such people, acts, circumstances do have sui generis moral properties 
independent of human beings thinks they do; moral judgments, thus, may be true or false 
whether or not they accurately describe such people, acts, or circumstances. 
Prescriptivism:  the view that the meanings of moral judgments are their function to issue 
commands that are universally applicable to all people in similar circumstances. 
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Projectivism:  the view that the putative features of a domain do not exist independently of 
human beings experiencing those features, and that instead they are the products of internal 
mental processes that produce an experience that the features exist independently of human 
beings. 
Quasi-realism:  Simon Blackburn’s project of earning the right to deploy moral judgments in all 
the ways supported by descriptivism and realism even though the meaning of moral judgments is 
explained by referring to their function to express non-cognitive mental states. 
Realism:  the view that the features of human experience are the products of objects and 
circumstances which cause and resemble them, and these objects and circumstance exist 
independent of human beings thinking of them; sentences are true or false whether or not they 
accurately describe such objects or circumstances. Realism can be augmented to reflect a view 
about a specific domain of human experience; see moral realism. 
Relativism:  the view that the sentences of a domain express the same proposition in different 
contexts, but their truth value can legitimately vary across contexts. Within moral practice moral 
relativism is the view that a moral judgment’s truth value may not be identical in all contexts. 
Skepticism: view that there is not sufficient evidence to support a claim of knowledge in some 
domain of inquiry; local skepticism limits the claim to a specific domain of inquiry, while global 
skepticism extends the claim to all domains of inquiry. 
Subjective Idealism:  the view that the only things that exist are minds, and objective reality is 
dependent on the existence of these minds to perceive it to exist. 
Subjectivism: the view that the meaning of moral judgments is explained by identifying their 
function with describing the speaker’s feelings or attitudes. 
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Supervenience:  the relation by which one level of properties is connected to another level of 
properties in which the second level of properties determines the first level, but the first level is 
not reducible to the second level of properties; the rough idea is that if one level of properties A, 
supervene on another level of properties B, then for any two things that are identical at the level 
of B properties, they are also identical at the level of A properties. In moral philosophy, Hare 
introduced the term to characterize the relation between moral properties and psychological 
and/or natural properties. However, as early as 1922, Moore had introduced the notion of 
supervenience, but not the term, “supervenience,” to moral philosophy in “The Conception of 
Intrinsic Value.” 
Theism:  understood broadly, the view that at least one divine being exists. 
Truth-conditional semantics:  the view that the meaning of a sentence is established by the 
conditions under which it would be true.
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